Toshboltaev

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NURIDDIN TOSHBOLTAEV, CASE NO. 4:25-CV-02253-JRK

Petitioner, JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP, II

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DARRELL A. CLAY

ICE, et al., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Respondents.

On October 21, 2025, Petitioner Nuriddin Toshboltaev filed a petition under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 for a writ of habeas corpus. (ECF #1). He asserts his continued detention in Immigration

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody pending removal is unlawful and requests his release or

removal from the United States. (Id. at PageID 6-7). On November 5, 2025, this case was referred

to me under Local Civil Rule 72.2 for preparation of a Report and Recommendation. (Non-

document entry dated Nov. 5, 2025). On November 6, 2025, I directed Respondents to show

cause why the writ should not be granted. (ECF #3).

On November 19, 2025, Respondents filed a Return of Writ and moved to dismiss the

petition. (ECF #5). Although given five days from receipt of the writ to respond (ECF #3), Mr.

Toshboltaev has not done so, nor has he requested further time, so this matter is now decisional.

As detailed below, I recommend the District Court GRANT the motion and DISMISS the

petition WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Mr. Toshboltaev’s ability to re-apply for relief if

circumstances change.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Toshboltaev is a native of Uzbekistan and a citizen of Russia. (ECF #5-1 at PageID 41).

He entered the United States on June 22, 2023 in California and applied for admission. (ECF #1

at PageID 6; ECF #5-2 at PageID 44). That day, Mr. Toshboltaev was issued a notice to appear that

alleged he was removable as an immigrant not in possession of a required valid entry document.

(ECF #5-2 at PageID 44). Mr. Toshboltaev was paroled into the United States pending removal

proceedings. (ECF #5-1 at PageID 41).

On March 5, 2024, ICE detained Mr. Toshboltaev pending resolution of his removal

proceedings. (Id.). On August 28, 2024, ICE ordered Mr. Toshboltaev removed to either Russia or

Uzbekistan. (ECF #5-5 at PageID 54-55). The order became administratively final on November

15, 2024, when the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Mr. Toshboltaev’s appeal.

(ECF #5-7 at PageID 61).

ICE requested travel documents from Russia either in October 2024, in November 2024,

or on January 31, 2025. (See ECF #5-1 at PageID 42; ECF #1 at PageID 6; ECF #1-4 at PageID 18).

On July 22, 2025, the Russian consulate notified ICE it was waiting for confirmation from the

Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs to issue the travel document. (Id.). In July and August 2025, a

third party sent letters to the Russian embassy on Mr. Toshboltaev’s behalf requesting a response

to ICE’s request. (ECF #1-1 and 1-2). On October 16, 2025, the Russian consulate informed ICE

that the Russian government had not yet authorized issuing the travel documents to Mr.

Toshboltaev. (ECF #5-1 at PageID 42). On November 13, 2025, ICE sent Mr. Toshboltaev an

application for an Uzbekistan travel document. (Id.). As of November 19, 2025, ICE expected a

travel document would issue. (Id. at PageID 43). ICE possesses Mr. Toshboltaev’s Russian passport,

which is valid until September 22, 2026. (ECF #5-8 at PageID 62).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Mr. Toshboltaev argues he has been subject to “continued, unjustified, and harmful

detention.” (ECF #1 at PageID 6-7). He requests release from ICE custody under supervision,

including with electronic monitoring, periodic check-ins, and restrictions on his travel. (Id. at

PageID 7). Respondents argue Mr. Toshboltaev is lawfully detained because he is subject to a final

order of removal and his detention has been extended beyond 90 days because he is inadmissible

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. (ECF #4 at PageID 21).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the district court may review the constitutionality and statutory

basis of executive detention. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir. 2003). Habeas

actions under § 2241 “remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to

post-removal-period detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001). Under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(1)(A), “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien

from the United States within a period of 90 days.” This 90-day period is often called the “removal

period.” “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(2)(A). Respondents concede Mr. Toshboltaev has been detained for “approximately one

year after his removal became final on November 15, 2024.” (ECF #5 at PageID 34). But

Respondents argue Mr. Toshboltaev’s detention has been extended because he is “an inadmissible

alien under [8 U.S.C.] § 1182 [and] was subject to discretionary detention beyond the 90-day

removal period” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). (Id. at PageID 33-34).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), “[a]n alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under

[8 U.S.C. § 1182] . . . may be detained beyond the removal period.” Further, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i) states:

[A]ny immigrant at the time of application for admission who is not in possession of

a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card,

or other valid entry document required by this chapter, and a valid unexpired

passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and

nationality . . . is inadmissible.

The Immigration Judge found Mr. Toshboltaev was removable under this provision. (ECF #5-5 at

PageID 52). Because Mr. Toshboltaev is inadmissible under § 1182, his detention may be extended

beyond 90 days under § 1231(a)(6).

While § 1231(a)(6) does not state how long the government may extend detention beyond

the 90-day removal period, the Supreme Court has held the government cannot detain a person

“indefinitely” under that section. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. The Supreme Court “read an

implicit limitation into the statute . . . in light of the Constitution’s demands” that “limits an

alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s

removal from the United States.” Id. at 689. Detention of an alien subject to a final order of

removal for up to six months is presumptively reasonable given the time needed to accomplish the

removal. Id. at 701. “After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that

there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government

must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.

Mr. Toshboltaev has been in ICE custody since March 5, 2024. (ECF #5-1 at PageID 41).

His order of removal became administratively final on November 15, 2024, after the BIA

dismissed his appeal. (ECF #5-7 at PageID 61). Mr. Toshboltaev has thus been in extended

detention longer than the 6-month period presumed reasonable by Zadvydas. Thus, the issue is

whether Mr. Toshboltaev has provided “good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” to Russia or Uzbekistan and, if so,

whether Respondents offer “evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” See id.

Mr. Toshboltaev alleges ICE submitted his travel document application in November 2024

and he has received no response. (ECF #1 at PageID 6). He sent follow-up letters to the Russian

embassy in August 2025 and still has received no response from the embassy. (Id. at PageID 7; see

also ECF #1-1 and 1-2). He asserts Russia is uncooperative and not accepting returning nationals.

(ECF #1 at PageID 7). He has attached multiple communications he had with ICE in August and

September 2025 where the agency has reported it sent a request for a travel document to Russia

but did not receive it or a denial. (See ECF #1-4). In one such communication, ICE referred Mr.

Toshboltaev to the Russian embassy for information on processing times. (Id. at PageID 18).

The record is unclear when precisely ICE requested travel documents from Russia. At least

three dates—October 2024, November 2024, and January 31, 2025—are listed in the record. (See

ECF #5-1 at PageID 42; ECF #1 at PageID 6; ECF #1-4 at PageID 18). ICE reports that Russian

authorities indicated they are waiting for approval from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs

before the travel documents can be issued. (ECF #5-1 at PageID 42). As of October 16, 2025, this

approval has not been given. (Id.). But whether there has been no response for 12, 14, or 15

months, “mere delay by the foreign government in issuing travel documents, despite reasonable

efforts by United States authorities to secure them,” does not meet the “good reason” standard of

Zadvydas. See Manjulaben v. ICE, No. 4:25-cv-2252, 2025 WL 2977713, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,

2025) (collecting cases). Although Mr. Toshboltaev asserts Russia is not cooperating and is not

accepting returned nationals, ICE has attempted to secure a travel document from Russia, received

updates from the Russian government, and Russia has not yet denied his travel document. Despite

ICE’s lack of success in obtaining a Russian travel document, this is not a case where the

government has made no effort to effect removal. See Izbitski v. Carnes, No. 1:25-cv-778, 2025 WL

3754485, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 2025) (citing cases where little-to-no effort was made to effect

removal suggested good reason that removal was not significantly likely).

Moreover, removal to Russia is not the only option given Mr. Toshboltaev’s alternative

order of removal to Uzbekistan. (ECF #5-5 at PageID 54-55). ICE only recently sent Mr.

