Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-1929

C&G BOATS, INC. ET AL SECTION “R” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the motion for judgment on the pleadings under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) of defendants C & G Boats, Inc. and M

N M Boats, Inc. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.1 For the reasons that

follow, the Court converts defendants’ motion into a motion for summary

judgment and GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action following an incident on the Ms. Megan

vessel during which he alleges he sustained injuries.2 Plaintiff alleges that he

was working aboard the Ms. Megan and made a transfer by swing rope from

1 Under Local Rule 7.5 of the Eastern District of Louisiana, “[e]ach party

opposing a motion must file and serve a memorandum in opposition

to the motion with citations of authorities no later than eight days

before the noticed submission date.” Plaintiff here has not done so.

2 See generally R. Doc. 12.

the vessel at the direction of the captain and/or officers of the vessel.3

Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries upon performing the transfer.4

Plaintiff claims that his injuries arose due to the negligence and

negligence per se of defendants, and the unseaworthiness of the Ms. Megan.5

Defendants now bring a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) arguing that plaintiff’s unseaworthiness claims

should be dismissed.6 Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The Court

considers the motion below.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Conversion to Summary Judgment

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) “‘is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are

not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking at

the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noted facts.’” Alliance of

Artists and Recording Cos., Inc. v. General Motors Co., 162 F. Supp. 3d 8,

*16 (D.D.C. 2016) (Brown Jackson, J.) (quoting Hebert Abstract Co. v.

Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990)). In ruling on a 12(c)

3 Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.

4 Id.

5 Id. at ¶¶ 4-5, 7, 9, 12.

6 R. Doc. 18.

motion, the Court must look only to the pleadings, Brittan Commc’ns Int’l

Corp. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 313 F.3d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 2002), and exhibits

attached the pleadings, see Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 600 (5th Cir.

2019). “If, on a motion under 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings

are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated

as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Here, defendants have attached extra-pleading material to the motion

for judgment on the pleadings. It is within the Court’s discretion to accept

and consider these materials, but to do so the Court must convert the motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, 5C Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1371 (3d ed. 2025)

(explaining that whether to accept extra-pleading material and convert the

motion or exclude the material and maintain the character of the motion is

within the district court’s discretion); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “A court need not

advise either party of its intention to convert the motion.” Hodge v.

Englemann, 90 F.4th 840, 845 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations omitted).

“The only requirement is that the non-moving party have at least ten days in

which to submit its own evidence.” Id. Defendants submitted exhibits with

the motion, putting plaintiff on notice that the court could consider material

outside the pleadings. See Isquith for and on Behalf of Isquith v. Middle S.

Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1988); see also McDonald v.

Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 2017 WL 1709353, at *2 (E.D. La. May 3, 2017). And

the submission date for the motion was over a month after defendants filed

the motion. Plaintiff has thus been on notice that the Court could consider

material outside the pleadings for more than the required ten days.

Plaintiff has thus had more than ten days to submit his own evidence,

and the court may opt to convert the motion without further notice. See id.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Court considers the evidence in

the record without making credibility determinations or weighing the

evidence. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d

395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of

the nonmoving party. Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216

(5th Cir. 1985). If the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute of material fact. EEOC v.

Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear

the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by

pointing out that the material in the record capable of being made admissible

is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party, who must, by submitting or referring to material capable of being

made admissible, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists.

See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings but must

identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g.,

id.

Unopposed summary judgment motions may be granted only when

they have merit. See John v. State of La. (Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges

and Universities), 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985); Bustos v. Martini Club

Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56

committee notes (“summary judgment cannot be granted by default”). The

movant must still show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and

that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v.

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 363 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). The non-

movant’s “failure to respond to a summary judgment motion leaves the

movant’s facts undisputed,” meaning the “court need only decide whether

those undisputed facts are material and entitle the movant” to summary

judgment. Flowers v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 614 F. App’x 214, 215

(5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

C. Summary Judgment is Appropriate

Under general maritime law, vessel owners hold “an absolute non-

delegable duty to provide a seaman with a vessel reasonably fit for its

intended use, i.e. a seaworthy vessel.” Bonefont v. Valdez Tankships, 136

F.3d 137, at *4 (1998) (internal citations omitted). The duty provides to

“seamen, and only seamen” a cause of action against vessel owners for

unseaworthiness. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 6:27 (7th ed.) (noting that the duty of

seaworthiness is “owed to a narrow class of maritime workers—those who

can claim ‘seaman’ status under the law”).

Defendants argue that plaintiff has not asserted seaman status and that

the allegations in his complaint, taken as true, do not provide a basis for

finding seaman status. Therefore, defendants argue plaintiff’s

unseaworthiness cause of action should be dismissed.

Not all persons who come aboard a vessel are seamen. Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 6:27 (7th ed.). Seaman status is not a

function of where the worker’s injury occurred. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,

515 U.S. 347, 361-68 (1995). Instead, for determining seaman status what

matters is “the nature of the seaman’s service, his status as a member of the

vessel, and his relationship as such to the vessel and its operation in

navigable waters.” Id. at 359-60 (quoting Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328

U.S. 1, 4 (1946)).

There is nothing in the record that raises an issue of material fact that

plaintiff is a seaman or that he is otherwise entitled to bring an

unseaworthiness claim.7 Although plaintiff alleges that he was “working

aboard” the vessel Ms. Megan at the time of the incident, plaintiff points to

no material capable of being made admissible to indicate that his duties

contributed to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its

mission. 8 He also points to no material capable of being made admissible

that would indicate that he had a sufficient connection to the vessel.9 Indeed,

defendants provide plaintiff’s own Answers to defendants’ Requests for

7 In Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), the Supreme Court

allowed a longshoreman “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a

seaman’s hazards” to bring an unseaworthiness claim. Smith v.

Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., 910 F.2d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 1990)

(citing Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 99). Plaintiff does not assert that he is

entitled to Sieracki seaman status, nor does he plead facts to rationally

conclude that he was “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s

hazard.” Id.

8 See R. Doc. 12.

9 See id.

Admission which essentially foreclose such conclusions.10 In the Request for

Admission Answers, plaintiff admits that he was not at the time of the

incident and has never been employed as a vessel crewmember for C & G

Boats, Inc. or M N M Boats, Inc; that he was then and is now an employee of

the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”); and that he was not working as a

vessel deckhand or vessel captain at the time of the incident.11 These

undisputed facts establish that plaintiff is not entitled to bring an

unseaworthiness claim against defendants. Accordingly, the Court must

dismiss his unseaworthiness claim.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion

which the Court has converted to a motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claims against C & G

Boats, Inc. and M N M Boats, Inc. based on the doctrine of unseaworthiness

WITH PREJUDICE.

10 See R. Doc. 18-2 at 2, 4, 5.

11 Id.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this__14th_ day of January, 2026.

hora Vareee

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE