In Re Juanita M.

01/16/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 1, 2025

IN RE JUANITA M.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Dyer County

No. 23-JV-249 Jason L. Hudson, Judge

No. W2025-00822-COA-R3-PT

In this action to terminate parental rights, the mother, father, and child all tested positive

for methamphetamine. Accordingly, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services

(“DCS”) took the child into protective custody, and the child was adjudicated dependent

and neglected. Despite completing many of DCS’s requirements, the mother and father

continued to fail drug tests. DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the

trial court determined that three grounds supported termination as to both parents: (1)

persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3)

failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical custody of or financial

responsibility for the child. The trial court also concluded that termination of both parents’

rights was in the child’s best interest. Both parents have appealed. Discerning no

reversible error, we affirm

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CARMA DENNIS

MCGEE, J., joined. ANDY D. BENNETT, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion.

Angela W. Mueller, Trenton, Tennessee, for the appellant, Angela M.C.

Mark D. Johnston, Dyersburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, Hector M.C.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jason R. Trautwein, Assistant

Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves a November 20, 2024 petition to terminate parental rights (“the

Termination Petition”) filed by DCS in the Dyer County Juvenile Court (“trial court”)

seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angela M.C. (“Mother”) and Hector M.C.

(“Father”) to their child, Juanita M.C. (“the Child”).1 The Child had been born in October

2020. In the Termination Petition, DCS alleged that clear and convincing evidence

supported the following grounds for termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the

conditions that led to the Child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest

an ability and willingness to care for the Child. DCS also alleged that termination as to

both parents was in the Child’s best interest.

The facts that led to the filing of the Termination Petition are largely undisputed. In

November 2023, DCS filed a petition seeking temporary custody of the Child and

requesting that the trial court adjudicate the Child dependent and neglected. DCS alleged

that caseworker Shimeka Foster had visited the parents’ home in response to a “referral of

domestic violence, drug exposed child, and environmental neglect.” Ms. Foster had

“observed the home to be unclean” with “trash, food, and other items covering the living

room and kitchen areas.” Ms. Foster had also observed that the “stove was pulled out from

the wall allowing access for the [C]hild to get behind the stove.”

DCS further alleged that both parents had initially refused to submit to drug screens.

According to DCS, Mother had been enrolled in Sparo Health, a “suboxone” clinic, and

personnel at the clinic had informed DCS that Mother had tested positive for

methamphetamine, methadone, and suboxone in August 2023. Mother subsequently tested

negative for all substances on October 2, 2023. Father tested positive for amphetamine

and methamphetamine on October 6 and 19, 2023. The Child underwent a hair follicle

drug screen which returned positive for methamphetamine on October 24, 2023. The

parents were each indicted for criminal child neglect in the Dyer County Circuit Court by

reason of the Child’s exposure to methamphetamine.

On November 3, 2023, the trial court entered an ex parte order granting temporary

custody of the Child to DCS after finding probable cause that the Child was dependent and

neglected based upon the facts alleged in the petition. DCS then placed the Child into the

care of the foster mother (“Foster Mother”) and her husband (collectively, “Foster

Parents”). The Child resided with Foster Parents continuously thereafter. On the date of

removal, both parents signed a Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights

(“Criteria and Procedures”) document indicating that they had received a copy of the

document and that its contents had been explained to them. The Criteria and Procedures

document is a standard form created by DCS that is given to parents whose children have

1

In the Termination Petition and many of the pleadings before the trial court, the Child’s name was

incorrectly spelled, “Junita.” This appeal was also filed using the incorrect spelling of the Child’s name.

However, the Child’s name appears as “Juanita” on her birth certificate, and we have accordingly amended

the style of the appeal to reflect the correct spelling.

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been placed in foster care. The document was provided to Mother and Father in English,

and testimony at trial revealed that DCS did not provide Father, whose primary language

is Spanish, with an interpreter to explain the document.

On November 15, 2023, the trial court entered an order appointing counsel for

Mother and Father. On November 27, 2023, DCS conducted a meeting with Mother and

Father for the purpose of creating and agreeing to a permanency plan with the stated goal

of reunification. The permanency plan required Mother to participate in “homemaker

services” provided by DCS, to participate in an alcohol and drug assessment (“A&D

Assessment”), to follow recommendations from the A&D Assessment, to submit to drug

screens and consistently test negative, and to attend “weekly outpatient therapy” as needed.

The plan required Father to also complete an A&D Assessment, to follow its

recommendations, and to submit to drug screens and test negative each time. DCS did not

provide Father with a Spanish interpreter to explain the goals of the permanency plan or

Father’s responsibilities thereunder.

On February 5, 2024, Father tested positive on a hair follicle drug screen for

methamphetamine, and Mother tested negative for all substances. On February 23, 2024,

the Dyer County Juvenile Court Foster Care Review Board (“the Board”) reviewed the

parents’ progress on the permanency plan and determined that Mother and Father had each

complied with his or her respective “significant responsibilities” and that DCS had made

“reasonable efforts” toward reunification. The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing

on February 29, 2024, during which the court ratified the November 27, 2023 permanency

plan and set a child support obligation for each parent at $100.00 per month.

On May 1, 2024, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order adjudicating

the Child dependent and neglected. The order included the following relevant findings:

Upon hearing the evidence presented on this date, the Court finds that

there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor child is dependent and

neglected due to drug exposure by the parents; the Court specifically finds

that [Mother, Father, and the Child] were all 3 positive for methamphetamine

and that the child was under the care and control of the parents during the

time she tested positive for methamphetamine.

[DCS] requested to reserve the issue of severe abuse in this matter due

to the progress of the parents with services at this time, but the Court would

note that it specifically finds the child was positive for methamphetamine

while in the care and control of the parents who were also positive for

methamphetamine.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) The trial court set the matter for dispositional hearing on

June 14, 2024.

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On June 26, 2024, the trial court entered an order determining that the Child should

remain in DCS custody and setting a hearing date in August 2024 for ratification of a

second permanency plan. DCS implemented the second permanency plan on July 25,

2024, setting forth continued responsibilities for both Mother and Father, including

completion of A&D assessments, submission to random drug screens, and participation in

recommended programs. The record indicates that Father, Mother, and counsel for Mother

were present during the creation of the permanency plan. DCS did not provide Father with

a Spanish interpreter to assist in Father’s understanding of the second permanency plan.

