Hammouda

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JABER HILMI HAMMOUDA, )

) CASE NO. 4:25-cv-2696

Plaintiff-Petitioner, )

)

v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

)

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND )

SECURITY, et al., ) ORDER

) [Resolving ECF No. 1]

Respondents-Defendants.1 )

Pending before the Court is Jaber Hilmi Hammouda’s Petitioner for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Respondents timely submitted a Return of

Writ and Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 6. The Court conducted a telephonic hearing, during

which the parties’ counsel presented oral argument regarding their respective positions.

Consistent with the Court’s Order (ECF No. 9), Respondents supplemented their Motion to

Dismiss with a declaration detailing Petitioner’s impending removal to the occupied Palestinian

territories. ECF No. 10. Petitioner responded. ECF No. 11. Being duly advised, having

reviewed the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6)

is denied. In light of the significant likelihood of removal, Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus

(ECF No. 1) is also denied.

1 Although the parties are labeled Petitioner-Plaintiff and Respondents-Defendants,

the Court will refer to the parties a Petitioner and Respondents, respectively.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Petitioner is a 40-year-old Palestinian2 who has lived in the United States for

approximately 17 years. He is married to a U.S. citizen, and they have three minor children, ages

16, 14, and 1. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 17.

On May 31, 2019, Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession

with intent to distribute marijuana and oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and sentenced

to 30 months incarceration. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 18. As a result, he was subject to removal proceedings

under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Notice to Appear, ECF No. 1-7. After

completing his sentence, Petitioner was afforded an individual calendar hearing,3 and on June 16,

2020, an immigration judge ordered that he be removed to Israel. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 20. Petitioner

did not appeal the order.

Following the issuance of the removal order, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) detained Petitioner for 90 days before releasing him on September 14, 2020, under an

2 Although neither party disputes that Petitioner is a national and citizen of

Palestine, the Government’s records inconsistently recognize his nationality and

citizenship as such. In its Notice to Appear, issued June 7, 2019, ICE alleged petitioner is

a native and citizen of Israel. ECF No. 1-7 at PageID #: 43. In the Decision to Continue

Detention, issued on September 4, 2025, ICE determined that Petitioner is “a native and

citizen of Palestine.” ECF No. 1-3 at PageID #: 30.

3 An individual calendar hearing (or merits hearing) is part of the removal process

during which a noncitizen may challenge removability through evidence, motions, and

witnesses. A merits hearing is conducted before an immigration judge responsible for

deciding whether an individual should be admitted into or removed from the country.

These decisions are appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). See

Executive Office for Immigration Review | 4.16 - Individual Calendar Hearing | United

States Department of Justice.

Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) because ICE had failed to obtain travel documents to effectuate

his removal and determined that he did not pose a danger to the community or a flight risk. It is

undisputed that Petitioner’s release was consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).4 Since his

release, Petitioner has complied with all conditions of his OSUP, including annual check-ins

with ICE officers. ECF No. 1, ⁋⁋ 21–22.

B. Respondents’ Removal Efforts

Petitioner appeared for his annual check-in on March 6, 2025, as required by the

conditions of his OSUP. There were no indications that he posed a threat to the community or a

flight risk and, therefore, he was not detained. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 23. On June 2, 2025, he was

ordered to appear before ICE officers again. He did so the next day and was immediately

arrested. He has been in detention at Northeast Ohio Correctional Center (“NEOCC”) since June

3, 2025. ECF No. 1, ⁋ 24.

ICE conducted a 90-day detention review on September 4, 2025, indicating that it

“expect[ed] to receive the necessary travel document to effectuate [Petitioner’s] removal, and

removal is practicable, likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, and in the public

interest.” ECF No. 1, ⁋ 28; ECF No. 1-3. At 180 days, ICE conducted another detention review

because it had not effectuated Petitioner’s removal within the second 90-day period. ECF No. 1,

⁋ 30. On December 4, 2025, Deportation Officer Ryan Serevitch told Petitioner’s counsel that

4 Section 1231(a)(1)(A) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this section,

when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the

United States within a period of 90 days[.]” Section 1231(a)(3) provides: “If the alien does

not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be

subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”

ICE Headquarters was “nearing final approval” of Petitioner’s travel documents and, “[i]f

approved, he will be nominated for removal to Palestine in mid-January.” ECF No. 1-4.

