In the Int. of: M.A.H.C., Appeal of: M.C.L.L.

J-S31011-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.H.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: M.C.L.L., MOTHER :

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:

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: No. 1319 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000103-2025

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.H.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: M.C.L.L., MOTHER :

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:

:

: No. 1320 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000104-2025

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.H.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: M.C.L.L., MOTHER :

:

:

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: No. 1321 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000105-2025

J-S31011-25

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.C.L.L., MOTHER :

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:

:

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: No. 1322 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000110-2025

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 16, 2026

M.C.L.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the May 15, 2025 decrees involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to I.C., a male, born in January 2021, and to

triplets born in September 2023, M.A.H.C., a male, and I.H.C. and M.H.C.,

females (“the triplets”) (collectively with I.C., “the Children”). 1, 2 After careful

review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 I.C.’s biological father passed away in November of 2024. See N.T.,

5/14/25, at 37.

2 The parental rights of the triplets’ biological father, A.H., were also

involuntarily terminated by separate decree on the same date. In addition,

the trial court terminated the parental rights of any unknown putative fathers

to the Children by separate decrees. Neither A.H. nor any unknown putative

fathers have appealed or participated in this appeal.

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Factual and Procedural History

We gather the following relevant factual and procedural history from the

certified record. The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) was

involved with this family prior to the Children’s births, when Mother’s older

three children were removed from her care after she was residing in a

domestic violence shelter with them, but intended to return home to their

natural father, who had physically abused the family. 3 See DHS Exhibit 6 at

2. While Mother’s three children were in placement, she gave birth to I.C. in

the State of New Jersey.4 Upon his discharge from the hospital, I.C. was

placed in the emergency protective custody of a New Jersey child welfare

agency due to the ongoing dependency of Mother’s older children. As best we

can discern, the New Jersey trial court transferred I.C.’s dependency matter

to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in February of 2021, and he was

promptly placed in the custody of DHS.

The trial court adjudicated I.C. dependent on April 13, 2021 and

established his permanency goal as reunification. In furtherance of that goal,

Mother was ordered to, inter alia: (1) complete a parenting capacity

evaluation; (2) undergo a mental health evaluation and follow all resulting

____________________________________________

3Mother’s older three children have a different biological father from the

Children.

4 There is no evidence that Mother was a resident of New Jersey at the time

of I.C.’s birth.

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recommendations; (3) attend parenting classes; and (4) participate in

supervised visitation. Mother completed a parenting capacity evaluation

(“PCE”) with licensed psychologist, William Russell, Ph.D. Although there is

no evidence that Mother participated in the ordered mental health evaluation,

she was attending mental health treatment. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 42-44.

According to DHS caseworker, Dayonna McCray, Mother stopped her mental

health treatment sometime in 2023, and, as best we can discern, against

medical advice. See id. Mother presented documentation that she completed

a parenting class in 2021. See Mother’s Exhibit 1 at 1. With respect to

supervised visitation, Mother progressed to one unsupervised visit every other

week in October of 2023, but the court revoked those visits in October of

2024, and ordered that her visits again be only supervised. See DHS Exhibit

3 (I.C.) at 81-82, 87.

At the time Mother gave birth to the triplets, I.C.’s dependency was

ongoing, as Mother was not in compliance with I.C.’s permanency plan. The

triplets were placed in the emergency protective custody of DHS upon their

respective discharges from the hospital. They had separate shelter care

hearings in November of 2023, which resulted in the court confirming DHS’s

custody and their separate foster placements. DHS filed dependency petitions

with respect to the triplets on November 30, 2023. Thereafter, Mother

relocated to the State of New York in approximately March of 2024. See DHS

Exhibit 6 at 6. The court did not adjudicate the triplets dependent until

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September 12, 2024.5 On the same date, the court issued separate orders

finding that aggravated circumstances existed as to Mother due to the

involuntary termination of her parental rights to her older children, discussed

above.6 The court further ordered that DHS was not to provide efforts to

reunify Mother and the triplets. In contradiction to that directive, the court

established the triplets’ respective permanency goals as reunification and

directed Mother to complete substantially similar permanency goals as those

ordered in I.C.’s case. As such, Mother participated in another PCE with Dr.

Russell, who diagnosed her at that time with impaired intellectual functioning,

inter alia. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 23-24. With respect to supervised visitation,

it is important to note that the court ordered weekly supervised visits, but

Mother attended only three, with her final visit occurring on May 1, 2025. See

id. at 40, 49; see also DHS Exhibit 3 (I.H.C.).

On March 11 and 12, 2025, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23

____________________________________________

5 The dependency hearing was first scheduled for November 27, 2023, but

cancelled because the dependency petitions had not been filed. See DHS

Exhibit 3 (I.H.C.) at 24. The hearing was next scheduled for January 18,

2024, but was continued upon the request of DHS. See id. at 24-25. Mother

requested and was granted a continuance for the next scheduled hearing date

of March 11, 2024. See id. at 25. DHS requested and was granted

continuances for the hearings scheduled on April 22, 2024, May 22, 2024, and

July 18, 2024. See id. at 26-27.

6 Mother’s parental rights to those children were involuntarily terminated in

December of 2021.

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Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).7 At that time, I.C. had been in

placement for 48 months, and the triplets for sixteen months.

The involuntary termination proceeding with respect to the Children

occurred on May 14, 2025.8 The Children were represented by their guardian

ad litem (“the GAL”), Catherine Houseman, Esquire, of the Support Center for

Child Advocates (“SCCA”).9

DHS presented the testimony of Dr. Russell, as well as DHS caseworkers

Ms. McCray and Aliyah Richardson. DHS also introduced a total of six exhibits,

____________________________________________

7 DHS filed amended petitions as to the triplets on March 14, 2025, to correct

a clerical error.

8 The Honorable Daine Grey, Jr., presided over the subject involuntary

termination proceeding and the Children’s underlying dependency matters.

9 Our Supreme Court has held that “appellate courts should engage in sua

sponte review to determine if orphans’ courts have appointed counsel to

represent the legal interests of children in contested termination proceedings,

in conformity with” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240

A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020). Further, if the GAL is appointed to the dual role

of representing a child’s best and legal interests, “appellate courts should

review sua sponte whether the orphans’ court made a determination” that the

child’s legal interests and best interests “did not conflict.” Id. In this case,

inasmuch as I.C. was four years old, and the triplets were 20 months old, the

court did not appoint separate legal counsel for them. We discern no error.

See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding, “if the preferred

outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very

young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal

interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section

2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied.); see also id. at 1089 n.17 (stating

that children “as young as five or six years of age . . . hav[e] opinions which

are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody.”); In re

M.M.R., 287 A.3d 894 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum at 5 n.3)

(stating that a GAL can represent both the legal and best interests of a four-

year-old child in accordance with T.S.).

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including, but not limited to, copies of the trial court dockets from the

Children’s dependency cases, which the court admitted into evidence. See

DHS Exhibit 3; see also N.T., 5/14/25, at 14. Mother testified on her own

behalf and introduced one exhibit, which the court also admitted into

evidence.

By separate decrees dated May 14, 2025, and entered on May 15, 2025,

the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On May 29,

2025, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal along with concise

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte

on June 9, 2025. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 30,

2025.

Issues

Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in permitting into evidence the

documents pertaining to all the prior dependency court orders

– those not having been certified?

2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence DHS

Exhibit 5 (PCE of Mother – 4/25/23) and Exhibit 6 (PCE of

Mother – 6/20/24) and more specifically in regards to the

opinions having been expressed therein?

3. Whether the trial court erred in not permitting questioning of

DHS’s expert Dr. Russell regarding the doctor’s opinion

concerning Mother’s parenting capacity as (to paraphrase)

being generally accepted in the field (Frye)?

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4. Whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), the evidence was

insufficient to establish a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim, or having refused or failed to perform parental

duties?

5. Whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the evidence having

been insufficient to establish Mother caused the Children to be

without essential parental care, nor could that not have been

remedied?

6. Whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), the evidence having

been insufficient to establish conditions having led to

placement continued to exist, nor could not have been

remedied?

7. Whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), the evidence having

been insufficient to establish having led to placement continued

to exist?

8. Whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), the evidence having been

insufficient to establish termination of parental rights would

best serve the needs and welfare of the Children?

9. Whether the trial court’s decision under the above Sections

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) inclusively, as well as under

Section 2511(b), is submitted as having been contrary to the

weight of the evidence?

Mother’s Brief at 6-7 (cleaned up, footnotes omitted). 10

____________________________________________

10 The GAL filed a brief in this Court which advocated for the affirmance of

the involuntary termination decrees.

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Evidentiary Claims

In her first three issues, Mother contends that the court abused its

discretion with respect to three separate evidentiary rulings, which we review

according to the following standard.

The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound

discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed

only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. An

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise

of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Wilson v. Smyers, 284 A.3d 509, 514 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

a. The Children’s dependency dockets

In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion

when it admitted into evidence the dockets from the Children’s underlying

dependency cases, which contained the text of the court’s orders. See

Mother’s Brief at 16. Specifically, Mother asserts that the dockets were not

properly certified pursuant to Pa.R.E. 902(4), or otherwise authenticated. See

id. at 16.

“Unless stipulated, to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or

identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence

sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”

Pa.R.E. 901(a). “Generally, authentication requires a low burden of proof.”

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 818 (Pa. Super. 2022).

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However, “authentication is required prior to admission of evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Evidence can be authenticated through the testimony of a witness with

knowledge that “an item is what it is claimed to be.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1). In

the alternative, evidence can be authenticated by “[a]ny method of

authentication or identification allowed by statute or a rule prescribed by the

Supreme Court.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(10).

Pa.R.E. 902 states, in relevant part:

The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they

require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be

admitted:

...

(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official

record—or a copy of a document that was recorded or filed in a

public office as authorized by law—if the copy is certified as correct

by:

(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the

certification; or

(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3),

a federal statute, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.

Pa.R.E. 902(4).

Further, the Commonwealth’s statute governing the authentication of

official records into evidence, which includes court orders, provides the

following:

§ 6103. Proof of official records.

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(a) General rule.--An official record kept within this

Commonwealth by any court, magisterial district judge or other

government unit, or an entry therein, when admissible for any

purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by

a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the

record, or by that officer's deputy, and accompanied by a

certificate that the officer has the custody. The certificate may be

made by any public officer having a seal of office and having

official duties with respect to the government unit in which the

record is kept, authenticated by the seal of that office, or if there

is no such officer, by:

...

(2) The clerk of the court of common pleas of the judicial

district embracing any county in which the government unit

has jurisdiction, in the case of any government unit other

than a Commonwealth agency.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6103(a)(2).

Although related, dependency proceedings and termination proceedings

are two separate, distinct proceedings “with their own docket numbers,

records, and divisions within the Court of Common Pleas.” Interest of S.S.,

252 A.3d 681, 688 (Pa. Super. 2021). Therefore, the orders from underlying

dependency matters are not part of the termination record unless properly

admitted into evidence. See id. (holding that the court’s consideration of a

report that was entered at a prior hearing in the underlying dependency case,

but not admitted into evidence in the termination proceeding, constituted

“consideration of evidence outside the record[.]”).

Here, DHS introduced the dependency dockets into evidence, and

Mother objected on the basis that they were not properly certified. See N.T.,

5/14/25, at 14-15. The trial court overruled Mother’s objection. See id. In

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its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court reasoned that it properly overruled her

objection and admitted the dockets because the orders memorialized in the

dockets were certified by a “notarial act” by the clerk of the court. Trial Court

Opinion, 6/30/25, at 8-9 (citing 57 Pa.C.S.A. § 302, 310) (Revised Uniform

Law on Notarial Acts). However, the court’s reliance upon Title 57 is mistaken

inasmuch as it pertains to the law governing notaries and not to the admission

of evidence. Moreover, even if relevant, the court’s reliance upon the cited

subsections is misplaced since there are no markings on the dockets

demonstrating that they were notarized. See generally DHS Exhibit 3.

Here, DHS did not attempt to authenticate the dockets through any of

the methods identified in Rule 901(b). DHS also did not seek to establish

authenticity of the dockets pursuant to Rule 902(4) or Section 6103. Counsel

for DHS simply asked for the dockets to be admitted without laying any

foundation whatsoever. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 14. Accordingly, we conclude

that the Children’s dockets from their underlying dependency proceedings

were improperly admitted at the termination hearing.

