Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

EDDIE J. LOGAN, III CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS CASE NO. 24-380

NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC BELT RAILROAD SECTION: “G”(2)

COMMISSION FOR THE PORT OF NEW

ORLEANS, et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are two motions filed by Defendant The New Orleans Public Belt

Railroad Commission for the Port of New Orleans’ (the “NOPB”): (1) a Motion for Summary

Judgment1 and (2) Motion in Limine to Exclude Medical Causation Testimony.2 NOPB seeks

summary judgment in its favor, contingent upon the exclusion of Plaintiff Eddie J. Logan, III’s

(“Plaintiff”) proposed medical causation testimony. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants

in part and denies in part NOPB’s Motion in Limine and denies NOPB’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.

I. Background

On February 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendants New

Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission for the Port of New Orleans, New Orleans Public Belt

Railroad Corporation, and Public Belt Railroad Commission for the City of New Orleans

(collectively “Defendants”).3 In 2002, Plaintiff was employed with Defendants as a

1 Rec. Doc. 48.

2 Rec. Doc. 47.

3 Rec. Doc. 1.

switchman/conductor and was assigned to work on tracks and equipment owned and operated by

Defendants.4 The Complaint states that Plaintiff’s rights and remedies against Defendants arise

under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”).5 The Complaint alleges that during

Plaintiff’s career with Defendants, Plaintiff was regularly exposed to unsafe work conditions

which took toll on his feet.6 Plaintiff explains that he was required to walk in rail yards for miles

with oversized and unstable main line ballast present, line switches, and adjust poorly maintained

and inadequately lubricated couplers, drawbars, and knuckles, amongst other tasks.7

The Complaint alleges that reporting work-related injuries were “frowned upon” and

“laughed at.”8 Plaintiff states that, as a result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiff has suffered

occupational injuries to his feet which have caused him to undergo extensive medical evaluation

and treatment, including plantar fasciotomy surgeries, prescribed medication, and extensive

physical therapy, from which Plaintiff will have permanent sensitivity in the areas of the surgical

sites.9 Plaintiff avers that his injuries were caused by, contributed to, or aggravated by exposed to

excessive and harmful cumulative trauma, repetitive stress, force, and/or vibration to his body and

feet.10 Plaintiff seeks damages for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss

of enjoyment of life, loss wages and earning capacity, and unpaid medical expenses.11

4 Id. at 3.

5 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq.

6 Rec. Doc. 1 at 5.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 6.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 7.

11 Id. at 11–12.

On July 5, 2024, the Court dismissed the claims against the New Orleans Public Belt

Railroad Corporation and the Public Belt Railroad Commission for the City of New Orleans.12

Therefore, only the claims against NOPB remain pending.

On November 25, 2025, NOPB filed the instant motions.13 On December 9, 2025, Plaintiff

filed a response to both motions.14 On December 15, 2025, NOPB filed reply memoranda in further

support of the motions.15

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Motion in Limine

1. NOPB’s Arguments in Support of the Motion

NOPB seeks to exclude the opinions and testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physicians and

non-retained expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Treuting and Dr. Carmen Bruno, under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 37(c) and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.16 NOPB explains that Plaintiff provided

summaries of the anticipated testimony of his treating physicians, but these disclosures are

deficient because Plaintiff was required to produce written expert reports.17

NOPB explains that Plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to prove medical causation,

an essential element of his FELA claim.18 NOPB argues that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno should

have produced expert reports and materials as required of retained expert witnesses under Federal

12 Rec. Doc. 15.

13 Rec. Doc. 47; Rec. Doc. 48.

14 Rec. Doc. 54; Rec. Doc. 55.

15 Rec. Doc. 60; Rec. Doc. 61.

16 Rec. Doc. 47.

17 Rec. Doc. 47-1 at 5.

18 Id. at 6.

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).19 NOPB contends that, by designating these treating

physicians as non-retained experts, Plaintiff is attempting to circumvent the more stringent

disclosure requirements for retained experts.20 NOPB avers that Plaintiff has the burden of proving

that expert reports are not required.21 NOPB explains that Plaintiff’s treating physicians will need

to rely on information outside of the scope of their treatment to opine on the cause of Plaintiff’s

plantar fasciitis, which necessitates expert reports.22 NOPB argues that because Plaintiff failed to

comply with Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(C), the testimony of Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno should be

excluded.23

NOPB contends that, according to the summaries, Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno will “rely

on records of other experts regarding Plaintiff, on depositions, photographs, diagnostic studies,

and will testify consistent with the same. These experts will also rely on Plaintiff’s job description,

medical illustrations, and models, as well as documents produced in discovery” when opining as

to the cause of Plaintiff’s plantar fasciitis.24 NOPB avers that if a non-retained expert relies on

sources other than those of a treating physician to causally connect Plaintiff’s injuries, an expert

report is required.25 NOPB further argues that Plaintiff has not identified or produced the purported

records and documents upon which Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno relied on to form their opinions.26