On August 20, 2024, the Board conducted a second review of the parents’ progress

relative to the permanency plan. Mother and Father were represented by counsel via Zoom

during the Board review. The Board noted that Mother and Father had both completed

“intensive out-patient counseling,” A&D assessments, and parenting classes. The Board

concluded that Mother had complied with her responsibilities under the permanency plan

but that Father had not. Specifically, the Board observed that Mother was “actively

participating” in the drug screen requirement but that Father was “not compliant” with the

drug screening. The Board expressed “major concerns with [Father’s] continued failure of

drug screens” and additionally noted that there had been “no forward movement” toward

reuniting the Child with the parents due to “[Father’s] failure to comply with passing drug

screens.” The Board found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in

reaching the goals set forth in the permanency plan and recommended that DCS “look for

relative placement, move toward [Termination of Parental Rights] and adoption.” The trial

court ratified the permanency plan in an order entered on October 2, 2024.

On September 13, 2024, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on a hair

follicle drug test. On December 10, 2024, Mother pled guilty to criminal child neglect

based on the indictment that had been brought against her shortly after the Child’s removal.

Father’s criminal charges of child neglect remained pending. DCS filed the Termination

Petition on November 20, 2024. The Board conducted another review of the parents’

progress relative to the second permanency plan on February 27, 2025. Mother and counsel

for Father attended the Board review meeting via Zoom. The Board again concluded that

Mother had complied with her most significant responsibilities in the permanency plan, but

that Father had not complied with the drug screening requirements. The Board also noted

that DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in reaching the goals set forth

in the permanency plan. The Board recommended that DCS “move forward” in seeking

termination of parental rights and adoption.

On May 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing relative to the Termination

Petition. The trial court heard testimony from Mother; Father; Foster Mother; and DCS

caseworkers, Shimeka Foster and Loretta O’Neill. On May 23, 2025, the trial court entered

an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court

determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that three statutory grounds supported

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termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s

removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to

assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also

determined that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s

best interest. Mother and Father timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Mother has raised the following issues on appeal, which we have restated and

reordered as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the conditions leading to the removal of the Child from

Mother’s custody persisted.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing

evidence, that Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness

to assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child.

3. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing

evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the

Child’s best interest.

Father has raised the following additional issues, which we have also restated and reordered

as follows:

4. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the ground of severe child abuse had been established

as to Father.

5. Whether the trial court erred in determining, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the grounds of persistent conditions and failure to

manifest an ability and willingness to care for the Child had been

established in support of termination of Father’s parental rights when

DCS had purportedly failed to make reasonable efforts to assist Father

relative to these grounds.

6. Whether the trial court failed to properly consider the failure of DCS

to make reasonable efforts to provide translators or other reasonable

methods of communication to Father when Father’s primary language

was Spanish and he had limited communication skills in English.

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7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly consider all relevant

and child-centered factors applicable to this case in its best interest

analysis.

III. Standard of Review

In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether

the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006). The

trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record, accompanied by a

presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523-24 (Tenn.

2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de

novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524

(citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s determinations

regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be

disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92

S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

“Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their

children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling,

92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not

absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence

justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96,

97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our

Supreme Court has explained:

The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property right.”

Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of

parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a

complete stranger and of [“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations

of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1);

see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating

parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and

consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to “fundamentally

fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; see

also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27

(1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of

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unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental

parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

“Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief

or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or

substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re

Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-

convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly

probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182

S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

***

In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings,

however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to whether

the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance

of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements

necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-

97.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental]

rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,”

including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319

S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

IV. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (West July 1, 2021, to current)2 lists the

statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part:

(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with

the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a

child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding

by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship

rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37,

chapter 2, part 4.

2

Unless otherwise noted, throughout this Opinion, all citations to any section within Tennessee Code

Annotated §§ 36-1-113 and 36-1-102 shall be made in reference to the version that was effective on the

date the Termination Petition was filed and not to any other version of the statute. See, e.g., In re Zakary

O., No. E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at *4, n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2023). In some

instances, such as this one, the section that was in effect at the time the Termination Petition was filed has

not changed and therefore remains current.

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***

(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the

best interests of the child.

As delineated above, the trial court concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly

supported three statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights: (1)

persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal from the parents’ custody, (2)

severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical

custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. We will address each statutory ground

in turn.

A. Persistence of Conditions

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) provides for termination of parental

rights when:

(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal

custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a

court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has

been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and

neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist,

preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or

guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable

probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further

abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care

of the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied

at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the

parent or guardian in the near future; and

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child

relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early

integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;

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(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the

termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard[.]

To terminate parental rights under this ground, a court must find that each of the foregoing

elements was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re B.A.C., 317 S.W.3d 718, 725

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).

In the instant case, the trial court summarized its findings regarding persistence of

conditions as follows:

[C]lear and convincing evidence established that [Mother] and [Father] failed

to remedy the persistent conditions, which barred reunification with the

child.

The child was removed from the custody of the parents on November

3, 2023, and it has been more than 6 months since the removal of the child

from the parents. Environmental concerns and drug use were the reasons for

the removal of the child from the custody of Mother and Father. Initially the

environmental concerns were addressed, and may still be addressed;

however, no one has been in the parents’ home in some time despite efforts

to visit the home by [DCS]. Mother pled guilty and admitted even that she

had exposed the child to methamphetamine. There has been no change in 18

months for the parents. The parents have failed drug screens throughout the

case, and have not gone for 6 consecutive months without failing a drug

screen. The use of methamphetamine has not been eradicated from the home.

The conditions that led to the removal of this child still exist and other

conditions exist in the homes of the parents that, in all reasonable probability,

would lead to further neglect or abuse of the child. There is little chance that

these conditions will be remedied soon so that the child can be returned safely

to the custody of either parent, and continuation of the parent/child

relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of being placed into a

safe, stable and permanent home. Based on the evidence, this Court finds

that clear and convincing evidence has been established that [Mother] and

[Father] have not remedied the persistent conditions that prevent

reunification with the child.

Regarding the condition of the parents’ home, DCS caseworker, Ms. O’Neill,

testified that the parents had moved residences and had “worked the [homemaker]

services” to the satisfaction of the homemaker service facilitator, Judy Gurien, and that Ms.

Gurien had reported that the parents’ new home environment had improved. However, the

record demonstrates that Mother and Father had not allowed DCS to enter their home since

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October 2024 such that there was no evidence between October 2024 and May 2025 that

the home remained in good condition. To this point, Ms. O’Neill testified that she had

attempted to visit the parents’ home “probably six times” since October 2024, and again

on the morning of the trial, but that she had not been granted access. Despite these

concerns, this Court has determined that a “record ‘devoid of proof’” about a parent’s home

environment or other conditions does not suffice to prove the ground of persistent

conditions by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Evandor C., No. M2022-01697-

COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 678014, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024). This is so even if

the lack of proof is due to the parents’ failure to cooperate. See id. We therefore conclude

that the evidence, as it specifically relates to the environmental conditions of the parents’

home, was insufficient to prove the ground of persistence of conditions.