Nevertheless, an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless if it “could not

have had any impact upon the orphans’ court’s decision.” In re A.J.R.-H.,

188 A.3d 1157, 1175 (Pa. 2018). Upon review, there is no indication that the

court relied upon the improperly admitted dockets to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights. Rather, as detailed infra, we conclude that the court

relied upon properly admitted evidence in involuntarily terminating Mother’s

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parental rights. Therefore, we conclude that the court’s admission of the

dockets was harmless error, and Mother is not entitled to relief on this claim.

See id.

b. Dr. Russell’s PCE reports

In Mother’s second issue, she argues that the trial court abused its

discretion when it admitted into evidence Dr. Russell’s PCE reports on the

basis of inadmissible hearsay. See Mother’s Brief at 16-18; see also DHS

Exhibit 5 and 6. Mother contends that Dr. Russell’s opinions were based upon

inadmissible hearsay because he relied upon materials that were not in

evidence. See id. at 17-18. Specifically, Mother asserts that Dr. Russell’s

reliance upon her medical records relating to her diagnoses, particularly

Trisomy X Syndrome, was inadmissible hearsay. See id.; DHS Exhibit 6 at

10. Mother argues that Dr. Russell’s reliance upon those records discredits

his opinions regarding her inability to provide safety for the Children and that

she is unlikely to develop a parental capacity through individual therapy. See

Mother’s Brief at 17-18; DHS Exhibit 6 at 10.

In his reports, Dr. Russell stated that Mother’s medical records indicated

that she was “born with Trisomy X syndrome,” which he described as having

“differences in brain structure, particularly in the cortical regions.” DHS

Exhibit 6 at 7; see also N.T., 5/14/25, at 24. He explained that the cortical

region of the brain is responsible for “executive functions,” which include her

ability to process information, organizational skills, and to follow tasks through

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to completion. DHS Exhibit 6 at 10; N.T., 5/14/25, at 23-24. Dr. Russell also

reviewed records indicating that Mother was diagnosed with major depressive

disorder with “recurrent, severe, [and] psychotic features,” autism spectrum

disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. DHS Exhibit 6 at 7.

Based on the totality of his evaluations, Dr. Russell opined that Mother was

unable to provide a safe environment for the Children and that her

impairments would not be overcome through participation in therapy. N.T.,

5/14/25, at 25; DHS Exhibit 6 at 10.

We discern no abuse of discretion by the court in concluding that Dr.

Russell’s reports were not hearsay inasmuch as he authored them and testified

with respect to them. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 17-31; see also Pa.R.E. 801(c)

(defining hearsay as “a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while

testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”).

To the extent Mother has relied upon Commonwealth v. McCloud,

322 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1974), in support of her argument, we conclude that she

misapprehends the holding of that case. See Mother’s Brief at 17. In that

second-degree murder case, the issue was the lower court’s allowance for the

Commonwealth to read an autopsy report into evidence without calling the

medical examiner who authored it as a trial witness. McCloud, 322 A.2d at

654. On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed for a new trial because the

defendant was denied his right to cross-examine the medical examiner

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concerning the contents of the autopsy report. See id. at 656-57. However,

the McCloud Court continued, “Of course, when the examiner does testify

and is subject to cross-examination, his report may be used.” Id. at 657.

Here, the author of the reports, Dr. Russell, testified with respect to his

findings and Mother cross-examined him. Therefore, Mother’s reliance upon

McCloud is unavailing.

Moreover, with respect to the basis for an expert’s opinion, this Court

has explained:

Rule 705 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence requires an expert

to “state the facts or data on which the opinion is based.” Pa.R.E.

705. Rule 703 provides that so long as the facts and data the

expert relies upon are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts

in that particular field of study, “they need not be admissible for

the opinion to be admitted.” Pa.R.E. 703. In interpreting these

evidentiary rules, this Court has held as follows:

It is well-established that an expert may express an opinion

which is based on material not in evidence, including other

expert opinion, where such material is of a type customarily

relied on by experts in his or her profession. Such material

may be disclosed at trial even though it might otherwise be

hearsay. . . . Such hearsay is admissible because the

expert’s reliance on the material provides its own indication

of the material’s trustworthiness[.] The fact that experts

reasonably and regularly rely on this type of information

merely to practice their profession lends strong indicia of

reliability to source material, when it is presented through a

qualified expert’s eyes. In re D.Y., [] 34 A.3d 177, 182

(Pa. Super. 2011).

