MICHAEL J. ROBINSON v. SAMPLE NEWS GROUP, LLC, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL J. ROBINSON,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-2306

Plaintiff,

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

v.

SAMPLE NEWS GROUP, LLC, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a report and recommendation filed by Magistrate Judge

Daryl F. Bloom recommending that Plaintiff Michael J. Robinson’s (“Robinson”) motion to

amend be denied and complaint be dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 5). On January 2, 2026,

Robinson filed a timely objection to the report. (Doc. 6). Based on the Court's review of the

relevant filings along with the report, Robinson’s objection (Doc. 6) is OVERULED, and the

report (Doc. 5) will be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Robinson initiated this action on December 3, 2025, by filing a complaint alleging

claims of civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants

Sample News Group (“Sample News”), Timothy Zyla, Larry Dekinsky, and ten unnamed

individuals arising from a newspaper article published on February 27, 2019 (together “Media

Defendants”). (Doc. 1). On December 3, 2025, Robinson also filed a motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, which Judge Bloom granted for screening purposes only on

December 23, 2025. (Doc. 5, at 3). On December 15, 2025, Robinson filed a motion to amend

the complaint, seeking to add Anthony Matulewicz as a defendant for claims under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). (Doc. 4). The RICO claims

Robinson seeks to add against Anthony Matulewicz are nearly identical to claims made by

Robinson in another civil case in this court, docketed at 4:25-cv-1134, in which Robinson

filed a notice of appeal on December 15, 2025, the same day he filed the amended complaint

in his action. (Notice of Appeal, 4:25-cv-01134, Doc. 103).

This case was reassigned to the undersigned and referred to Judge Bloom on December

23, 2025. Judge Bloom reviewed Robinson’s complaint and motion to amend and issued the

report recommending that the Court deny the motion to amend and dismiss the complaint

(Doc. 5). On January 2, 2026, Robinson filed a timely objection to the report. (Doc. 6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen

days of being served a report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written

objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de

novo review of the challenged portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings unless the objection

is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on

the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.

Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

III. DISCUSSION

In the report, Judge Bloom determined that the Court has general administrative

power to deny Robinson’s motion to amend because the proposed amended complaint is

duplicative of a proposed amended complaint Robinson filed in his other civil action before

the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 5, at 6-7; see Amended Complaint, 4:25-cv-1134,

Doc. 5). Judge Bloom also determined that Robinson’s initial complaint should be dismissed

because Robinson failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because

Robinson’s claims are time-barred. (Doc. 5, at 7-10). After reviewing the relevant filings, the

Court finds no error in Judge Bloom’s conclusions. (Doc. 5). The Court finds Judge Bloom’s

analysis to be well-reasoned and supported by the applicable law. (Doc. 5). Robinson objects

to Judge Bloom’s conclusions that the Media Defendants are not state actors and that

Robinson’s claims are time-barred. (Doc. 6, at 2). The Court will address Robison’s objections

in turn.

A. JUDGE BLOOM DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THE MEDIA DEFENDANTS ARE NOT

STATE ACTORS.

Robinson contends that the Media Defendants should be considered state actors

because they are entwined with the Shamokin City Council. (Doc. 6, at 3). To assert a Section

1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant(s) acted under color of state law.

Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998); Luck v. Mount Airy

No. 1, LLC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2012). The Supreme Court has found that

conduct under color of state law should be treated the same as establishing “state action”

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982);

Luck, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 560. Generally, private actors do not act under color of state law, but

in certain circumstances, a private actor may be treated as a state actor if there is a close nexus

between the parties. Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005); Luck, 901 F. Supp. 2d

at 560. A close nexus or symbiotic relationship exists “by virtue of the close involvement of

the state and interdependence of the [private] actors. . .” Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t Inc.,

289 F.3d 231, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.

715, 724-25 (1961)). Courts look at the relationship between the parties to determine whether

their conduct could be linked to joint beneficial activities. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-25; Crissman,

289 F.3d at 240-41.

Here, Robinson fails to articulate any nexus between the Media Defendants and a state

actor. Robinson only provides conclusory statements regarding Sample News’s power over

the Shamokin City Council. (Doc. 6, at 3-4). Looking at the alleged relationship between the

Media Defendants and Shamokin City Council, the court cannot find any facts that describe

a relationship or any joint beneficial activity between the two. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724-25;

see Crissman, 289 F.3d at 240-41. While pro se complaints should be construed liberally, the

Court is not required to accept Robinson’s conclusory statements or formulaic recitations of

the elements as true. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003); see Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Accordingly, the Court agrees

with Judge Bloom’s conclusion that Robinson has failed to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. (Doc. 5).

B. JUDGE BLOOM DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING ROBINSON’S CLAIMS ARE TIME

BARRED.

Robinson also contends that his claims are not time barred because he suffers

continuing violations by the Media Defendants. (Doc. 6, at 2). “[C]laims such as [Robinson’s]

brought under section 1983 are subject to statutes of limitations governing personal injury

actions.” Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). The Pennsylvania statute

of limitations for personal injury actions is two years from the date the cause of action

accrued. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. However, under the continuing violation doctrine, a

federal cause of action based on a defendant’s continuing conduct is timely if the last act of

the continuing conduct is within the statute of limitations for that action. Sameric Corp. of Del.,

Inc., 142 F.3d at 599.

“The continuing violation doctrine is an ‘equitable exception to the timely filing

requirement’ that applies ‘when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice.”

Johnston v. Wetzel, 431 F. Supp. 3d 666, 675 (W.D. Pa. 2019). In applying the continuing

violation doctrine, district courts focus on the affirmative acts of the defendant. Sameric Corp.

of Del., Inc., 142 F.3d at 599. To prevail on a continuing violation theory, a plaintiff must show

defendant’s continual unlawful acts, not the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts or

continued negative effects from an original violation. Johnston, 431 F. Supp. 3d 675. District

courts consider three factors when determining whether a defendant’s acts constitute a

continuing violation: (1) whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination;

(2) whether the acts are recurring or isolated incidents; and (3) whether the act had a degree

of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff’s duty to assert his or her rights and whether

the consequences of the act would continue without continuing intent to discriminate.

Johnston, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 675-76 (citing Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir.

2001).

Robinson fails to assert further affirmative acts of the Media Defendants to constitute

a continuing violation. In his objection, Robinson submits a “complete news blackout”

allegedly imposed by Sample News and that there has been “zero coverage” of this federal

lawsuit by Sample News. (Doc. 6, at 2-3). A lack of news coverage on Robinson by the Media

Defendants does not constitute an affirmative action for the purposes of the continuing

violation doctrine. See Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc., 142 F.3d at 599; Cowell, 263 F.3d at 294

(quoting Ocean Acres Ltd. V. Dare Cnty Bd. of Health, 707 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[a]

continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from

an original violation”). While the Media Defendants’ publishing of Robinson’s photograph

on February 27, 2019 and failure to cover Robinson’s lawsuit filed on December 3, 2025 could

possibly be considered part of the same civil conspiracy, these alleged actions are isolated

incidents. See Johnston, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 675-76; see Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292. Further,

Robinson would continue to suffer consequences from the alleged publishing of his

photograph on February 27, 2019, regardless of whether the Media Defendants instituted the

alleged news blackout regarding this lawsuit. See Johnston, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 675-76; see

Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292. As Robinson failed to show a continuing violation and the alleged

incident upon which this lawsuit is based occurred more than two years before the filing of

this action, the Court agrees with Judge Bloom’s conclusion that Robinson’s claim is time-

barred. (Doc. 5); see Garvin, 354 F.3d at 220; see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court agrees with the report’s sound reasoning and discerns no error of law.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the report (Doc. 5) is ADOPTED IN ITS

ENTIRETY as the opinion of the Court. Robinson’s motion to amend (Doc. 4) is DENIED,

Robinson’s complaint (Doc. 1) is DIMSISSED with prejudice, and the clerk of court is

directed to CLOSE this case.

Dated: January 15, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge