Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

FREDERICK D. HARRIS, M.D., ) Case No. 1:25-cv-980

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

BEVERLY HILLS CAR CLUB, )

INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Beverly Hills Car Club, Inc., John Salas, and Adam Lopez move to

compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss this matter for lack of personal

jurisdiction and improper venue. Plaintiff did not timely respond to the motion. For

the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel arbitration and

STAYS this matter pending arbitration.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

According to the complaint, on or about December 30, 2024, Dr. Frederick

Harris purchased a 1999 Rolls-Royce Silver Seraph from Beverly Hills Car Club, Inc.

for $13,000. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 8, PageID #2.) Dr. Harris spoke with Adam Lopez, the

seller from Beverly Hills Car Club, Inc., to “arrange the purchase.” (Id., ¶ 9, PageID

#2.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Lopez “had full knowledge that Plaintiff was

purchasing the [v]ehicle to use as a source for replacement parts.” (Id., ¶ 10, PageID

#2.) John Salas “approved the sale.” (Id., ¶ 11, PageID #2.)

On or about February 6, 2025, Dr. Harris “discovered” that he could not use

the vehicle for replacement parts because the vehicle “sustained severe flood damage

prior to the sale.” (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were aware

of this severe flood damage before the sale. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #3.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Frederick Harris filed this action without a lawyer against

Defendants Beverly Hills Car Club, John Salas, and Adam Lopez. (ECF No. 1.) While

Plaintiff did not explicitly state particular claims, Defendants read the complaint to

bring claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty. (ECF No. 6, PageID #58.)

On October 30, 2025, Defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay the

proceedings or, in the alternative, to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper

venue. (ECF No. 6.) On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff was served with the motion by

certified mail. (ECF No. 7, PageID # 79.) On December 8, 2025, Defendants notified

the Court that Plaintiff had not filed a response and requested that the Court deem

the motion unopposed. (ECF No. 7.) On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response.

(ECF No. 8.) However one calculates the deadline to respond to Defendants’ motion,

Plaintiff’s response was untimely. On January 6, 2026, Defendants filed a reply in

support of their motion to compel arbitration. (ECF No. 9.)

ANALYSIS

Defendants moved to stay these proceedings pending arbitration under the

Federal Arbitration Act. (ECF No. 6.) Enacted in response to a perception that

federal courts were unduly hostile toward arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act

“establishes ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’” Epic Sys.

Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 505 (2018) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The Act makes arbitration agreements

“as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” Parker v. Tenneco, Inc., 114 F.4th

786, 792 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022)).

To compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, “a court must conclude that

(1) the parties agreed to arbitrate, (2) their agreement covers the claims at issue, and

(3) Congress intended those claims to be arbitrable.” Gavette v. United Wholesale

Mortg., LLC, 2025 WL 318224, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025) (citing Stout v. J.D.

Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000)).

A “written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving

commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract

or transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The

“principal purpose” of the Federal Arbitration Act is to ensure “that private

agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc.

v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); see also

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664 (2010). Section 2 of

the Act “makes arbitration agreements ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ as

written.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).

Where an action is referable to arbitration, a court “shall on application of one

of the parties stay” the case pending arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3; see Smith v. Spizzirri,

601 U.S. 472, 473–74 (2024). Section 3 of the Act does not permit the Court to dismiss

the case instead of issuing a stay where the dispute is subject to arbitration and a

party requests a stay pending arbitration. Smith, 601 U.S. at 478.

“Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with

a ‘national policy favoring [it.]’” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,

581 (2008) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443

(2006)). The Act embodies “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,

notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The language of the Act creates “a body of federal

substantive law of arbitrability.” Moses, 460 U.S. 1 at 24.

Courts have four tasks when considering a motion to stay proceedings pending

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act: (1) “determine whether the parties

agreed to arbitrate”; (2) “determine the scope of that agreement”; (3) if a party asserts

federal statutory claims, “consider whether Congress intended those claims to be

nonarbitrable”; and (4) if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in

the action are subject to arbitration, “determine whether to stay the remainder of the

proceedings pending arbitration.” Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir.

2000).

First, the Court determines that the parties agreed to arbitrate. The parties

entered into a sales agreement, which contains an arbitration clause. (ECF No. 6-1,

¶ 7, PageID #67.) Unlike other clauses in the sales agreement, the arbitration clause

is not bolded and did not require Dr. Harris to initial it. (Id.) But Dr. Harris did sign

the sales agreement. (Id., PageID #68.) In his complaint, Plaintiff does not contest

the validity or enforceability of the arbitration clause. (ECF No. 1.) In fact, Plaintiff

does not mention the arbitration clause at all. (Id.) In his untimely response to

Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff maintains that the arbitration clause is unenforceable

because the sale of the vehicle at issue was obtained through fraud. (ECF No. 8,

PageID #82.) Because Plaintiff’s response to the motion to compel arbitration was

not timely, the Court need not consider this argument. Additionally, he did not plead

fraud in the inducement in his complaint. Plaintiff cannot conjure new theories as

the case progresses. Even on the merits, however, Plaintiff’s response fails. Under

California law, which governs the sales agreement (ECF No. 6—1, PageID #67),

“claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract (as distinguished from claims of

fraud directed to the arbitration clause itself) will be deemed subject to arbitration.”

Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St., 673, P.2d

251–58 (Cal. 1983). Therefore, the Court determines that the parties agreed to

arbitrate.

Second, the Court determines that this dispute falls squarely within the scope

of the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause provides that “[a]ny dispute, claim

or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination,

enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, including the determination of the

scope or applicability of this Agreement to arbitrate, together with any claims of any

nature whatsoever pertaining to the Vehicle shall be determined by arbitration in the

County of Los Angeles to be administered by ADR Services, Inc. pursuant to its

commercial arbitration rules.” (ECF No. 6-1, { 7, PageID #67.) Plaintiffs claims for

breach of contract and breach of warranty arise out of or relate to the sales agreement.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are subject to arbitration.

Third, Plaintiff does not assert any federal statutory claims. Fourth, all the

claims in this action are subject to arbitration. On balance, the facts and

circumstances of this action weigh in favor of the Court staying proceedings pending

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel

arbitration (ECF No. 6) and STAYS this matter pending arbitration. Further, the

Court ORDERS the parties to provide a joint status report by June 30, 2026 updating

the Court on the status of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 12, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio