Freeman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

Alonzo Freeman,

Plaintiff, pro se,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-246

Judge Thomas M. Rose

Zachary Wilson, et al.,

Defendants.

ENTRY AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION BY

CHRISTOPHER D. ROBERTS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE

TO STATE A CLAIM (DOC. 17), GRANTING MOTION BY

ALISSA SCHRINER TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM (DOC. 20), GRANTING MOTION BY

ALONZO FREEMAN, JR. FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUR-

REPLY (DOC. 27), DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST

CHRISTOPHER COLBERT AND ZACHARY WILSON FOR

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, FINDING MOOT MOTION BY

ALONZO FREEMAN, JR. TO RECOGNIZE SERVICE BY

PUBLICATION (DOC. 22), AND TERMINATING CASE.

Plaintiff Alonzo Freeman, Jr. has filed an action bringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as claims for

conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of authority, and judicial misconduct for events that

began with a traffic stop. Two Defendants therein, Judge Christopher Roberts and Dayton

Municipal Prosecutor Alissa Schriner, have filed motions to dismiss. (Docs. 17, 20.) Because

Freeman’s claims against Roberts and Schriner are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and

also because they enjoy immunity from such claims, those Motions will be granted. Because

Freeman has been warned that his other claims risk being dismissed if he does not perfect service,

and he has not done so, his other claims will be dismissed as well.

I. Background

Pro se Plaintiff Alonzo Freeman, Jr. brings claims against Judge Christopher Roberts, Ohio

State Highway Patrol Trooper Zachary Wilson, Ohio State Highway Patrol Sargeant Christopher

Colbert, and Dayton Municipal Prosecutor Alissa Schriner. Freeman’s claims stem from a traffic

enforcement action in the Dayton Municipal Court – Case No. 2022-CRB-003076 – over which

Judge Roberts presided. (Doc. 17-1, PageID 111-116.)1 Freeman initiated the instant action on

September 6, 2024, and filed an Amended Complaint on December 18, 2024 (Doc. 6.)

In his Amended Complaint, Freeman alleges that on September 6, 2022, he was pulled over

by Wilson on Northbound I-75 for having unregistered plates. Wilson then asked for Freeman’s

driver’s license, but Freeman could only produce a U.S. Passport. Wilson then requested that

Freeman step out of the vehicle. When Freeman refused to exit the vehicle, he alleges that Wilson

pulled him out of the vehicle through the window and handcuffed him. Freeman was taken into

custody and subsequently charged in the Dayton Municipal Court with obstructing official

business, resisting arrest, and failure to comply. (Doc. 6, PageID 30-37.)

Freeman appeared before Judge Roberts on September 20, 2022, for arraignment, and on

October 7, 2022, for a trial on the merits. Freeman alleges that during the trial, Judge Roberts

1 Courts may take judicial notice of facts appearing on a state court online docket. See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F. 3d 642,

647, n.5 (6th Cir. 2004).

improperly suppressed evidence and wrongfully convicted him without any evidentiary basis.

Freeman was found guilty on the charges of obstructing official business and failure to comply.

(Id.)

Freeman brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as claims for conspiracy, malicious prosecution, abuse of

authority, and judicial misconduct. He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory

and punitive damages. (Id.)

On June 24, 2025, Roberts filed his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc.

17.) On July 3, 2025, Schriner filed her Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 20.)

Freeman has replied to these. (Docs. 23, 25.) Roberts has replied (Doc. 24) as has Schriner. (Doc.

26.) Freeman filed a Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 27), which is GRANTED,

rendering the matter ripe for review.

II. Standard

“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to allow a defendant to test whether,

as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint

is true.” Bihn v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Mayer

v. Mylod, 988 F. 2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, the purpose of the motion is to test the

formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief. Id. “[F]or the purposes of a motion to

dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and its

allegations taken as true.” Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must provide more than labels and

conclusions; a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not enough. Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Further, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level and must also do something more than merely create a

suspicion of a legally cognizable right. Id. However, the Court is not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as factual allegation or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. at 555;

Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F. 2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009). Moreover, only well-pleaded facts are construed liberally in favor of the

party opposing the motion to dismiss. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. Of Educ., 76 F. 3d 716, 726

(6th Cir. 1996).

It is well-settled that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed” and that a pro

se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976)). This liberal construction does not come at the expense of “abrogat[ing] basic pleading

essentials in pro se suits.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).

Further, a case must be dismissed if a plaintiff fails to make proper service of process upon

a party in each of the identities in which he is sued. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), “a trial court, upon

motion, may dismiss a complaint for failure to make proper service of process.” Vitek v. AIG Life

Brokerage, 2:06-CV-615, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18814, 2007 WL 682431, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb.

27, 2007).

III. Analysis

Roberts’ and Schriner’s motions assert that the instant action is barred by the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine, is barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity and fails of want of service of

process. (Docs. 17, 20.) Freeman’s responses to these motions include a Motion to Recognize

Service by Publication. (Doc. 22.) Because the Rooker-Feldman and immunity arguments prevail,

the Motion to Recognize Service by Publication will be found moot. The Court’s analysis begins

with the claims against Judge Roberts.