19 Id. at 8.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 9.

22 Id. at 11.

23 Id. at 12.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 Id. at 13.

NOPB further argues that Dr. Bruno’s opinion on causation should be excluded because

the outcome of the opinion was dictated by counsel.27 NOPB argues that Dr. Bruno’s opinion was

not developed independently during the normal course of patient treatment.28 NOPB reiterates that

an expert report was required under these circumstances, and because Dr. Bruno failed to produce

an expert opinion, the testimony should be limited to that of a fact witness.29

Addressing the factors considered in evaluating whether to exclude expert testimony,30

NOPB argues that Plaintiff was aware of the expert report deadline but failed to provide an expert

report.31 As to the second and third factors, NOPB contends it would be prejudiced if Dr. Treuting

and Dr. Bruno are permitted to testify as to causation because Plaintiff has deprived NOPB of the

opportunity to review a written report citing support materials, authoritative sources, and the

underlying data and reasoning for their opinions.32 As to the fourth factor, NOPB states that trial

is set to begin in eight weeks, and the trial has already been continued once.33

Alternatively, NOPB argues that the opinions of Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno are

unreliable.34 NOPB contends that there is no evidence that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno considered

27 Id. at 14.

28 Id. at 15.

29 Id.

30 “In evaluating whether to exercise its discretion to exclude expert testimony, Circuit instructs that courts

should consider four factors: (1) the importance of the excluded testimony, (2) the explanation of the party for its

failure to comply with the court's order, (3) the potential prejudice that would arise from allowing the testimony, and

(4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” McIntyre v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 2015 WL

5083503, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2015).

31 Rec. Doc. 47-1 at 16.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 17.

34 Id.

alternate causes for Plaintiff’s idiopathic plantar fasciitis.35 NOPB avers that Dr. Treuting and Dr.

Bruno’s causation opinions are based on vague and inaccurate information provided by Plaintiff,

and thus, must be excluded as unreliable.36 NOPB further argues that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno

do not establish general or specific causation.37 NOPB asserts that Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting

cannot supply unsupported legal conclusions as to the causation of Plaintiff’s plantar fasciitis as

this question is to be determined by the jury.38

2. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) does not

require Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting to provide written expert reports.39 Plaintiff contends that Rule

26(a)(2)(B) applies to experts “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the

case.”40 Plaintiff avers that he properly complied with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(C).41

According to Plaintiff, other judges in this District have repeatedly rejected NOPB’s argument that

treating physicians are required to provide written expert reports.42 Plaintiff contends that the

causation opinions were formed in connection with Plaintiff’s medical treatment, and the purposes

of Rule 26 are satisfied because NOPB could have deposed Plaintiff’s treating physicians but chose

35 Id. at 21.

36 Id. at 22.

37 Id. at 23.

38 Id. at 25.

39 Rec. Doc. 54 at 11.

40 Id.

41 Id.

42 Id.

not to do so.43 Plaintiff avers that he fully disclosed his treating physicians’ ultimate causation

opinions along with their treatment history, so NOPB is not unfairly prejudiced.44

Plaintiff argues that the causation opinions of Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting are reliable and

admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert.45 Plaintiff draws similarities between

the instant case and Lewis v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,46 wherein the court rejected

identical arguments, finding that it “fails to consider [the podiatrist’s] role…as a treating physician,

not a retained expert.”47 Plaintiff contends that Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting properly relied on

Plaintiff’s self-reported history in connection with other evidence such as physical examinations

and medical testing in reaching their causation opinions.48

Plaintiff avers that Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting considered and ruled out other sources of

Plaintiff’s injuries, which is the function of a differential diagnosis.49 Plaintiff reiterates that a

treating physician is not required to comply with the reporting requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).50

Plaintiff contends that the issues addressed by NOPB can be addressed during cross-examination,

not wholesale exclusion.51

3. NOPB’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion

43 Id. at 13.

44 Id. at 14–15.

45 Id. at 15.

46 2023 WL 5312873 at *7 (C.D. III. Aug. 16, 2023).

47 Rec. Doc. 54 at 16.

48 Id. at 18.

49 Id. at 19.

50 Id. at 20.

51 Id.

NOPB reiterates that Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting were required to, but did not comply with

Rule 26(a)(2)(B).52 NOPB contends that Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting rely on sources outside of

their treatment of Plaintiff, which requires compliance with Rule 26(a)(2)(B).53 NOPB avers that

Dr. Bruno’s opinion was elicited specifically for purposes of litigation.54 NOPB argues that

Plaintiff’s non-compliance was not justified and cannot be remedied by deposition.55 NOPB states

that Plaintiff has not identified the records, depositions, illustrations, and other materials upon

which Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting will rely.56

NOPB contends that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno’s causation opinions are unreliable under

Daubert because they are based on Plaintiff’s misrepresentations about his working conditions.57

NOPB avers that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno did not consider other causes despite being required

to do so.58 NOPB argues that Plaintiff offers no evidence that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno’s

opinions satisfy Daubert.59 NOPB asserts that Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting cannot supply legal

conclusions as this usurps the role of the jury.60

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

1. NOPB’s Arguments in Support of the Motion

52 Rec. Doc. 60 at 1.

53 Id. at 2.

54 Id. at 4.

55 Id. at 5.

56 Id.

57 Id.

58 Id. at 7.

59 Id. at 9.

60 Id. at 10.

NOPB seeks summary judgment in its favor if the Court grants NOPB’s motions to exclude

the medical causation opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.61 If the Court excludes Plaintiff’s

proposed expert testimony on causation, NOPB contends Plaintiff will be unable to offer any

admissible evidence to prove medical causation, an essential element of the FELA claim.62 NOPB

argues that if the medical causation opinions are excluded, Plaintiff cannot prevail under the

FELA.63 NOPB explains that expert testimony is necessary to prove causation in FELA cases.64 If

Plaintiff does not have admissible evidence to prove medical causation, NOPB avers it is entitled

to summary judgment in its favor.65

2. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion

In opposition, Plaintiff points out that this suit arises under the FELA, and a plaintiff’s

FELA claim should be dismissed on summary judgment only “when there is a complete absence

of probative facts supporting the plaintiff’s position.”66 Plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court

has recognized that FELA incorporates a relaxed standard of causation.67 Plaintiff argues that the

causation testimony of his treating physicians is admissible.68 Plaintiff avers that the testimony of

his treating physicians create a reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that Plaintiff’s plantar

61 Rec. Doc. 48-1 at 1.

62 Id.

63 Id. at 6.

64 Id. at 7.

65 Id. at 8.

66 Rec. Doc. 55 at 13 (citing Barrios v. New Orleans & Gulf Coast Railway Co., 2019 WL 6464962 at *4

(E.D. La. Dec. 2, 2019)).

67 Id. at 14.

68 Id. at 17.

fasciitis was caused by work-related walking surfaces.69 Plaintiff asserts that NOPB’s Motion for

Summary Judgment should be denied.70

3. NOPB’s Arguments in Further Support of the Motion

In further support of the motion, NOPB argues that Plaintiff misstates the summary

judgment standard and the standard for medical causation.71 NOPB reiterates that if the Court

grants the motion to exclude medical causation opinions from Plaintiff’ treating physicians, NOPB

is entitled to summary judgment.72 NOPB avers that Plaintiff fails to identify any other sources of

admissible expert testimony to establish medical causation.73 NOPB contends that Plaintiff cannot

rely on medical records to establish a disputed issue of material fact.74 NOPB argues that this Court

should not infer causation.75 NOPB asserts that the motion for summary judgment should be

granted.76

III. Law and Analysis

NOPB moves to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Dr. Bruno and Dr.

Treuting, on the basis that they did not submit expert reports as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

Although the physicians provided summaries of their proposed testimony, NOPB maintains that

Rule 26(a)(2)(B) applies because the opinions offered are derived from sources beyond the

69 Id. at 20.

70 Id.

71 Rec. Doc. 61 at 1–2.

72 Id. at 2.

73 Id. at 3.

74 Id. at 4.

75 Id.

76 Id. at 7.

physicians’ treatment of Plaintiff. Alternatively, NOPB contends Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno’s

causation opinions are unreliable under Daubert because they are based on Plaintiff’s

misrepresentations about his working conditions, and Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno did not consider

other causes despite being required to do so. NOPB also seeks summary judgment in its favor

contingent upon the exclusion of Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting’s causation opinions.