During a telephonic hearing conducted by the Court on January 7, 2026, Respondents

presented a declaration from Officer Serevitch attesting to the following, in part:

10. On December 31, 2025, a Detention and Deportation Officer

(“DDO”) with ICE HQ RIO5 notified ERO6 Detroit (Cleveland) that

two special charter missions for removals to Israel and the occupied

Palestinian territories are scheduled to depart by February 1, 2026.

According to the DDO, Hammouda would be manifested for

removal on these upcoming charter missions.

11. On January 5, 2026, ICE Air Operations notified ERO Detroit

(Cleveland) that Hammouda is manifested for removal on the

upcoming charter missions to Israel and the occupied Palestinian

territories. This notification included instructions to promptly

transfer Hammouda to ICE’s removal staging facility in Mesa,

Arizona.

12. Based on the information provided by ICE HQ RIO, since April

2025, ICE has successfully removed multiple individuals to the

occupied Palestinian territories with special transit permission from

the Government of Israel.

ECF No. 8-1, ⁋⁋ 10–12. Respondents submitted a supplemental declaration clarifying the

following:

4. Subject to unforeseen circumstances . . . Hammouda is

manifested as an alternate passenger on the first flight and a primary

on a second flight. Both flights are scheduled to depart the United

States from Mesa, Arizona between January 20 and February 1,

2026. . . .

6. Hammouda is currently scheduled to be transported to the [ICE

Air Operations] operational location in Mesa, Arizona on or before

January 16, 2026. . . .

5 ICE Headquarters Removal and International Operations. ECF No. 8-1, ⁋ 9.

6 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations. ECF No. 8-1, ⁋ 1.

8. According to the most recent information provided to me by RIO

personnel on January 8, 2026: (i) the list of manifested passengers

for these scheduled charter missions has been provided to the

Government of Israel; (ii) the ERO Attaché in Tel Aviv expects to

receive approval to transit to the occupied Palestinian territories; and

(iii) removals to the occupied Palestinian territories are not

dependent on valid passports/travel documents and can be

completed with expired Palestinian passports/travel documents.

ECF No. 10, ⁋⁋ 4, 6, 8. Petitioner argues that the declarations are deficient because they contain

vague, generalized plans, rather than specific itinerary information, travel documentation, or

approval confirmation from the Israel government or Palestinian Authority. ECF No. 11.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to prevent Petitioner’s removal

because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) abrogates judicial review of removal orders. ECF No. 6 at PageID #:

62. The Court disagrees.

While the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court

acknowledge that § 1252(g) bars judicial review over “all claims arising from deportation

proceedings,” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020); see

Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018) (A “district court’s jurisdiction over the

detention-based claims is independent of its jurisdiction over the removal-based claims.”), the

Supreme Court also holds that this jurisdictional bar is limited to three enumerated categories in

§ 1252(g)—commencement, adjudication, and execution of removal orders. Reno v. Am.-Arab

Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). The Government’s argument that the

Court is barred from adjudicating a challenge to detention as inherently implicating a challenge

to removal is incorrect, and, if left unchecked, would lead to “absurd” results. Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293 (2018) (opinion of Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy,

J.). Accordingly, claims that do not seek “review of an order of removal, the decision to seek

removal, or the process by which removability will be determined” are not barred by § 1252(g).

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. at 19; Elgharib v. Napolitano, 600 F.3d 597, 605 (6th Cir.

2010).

In this case, Petitioner does not challenge Respondents’ authority or discretion to enforce

the final order of removal. Rather, Petitioner requests the Court review whether: (1)

Respondents lawfully revoked his supervised release; and (2) his continued detention violates

due process. ECF No. 1. Such claims do not fall within the three enumerated categories set

forth in § 1252(g). Therefore, the Court retains jurisdiction to resolve Petitioner’s claims.