Toshboltaev the paperwork to request an Uzbek travel document. If Mr. Toshboltaev completes

the travel application, the Uzbek government can consider it and either grant or deny it. Thus,

even presuming Russia is unwilling to accept Mr. Toshboltaev, there is a significant likelihood that

he could be removed to Uzbekistan in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Surovtsev v. Noem,

No. 1:25-cv-160, 2025 WL 3264479, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2025) (finding significant likelihood

of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future for noncitizen born in the former Soviet Union

who was denied a Russian travel document but recently applied for a Ukrainian travel document).

At this time, there is no evidence that Uzbekistan would not cooperate once presented with the

request for travel authorization or that Mr. Toshboltaev could not receive an Uzbek travel

document. See Vaskanyan v. Janecka, No. 5:25-cv-1475, 2025 WL 2014208, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June

25, 2025) (granting relief under Zadvydas where, after denial of a Russian travel document, ICE

pursued removal to Armenia but the petitioner could not establish his Armenian ethnicity by

descent and thus would not qualify for Armenian citizenship). Mr. Toshboltaev appears to have

Uzbek citizenship (see ECF #5-3 at PageID 48) and his family appears to hold Uzbek passports (see

ECF #5-9 at PageID 65). Taken together with the barrier to Mr. Toshboltaev’s removal to Russia

apparently being bureaucratic delay by the Russian government, I conclude there is a significant

likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Although Respondents argue Mr. Toshboltaev has not been cooperating with ICE officials

by withholding his Russian and Uzbek passports (ECF #5 at PageID 37-38), nothing in the record

(including what Respondents submitted) substantiates that claim. The application for an Uzbek

travel document was forwarded to the liaison at Mr. Toshboltaev’s prison a few days before

Respondents filed the Return of Writ and nothing indicates Mr. Toshboltaev has not been

cooperative with ICE. (See ECF #5-1 at PageID 43). Respondents attach a portion of the transcript

of Mr. Toshboltaev’s removal proceeding suggesting he is withholding an Uzbek passport, but they

do not further clarify the issue. True, Mr. Toshboltaev testified he holds an Uzbek passport, but

also that he has submitted “a copy of my both passports” (sic). (ECF #5-9 at PageID 64). Though

the attorney for ICE disputed that, saying Mr. Toshboltaev “only submitted a copy of your Russian

passport, as well as Uzbek passports for your family, including your father, wife, and daughter,”

counsel did not pursue the question and asked about other matters. (Id. at PageID 65). Moreover,

Respondents attach a government-generated “subject profile” where Mr. Toshboltaev’s “current

passport” is listed being from Russia without any mention of an Uzbek passport. (See ECF #5-3).

Together, these records do not indicate Mr. Toshboltaev has an Uzbek passport, let alone that he

has withheld it.

At this time, Mr. Toshboltaev has not demonstrated good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

701. The apparent barrier to his removal to Russia is bureaucratic delay by the Russian

government in issuing travel documents, which is not enough on its own to demonstrate good

reason. Even if Russia refused to provide a travel document, Mr. Toshboltaev has been ordered

alternatively removed to Uzbekistan and nothing suggests any barrier to his receiving an Uzbek

travel document once his application is submitted.

If circumstances change, Mr. Toshboltaev may file a new § 2241 petition setting forth good

reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future. See Estenor v. Holder, No. 1:1 1-cv-743, 2011 WL 5572596, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2011)

(denying petition without prejudice to future relief if circumstances change), report and

recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 5589279 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2011).

CONCLUSION

I recommend the District Court GRANT the Respondent’s motion and DISMISS the

petition WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Mr. Toshboltaev’s ability to re-apply for relief if

circumstances change.

Dated: January 15, 2026

DARRELLA.CLAY st”

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Objections, Review, and Appeal

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Civ. R. 72.3(b). Properly asserted

objections shall be reviewed de novo by the assigned district judge.

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or

waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, either to the district judge or in a

subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or

whether the party responds to the Report and Recommendation.

, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be specific and not

merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the Report and

Recommendation; “a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to

object.” , 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.

1991). Objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the

arguments in briefs submitted to the Magistrate Judge. “A reexamination of the

exact same argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific

objections ‘wastes judicial resources rather than saving them and runs contrary to

the purpose of the Magistrates Act.’” , No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018

WL 3018175, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) (quoting , 932 F.2d at 509).

The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the interest

of justice. , 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).