Jane Doe v. Kristan P. Reibel

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

FILED

Jane Doe,

Jan 16 2026, 8:52 am

Appellant-Plaintiff CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

v.

Kristan Reibel,

Appellee-Defendant

Jane Doe,

Appellant-Plaintiff

v.

Kristan Reibel, Beauty + Grace Carmel, LLC, and Amber

Stanley,

Appellees-Defendants

January 16, 2026

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-258 | January 16, 2026 Page 1 of 21

Court of Appeals Case No.

25A-CT-258

Interlocutory Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court

The Honorable Jonathan M. Brown, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

29D02-2406-CT-006374

29D02-2406-CT-007217

Opinion by Judge Felix

Judges Foley and Scheele concur.

Felix, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Two women—both using the pseudonym “Jane Doe” (collectively, the

“Does”)—individually sued Kristan Reibel for negligence based on his alleged

violations of their privacy as well as alleged sexual, emotional, and

psychological abuse. Reibel filed motions to strike both complaints for failing

to name the plaintiffs therein, so the Does filed motions to proceed

anonymously. After a hearing, the trial court granted Reibel’s motions to strike

and denied the Does’ motions. The Does now bring this interlocutory appeal

and present two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court clearly erred by denying the Does’ motions to

proceed pseudonymously; and

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred by granting Reibel’s motions to

strike.

[2] We affirm.

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Facts and Procedural History

[3] This case arises from two separate negligence lawsuits against Reibel—the first

filed in Cause 29D02-2406-CT-006374 by a Jane Doe (“Doe 6374”), and the

second filed in Cause 29D02-2406-CT-007217 by another Jane Doe (“Doe

7217”). Prior to the Does filing their lawsuits, the State charged Reibel with

two counts of voyeurism—one count for his conduct involving Doe 6374 in

June 2022 and one count for his conduct involving Doe 7217 in April 2021. 1

Doe 6374 was identified as “Victim 1” in the publicly available charging

information and probable cause affidavit, Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 61, 63–67,

70, but she was identified by her name in the Guilty Plea and Sentencing Order;

Doe 7217 was identified by her name in the charging information, probable

cause affidavit, and Guilty Plea and Sentencing Order.

[4] Doe 6374 alleged in her complaint that in mid-June 2022, when she was 18

years old and Reibel was 53 years old, she house-sat for Reibel and discovered

he had hidden cameras in his home, including cameras in the bedroom and

bathroom where Reibel had told her to sleep and shower. Doe 6374 asserted

that she discovered a tablet containing multiple videos of her “in various stages

of undress and nudity,” and she maintained that she did not consent to being

videoed. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 23. Doe 6374 claimed Reibel was

negligent for “[f]ailing to uphold [her] privacy,” “[g]rooming” her, “[s]exually

1

Cause 29D04-2402-F6-001312. While this appeal was pending, Reibel pled guilty to the count relating to

Doe 6374, and the count relating to Doe 7217 was dismissed.

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abusing” her, “[e]motionally abusing” her, and “[p]sychologically abusing” her.

Id. at 23–24.

[5] Doe 7217 alleged in her complaint that in April 2021, Reibel made her an

“alcoholic beverage,” which she drank, and he then “engaged in non-

consensual sexual contact” with her. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 27. According

to Doe 7217, Reibel “recorded himself engag[ing] in non-consensual sexual

contact with [her] via hidden cameras” without her consent. Id. Doe 7217

asserted that in 2021 when she worked for Reibel’s business Beauty + Grace

Carmel, LLC, Reibel “watch[ed] employees of B+G changing clothes at the

B+G store.” Id. at 28. Doe 7217 also alleged that in February 2022, she house-

sat for Reibel, during which time he recorded her via hidden cameras in the

bathroom and bedroom without her consent. Additionally, Doe 7217 asserted

that in September 2022, Reibel told her that “he had recorded women in his

home, including her.” Id. at 28. Doe 7217 claimed that Reibel was negligent

for “[a]llowing [her] privacy to be violated,” “[s]exually abusing” her,

“[e]motionally abusing” her, and “[p]sychologically abusing” her. 2 Id. at 28.