As this ground relates to Father’s conduct, the evidence of his continued drug use

following removal of the Child does preponderate in favor of the trial court’s findings.

After the Child was removed into DCS custody, Father did not comply with the drug screen

requirements set forth in the permanency plans and continued to test positive for

methamphetamine. This included testing positive on February 21, 2025, just three months

before the termination trial. We find that Father’s continued drug use throughout the

proceedings indicates that (1) return of the Child into Father’s custody would have placed

the Child at risk of substantial harm, (2) there was little likelihood that Father’s drug use

would be remedied at an early date such that the Child could be safely returned to him in

the near future, and (3) continuation of the relationship between Father and the Child would

greatly diminish the Child’s opportunity to be placed in a safe and stable home. Each

element of this statutory ground, as it pertains to Father, has been met. See § 36-1-

113(g)(3)(A)(i)-(iii). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that clear and

convincing evidence supported this ground for termination of Father’s parental rights to

the Child.

The analysis is more difficult with respect to Mother. Although Mother tested

positive for methamphetamine on September 13, 2024, she later tested negative for any

illicit substances in January 2025. Mother did not report for a drug screen in February

2025, but this was because she had been incarcerated on the child neglect charges that had

been brought against her in 2023. During the intervening months, the Board repeatedly

noted that Mother had been making progress toward the permanency plan goals and that

she had substantially complied with plan requirements.

However, despite Mother’s commendable efforts to discontinue her drug use and

the evidence that she had made some improvements in this regard, Mother continued to

live with Father—an active drug user—until the termination trial. Mother did not indicate

any plan to extricate herself from her relationship with Father or to move to a different

residence so that she could eventually be reunited with the Child in a drug-free home. Thus,

returning the Child to Mother’s custody would put the Child at risk of substantial harm and

would diminish the Child’s chances for early integration into a safe and stable home for

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the same reasons that returning the Child to Father’s custody would do so. As noted above,

Father’s continued drug use appeared unlikely to improve such that the Child could be

safely restored to his custody in the future, and the same was true for Mother as long as

Mother continued to reside with Father. For these reasons, we find clear and convincing

evidence supports the trial court’s determination that this ground had been established as

to Mother as well as to Father.

B. Severe Child Abuse

The trial court concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated

that Mother and Father had committed severe child abuse against the Child by exposing

the Child to methamphetamine. The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-

113(g)(4) (West July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025) that was in effect at the time the

Termination Petition was filed provided that this ground had been proven when:

Under a prior order of a court or by the court hearing the petition to terminate

parental rights or the petition for adoption, a child has been found to be a

victim of severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, and the parent or

guardian has been found to have knowingly or with gross negligence either

committed severe child abuse or failed to protect the child from severe child

abuse.

At the time the Termination Petition was filed, § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E) (West July 1, 2024,

to December 31, 2024) included the following definition of “severe child abuse”:

The ingestion of an illegal substance or a controlled substance by a child

under eight (8) years of age that results in the child testing positive on a drug

screen[.]

Here, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination

of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights relative to this ground, stating:

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-

102(b)(27)(E), there is clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] and

[Father] have committed severe child abuse as defined in TCA § 37-1-

102(b)(27)(E).

***

[T]he evidence as presented today shows that [Mother] and [Father] have

both committed severe abuse against the child pursuant to TCA § 37-1-

102(b)(27)(E) as evidenced [by proof of positive drug screens from Father,

Mother, and the Child] along with the certified guilty plea of Mother[].

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According to the testimony of Shimeka Foster, the testimony of the Mother

and Father, and a review of the exhibits consisting of the hair follicle results

of the child, the mother and the father, the Court specifically finds: that the

child was under the age of 8 at the time she was exposed to and tested positive

for methamphetamine on her hair screen, in fact the child was 3 years old at

the time; that the Mother and Father both testified they were using drugs,

specifically methamphetamine, at that time; and all three failed hair follicle

drug screens for methamphetamine. Further, Mother testified that the child

was in her care 100% of the time and if not with her then the child was only

with the Father. The parents knowingly and recklessly exposed this child to

their methamphetamine use, shown both through the drug screen results for

the parties and based on Mother’s admission in pleading guilty. Based on

these facts, this ground has been met [by] clear and convincing evidence.

The undisputed evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination that

this ground was established by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents. The Child

tested positive for methamphetamine in October 2023. Prior to that drug test, the Child

had been under the exclusive care and control of Mother and Father. On May 1, 2024, the

trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the Child was “dependent and

neglected due to drug exposure by the parents,” specifically finding that Mother, Father,

and the Child “were all 3 positive for methamphetamine and that the [C]hild was under the

care and control of the parents during the time she tested positive for methamphetamine.”

Significantly, neither Mother nor Father raised any objection to these findings in the

proceedings below. Neither appellant disputes that Father, Mother, and the Child all tested

positive for methamphetamine while all three were residing together.

On appeal, Father asserts that this Court should reverse the trial court’s findings as

this ground relates to him because “there is nothing in the record that would establish drug

use by the Father in the presence of the [C]hild” and “there is nothing in the record that

would establish a reason for the Father to know of the potential for any drug use by the

mother around the Child.” Thus, according to Father, he did not “knowingly” expose the

Child to methamphetamine. However, “a parent’s failure to protect can be considered

knowing if the parent was deliberately ignorant, as where the parent avoids actual

knowledge of the abuse or neglect but is aware of facts, circumstances, or information that

would put a reasonable parent on notice of the risk and the need to protect the child.” See

In re Markus E., 671 S.W.3d 437, 463 (Tenn. 2023). Here, there is one glaringly obvious

reason that Father should have known that the Child was at risk of severe child abuse from

exposure to methamphetamine, and that is that Father himself had been using

methamphetamine while living with the Child. Furthermore, the record established that

Mother had been going to a suboxone clinic prior to the Child’s removal because of her

addiction to methamphetamine, and Father, who resided with Mother, should have been

aware of these facts and circumstances.

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Moreover, this Court has determined that it is not the “method or level of exposure

of the child to drugs” upon which the determination of severe child abuse turns, but rather

it is “the exposure of the child to harm that matters[.]” See In re A.L.H., No. M2016-01574-

COA-R3-JV, 2017 WL 3822901, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017). Indeed, “[t]his

Court has repeatedly held that exposure of a child to drugs constitutes severe child abuse.”