B. APA and Procedural Due Violations

Petitioner claims that Respondents acted ultra vires of their statutory and regulatory

authority and violated the Accardi doctrine by failing to comply with their own rules and

procedures concerning Petitioner’s supervised release revocation. ECF No. 1. Respondents

insist Petitioner’s supervised release revocation and subsequent detention were lawfully within

ICE’s discretion and consistent with its rules and procedures. ECF No. 6. Respondents further

retort that any violation amounts to harmless error because Petitioner was provided with three

notices concerning ICE’s intention to effectuate his removal. ECF No. 6-1.

1. Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Removal

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), a final removal order must be effectuated within 90 days

(“Removal Period”). The Removal Period may be extended if the noncitizen is: (1) inadmissible

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182; (2) removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227; or (3) a danger to the community

or a flight risk. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). After the Removal Period expires, noncitizens not yet

removed are subject to supervision pursuant to the regulations established by the Attorney

General (whom has since delegated her authority to the Department of Homeland Security

Secretary). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). ICE, thereafter, promulgated Post-Order Custody

Regulations (“POCR”) setting forth the mechanisms concerning custody reviews, release from

ICE custody, and release revocations concerning removal orders. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).

Under POCR, ICE may revoke an individual’s supervised release: (1) when the agency

determines the purpose of release has been satisfied; (2) an individual violated the conditions of

release; (3) it is appropriate to enforce a removal order against an alien; or (4) any other

circumstance indicating release would no longer be appropriate. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(i)—(iv).

The procedures for revocation are set forth in § 241.4(l)(1), which provides:

Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for the

revocation of his or her release or parole. The alien will be afforded

an initial information interview promptly after his or her return to

[ICE] custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the

reasons for revocation stated in the notification.

8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1).

2. Respondents violated POCR and the Accardi doctrine.

It is undisputed that the Department of Homeland Security and its instrumentalities have

broad discretion to enforce immigration laws, including whether to revoke an OSUP. Still,

government agencies, including ICE, must follow their own regulations, rules, and procedures.

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); see Morton v. Ruiz, 415

U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (requiring agency compliance with unpublished agency rules and manuals).

As explained below, ICE did not comply with its own regulations and procedures when it

revoked Petitioner’s OSUP.

Respondents first argue that the procedures in § 241.4(l)(1) do not apply to Petitioner

because his supervised release was not revoked due to any condition violations. ECF No. 6 at

PageID #: 58–59. That argument is unpersuasive and has been rejected by other district courts

within this and other Circuits as unsupported by the text or case law and inconsistent with ICE’s

own practice. Mbonga v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2315, 2025 WL 3122829, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov.

7, 2025) (Polster, J.); K.E.O. v. Woosley, No. 4:25-cv-74-RGJ, 2025 WL 255339, at *4 (W.D.

Ky. Sept. 4, 2025) (Jennings, J.); Ceesay v. Kursdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3 137 (W.D.N.Y. 2025);

see Zhen v. Doe, 3:25-cv-1507, 2025 WL 2258586, at *10 n. 19 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2025)

(Barker, J.) (recognizing that procedural requirements in § 241.4(l)(1) apply to noncitizens

whose supervised release has been revoked for reasons other than condition violations.); see also

Barrios v. Ripa, 2025 WL 2280485, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (noting that ICE afforded an

informal interview to a noncitizen detained under § 241.4(l)(2).). To adopt Respondents’

interpretation would lead to a nonsensical result with individuals who violate conditions of their

release receiving more process than individuals who do not. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

471, 482 (1972) (holding that while parolees are subject “to many restrictions not applicable to

other citizens,” they are nevertheless entitled to some “minimal inquiry” to determine whether

detention before parole revocation is appropriate).

Next, Respondents argue that any failure to provide Petitioner with revocation notice was

harmless error because three notices were provided shortly after his detention in July, September,

and November 2025. ECF No. 6 at PageID #: 59; ECF No. 6-1. The regulation’s text does not

require notice or an informal interview before detention. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); Jimenez v.

Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 651 (D. Mass. 2018). Petitioner points out, however, that none of

the notices Respondents provided include the reasons for the OSUP revocation or mentioned an

opportunity to address such reasons. ECF No. 7. The Court agrees.

The 1-229(a) forms submitted by Respondents merely include instructions that Petitioner

is required to cooperate with efforts to effectuate his removal, including providing ICE officers

with copies of his passport, birth certificates, foreign government documentation identifying

himself, and communication efforts Petitioner may have made to prepare for removal. ECF No.