A. Expert Report Requirement

Rule 26(a)(2) governs the disclosure of expert testimony. An expert that is retained by a

party for purposes of litigation is required to provide an expert report pursuant to Rule

26(a)(2)(B).77 Prior to 2010, non-retained experts, such as treating physicians, were exempt from

Rule 26’s expert reporting requirements.78 In 2010, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was added, which provides

a less stringent disclosure requirement for non-retained experts, such as treating physicians.79 Rule

26(a)(2)(C) requires that a party provide a written disclosure for a non-retained expert stating: “(i)

the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is

expected to testify.”80 A Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosure “need not be extensive,” but must include

“‘an abstract, abridgement, or compendium of the opinion and facts supporting the opinion.’”81

Although a Rule 26(a)(2)(C) summary disclosure generally suffices for a treating

77 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

78 Tucker v. United States, 2019 WL 4198254, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019) (collecting cases).

79 Id.

80 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).

81 Causey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2234749, at *2 (E.D. La. May 16, 2018) (quoting Rea

v. Wis. Coach Lines, Inc., 2014 WL 4981803, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted;

emphasis in original).

physician, a more comprehensive report that complies with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is required when such

a witness intends to render opinions based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge.82 Further, “where physicians’ testimony is prepared in anticipation of litigation by the

attorney or relies on sources other than those utilized in treatment, courts have found that the

treating physician acts more like an expert and must submit a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).”83

NOPB argues that the physicians’ causation opinions were developed outside of the scope

of treatment and therefore required written expert reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). While the Fifth

Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, other circuits have held someone may be a witness

not required to produce a report as to portions of his testimony and simultaneously deemed a

retained or specially employed expert who is subject to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) as to other portions.

For example, in Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, the Ninth Circuit

addressed a situation in which a plaintiff in a personal injury case “retained a number of her treating

physicians to render expert testimony beyond the scope of the treatment rendered.”84 In forming

their additional opinions, the physicians “reviewed information provided by [plaintiff's] attorney

that they hadn’t reviewed during the course of treatment.”85 The appellate court held that “those

doctors fell outside the scope of the ‘treating physician exception’ insofar as their additional

opinions are concerned,” and that therefore “Rule 26(a)(2)(B) required disclosure of expert

reports.”38

82 See Hooks v. Nationwide Housing Sys., LLC, 2016 WL 3667134, at *3 (E.D. La. July 11, 2016).

83 Id.

84 644 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2011)

85 Id.

Similarly, in Meyers v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak),86 the Seventh

Circuit, assessing whether Rule 26 required an expert report, looked to whether the opinions at

issue were developed in the course of a physician’s treatment. The court held that “a treating

physician who is offered to provide expert testimony as to the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, but

who did not make that determination in the course of providing treatment, should be deemed to be

one ‘retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case’ and thus is required

to submit an expert report.”87

Finally, in Fielden v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,88 the Sixth Circuit explained that courts

have not required a report when a treating physician testifies “within a permissive core on issues

pertaining to treatment.”42 In Fielden, the Sixth Circuit held that the treating physician at issue did

not have to produce a report where evidence showed that the physician formed his opinion during

the course of treatment, rather than at the request of counsel.89

NOPB contends that the physicians relied on deposition testimony, photographs,

diagnostic studies, job descriptions, and medical illustrations, and that Plaintiff’s counsel

affirmatively solicited a causation opinion by email. The Court addresses each category in turn.

Review of diagnostic studies is plainly within the scope of medical treatment and does not

convert a treating physician into a retained expert. Likewise, consideration of medical illustrations

to explain anatomical or biomechanical concepts is consistent with clinical practice and does not,

by itself, indicate that an opinion was developed for litigation. Consideration of a patient’s job

86 619 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2010).

87 Id. at 734–35.

88 482 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2007).

89 Id. at 869.

duties and work conditions is also a routine component of medical assessment, particularly where

the alleged injury is repetitive or occupational in nature. A treating physician does not exceed the

scope of treatment by merely evaluating how a patient’s work activities may relate to a diagnosed

condition.

By contrast, reliance on deposition testimony or photographs prepared for litigation may

support NOPB’s argument if such materials formed the basis for a causation opinion that was not

previously reached during treatment. NOPB also argues that Plaintiff’s counsel emailed the

treating physicians requesting an opinion on causation. While solicitation by counsel is a relevant

factor, it is not dispositive. A treating physician does not become a retained expert merely because

counsel asks the physician to articulate or confirm an opinion already formed during treatment.

The key question remains whether the physicians’ causation opinion existed independently of

counsel’s request.

NOPB also points out that Plaintiff has not identified the depositions or illustrations upon

which Dr. Bruno and Dr. Treuting will rely. The Court agrees that Plaintiff may not elicit opinions

that were newly formed, materially expanded, or solely derived from litigation materials, including

deposition testimony or counsel-supplied documents reviewed after treatment concluded. As such,

the treating physicians may testify regarding causation opinions that were formed during and based

upon their treatment of Plaintiff.90 They may not offer opinions that depend on post-treatment

review of deposition testimony, litigation photographs, or other materials outside of the scope of

their medical care.