[6] The Does filed their complaints under pseudonyms without simultaneously

seeking permission from the trial court to do so. In explanation, the Does’

2

Doe 7217’s complaint also contained allegations and claims against Reibel’s business partner Amber

Stanley and their business Beauty + Grace Carmel. All of Doe 7217’s claims against Stanley and Beauty +

Grace Carmel derive from her claims against Reibel. For example, Doe 7217 claims that Stanley and Beauty

+ Grace Carmel were negligent for “[f]ailing to protect [her] from” Reibel, “[f]ailing to warn of a dangerous

condition on the premises created by the presence of” Reibel, and “[f]ailing to provide proper and reasonable

procedures to reduce the risk of voyeurism.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 29.

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complaints contained the following footnote: “Given the sensitive nature of

JANE DOE’s claims against the Defendant[], a confidential disclosure of

JANE DOE’s identity will be made to counsel for Defendants.” Appellants’

App. Vol. II at 22, 26.

[7] Before filing responsive pleadings, Reibel filed motions to strike the Does’

complaints. Reibel contended that the Does had violated Indiana Trial Rules

10 and 17 by proceeding pseudonymously without first obtaining court

permission to do so. The Does opposed Reibel’s motions to strike and filed

motions to proceed pseudonymously, arguing their right to privacy outweighs

the “customary and constitutionally embedded presumption of open judicial

proceedings,” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 44, 50.

[8] After a hearing, the trial court granted Reibel’s motions to strike, denied the

Does’ motions to use pseudonyms, and granted the Does leave to amend their

complaints. Upon the Does’ motions, the trial court certified its order for

interlocutory appeal. We accepted jurisdiction for the Does’ interlocutory

appeals of that order, consolidated their cases, and this appeal ensued. 3

3

Beauty + Grace Carmel and Stanley did not file briefs in this appeal.

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Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[9] We typically review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decisions on the

Does’ motions to proceed under pseudonyms and Reibel’s motions to strike.

Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting

cases); Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc. v. AutoXchange.com., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 764, 768

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Cua v. Ramos, 433 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ind. 1982)).

Because the trial court here resolved disputed facts without conducting an

evidentiary hearing 4 and instead ruled on a paper record, our review is de novo.

See Walczak v. Labor Works-Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2013)

(citing GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001)).

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying the Does’ Motions to

Proceed Pseudonymously

[10] The Does assert the trial court erred by denying their motions to use

pseudonyms. Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution states that “[a]ll

courts shall be open.” The requirement that all courts be open leads to a

presumption of openness of judicial proceedings; that is, the public should

generally have access to such proceedings. In furtherance of that presumption,

Trial Rule 10(G) requires that a complaint “include the names of all the

parties,” and Trial Rule 17(A) requires that an action “be prosecuted in the

4

The trial court held a hearing on the Does’ motions to proceed pseudonymously and Reibel’s motions to

strike, but this hearing was an oral argument and no evidence was presented.

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name of the real party in interest.” These rules “protect the public’s legitimate

interest in knowing which disputes involving which parties are before the . . .

courts that are supported with tax payments and that exist ultimately to serve

the American public.” Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d at 1208 (quoting Doe v. Ind. Black

Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D. Ind. 1996)). In “exceptional cases,”

however, a court has “the discretion to permit a party to proceed under a

fictitious name.” Id. (quoting Ind. Black Expo, 923 F. Supp. at 139). To that

end, this court held in Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204 (Ind. Ct. App.

2007), that a plaintiff may not file a complaint under a pseudonym unless the

plaintiff can show she has “a privacy right so substantial as to outweigh the

customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial

proceedings.” Id. at 1208 (quoting Ind. Black Expo, 923 F. Supp. at 139).

[11] The Plainfield court held that to determine whether a plaintiff has the requisite

substantial privacy right, the trial court must “carefully review all the

circumstances of the given case” and “decide ‘whether the customary practice

of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should yield to the plaintiff’s privacy

concerns.’” Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d at 1208–09 (quoting Ind. Black Expo, 923 F.

Supp. at 140). “Against the backdrop of the presumption in favor of public

disclosure, . . . the court will review and then evaluate the nature of plaintiff’s

claims, his asserted need for privacy, and the defendants’ interests in public

disclosure of the plaintiff’s name.” Id. at 1209 (quoting Ind. Black Expo, 923 F.

Supp. at 140). In conducting this analysis, the Plainfield court required the trial

court to consider several factors, which may include any of the following:

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(1) whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental activity; (2)

whether the plaintiff would be required to disclose information of

the utmost intimacy; (3) whether the plaintiff would be

compelled to admit his or her intention to engage in illegal

conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution; (4) whether the

plaintiff would risk suffering injury if identified; (5) whether the

party defending against a suit brought under an anonym would

be prejudiced; (6) whether the interests of children are at stake;

(7) whether there are less drastic means of protecting legitimate

interests of either the party seeking anonymity or the opposing

party; (8) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been

kept confidential; and (9) the public interest in knowing the

litigant’s identities.

Id. at 1208 (citing Ind. Black Expo, 923 F. Supp. at 140; Doe v. Provident Life &

Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467–78 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). These factors are not

exclusive and not every factor may be present in every case. Id. (citing Provident

Life & Acc. Ins., 176 F.R.D. at 468).

[12] At the trial level and in their initial briefs on appeal, the parties applied the

framework crafted by the Plainfield court. However, given the apparent

application of the Indiana Access to Court Records (“A.C.R.”) Rules, 5

particularly A.C.R. Rule 6, we asked the parties to file supplemental briefing on

the issue. We first determine whether the A.C.R. Rules apply to requests to

5

The Plainfield court recognized the potential applicability of the predecessor to the A.C.R. Rules

(Administrative Rule 9) but did not decide the case thereunder because the parties did not base their

arguments thereon. Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-258 | January 16, 2026 Page 8 of 21

proceed pseudonymously. Concluding that they do, we then apply the A.C.R.

Rules to this case.

a. The A.C.R. Rules Apply to Requests to Proceed Pseudonymously

[13] The interpretation of the A.C.R. Rules is a question of law that we review de

novo. See Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019) (citing State v.

Holtsclaw, 977 N.E.2d 348, 349 (Ind. 2012)). We use the rules of statutory

construction to interpret the A.C.R. Rules. See In re P.R., 267 N.E.3d 1101,

1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Coronado v. Coronado, 243 N.E.3d 1121,

1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)). In construing a rule’s meaning, “our objective is to

ascertain and give effect to the intent underlying the rule.” Id. (citing Coronado,

243 N.E.3d at 1124). If the rule’s language “is clear and unambiguous, it is not

subject to judicial interpretation.” Id. (citing Coronado, 243 N.E.3d at 1125).

“We do not presume that the language was intended to be applied illogically or

to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Gaudin, 42

N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. 2015)).

[14] The purposes of the A.C.R. Rules are to (1) “[c]ontribute to public safety”; (2)

“[p]rotect individual Due Process rights and privacy interests”; (3) “[m]inimize

the risk of injury to individuals; (4) “[p]romote accessibility to Court Records”;

(5) “[p]romote governmental accountability and transparency”; (6) “[p]rotect

proprietary business information”; and (7) “[m]ake the most effective use of

Court and Clerk of Court staff.” Ind. Access to Court Records Rule 1. The

A.C.R. Rules “start[] from the presumption of open Public Access to Court

Records” and are designed to “provide maximum public accessibility to Court

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Records” because “denial of access could compromise the judiciary’s role in

society, inhibit accountability, and endanger public safety.” Id. cmt. However,

courts should keep in mind that “public policy interests . . . are not always fully

compatible with unrestricted access.” Id. To that end, the A.C.R. Rules

“attempt[] to balance competing interests and recognize[] that unrestricted

access to certain information in Court Records could result in an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy or unduly increase the risk of injury to individuals

and businesses.” Id.