See id.; see, e.g., In re Ezmaie F., No. M2023-01731-COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 5183675, at

*7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2024) (affirming a finding of severe child abuse when the

parents’ two children had tested positive for methamphetamine and other drugs and

determining that “each parent was, at minimum, grossly negligent in allowing each child

to ingest an illegal substance”); In re Kailey A., No. E2021-00801-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL

773617, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2022) (finding by clear and convincing evidence

that the mother had severely abused her children based on “their exposure to

methamphetamine in the family home as shown by, among other things, their subsequent

drug test results being positive for methamphetamine”).

The Child’s October 2023 positive hair follicle drug test definitively proved that the

Child had been exposed to methamphetamine while in Mother’s and Father’s exclusive

care. Neither Mother nor Father deny that they each used methamphetamine during the

time when they both resided with the Child or that the Child was exposed to

methamphetamine while in their care. Whether it was Mother or Father who exposed the

Child to methamphetamine, and whether each knew of the other’s drug use, is of no import.

The controlling determination is that while the Child was in the exclusive care of Mother

and Father, both parents failed to protect the Child from exposure to drugs. See In re

A.L.H., 2017 WL 3822901, at *4. Therefore, Father’s arguments concerning this ground

are unavailing, and we affirm the trial court’s determination that this ground was

established by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents.

C. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume

Legal and Physical Custody of or Financial Responsibility for the Child

The trial court also determined that Mother and Father had failed to manifest an

ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child.

Regarding this statutory ground, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) provides

for termination of parental rights when:

A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and

willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial

responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and

physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or

psychological welfare of the child[.]

To prove this ground, DCS was required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that

(1) Mother and Father failed to manifest either an ability or willingness to assume custody

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of or financial responsibility for the Child and (2) returning the Child to Mother’s or

Father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s welfare. In re Neveah

M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674, 677 (Tenn. 2020); In re Jeremiah S., No. W2019-00610-COA-

R3-PT, 2020 WL 1951880, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020) (“Under this ground for

termination, the petitioner must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.”).

As to the first prong, our Supreme Court has instructed:

[S]ection 36-1-113(g)(14) places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or

guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume

legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a person

seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that

a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then

the first prong of the statute is satisfied.

In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 677 (citing In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-

PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018)). Concerning the

“substantial harm” requirement of the second prong, this Court has observed:

The courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose a risk

of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable to

precise definition because of the variability of human conduct. However, the

use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First, it connotes a

real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it

indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While

the harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a

reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.

In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Apr. 4, 2018) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (footnotes

omitted in Maya R.)).

In the instant action, the trial court articulated the following relative to this ground:

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14), clear and convincing

evidence has established that [Mother] and [Father] have failed to manifest

an ability and willingness to care for the child and placing the child in either

of their custody would pose a substantial harm to the child. There are two

parts to the analysis of this ground which will be addressed below.

This matter began approximately 18 months ago with drug use by the

parents which resulted in the child testing positive for methamphetamine.

[DCS] offered services to the parents, and whether it was enough is

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debatable, but the fact is that the parents continue to have positive drug

screens after participating in the services offered. If drug use is still there,

then the parents are not manifesting an ability and willingness to assume

custody or care for the child in any manner. This child was positive for

methamphetamine at 3 years old. The Court is not a scientist and does not

know all medical effects of exposure to methamphetamine. If we assume

that was the first exposure, then maybe there will not be long term effects,

but we do not know that it was the first exposure, especially considering that

the parents still have not passed consecutive drug screens. Both parents were

charged with child abuse and neglect; Mother has entered a plea and has been

sentenced while Father has a hearing date in September. Drug screens have

been failed by both parents throughout this case, with neither passing

consecutive drug screens for even a period of 6 months. This continued drug

use has prevented the parents from assuming legal and physical custody or

financial responsibility for the child.

Placing the child in either Mother or Father’s custody would pose a

risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

The parents continue to engage in drug use. Mother was just released from

jail for child abuse and neglect in April of 2025. Father has pending criminal

charges for child abuse and neglect. There is a history of drug use by both

parents. All of these behaviors exhibited by the parents pose a risk of

substantial harm to the child, and there is no indication that these behaviors

would cease as they have not ceased in the 18 months the child has been in

foster care. The Court concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence

that [Mother] and [Father] have failed to manifest an ability and willingness

to assume custody of the child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g).

The evidence supporting termination discussed above pursuant to the grounds of

persistent conditions and severe child abuse also supports termination relative to this

statutory ground. After the Child was removed and placed into DCS custody in November

2023, both Mother and Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine, with

Mother’s latest positive test result in September 2024 and Father’s most recent positive

screen in February 2025. This demonstrates that neither parent was willing or able to take

the necessary steps to cease using drugs so that he or she could assume physical custody

of the Child. We acknowledge that Mother had made progress toward conquering her drug

addiction, as demonstrated by her occasional ability to return a clean drug screen.

However, Mother had not demonstrated consistency in ending her drug use during the

entirety of the proceedings. Even more troubling, Mother continued to reside with Father,

who was proven to be actively using methamphetamine just three months before the

termination trial.

Mother’s and Father’s continued drug use also supports termination as to the second

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prong of this ground because return of the Child to the parents would pose a risk of

substantial harm to the Child. Furthermore, the Child had resided with Foster Mother and

her family for eighteen months by the time of the termination trial, during which time the

Child had bonded with the Foster Parents. This Court has previously determined that

removing a child who has “bonded and thrived” with her current family amounts to

substantial harm. See In re Braelyn S., No. E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 4200088,

at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2020) (finding that the child would be at risk of substantial

psychological harm if custody were restored to the father who had been apart from the

child for five years and was a “virtual stranger”); In re Antonio J., No. M2019-00255-

COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 6312951, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019) (concluding that

placing the children in the mother’s custody would put them at risk of substantial harm

because the children were “very young” when they were removed and had “little to no

contact” with the mother for more than a year).

The Child had come to live with Foster Parents at the age of three. At trial, Foster

Mother testified that the Child was “thriving,” with her foster family and that she was “in

daycare,” playing “t-ball,” and “very active with the church.” Foster Mother further

articulated that the Child had “bonded” with the Foster Parents’ infant child and that she

got along “great” with both Foster Parents, actively participating in family events. Ms.

O’Neill testified that the Child had exhibited a “healthy parental attachment” to Foster

Parents and that their home was a “safe, secure environment” for the Child. By contrast,

Ms. O’Neill testified that the Child referred to Mother and Father by “their first names”

such that the Child did not appear to consider them parental figures. For the above-stated

reasons, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that both prongs of this ground were

established by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents.