To the extent Freeman is challenging judicial determinations previously made by Judge

Roberts, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review

Freeman’s claims against Judge Roberts. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a federal district

from exercising jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision. Federal courts

have no jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions, even if the challenges allege that the

state court [actors] acted unconstitutionally.” Luber v. Sprague, 90 Fed. Appx. 908, 910 (6th Cir.

2004) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine...is confined to cases brought

by state-court losers complaining of injuries cause[d] by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

Freeman’s Amended Complaint takes issue with Judge Roberts’ decisions made in his

state-court case. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the federal district court from evaluating

such claims, premised on and intertwined with state court proceedings, even where the claims are

couched in constitutional terms:

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that under the

Rooker Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to…evaluate constitutional claims that are

inextricably intertwined with a state court’s decision rendered in a

judicial proceeding. Further, the Sixth Circuit has stated that a party

cannot escape Rooker-Feldman by raising a new constitutional

theory in federal court unless the party lack[ed] a realistic

opportunity to fully litigate the constitutional claim in the state court

proceeding.

Watterson v. Milligan, 2:06-cv-809, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72183 at *8-9 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 3,

2006). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to both interlocutory orders and judgments of lower

state courts. Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, n.5 (6th Cir. 2003).

Freeman’s claims against Judge Roberts are entirely based on criticism of decisions made

and orders entered in the trial court. Freeman’s constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined

with the Underlying Case, and he has not demonstrated that he lacked a meaningful opportunity

to litigate those claims in the state courts.

While he styles his case as an independent action, it is essentially a quasi-appeal; it attempts

to have this Court review the conduct of Judge Roberts and others and deem their conduct, and the

Judge’s decisions, improper. The only appropriate place to raise such contentions is in the Ohio

appellate courts, not as a collateral attack in this Court. To the extent Freeman essentially seeks

for this Court to apply appellate jurisdiction over the state court proceedings, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction over this matter. Freeman’s claims

against Judge Roberts will thus be dismissed.

Additionally, Judge Roberts enjoys judicial immunity from civil liability. Judges are

absolutely immune from individual liability for monetary relief for the performance of any judicial

act unless there is a “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357

(1978); King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1985). This immunity will be lost only where

a judge “knows he lacks jurisdiction or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law

expressly depriving him of jurisdiction[.]” Schorle v. Greenhills, 524 F. Supp. 821, 828 (S.D. Ohio

1981). Such far-reaching protection is justified by a “long-settled understanding that the

independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by

exposure to potential damages liability.” Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993)).

Judge Roberts’ immunity can only be overcome in two situations: 1. If he was acting in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction, or 2. If his challenged actions were non-judicial. Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d at 1116. Freman alleges nothing

that, if proven true, would overcome Roberts’s immunity.

Plaintiff’s allegations fair no better against Schriner. Plaintiff alleges prosecutorial

misconduct in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, as well as of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Schriner failed to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff

and allowed the trial to proceed; and failed to object or intervene when the judge suppressed

exonerating portions of a video. (Id., PageID 35.) As a result, Plaintiff was sentenced to 27 days

in jail. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges false arrest and unlawful detention against all four defendants,

including Schriner. (Id., at PageID 36.) Plaintiff alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated in addition to his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for collective abuse of

authority, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. (Id.) As this count relates to Schriner, Plaintiff

alleges that Schriner failed to intervene or dismiss the charges. (Id.)

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine similarly bars Freeman’s critique of Schriner’s role in the

prosecution of Plaintiff. In order for Freeman to prevail, this Court would have to disagree with

the outcome in state court. See Ewing v. O'Brien, 115 F. App'x 780, 782 (6th Cir. 2004). Such

criticisms should be brought in a state appeal of the municipal case as opposed to making

allegations in federal court. (Id.) Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to review or

otherwise intervene in Schriner’s conduct, such claims will be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

Schriner also enjoys immunity. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states and their

officers from a § 1983 suit. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). A suit against an

individual in their official capacity is a suit against the entity. Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652,

657 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 159). A city prosecutor is protected by the

Eleventh Amendment when the prosecutor prosecutes state criminal charges. Pusey, 11 F.3d at

657-58.

The three charges against Plaintiff consisted of: Ohio Revised Code § 2921.31(A)

obstructing official business, Ohio Revised Code § 2921.33(A) resisting arrest, and Ohio Revised

Code § 2921.331(A) failure to comply with orders or signals of an officer. These charges are all

brought under Chapter 2921 of the Ohio Revised Code. (Doc. 17-1, PageID 111-116.) The

Eleventh Amendment shields Schriner from suit in her official capacity arising out of prosecuting

these three charges. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Schriner in her official capacity will be

dismissed for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

As for suing Schriner in her personal capacity, prosecutors are absolutely immune from

monetary suits for “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s evidence.” Patton v.

