DUKES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MELONIECE DUKES,

Civil Action No.: 25-02069 (JXN)(JRA)

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

VANDO HOLDING LTD,

Defendant.

NEALS, District Judge

Before the Court is the application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 1-1)

and Complaint (ECF No. 1) filed by Plaintiff Meloniece Dukes, parent and guardian of A.M.G., a

minor (“Plaintiff”). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff initiated this action on March 25, 2025, against Defendant Vando Holding, Ltd.

d/b/a Delta 8 Resellers (“Defendant”). (See Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.) In the Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that on December 26, 2024, Plaintiff’s seventeen-year-old child, A.M.G.,

purchased Delta-8 hemp products containing tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) from Defendant’s

website. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff claims Defendant’s website had an insufficient age verification

system, leading to the sale, distribution, and consumption of the products to Plaintiff’s minor child.

(Id. ¶ 14.)

1 The Court will accept as true the factual allegations in the Complaint for the purposes of this screening only. The

Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992)

(“[T]he § 1915(d) frivolousness determination . . . cannot serve as a factfinding process for the resolution of disputed

facts.”)

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts one count of Negligence (Count I), related to

Defendant’s alleged failure to establish and enforce adequate security measures to prevent minors

from purchasing their products online. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Plaintiff also asserts a claim for Unfair and

Deceptive Trade Practices (Count II), alleging that Defendant misled customers and created an

unreasonable risk of harm to minors who were able to purchase marijuana products unlawfully.

(Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff claims that because of Defendant’s actions, A.M.G. was exposed to and

consumed an illegal substance, causing emotional distress and other damages. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff

seeks $500,000,000 in compensatory damages. (Id. at *4.)2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In submitting the IFP application, the Complaint is subject to sua sponte screening and may

be dismissed if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious or fails to comply with the

proper pleading standards.”3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); Brown, 941 F.3d at 662. “If

the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court’s continuing obligation to assure its jurisdiction

includes an assessment of whether a plaintiff has standing to pursue her claims. See Seneca Res.

Corp. v. Township of Highland, 863 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Our ‘continuing obligation’ to

assure that we have jurisdiction requires that we raise issues of standing and mootness sua sponte.”

(quoting Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2007))); see also Sprint

Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008) (explaining that Article III of

the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of cases and

controversies, and that this “requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing”).

2 Page numbers preceded by an asterisk (*) reflect CM/ECF pagination.

3 “[A] court has the discretion to consider the merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even

simultaneously.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are based on harm suffered by

Plaintiff’s minor child, A.M.G. (See Compl. ¶ 9.) Having screened Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing.

To establish Article III standing, Plaintiff must show: (i) she personally suffered an actual

or threatened injury; (ii) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s illegal conduct; and (iii)

the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &

State Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the

rights of third persons.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,

263 (1977). “We have not treated this rule as absolute, however, recognizing that there may be

circumstances where it is necessary to grant a third party standing to assert the rights of another.”

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004). The party seeking third-party standing must

show (1) “a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right,” and (2) “a ‘hindrance’

to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.” Id. at 130 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499

U.S. 400, 411 (1991)). Here, Plaintiff has a parent-child relationship with A.M.G., and A.M.G.’s

age is a hindrance to their ability to protect their own interests.

However, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) allows guardians to sue on behalf

of minor children in their representative capacities, and litigants may represent themselves in

federal court pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the Third Circuit has consistently held that a non-

attorney parent may not represent his or her child pro se in federal court. See, e.g., Osei-Afriyie by

Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a “non-attorney

parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child”) (quoting

Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir.1990)); see also

Watson v. Washington Twp. Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 09-3650, 2010 WL 2540180, at *3 (D.N.J. June

17, 2010), aff’d, 413 F. App’x 466, 468 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff-parent could not

prosecute any of her son’s claims pro se in federal court).4 Further, a parent cannot waive their

child’s right to counsel. Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883. When parents are unwilling or unable to

obtain counsel for their children, the Court may dismiss the action without prejudice “to accrue for

purposes of the relevant statutes of limitations when the children reach eighteen years of age, or

sooner if they become emancipated minors.” Id. Here, pro se Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any

claims on behalf of her minor child. Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice all claims

in the Complaint purportedly brought on behalf of A.M.G.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: January 12, 2026

_______________________

JULIEN XAVIER NEALS

United States District Judge

4 Since Osei-Afriyie, the Third Circuit has upheld the proposition that parents cannot represent their minor children in

federal court. See, e.g., Cole v. Montague Bd. of Educ., 145 F. App’x 760, 762 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); Harris–Thomas v.

Christina School Dist., 145 F. App’x 714, 715 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a non-attorney parent cannot represent her

child in federal court for a school district’s alleged civil rights violations); Pinkney v. City of Jersey City Dept. of

Hous. & Econ. Dev., 42 F. App’x 535, 536 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a parent cannot bring suit on behalf of a minor

or mentally incompetent adult child without counsel for an alleged violation of Section 1983); see also Wolf v. Escala,

No. 14-5985, 2015 WL 2403106, at *8 (D.N.J. May 20, 2015) (holding that a parent could not seek relief on behalf

of her children pro se, including relief for a “laundry list of injuries” based on alleged violations of federal and state

law); Woodruff ex rel. B.W. v. Hamilton Twp. Pub. Sch., No. 06-3815, 2007 WL 4556968, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Dec. 20,

2007) (finding that parents lacked “standing to prosecute any of their son’s claims.”).