[15] The A.C.R. Rules “appl[y] to all Court Records, regardless of the manner of

creation, method of collection, form of storage, or the form in which the record

is maintained.” A.C.R. 4(B). A “Court Record” means (1) “any document,

information, data, or other item created, collected, received, or maintained by a

Court, Court agency or Clerk of Court in connection with a particular case,” id.

3(B); and (2) “any document, information, data, or other item created,

collected, received, or maintained by a Court, Court agency, or Clerk of Court

pertaining to the administration of the judicial branch of government and not

associated with any particular case,” id. 3(C). See id. 3(A).

[16] “Information” is undefined in the A.C.R. Rules, so we give that term its plain

and ordinary meaning. See Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1054 (Ind. 2024)

(quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195

(Ind. 2016)). Generally, “information” denotes facts that have been provided or

learned about a person or thing. See Information, OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/information_n?tl=true (last

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visited Dec. 3, 2025); Information, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/information (last visited Dec.

3, 2025); Information, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/information (last

visited Dec. 3, 2025). A person’s name clearly falls within the plain meaning of

“information.” And because the Does’ names would have been “collected,

received, or maintained” by the trial court “in connection with” this case but for

their use of pseudonyms, the A.C.R. Rules govern whether or not the public

may have access to the Does’ names. Cf. In re K.H., 127 N.E.3d 257 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2019) (applying Ind. Admin. R. 9 (the A.C.R. Rules’ predecessor) to

exclude from public access records of a transgender person’s petition for a name

and gender marker change); In re A.L., 81 N.E.3d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)

(same).

[17] A.C.R. Rule 5 provides that certain types of records—such as mental health

cases filed pursuant to Indiana Code article 12-26—and personal information—

such as the Social Security Numbers of living persons—must be excluded from

Public Access. If a record or personal information is not excluded under

A.C.R. Rule 5, it may be excluded under A.C.R. Rule 6, which allows for

exclusion of a Court Record in “extraordinary circumstances.” To establish

extraordinary circumstances justifying exclusion of a Court Record, the person

requesting such exclusion must demonstrate

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(1) “by clear and convincing evidence that any one or more of

the requirements of Rule 6(A) have been satisfied,” A.C.R.

6(D)(2):

(a) “The public interest will be substantially served by

prohibiting access,” id. 6(A)(1);

(b) “Access or dissemination of the Court Record will

create a significant risk of substantial harm to the

requestor, other persons or the general public,” id. 6(A)(2);

or

(c) “A substantial prejudicial effect to on-going

proceedings cannot be avoided without prohibiting Public

Access,” id. 6(A)(3), and

(2) the A.C.R. Rule 6(A) grounds for her request outweigh the

Public Access interests served by the A.C.R. Rules, id. 6(D)(3).

If the trial court grants the request, it must use “the least restrictive means and

duration when prohibiting access” to the Court Record. Id. 6(D)(4).

[18] Today, we hold that a party’s request to use a pseudonym—when not covered

by A.C.R. Rule 5—is subject to the test provided by A.C.R. 6, 6 as articulated

6

Pursuant to Indiana Access to Court Records Rule 6(A), a person requesting exclusion of a Court Record

from public access must file a verified request therefor. The Does’ requests to proceed pseudonymously were

not verified filings, but no court had yet held that requests to proceed pseudonymously are governed by the

A.C.R. Rules, so our decision does not turn on the Does’ failure to do something they did not yet know they

needed to do. Cf. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc.,

897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)) (noting well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits). We

also observe that best practice for filing a complaint pseudonymously would be to file the complaint

simultaneously with the requisite A.C.R. Rule 5 notice or A.C.R. Rule 6 verified written request.

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above. Although we decline to follow the framework set forth in Plainfield, 860

N.E.2d at 1208–09, we still look to that case for guidance on this issue,

particularly considering that the factors used by the Plainfield court clearly align

with the A.C.R. Rule 6 test. See Minges v. State, 192 N.E.3d 893, 899 (Ind.

2022) (declining to follow case law when trial rule provided appropriate

framework for analyzing issue). With all this in mind, we now turn to the

merits of the case before us.

b. The Does Have Not Shown that Their Names Should Be

Excluded from Public Access

i. A.C.R. Rule 5

[19] The Does assert that their names must be excluded from public access under

A.C.R. Rule 5(B)(2), which provides for exclusion when required by statute.

The Does maintain their names are confidential pursuant to Indiana Code

section 35-40-5-12 because of Reibel’s criminal case. Under that statute, a

person’s name must be omitted from publicly accessible court documents if the

person is (1) a victim of a sex crime under Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4, or (2)

a child victim of a crime of violence (as defined in Indiana Code section 35-50-

1-2). Ind. Code § 35-40-5-12(a). First and foremost, this is not a criminal case,

so Indiana Code section 35-40-5-12 does not apply. Even if it could apply in a

civil case, it could not apply in this one. Reibel was charged with voyeurism—

one count for each of the Does—under Indiana Code section 35-45-4-5.

Voyeurism is not included in Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4, so neither of the

Does are a victim of a sex crime under that chapter. Nor are the Does child

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victims of a crime of violence. Because no provision of Indiana Code section

35-40-5-12 applies to either of the Does, their names are not confidential

thereunder. 7 Accordingly, the Does’ names are not automatically excluded

from public access pursuant to A.C.R. Rule 5(B)(2).

ii. A.C.R. Rule 6

[20] The Does also argue their names should be excluded from public access due to

extraordinary circumstances under A.C.R. Rule 6. In particular, the Does

contend that the public interest will be substantially served by prohibiting access

to their names, that access or dissemination of their names will create a

significant risk of substantial harm to them, and those grounds for their requests

outweigh the public access interests served by the A.C.R. Rules. We address

each contention in turn.

[21] Public Interest. The Does assert that the public interest will be served by

excluding their names from public access because they are victims of crime and

allowing them to use pseudonyms “support[s] their effort[s] to place

accountability for their economic loss and personal injury upon the person(s)

responsible for it through the civil justice system.” Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 7.

In support, the Does cite to the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois’s decision in Kane v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 2024 WL

7

As aforementioned, Doe 7217’s name was not redacted from any of the filings in the criminal case against

Reibel, and Doe 6374’s name was not redacted from the Guilty Plea and Sentencing Order.

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4907100, No. 22 CV 6476 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2024). The plaintiffs in Kane were

all students at Loyola University and victims of sexual assault or domestic

violence; in suing Loyola for its alleged indifference to on-campus sexual

assault, the plaintiffs sought to use pseudonyms. Id. at *1. The Northern

District of Illinois granted the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed pseudonymously,

reasoning in relevant part as follows:

Courts often extend the protection of anonymity to victims of sex

crime on the grounds that such individuals are especially

vulnerable. Unlike a litigant who objects to disclosure of their

own immoral or irresponsible conduct, a victim of sexual assault

has no choice in the harm they suffer. Pseudonymity also

prevents a chilling effect that would deter similarly situated

plaintiffs from bringing future lawsuits. The public has a strong

interest in protecting the identities of sexual assault victims so

that other victims will feel more comfortable suing to vindicate

their rights.

Id. at *2 (alteration, internal citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted).

[22] In the criminal context, the Indiana General Assembly has chosen to not

protect the identities of voyeurism victims in the same way it has chosen to

protect the identities of sex crime victims. See I.C. § 35-40-5-12(a). And

although voyeurism victims also do not have a choice in the harm they suffer,

that is true of almost all victims of crime. Furthermore, the Indiana General

Assembly has chosen to not categorize voyeurism as a sex crime. See id.