Haddox, 2:10-cv-743, 2010 WL 4792616 * 3 (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 18, 2010) (quoting Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Absolute immunity for

prosecutors is essential to keep from retrying the criminal offense in a new forum and burdening

a prosecutor to defend decisions. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (quoting

Imbler, 424 U.S., at 425-26). However, while the immunity is absolute, such immunity only

applies for actions taken as “an officer of the court,” instead of investigative or administrative

tasks. Goldstein, 555 U.S., at 342 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S., at 431, n.33) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Absolute immunity only applies to conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Goldstein, 555 U.S. at 342-43 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S., at 430).

Freeman alleges that Schriner failed to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and allowed

the trial to proceed; failed to object or intervene when the judge suppressed exonerating portions

of a video; and engaged in collective abuse of authority, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution.

The facts that Freeman allege all encompass Schriner’s role as an officer of the court. There are

no facts alleged to suggest that Schriner engaged with Plaintiff outside of her role as an officer of

the court. Therefore, Schriner is absolutely immune in her personal capacity and Plaintiff’s claims

against Schriner in her personal capacity will be dismissed for failure to state claims upon which

relief can be granted.

This brings the Court to Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff listed as his entitlements declaratory relief “The Defendants violated [his] constitutional

rights[]” and injunctive relief “To prevent future violations and ensure [his] safety[.]” However,

Plaintiff is not entitled to the vague declaratory and injunctive relief that he seeks because the

claims are precluded and not justiciable. Additionally, these claims for relief, to the extent that

they are claims, fail to satisfy notice pleading.

Declaratory relief depends on “equitable considerations” and “the teachings and experience

concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72

(1985) (citing Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971)) (quoting Public Service Comm’n v.

Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952)). Declaratory relief is not appropriate in the absence of

claimed continuing violations of federal law. Green, 474 U.S. at 73; see also Kanuszewski v.

Michigan Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 408 (6th Cir. 2019). In Green, the

Supreme Court determined that, in a dispute over the lawfulness of a party’s past actions, the

appropriate remedy is monetary damages or restitution (subject to applicable considerations like

the Eleventh Amendment). 474 U.S. at 73. Here, Plaintiff’s requested relief includes declaratory

relief for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Declaratory relief is not appropriate

for this type of claim. Plaintiff made no allegations that Schriner continually violates federal law

against Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief will be dismissed.

Moreover, a court is only authorized to hear a case if it is justiciable. One consideration for

justiciability is whether a litigant has standing to bring suit. As it relates to Plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief, such a claim is not justiciable because Plaintiff lacks the standing to bring the

claim. “Standing seeks to ensure the plaintiff has a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy’ at the outset of litigation.” Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 490 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). A plaintiff needs to demonstrate a

concrete and particularized threat of suffering injury in fact and the threat needs to be actual and

imminent. Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 491 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493

(2009)). Past exposure without continuing violations does not establish a present case or

controversy. Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 491. In the context of a plaintiff who interfaces with the criminal

justice system, a court “can only speculate as to whether [the plaintiff] will ever [interface again].”

Sumpter, 868 F.3d at 491. In the interim, the court “must assume that plaintiff ‘will conduct [her]

activities within the law and so avoid . . . exposure to the challenged course of conduct.” Id.

(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)).

Plaintiff requested injunctive relief to prevent future violations and to ensure his safety.

(Doc. 6.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges past conduct without mention of continued

violations. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief does not allege a concrete and particularized

threat. Moreover, it is only speculation as to whether Plaintiff will interface with the criminal

justice system in the future and for the purpose of this case and allegations, it is assumed that his

activities will be within the law and to avoid exposure with the challenged course of conduct.

Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing for injunctive relief and the request will be dismissed.

This leaves Plaintiff’s claims against Colbert and Wilson. Plaintiff has previously been

granted an extension to serve Defendants Colbert and Wilson until June 6, 2025 and was warned

that failure to do so would result in dismissal. (Doc. 14, PageID 87.) Plaintiff’s Motion for service

by publication (Doc. 22) seeks only an extension of time to serve Roberts. (Doc. 22, PageID 135,

146.) As Plaintiff has failed to serve them, his claims against Colbert and Wilson will be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

Motion by Alonzo Freeman, Jr. for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Doc. 27) is GRANTED.

Because Freeman’s claims against Roberts and Schriner are barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and also because Roberts and Schriner enjoy immunity from such claims, Motion by

Christopher D. Roberts to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 17) is GRANTED and

Motion by Alissa Schriner to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 20) is GRANTED.

Because Freeman has been warned that his other claims risk being dismissed if he does not perfect

service, and he has not done so, Freman’s claims against Christopher Colbert and Zachary Wilson

are DISMISSED. Because the Court has granted Roberts’ Motion to Dismiss, Motion by Alonzo

Freeman, Jr. to Recognize Service by Publication (Doc. 22) is MOOT. All claims having been

disposed of, the instant case is TERMINATED on the dockets of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division at Dayton.

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Monday, January 12, 2026.

s/Thomas M. Rose

________________________________

THOMAS M. ROSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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