In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 677 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Dr. Russell testified regarding his review of Mother’s records, as follows:

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Q: And what history did you review regarding [Mother]?

A: [A]ll the information I reviewed in both reports is listed on the

first page. They include the basic – typical material I receive in

these types of evaluations from [DHS], that is they have any

psychological records, any other mental health records, social

records, records of the case, the docket of the case, any

dependency petitions that were generated, and any other relevant

information that the referral team felt was important.

...

Q: Did you arrive at an opinion regarding [Mother]’s capacity to

parent [the C]hildren?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: What was that opinion?

A: That she’s not able to provide a safe and long-term

environment for [the C]hildren.

Q: How did you arrive at that conclusion?

A: Following the procedure I [] described, in terms of a typical

parenting capacity evaluation. By examining her history; viewing

different materials . . . such as prior psychological records, looking

at those results. There was IQ testing conducted on [Mother]. I,

then, used some psychological testing, in this case the MMPI-2, to

look at her functioning. . . . [T]hen, the interviews. I spent several

hours over the course of two evaluations with [Mother].

N.T., 5/14/25, at 20, 23. Dr. Russell also testified that the procedure that he

follows for parenting capacity evaluations are “consistent with the guidelines

for forensic psychologists,” and guidelines promulgated by the American

Psychological Association. Id. at 30.

Therefore, Dr. Russell based his opinion with respect to Mother’s

parental incapacity upon a combination of her medical records, as well as his

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own testing and interviews of Mother. See id. at 23. Dr. Russell’s testimony,

along with the content of the reports, satisfies the prerequisites for the proper

admission of his opinions pursuant to Rules 703 and 705. We discern no issue

with Dr. Russell basing his expert opinions, in part, upon “material not in

evidence” as he clearly explained that the materials were “of a type

customarily relied on by experts in his or her profession.” R.K.Y. 72 A.3d

669, 677.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling

Mother’s objection to the admission of Dr. Russell’s PCE reports on the basis

of inadmissible hearsay.

c. The Frye standard

In her third evidentiary issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by sustaining DHS’s objection to her counsel’s question during

Dr. Russell’s cross-examination. See Mother’s Brief at 6; see also N.T.,

5/14/25, at 30. The relevant portion of Mother’s cross-examination of Dr.

Russell was as follows:

Q: Is – based on your expertise, is your conclusion, based on

what you’ve been provided with consistent with other experts in

the field?

A: The procedures I follow in conducting a parenting capacity

evaluation are consistent with the guidelines for forensic

psychologists, as well as the guidelines for psychologists fostered

by the American Psychological Association.

Q: Is your conclusion consistent with what other experts would

conclude?

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[Counsel for DHS]: Objection. That calls for speculation.

...

The court: That objection is sustained. It calls –

[Mother’s counsel]: Well, that’s the Frye test.

The court: The objection is sustained.

N.T., 5/14/25, at 30 (emphasis added).

Mother contends that the excluded question related to the scientific

legitimacy of Dr. Russell’s expert opinion regarding her inability to provide a

safe environment for the Children. See Mother’s Brief at 18. Mother argues

that because the court did not allow her question, Dr. Russell’s expert opinion

did not meet the standard established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,

1014 (1923) and was consequently “questionable[.]” Id. at 19. We disagree.

With respect to expert testimony, Frye stated:

[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony

deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,

the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently

established to have gained general acceptance in the particular

field in which it belongs.

Frye, 293 F. at 1014. This standard was first recognized in Pennsylvania in

Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1280-82 (Pa. 1977), which relied

upon the Frye standard when reversing a murder conviction based upon

voiceprint analysis from a phone call confession, when experts in the field

questioned its credibility.

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Here, we conclude that Dr. Russell’s response to Mother’s first question

satisfied the Frye standard. Dr. Russell unequivocally stated that his

procedure was consistent with several guidelines in psychology, which

sufficiently establishes its general acceptance in the field. See N.T., 5/14/25,

at 30; Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Furthermore, we emphasize that Mother

stipulated to Dr. Russell’s expertise in parenting capacity. See N.T., 5/14/25,

at 15. Therefore, Mother’s third issue merits no relief.

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

Mother’s final six issues claim that the record evidence was insufficient

to support the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate her parental

rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

Our standard of review in this context is well settled:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the

decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must

accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the

trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an

appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it

has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial

courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple

hearings.