B. Reliability

90 Goodman, 644 F.3d at 826 (holding that a treating physician does not have to produce an expert report “to

the extent that his opinions were formed during the course of treatment”.).

Ultimately, a party seeking to introduce expert testimony must show that the witness is

qualified by education, training, or experience to give relevant and reliable testimony and that (1)

the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the

facts of the case.91

NOPB first argues that Plaintiff’s treating physicians may not testify as to causation.

Treating physicians routinely testify regarding the cause of a patient’s condition where such

opinions arise from diagnosis and treatment. There is no categorical bar preventing treating

physicians from offering causation testimony, provided the opinions are based on the physician’s

personal knowledge and medical expertise. Accordingly, the Court rejects NOPB’s argument.

NOPB further argues that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno’s causation opinions are unreliable

under Daubert because they are based on Plaintiff’s misrepresentations about his working

conditions.92 However, “as a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert’s

opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its admissibility and should be left

for the jury’s consideration.”93 Such disputes are appropriately addressed through cross-

examination, impeachment, and the presentation of contrary evidence, not exclusion.

NOPB also argues that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno did not consider other causes despite

being required to do so. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the treating physicians did consider

alternative causes. To offer reliable causation testimony, “medical causation experts must have

91 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702; Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 495 F.3d 224, 227 (5th Cir.

2007).

92 Id.

93 Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987).

considered and excluded other possible causes of injury.”94 This requirement “does not necessitate

an exhaustive search that forces an expert to ‘disprov[e] or discredit[ ] every possible cause other

than the one espoused by him,’ ... but an expert must be aware of the plaintiff's pertinent medical

history.”95 Testimony should only be excluded when “[the] expert utterly fails to consider

alternative causes or fails to explain why the opinion remains sound in light of alternative causes

suggested by the opposing party.”96

The absence of an exhaustive written analysis of alternative causes does not, by itself,

render such testimony inadmissible. Here, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s treating physicians

evaluated Plaintiff’s symptoms, medical history, diagnostic studies, and reported work activities

in diagnosing and treating his condition. NOPB has not shown that the physicians ignored obvious

alternative causes or relied on a methodology so flawed as to be unreliable. Rather, NOPB’s

argument focuses on the physicians’ alleged failure to explicitly address other potential

contributing factors, such as non-work-related activities or pre-existing conditions. Such

challenges are properly addressed through cross-examination and the presentation of contrary

medical evidence. The jury may consider whether the physicians adequately accounted for other

potential causes when determining the weight to give their opinions.

C. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

demonstrate “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

94 McNabney v. Lab Corp. of Am., 153 F. App'x 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2005).

95 Id. (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 424).

96 Cross v. Forest Labs., No. 05-CV-00170, 2015 WL 728511, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2015) (citing

Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 1999)).

a matter of law.”97 To decide whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court

considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations

or weighing the evidence.”98 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving

party.99 Yet “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and

conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”100

If the entire record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then

no genuine issue of fact exists and, consequently, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.101 The nonmoving party may not rest upon the pleadings.102 Instead, the nonmoving

party must identify specific facts in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that

evidence establishes a genuine issue for trial.103

NOPB seeks summary judgment in its favor if the Court excludes the causation testimony

of Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies NOPB’s request to

exclude the testimony of Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno. As such, because material issues remain in

dispute, the Court denies NOPB’s motion for summary judgment.

97 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

98 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

99 Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at

150).

100 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

101 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of

Ariz. v. Cites Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

102 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

103 See id.; Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno are not

categorically barred from offering causation testimony and that expert reports under Rule

26(a)(2)(B) were not required for opinions formed during the course of treatment. The Court

further finds that the physicians’ causation opinions are sufficiency reliable under Federal Rule

702 and Daubert. However, Plaintiff may not elicit testimony reflecting opinions that were newly

formed or materially expanded in anticipation of litigation, including opinions based on post-

treatment review of deposition testimony or other litigation-generated materials.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that NOPB’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Medical

Causation Testimony!”* is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is

DENIED to the extent is seeks exclusion of Dr. Treuting and Dr. Bruno’s causation opinions. The

motion is GRANTED as to the exclusion of any opinions that were newly formed or materially

expanded in anticipation of litigation, including opinions based on post-treatment review of

deposition testimony or other litigation-generated materials.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that NOPB’s Motion for Summary Judgment! is

DENIED.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 15th day of January, 2026.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

104 Rec. Doc. 47.

105 Rec. Doc. 48.