(defining “sex crime” as any offense found in under I.C. 35-42-4); id. §§ 35-42-4-

1 to -14 (voyeurism not included); id. § 35-37-4-4 (providing protections for

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victims of sex offenses listed in I.C. § 11-8-8-4.5(a)); id. § 11-8-8-4.5(a) (defining

“sex offender” as a person convicted of particular offenses; voyeurism not

included); id. § 16-21-8-1 (defining “sex crimes” for emergency services

purposes; voyeurism not included). Indiana law thus bestows fewer protections

on victims of voyeurism than it does on victims of sex crimes.

[23] In the civil context, crime victims have even fewer protections, as Indiana Code

section 35-40-5-12(a) does not apply to civil cases. Doe 6374’s lawsuit is

premised entirely on Reibel’s voyeurism. Without more, we cannot say that

Doe 6374 established by clear and convincing evidence that the public interest

will be substantially served by prohibiting access to her name. Doe 7217’s

lawsuit is premised in large part on Reibel’s voyeurism, but she also alleges that

she was the victim of “non-consensual sexual contact,” Appellants’ App. Vol. II

at 27. Although Indiana Code section 35-40-5-12(a) does not apply here, the

public undoubtedly has a strong interest in protecting Doe 7217’s identity so

that other victims of sex crime will feel more comfortable suing to vindicate

their rights. Therefore, this factor does weigh toward prohibiting public access

to Doe 7217’s name.

[24] Significant Risk of Substantial Harm. The Does maintain that having their

names disclosed presents a significant risk of substantial harm because

“intimate details of their bodies and their actions in private moments—that

were captured illegally—[will be] linked to them in the public record for the rest

of their lives.” Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 6; see also Appellants’ Am. Br. at 20.

According to the Does, “[s]uch violations go beyond mere embarrassment or

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humiliation.” Appellants’ Am. Br. at 20. At the trial level, the Does argued

that they have “suffered unnecessarily, and identifying [them] and publicly

tying [them] to these events would cause additional and unnecessary harm.”

Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 46, 52.

[25] At no point at the trial level or on appeal do the Does identify what this

“additional and unnecessary harm” would be. It is not clear that the use of Doe

7217’s name in the civil suit creates a significant risk of substantial harm—her

name is already linked to some of the intimate details of her body and her

private actions because her name was not redacted from any of the publicly

available filings in the criminal case against Reibel. Doe 6374’s name was

redacted from most of the publicly available filings in Reibel’s criminal case—

her name was disclosed in the Guilty Plea and Sentencing Order—but she, too,

fails to elucidate how further disclosure of her name creates a significant risk of

substantial harm. Additionally, and worthy of note, the rule does not suggest

exclusion is proper if there’s a “risk of harm”; instead, it requires the risk be

“significant” and the harm be “substantial.” It is the Does’ burden to establish

not simply a risk of harm, but a significant risk of substantial harm. On this

record, we cannot say the Does have demonstrated by clear and convincing

evidence that dissemination of their names will create a significant risk of

substantial harm to themselves, other people, or the general public.

[26] On Balance. The Does’ asserted reasons for prohibiting public access to their

names do not outweigh the public access interests served by the A.C.R. Rules.

The Does contend they should be allowed to use pseudonyms because their

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“status as victims of Reibel’s crimes is the entire basis for their use of the public

courts.” Appellants’ Am. Br. at 19 (emphasis omitted).

[27] In weighing the Does’ bases for exclusion against public access interests, the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana’s decision in

Doe v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc. is instructive. There, a plaintiff brought private

claims, primarily for money damages, against a former employer for alleged

harassment, a hostile work environment, and civil rights violations, among

other claims. 923 F. Supp. at 140–41. The Southern District of Indiana

determined that “allowing this plaintiff to proceed under a fictitious name in

this case would not be fair or appropriate” and the “reasons for adhering to the

customary practice of identifying the parties are powerful in this case.” Id. In

reaching this conclusion, the District Court stated in relevant part as follows:

To begin with, these are private claims, primarily for damages,

that the plaintiff himself has chosen to bring to this court.

Unlike, for example, the victim in a criminal case, he has not

been caught up unwillingly in litigation in public courts but has

instead chosen to initiate this action. Nor does plaintiff claim

that he is an unwilling victim of unlawful action by a

government. The fact that these are damages claims against

private parties is not necessarily decisive in and of itself, but it

takes this case outside the categories of cases in which courts

have most often been willing to allow use of fictitious names.

923 F. Supp. at 141. The Does argue they are victims in a criminal case, and

their civil lawsuits against Reibel are an extension of his criminal conduct such

that they are merely unwilling participants in litigation. We cannot agree.

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[28] Although they may be crime victims, the Does have chosen to bring their

private claims, which are primarily for damages, to court. See Ind. Black Expo,

923 F. Supp. at 141. In those private claims, the Does directly accuse Reibel of

several forms of serious and deliberate wrongdoing, and the Does attack

Reibel’s integrity and reputation. See id. Because the Does have made their

accusations publicly, basic fairness requires that the Does stand behind those

accusations and that Reibel be able to defend himself publicly. See id. at 141–42

(collecting cases). Reibel has a powerful interest in being able to respond

publicly to defend himself, not only in court but also in other situations where

the Does’ claims may be of interest to those with whom Reibel has business or

other dealings. See id. at 142.

[29] Additionally, the Does “ha[ve] raised claims in which the parties’ testimony is

virtually certain to be at odds on material matters” such that “their credibility

will be directly at issue.” Id. Part of Reibel’s defense will likely include direct

challenges to the Does’ credibility, which may well be affected by the facts the

Does prefer to keep secret—details of their bodies and private actions. 8 See id.

While these may be sensitive subjects that the Does reasonably want to keep

8

We also note that some of the material that likely gives the Does the most cause for concern should it be

made public may qualify for exclusion under other provisions of the A.C.R. Rules. For instance, A.C.R.

Rule 5(B)(11) and (12) may be applicable for excluding exhibits portraying a person’s “uncovered genitals” or

“sexual conduct,” respectively. This opinion should in no way be read to foreclose the possibility of

excluding from public access anything other than the Does’ names.

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out of the public eye, they are also at the heart of the Does’ credibility in

making the serious accusations they have made here. See id.

[30] Based on the facts of this case, we cannot say that the grounds the Does have

asserted for excluding their names from public access outweigh the public

access interests served by the A.C.R. Rules. The Does chose to rely on blanket,

unsupported assertions of harm. Such bare assertions are not the extraordinary

circumstances contemplated by A.C.R. Rule 6. And both the Does’ names

were accessible through Reibel’s criminal case, thereby diminishing the weight

of their interests in prohibiting public access to their names in their civil cases.

We therefore cannot say the trial court erred by denying their motions to

proceed pseudonymously.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Reibel’s Motions to Strike

[31] The Does contend the trial court erred by granting Reibel’s Trial Rule 12(F)

motions to strike their complaints. Trial Rule 12(F) provides that upon a

party’s motion, a trial court “may order stricken from any pleading any

insufficient claim or defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Based on our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by denying the Does’ motions to use pseudonyms—that is, the

Does must sue Reibel in their own names—we must also conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by granting Reibel’s motions to strike.

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Conclusion

[32] In sum, the trial court did not err by denying the Does’ motions to proceed

anonymously or by granting Reibel’s motions to strike their complaints. In

reaching these conclusions, we are not unmindful of or insensitive to the Does’

desire to shield from the public eye the intimate details of their persons and

private actions that will likely be divulged as litigation continues in this case.

But on this record, the Does’ desire alone does not overcome the presumption

of openness enshrined in our constitution and built into the A.C.R. Rules.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[33] Affirmed.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Ashley N. Hadler

Garau Germano, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE – KRISTAN REIBEL

Christopher P. Jeter

Alexandra M. Dowers

Massillamany Jeter & Carson LLP

Fishers, Indiana

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