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In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court

must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with

the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and

support. Termination of parental rights has significant and

permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,

the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to

establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,

which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses

upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant

termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the

trial court determines the petitioner has established grounds for termination

under one of these subsections by “clear and convincing evidence,” the court

then assesses the petition pursuant to Section 2511(b), which focuses upon

the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. See

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

This Court need only agree with the trial court’s determination as to any one

subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to

affirm termination. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 830 (citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)).

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Our analysis in this case will focus upon 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and

(b),11 which provide, as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied by the parent.

...

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

In order to satisfy Section 2511(a)(2), the petitioning party must

establish: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

____________________________________________

11 Given our disposition with respect to Section 2511(a)(2), we need not

review Mother’s fourth, sixth, seventh, and ninth issues. See B.L.W., 843

A.2d at 384; see also In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 979 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc) (observing this Court may proceed to a review of one subsection of

Section 2511(a) “[w]ithout considering the orphans’ court’s determinations”

under any other subsection).

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(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021). Grounds for

termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), however, “are not limited to

affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied.” Id. (citing In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

Overall, we emphasize that “[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts

toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247

A.3d at 443.

Further, it is well-settled that Section 2511(a)(2) provides the statutory

basis for “terminating involuntarily the rights of a parent with a physical or

mental impairment.” In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 893 (Pa. 1986).

Our Supreme Court emphasized, “the focus in such cases is the effect which

an impairment has on the person’s ability to provide parental care, not the

mere fact of impairment. . . .” Id. As such, the Court stated, “The fact that

a parent suffers from a physical or mental disability is not, and never was, the

only relevant factor in determining whether his or her parental rights should

be terminated, or whether there should be a different legal standard applied.”

Id.

With respect to this subsection, Mother reiterates her assertion that Dr.

Russell’s expert opinion regarding her inability to parent the Children was

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inadmissible, and therefore the court erred in crediting his testimony. See

Mother’s Brief at 24. Mother argues that Dr. Russell’s personal interviews with

Mother revealed no discernable issues with her parenting capacity. See id.

at 24-25. Mother further claims that she successfully completed most of her

permanency objectives. See id. at 25.

The trial court found that Mother’s impaired cognitive abilities

constituted a repeated and continued incapacity that caused the Children to

be without proper parental and control. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/25, at

6-7. In addition, the court reasoned that Mother cannot or will not remedy

her incapacity. See id.

The court’s findings are supported by the certified record. We have

established that Dr. Russell’s expert opinions were indeed admissible in our

above discussion of Mother’s failed evidentiary issues. We further note that

the court was undoubtedly within its discretion to determine that Dr. Russell’s

expert testimony was credible. See In re R.A.M.N., 230 A.3d 423, 427 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (the trial court “is free to believe all, part, or none of the

evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility

determinations[.]”) (citation omitted).

It is undisputed that Mother has never provided the Children with proper

parental care and control, as they were all removed from her care shortly after

their respective births. Dr. Russell testified that, in his expert opinion, Mother

could not provide a safe environment or appropriate supervision for the

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Children. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 25. He explained that this opinion was, in

part, based upon Mother’s cognitive impairments. See id. at 24. Dr. Russell

stated that the psychological testing that he conducted with Mother and her

“presentation” at the interviews were “consistent with an extremely low IQ

score.” Id. at 24. For example, as mentioned above, Mother relocated to

New York in March of 2024, for the purpose of marrying a man. See DHS

Exhibit 6 at 6. Dr. Russell reported that, upon inquiring about the name of

her husband, she provided the wrong first name and was unable to remember

his surname. See id. Dr. Russell further testified that Mother has impaired

intellectual functioning, which he described as difficulties with “executive

functions,” as described above. Id. at 23-24. Dr. Russell also reported that

Mother’s Trisomy X syndrome could contribute to her decreased cognitive

functioning. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 24.

The record is devoid of any evidence that Mother successfully completed

the court-ordered mental health evaluation or any recommended treatment.

Notwithstanding, Ms. McCray testified that Mother had not participated in

mental health treatment in two years, last attending sometime in 2023. See

id. at 42-44. Even if she had engaged with treatment, Dr. Russell concluded

that therapy would not provide Mother “any tangible benefit” due to the extent

of her cognitive impairments. DHS Exhibit 6 at 10.

Further, while Mother was temporarily granted unsupervised visits with

I.C., there is no record evidence that she participated in those visits, and the

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court ultimately revoked them. See DHS Exhibit 3 (I.C.) at 81-82, 87. Mother

had regressed back to only supervised visits with I.C. for the seven months

preceding the subject hearing. See id. at 87-89. Mother never progressed

past supervised visits with the triplets and only attended three visits with them

in eighteen months. See generally DHS Exhibit 3 (I.H.C.); see also N.T.,

5/14/25, at 40, 49. Ms. Richardson, who supervised the visits, stated that

Mother was unable to manage the Children without assistance. See N.T.,

5/14/25, at 50. She explained that Mother would bring relatives to assist her

during visits or request help from the supervision staff. See id. at 49-50.

Mother testified that she had not taken a parenting class since 2021, well

before the birth of the triplets. See id. at 55-56; Mother’s Exhibit 1 at 1.

In addition, the triplets participated in services for undescribed special

needs, such as physical and occupational therapy. See N.T., 5/14/25, at 45.

Ms. McCray testified that M.A.H.C. and I.H.C. were “recently discharged,”

although the record does not describe from which services. Id. Mother

testified that she was unaware of any special services that any of the Children

received. See id. at 56.

The foregoing record evidence demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and

continued incapacity due to her cognitive impairments has caused the Children

to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for

their physical or mental well-being. The record undoubtedly supports that her

incapacity cannot or will not be remedied inasmuch as Dr. Russell concluded

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she would not benefit from therapy, and she had not remedied her incapacity

in four years with DHS services. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights

was warranted pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

If the trial court concludes that adequate grounds for termination exist

pursuant to Section 2511(a), the court must then turn to Section 2511(b),

which requires that it “give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Our Supreme Court has directed

that a Section 2511(b) inquiry must include consideration for the bond

between the parent and the child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993).

Our Supreme Court has further explained that “[i]t is only a necessary and

beneficial bond, after all, that should be maintained.” Interest of K.T., 296

A.3d 1085, 1109 (Pa. 2023). The “severance of a necessary and beneficial

relationship [is] the kind of loss that would predictably cause ‘extreme

emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” Id. at 1109-10.

The extent of the “bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the

circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321,

324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

The K.T. Court recognized that “case law indicates that bond, plus

permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the

determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional

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needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section

2511(b) analysis.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. Further, trial courts “must

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 1106.

It is within the province of the trial court to “consider the totality of the

circumstances when performing a needs and welfare analysis.” M.E., 283

A.3d at 839. We will not disturb such an assessment if the court’s factual

findings are supported by the record. See id.

Regarding Section 2511(b), Mother concedes that the Children are

“thriving” in their respective foster placements. Mother’s Brief at 26. Mother’s

only argument is that, assuming DHS failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden

under Section 2511(a), then the court abused its discretion by considering

Section 2511(b). See id. at 26-27; see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267

(reiterating that only if the trial court determines that termination is warranted

under Section 2511(a) does it then consider Section 2511(b)). Mother does

not argue that she has any bond with the Children. Mother’s argument fails

because we have already concluded that the involuntary termination of

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) was warranted.

In any event, the certified record supports the trial court’s conclusion

that DHS met its evidentiary burden pursuant to Section 2511(b). When

asked if the Children shared a parental bond with Mother, Ms. Richardson

replied, “Not at all. No.” N.T., 5/14/25, at 50. Ms. McCray testified that

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Mother had only seen the triplets “maybe twice” prior to her last visit with

them on May 1, 2025. Id. at 40. Further, Ms. Richardson explained that I.C.

would take about an hour to “acclimate” to Mother in visits. Id. at 50. She

continued that I.C. “wasn’t interested at all” in interacting with Mother. Id.

Ms. McCray testified that the Children share parental bonds with their

respective pre-adoptive caregivers. See id. at 33-36.

Therefore, the record evidence establishes that the Children do not

share any relationship with Mother, let alone a necessary and beneficial one.

See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. Based upon the undisputed testimonial evidence

set forth above, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

conclusion that the termination of Mother’s parental rights will serve the

Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant

to Section 2511(b).

Thus, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental

rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

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Date: 1/16/2026

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