V. Best Interest of the Child

When, as here, a parent has been deemed unfit by establishment of at least one

statutory ground for termination of parental rights, the interests of parent and child diverge,

and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838,

877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (“The best

interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear

and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” (quoting In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d

240, (Tenn. 2010))). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a list of factors the

trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental rights is in a child’s

best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find

the existence of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest.

See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (“The

relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of each case.”).

Furthermore, the best interest of a child must be determined from the child’s perspective

and not the parent’s. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

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Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)(1) (West July 1, 2021, to current) lists the

following factors for consideration:

(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s

critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the

child’s minority;

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely

to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical

condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in

meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety

needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental

attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that

the parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact

with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a

positive relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household

trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-

traumatic symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with

another person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with

persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or

foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on

these relationships and the child’s access to information about the

child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of

circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial

for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration

of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or

the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance

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analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care for

the child in a safe and stable manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs,

services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting

adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the

parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in

the custody of the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in

establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or

addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an

award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest;

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the

home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual,

emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any

other child or adult;

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child

or any other child;

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic

and specific needs required for the child to thrive;

(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to

creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and

specific needs and in which the child can thrive;

(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and

safe for the child;

(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token

financial support for the child; and

(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be

detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

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The statute further provides: “When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1),

the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be

in the child’s best interest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(i)(2).

As our Supreme Court has instructed regarding the best interest analysis:

These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the

termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to

the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (citing In

re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts considered

in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a preponderance of the

evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455

S.W.3d [533,] 555 [(Tenn. 2015)] (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861).

“After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should then

consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they

amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s

best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must

remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s,

rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.

Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme”

evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the

child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be

resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts and

circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each

statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d

at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually

intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon the

circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration

of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the obligation of considering

all the factors and all the proof. Even if the circumstances of a particular

case ultimately result in the court ascribing more weight—even outcome

determinative weight—to a particular statutory factor, the court must

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consider all of the statutory factors, as well as any other relevant proof any

party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

In the case at bar, the trial court considered each of the best interest factors and

determined that several of them weighed in favor of terminating Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights. The trial court then concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest.

The trial court weighed factor (A)—the effect termination will have on the child’s

critical need for stability and continuity of placement—in favor of termination, noting that

there “has continued to be drug use in the parents’ home, which does not give rise to

stability.” The court also weighed factor (B)—the effect a change of caretakers and

physical environment is likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical

condition—in favor of termination, noting that the Child had “thrived over the last 18

months with the foster family” and that when she came into DCS custody, the child “was

bruised, thin, dirty and hungry” but that those characteristics were no longer present. For

the reasons stated above relative to all three statutory grounds for termination, we agree

with the trial court that factors (A) and (B) weigh in favor of termination as to both parents.

The trial court determined that factor (C), which considers whether the parent has

demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic needs, weighed in favor

of termination as to both parents. The court noted that although the parents had “made

changes to the home environment,” they had not been able to present “a drug free home”

and that this constituted a “safety issue.” The parents continued to live together throughout

the proceedings. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine eight months before trial,

and Father tested positive for methamphetamine a mere three months before trial. The

evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination.

The trial court weighed both factors (D) and (E) against termination. Factor (D)

considers whether the parents and child have a secure and healthy parental attachment and

if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the parent can create such attachment.

Factor (E) considers whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact

with the Child. In weighing these factors against termination, the trial court noted that the

parents had “maintained regular supervised contact and visitation” with the Child

throughout the proceedings. Regarding factor (E), we agree that this factor weighs against

termination. The parents consistently visited with the Child, even reaching out with Foster

Mother’s consent and assistance to speak to the Child outside of their regularly scheduled

supervised visits. Both parents appear to have fostered and maintained a positive

relationship with the Child.

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However, we disagree with the trial court as to factor (D). Since the Child was

placed into DCS custody, Mother and Father had enjoyed only supervised visits with the

Child for four hours per week plus occasional video calls facilitated by Foster Mother.

According to Ms. O’Neill, the Child did not refer to Mother and Father as her parents

during the visits but instead called them by their first names. By contrast, the Child referred

to her Foster Parents as “mom and dad.” Although the parents’ efforts to visit the Child

regularly are commendable and they clearly maintained a positive relationship with the

Child, there was no evidence that the Child had developed a “secure and healthy parental

attachment” to Mother and Father. Moreover, the parents’ continued drug use cuts against

any reasonable expectation that the parents could create such an attachment in the near

future. Therefore, Factor (D) weighs in favor of termination. By virtue of the bond

between the Child and Foster Parents, we also agree with the trial court that factor (H)—

whether the Child has created a healthy parental attachment with another person or

persons—weighs in favor of termination.

The trial court determined that factors (F) and (G) weighed neutrally because there

had been no evidence presented about whether the Child was fearful of living in the

parents’ home. The record is consistent with the trial court’s determination, and we will

not disturb its findings regarding these factors.

With respect to factor (I)—whether the child has emotionally significant

relationships with persons other than parents and caregivers and how these relationships

affect the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage—the trial court weighed

this factor in favor of termination, reiterating the Child’s growing parental attachment to

Foster Parents. Regarding the Child’s access to her family heritage, there was no evidence

presented about Mother’s family except Mother’s testimony that she had family in the area

but did not “talk to them that much.”

As to Father’s cultural heritage, Father and Foster Mother testified that Father and

the Child would communicate in Spanish during their video calls. Father expressed a desire

for the Child to learn “Spanish tradition and culture” and “the Spanish language.” We are

sensitive to the fact that if the Child loses access to Father’s family, there would possibly

be aspects of Father’s Mexican heritage that may be lost to the Child. However, Father’s

closest family resided in Colorado at the time of trial, and there was no evidence that Father

maintained a close relationship with those family members such that the Child would

necessarily have access to her heritage through them. Regarding the Child’s exposure to

the Spanish language, Foster Mother testified that Foster Parents had “engaged a tutor” to

teach the Child Spanish and to “preserve her culture.” Such action on the part of Foster

Parents indicated their intention to help the Child know about her family of origin and

heritage. The evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s findings regarding factor

(I).

As to factor (J), the trial court stated:

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Factor (J) is this case in a nutshell. These parents have not

demonstrated a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions

to make it safe and beneficial for the child to be in the home of the parent.

There continues to be the use of controlled substances, namely

methamphetamine, which renders the parents unable to consistently care for

the child in a safe and stable manner. The parents have not shown that they

are able to remain drug free in this matter. This factor weighs in favor of

termination.

Upon careful review, and for the reasons stated above relative to all three statutory grounds

for termination, we agree with the trial court’s conclusions respecting factor (J).

Turning to factor (K), which considers whether the parent has taken advantage of

available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting

adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions, the trial court weighed this factor in

favor of termination. The trial court reasoned that although the parents “did take advantage

of services offered to them,[] they made no lasting adjustment and were unsuccessful in

implementing and demonstrating the skills learned.” The trial court stated that the parents

had “completed [A&D] assessments and did 1-2 months of IOP services” but then failed

hair follicle drug screens.

As factor (K) pertains to Mother, it is undeniable that Mother worked with DCS to

improve her circumstances and that she took steps to overcome her drug habit so that she

could be reunited with the Child. The most detailed evidence of Mother’s progress toward

reunification can be found in the three foster care Board review reports. All three of the

Board reports stated that Mother had complied with her most significant responsibilities in

the permanency plan. In the February 23, 2024 report, the Board commended mother in

“actively pursuing” her action steps. In the August 20, 2024 report, the Board wrote to

Mother: “Keep up the good work!” In the February 27, 2025 report, which occurred

shortly after Mother tested positive once again for methamphetamine, the Board

encouraged Mother to “focus on her sobriety” and to seek legal counsel regarding steps she

could take to “increase her chances of reunification” with the Child. Additionally, Mother

consistently reported for drug screens following removal of the Child, regularly attended

supervised visitation, completed an IOP, and completed homemaker services. It is

unfortunate that Mother’s efforts to improve her life were hampered by her inability to end

her unlawful drug use or to extract herself from Father’s influence. However, it would be

inaccurate to state that Mother did not avail herself of the services offered by DCS or that

she did not try. Factor (K) weighs against termination as to Mother.

Father made fewer efforts toward improving his circumstances. The latter two of

three Board reports concluded that Father had failed to comply with his most significant

responsibilities in the permanency plan. Father tested positive for methamphetamine on

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February 5, 2024, and February 21, 2025. Father has raised on appeal that he was not

provided a Spanish interpreter by DCS and that this caused him to misunderstand what was

required of him. We will address that important issue in more detail in a subsequent section

of this Opinion. However, considering Father’s purported language barrier, we find

Father’s argument that he did not understand what was required of him by DCS

disingenuous as it relates to his continued drug use. Father admitted during trial that after

he had tested positive for methamphetamine, DCS had offered him assistance in addressing

his drug use and that he refused that assistance:

Attorney: You understand part of what you were asked to do were some

drug screens in [February 2024 and February 2025]. You

submitted to those and failed them, didn’t you.

Father: Here is my point. After those drug tests, we had a video chat

meeting. It was a phone call maybe. It is what they asked me

if I needed help in that matter or was it something I would be

able to address on my own. I told them I could do it by myself

but from [February 2025] until here, there has been no more

drug tests, no contact, no nothing.

When questioned about the failed drug screens again later during his testimony, the

following interaction ensued:

Attorney: [W]ere you using methamphetamine during that time period

[between February 2024 and February 2025] when you failed

tests for it?

Father: When I failed the drug test, yes, that’s why I failed it. . . . Right

after that one time over the phone when I told them I would be

able to get clean and help on my own, from then on if you were

to give me a test now, I will do it right now, clean.

These exchanges demonstrate that Father understood that he had failed a drug screen, that

he further understood that getting “clean” was the desirable outcome, and that DCS was

offering him assistance to address his unlawful drug use. By Father’s own admission, he

had declined DCS’s offer of assistance because he had intended to “get clean and help on

[his] own.” Thus, Father intentionally and knowingly refused to avail himself of DCS’s

services on the paramount issue relative to his termination case: his continued drug use.

We agree with the trial court that Factor (K) weighs in favor of termination as to Father.

Moving to factor (N), which considers whether the parent or any other person in the

parent’s home has shown brutality or any other form of abuse or neglect toward the child

or any other child, the trial court simply stated that the parents had “shown neglect” toward

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the Child as evinced by the Child “testing positive” for methamphetamine “at 3 years old”

and the parents’ “continued failure of drug screens over a period of 18 months.” For the

reasons articulated above relative to the ground of severe child abuse, we agree that this

factor weighs in favor of termination as to both parents.

The trial court found that factor (O)—whether the parent has ever provided safe and

stable care for the child or any other child—weighed in favor of termination for both

parents as well. The trial court noted that at the time the Child was placed into foster care

in November of 2023, the Child had “presented as dirty, bruised, thin, and hungry”; she

had recently “tested positive for methamphetamine on a hair follicle drug test”; the parents’

home had been “dirty, there was trash all around; clutter, water standing on the floor, old

food on the counters and surfaces, the refrigerator did not work, there was garbage in the

rooms”; and “there was no bed for the Child.” We additionally note that Mother testified

to having two children other than the Child, one of whom was with the child’s maternal

grandmother and the other, Mother’s “second son,” had been “adopted out” due in part to

Mother’s use of methamphetamine. Mother had been living with Father when her second

son was adopted due to Mother’s drug use. The evidence in the record supports the trial

court’s conclusion that factor (O) weighed in favor of termination as to both parents.

The trial court determined that there was “no proof presented” respective of factor

(P), which concerns whether the parents have demonstrated understanding of the basic and

specific needs required for the child to thrive, or factor (Q), which considers whether the

parent had demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home

that meets the child’s basic and specific needs and in which the child can thrive. The trial

court declined to weigh either factor for or against termination. However, we find it quite

apparent that Mother and Father, who both tested positive for methamphetamine during the

proceedings, failed to demonstrate, by their continued drug use alone, a basic

understanding of or an ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home that

would meet the basic and specific needs of the Child. A child cannot thrive in a home

wherein one parent, and certainly both parents, are using methamphetamine. Factors (P)

and (Q) weigh in favor of termination. For the same reasons, we agree with the trial court

that factor (R)—whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and safe

for the child—also weighs in favor of termination.

As to factor (S), whether the parent has consistently provided more than token

financial support for the child, the trial court weighed this factor against termination as to

Father, noting that he had “provided consistent child support payments” for the Child. The

evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination as to Father. With respect

to Mother, the trial court stated there was “no proof presented as to Mother for child

support” and determined the factor did not weigh in favor of termination as to Mother.

Although we agree with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion, we note that the record does

include some proof respective of Mother’s child support obligation. Beginning in

November 2023, the permanency plans required that Mother pay $100.00 per month for

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the financial support of the Child. The trial court reiterated the child support requirement

when it ratified the permanency plans in February and October 2024 and included in each

ratification order an instruction that both parents should pay their respective child support

obligations directly to the ”State Disbursement Unit.” In June 2024, DCS filed a petition

for contempt against Mother, alleging that she had failed to make any payment toward her

child support obligation and seeking an arrearage of $300.00. Attached to the petition was

a notice of civil contempt signed by a child support enforcement officer. However, it is

unclear how or whether Mother’s alleged child support arrearage or the petition for

contempt was resolved. We therefore find that the proof regarding Mother’s child support

obligation is insufficient to weigh this factor either for or against termination, and we agree

with the trial court that it weighs neutrally as to Mother.

Factor (T) considers whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would

be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and effectively providing

safe and stable care and supervision of the child. The trial court weighed this factor in

favor of termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights predicated on the

“impact their continued drug use has on the child,” which the court found to be

“significant.” The parents’ continued drug use was proven, inter alia, by the positive drug

screens and the admission of the parents under oath. For the same reasons that we weighed

factors (P) and (Q) in favor of termination, factor (T) also weighs in favor of termination

as to both parents.

Concerning factor (L)—whether DCS has made reasonable efforts to assist the

parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of the

department, the trial court determined:

[DCS] did make reasonable efforts to assist the parents. Could [DCS]

have done more, possibly. However, the parents did not successfully engage

in the services offered as evidenced by their continued use of drugs. This

factor weighs in favor of termination.

On appeal, Father asserts that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to help him reunite

with the Child in two main areas: (1) failure to provide adequate “assistance and support”

in helping Father “overcome allegations of drug abuse or addiction” and (2) failure “to

provide translators or other reasonable methods of communication” to Father, who “spoke

Spanish and had limited communication skills in English.” We will address each postulate

in turn.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-166(g), the statute governing dependency and

neglect proceedings before a juvenile court, defines “reasonable efforts” as “the exercise

of reasonable care and diligence by [DCS] to provide services related to meeting the needs

of the child and the family.” DCS bears the burden to demonstrate that reasonable efforts

have been made to either “(1) prevent the need for removal of the child from such child’s

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family; or (2) make it possible for the child to return home.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-

1-166(a) and (b). In determining what constitutes “reasonable efforts,” the statute instructs

that “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” See § 37-1-166(g).

Regarding the “reasonable efforts” requirement in the context of a parental

termination proceeding, our Supreme Court has held that the “extent of DCS’s efforts to

reunify the family is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis but proof of reasonable

efforts is not a precondition to termination of the parental rights of the respondent parent.”

See In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). Thus, “the extent of DCS’s efforts

remains a factor to be weighed in the best interest analysis, not an essential element that

must be proven in order to terminate [parental rights].” See id. at 556. In other words,

parental rights may still be terminated even if the trial court finds that DCS did not make

reasonable efforts toward reunification. See id.

However, in so holding, the In re Kaliyah S. Court cautioned:

In many circumstances, the success of a parent’s remedial efforts is

intertwined with the efforts of the Department’s staff to provide assistance

and support. Reasonable efforts entail more than simply providing parents

with a list of service providers and sending them on their way. The

Department’s employees must use their superior insight and training to assist

parents with the problems the Department has identified in the permanency

plan, whether the parents ask for assistance or not.

Id. at 556 (quoting In re C.M.M., No. M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326, at *7

(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004)).3 The Court continued that a lack of reasonable efforts

“may weigh heavily enough to persuade the trial court that termination of the parent’s

rights is not in the best interest of the subject child.” See id.

Father relies on this excerpt from In re Kaliyah S. to argue that his lack of success

in passing drug screens was “intertwined with the efforts of [DCS] staff to provide

assistance and support.” Father asserts that his “stance that he could [end his drug

addiction] on his own was not a legitimate reason for DCS to simply ignore the need for

more attention to these matters.” Father refers here to the fact that after he tested positive

for methamphetamine in February 2025, he declined an offer of assistance from DCS to

address his drug problem. Father expounds that his refusal of help after this last drug screen

was not a “legitimate reason” for DCS to “simply ignore” Father’s needs in this area.

3

The Supreme Court overruled In re C.M.M. by holding that the State is not required, as a precondition to

termination, to prove that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child. See In re Kaliyah

S., 455 S.W.3d at 535. Nevertheless, the Court quoted this excerpt from C.M.M. with approval in an effort

to avoid “minimiz[ing] the importance of DCS’s efforts to assist parents who lose custody of their child

and seek to regain it.” See id. at 556.

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We note that Father has narrowed the focus of his argument to the three-month

period between his positive drug screen and the termination trial in May 2025. In so doing,

Father ignores the preceding fifteen-month period that included the many documented

efforts made by DCS to assist him with his drug problem and other needs. Between

November 2023 and February 2025, DCS funded, facilitated, and monitored the parents’

participation in homemaker services, parenting assessment services, mental health

assessments, alcohol and drug assessments, an online parenting class, and intensive

outpatient services. DCS also met with the parents to form two permanency plans,

participated in numerous court hearings to ratify and review the parents’ progress, and

participated in three foster care Board review sessions. DCS caseworker Ms. O’Neill

testified that she personally attempted to visit the parents’ home “probably six times” in

addition to the home visit she attempted, at Mother’s request, on the morning of trial.

In the case at bar, DCS clearly did more for Mother and Father than “simply

providing parents with a list of service providers and sending them on their way.” See In

re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 556. And although we agree that DCS does bear the

responsibility to assist parents with problems like drug addiction and other needs that are

identified in a permanency plan, see id., parents also bear responsibility to take advantage

of the help offered. See, e.g., In re Jah’Lila S., No. W2021-01199-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL

4362839, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2022) (“Reasonable efforts are not tantamount

to Herculean efforts . . . and parents are also required to make reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate themselves.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Nicholas

C., No. E2019-00165-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 3074070, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15,

2019) (“This court has previously stated that DCS’s duty to make reasonable efforts is a

two-way street. A parent’s response to and cooperation with the Department’s

reunification efforts is one of the factors to be considered when evaluating the

reasonableness of DCS’s efforts.”) (citation omitted). Father admits that he continued to

use methamphetamine during the pendency of the termination proceedings and that when

DCS asked him if he required assistance with his drug addiction, he declined that help.

Father did not make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate himself. See In re Jah’Lila S., 2022

WL 4362839, at *13.

As the trial court stated, perhaps DCS could have done more to assist these parents.

But DCS could not prevent the parents from using drugs. That goal was the parents’

responsibility to accomplish. Upon careful consideration of the record as a whole, we find

that DCS did make reasonable efforts to assist both parents in battling their drug addiction.

Father next contends that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to assist him with

his language barrier. Specifically, Father claims that DCS failed to provide Father with a

Spanish interpreter. At trial, Father testified that he had lived in the United States for “26

years” and that he was able to “function in [the United States] culture to some degree with

English speaking people.” However, Father explained that his “primary language” was

Spanish and that he could understand “maybe 50 percent” of what was said to him in

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English. Father added that due to this language barrier, he had been “very confused” during

the termination proceedings and did not understand how “grave” the situation had become

until “maybe three weeks” before trial. Notably, the trial court did provide a Spanish

interpreter during the termination trial in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule

42 § 3 (“It is the responsibility of the court to determine whether a participant in a legal

proceeding has a limited ability to understand and communicate in English. If the court

determines that a participant has such limited ability, the court should appoint an

interpreter[.]”).

DCS acknowledges that it did not provide Father with an interpreter during the pre-

trial proceedings. In its defense, DCS points out that “both Mother and Father signed the

[Criteria and Procedures document]” indicating that the document had been explained to

them. At trial, Father’s attorney handed him a copy of the Criteria and Procedures, which

bore Father’s signature. Father acknowledged that the signature was his but explained that

he was unable to read the document or “understand it fully” because it was written in

English. When asked whether DCS had reviewed the Criteria and Procedures with the

parents at the time of the Child’s removal, Ms. O’Neill merely answered that the document

was “in the file.” There was no further testimony regarding whether DCS had reviewed or

explained the Criteria and Procedures document to Mother or Father. Father also recounted

that at one point, he had approached a DCS employee with a request for an interpreter but

“no one ever got back” to him and that on another occasion, Father had asked his former

attorney for an interpreter, but none was ever provided.

Given that parents have a fundamental, constitutional interest in the care and

custody of their children, see Keisling, 92 S.W.3d at 378, we take very seriously Father’s

contention that DCS should have provided him with an interpreter so that he could fully

participate in the proceedings leading up to the trial. There is no statutory or regulatory

requirement in Tennessee that DCS provide an interpreter for parents who face termination

of their parental rights. However, DCS has in some instances provided interpreters and

Spanish-language versions of relevant documents to parents. See, e.g., In re Jose L., No.

E2016-00517-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 6426774, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016)

(affirming termination when a DCS interpreter had thoroughly explained the criteria and

procedures for termination of parental rights and each of the permanency requirements to

the father in Spanish and DCS had provided Spanish copies of each of the relevant

documents to the father); In re D.P.M., No. M2005-02183-COA-R3PT, 2006 WL

2589938, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2006) (affirming termination when DCS had

employed an interpreter to read the permanency plans to the mother in Spanish and explain

them). These examples notwithstanding, this Court has not directly addressed the issue of

whether DCS should provide an interpreter to parents of limited English-speaking ability

as part of the department’s “reasonable efforts to assist” in a termination proceeding.

Although we find no authority requiring DCS to provide an interpreter, this Court

has emphasized the importance of providing an interpreter “at all stages” of a termination

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proceeding. See In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d 566, 570, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (considering

whether “due process requires that a translator be provided a non-English speaking parent

in a termination of parental rights case” and reversing the trial court’s termination of the

parental rights in part because the court failed to do so). In In re Valle, we determined:

While we have found no case dealing with the precise issue before us,

we generally recognize that the party litigant is entitled to be present in all

stages of the actual trial of the case. Warren v. Warren, 731 S.W.2d 908,

909 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Thus, a party must be in a position to understand

the nature of the case and the testimony of the witnesses. When this question

presents itself, the trial court must determine whether an interpreter is

necessary, based upon the nature and extent of any alleged disability of the

parties. Considering the drastic nature of a termination of parental rights

case, it is particularly incumbent upon the trial court to be careful in

exercising discretion for the appointment of an interpreter.

31 S.W.3d at 573 (emphasis added).

We recognize that In re Valle dealt with the question of whether the trial court, not

DCS, violated the parent’s constitutional rights by failing to provide an interpreter. See id.

However, in cases when a child has been removed into DCS custody, a parent’s

understanding of the nature of the case necessarily involves a parent’s understanding of

DCS’s criteria and procedures for termination. As Father asserts, DCS’s reasonable efforts

prior to a parental termination trial are often “intertwined” with a parent’s success in

avoiding termination of his or her parental rights. See In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 556.

This is particularly so in a case such as the instant action wherein the Child had been placed

into DCS custody, DCS had initiated the Termination Petition, and DCS had maintained a

pivotal role in assisting the parents in completing the requirements set forth in the

permanency plans.

Upon reviewing the facts before us, we find that the better practice for DCS would

have been for the department to provide Father with a Spanish interpreter for the specific

purpose of (1) explaining the general criteria and procedures for termination of parental

rights (including an explanation of the Criteria and Procedures document) and (2)

explaining to Father what was expected of him to avoid termination of his parental rights.

Also, a better practice would have been to provide a written, Spanish version of the Criteria

and Procedures document and the permanency plans to Father so that Father could review

those critical documents in his native language.

We do not intend to suggest that DCS should have provided Father with an

interpreter for every check-in, meeting, supervised visitation, service, or class. Such a

requirement would be impractical, if not impossible, considering that many of the services

and referrals provided by DCS are facilitated by third-party organizations over which DCS

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has no direct control. We are also mindful that Father was represented by counsel during

every stage of the termination proceedings, such that Father’s attorney could have asked

for an interpreter for Father during DCS meetings. However, in our estimation, it would

have been reasonable for DCS to provide Father with an interpreter, at the minimum, to

translate for Father the Criteria and Procedures document and to interpret the requirements

expected of Father pursuant to the permanency plans. Had DCS provided Father a Spanish

interpreter for these discrete purposes, Father would have been better placed “in a position

to understand the nature of the case” against him. See In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d at 573.

Cognizant of the due process and constitutional implications that are inherent to a

parental termination action, we conclude that by failing to provide Father with a Spanish

interpreter to (1) explain to Father the Criteria and Procedures document and (2) explain to

Father what was expected of him to regain custody of the Child, including the requirements

laid out in the permanency plans, DCS fell short of its responsibility to make reasonable

efforts to assist Father in making lasting adjustments toward reunification with the Child.

Accordingly, we conclude that factor (L) weighs against termination of Father’s parental

rights.

However, we reiterate that the reasonableness of DCS’s efforts is but one factor to

be considered among twenty factors in the best interest analysis. See In re Kaliyah S., 455

S.W.3d at 555. Furthermore, when reasonable efforts are being evaluated, the “child’s

health and safety” is of “paramount concern.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g).

Regardless of any deficiency on the part of DCS, Mother and Father continued to test

positive for methamphetamine after the Child was removed from their care. Thus, the

parents demonstrated an inability to eradicate drugs from their home, and this fact proved

fatal to their case. Considering the totality of the best interest factors, we determine that

the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s conclusion, by clear and convincing

evidence, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best

interest.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects,

including termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. This case is remanded to

the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child and for collection of costs

assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant, Angela M.C., and

one-half to the appellant, Hector M.C.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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