6-1. There is no mention of a hearing or informal interview about his detention, nor any specific

reasons for the OSUP revocation. Respondents’ notices were deficient.

Finally, Petitioner argues that the revocation was unlawful ab initio because the

individual responsible was not properly delegated the authority to revoke his release. Section

241.4(l) authorizes the Executive Associate Commissioner to revoke supervised release. Under

8 C.F.R. § 1.2, such authority is further delegated to the field office directors and any other

official “delegated the function or authority . . . for a particular geographic district, region, or

area.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 241.4(l)(2). Respondents did not respond to this challenge. ECF No. 6.

The Court, therefore, concludes that the officer whom revoked Petitioner’s supervised release

acted ultra vires, that is without proper delegated authority, and in violation of POCR.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Respondents violated the Accardi doctrine

and Petitioner’s detention violated his procedural due process rights secured by the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

C. Petitioner’s Detention is Not Unreasonable

Notwithstanding the procedural violations discussed above, Petitioner’s continued

detention is not unreasonable considering his impending removal to Palestine.

Under the Due Process Clause, the Government is prohibited from depriving any person

of liberty without due process of law. Freedom “from government custody, detention, or other

forms of physical restraint [ ] lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). The

Supreme Court has only recognized certain narrow, nonpunitive justifications for civil detention,

including when an individual poses a danger to the community or poses a flight risk. Id. (citing

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997)).

In Zadvydas, the Court considered two cases in which removal was ordered but the

receiving states (in Zadvydas’ case, Germany and Lithuania, and in Ho Ma’s case, Cambodia)

refused to accept them for various reasons. Id. at 684–86. The Court found that Congress did

not intend to authorize the Attorney General to detain such individuals indefinitely, even if the

reason is to protect the community from dangerous aliens. Id. at 697. Interpreting the statute’s

text, the Court held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention

is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. The Court recognized that a six-month detention

period is “presumptively reasonably,” after which, the Government must proffer sufficient

evidence that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id.

at 701.

The Court acknowledges that when Petitioner was detained in June 2025, Respondents

did not have any travel documents or plans to remove him to Palestine. This is shown by the

email communications with Officer Serevitch six months later, in December 2025, in which he

acknowledged that ICE was still waiting for approval from the Palestinian Authority to issue

travel documents. ECF No. 1-4. Although Petitioner has been detained in excess of six months,

Respondents have demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction that removal is significantly likely in

the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents declare that Petitioner is slated for one of two

missions to the occupied Palestinian territories on either January 20, 2026, or February 1, 2026.

ECF No. 10. Furthermore, Respondents aver that they have provided Petitioner’s information to

the Israeli government and anticipate receiving special transit permission necessary to enter the

occupied Palestinian territories. ECF No. 10.

While recent events fuel legitimate skepticism, there is no evidence that the

declaration is made in error. Because the Government has pledged that Petitioner’s

removal is likely to occur within days, his continued detention is not unreasonable. The

Court reaches this conclusion by relying on the declarations of Officer Serevitch. In those

declarations, he attests that removal should begin by January 16, 2026, with Petitioner being

transported outside of the United States between January 20 and February 1, 2016. If

Petitioner is no longer slated for one of the two missions destined for Palestine, Petitioner

can refile a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district having jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that: (1) Respondents acted ultra vires when

an unauthorized official revoked Petitioner’s order of supervision; and (2) Respondents violated

the Accardi doctrine by failing to provide Petitioner with notice of the reason(s) for the

revocation of his supervised release or afford him an opportunity to respond to such reasons.

Therefore, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is denied.

Notwithstanding the procedural violations, Petitioner’s continued detention is not

unreasonable because the record includes plausible evidence that his removal to the occupied

Palestinian territories is significantly likely in the foreseeable future, with travel beginning on

January 16, 2026, and concluding by February 1, 2026. Accordingly, Petitioner’s writ for

habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is denied.

On or before 4:00 p.m. on February 2, 2026, Respondents shall submit to the Court

written confirmation that Petitioner was removed from the United States to the occupied

Palestinian territories.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 13, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge