PNC Bank, N.A. v. Seneca Leandro View, LLC

J-S29035-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

PNC BANK, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MERGER TO NATIONAL CITY BANK : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

v. :

:

:

SENECA LEANDRO VIEW, LLC :

: No. 1471 WDA 2024

Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 31, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Civil Division at No(s):

No. AD-435-2022

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: January 15, 2026

Seneca Leandro View, LLC (“SLV”) appeals from the order entered on

October 31, 2024, in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County, which

granted summary judgment in favor of PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”), successor by

merger to National City Bank, in this mortgage foreclosure action. We affirm.

Background

In October 2000, Michael Litwinovich and Margaret Litwinovich, both

now deceased, obtained an open-end home equity line of credit (“HELOC”)

from National City Bank with a maximum limit of $31,000.00, set to mature

in October 2010. See Complaint, 6/21/22, at Exhibit B (“HELOC Agreement”);

SLV’s Brief at 12-13; see also id. at Exhibit A (certifying that PNC is the

successor by merger to National City Bank). The HELOC was secured by a

mortgage on the Litwinoviches’ residential property located at 197 North

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Liberty Street, Waynesburg, PA 15370 (“Mortgaged Premises”), which was

recorded in the Greene County Office of the Recorder of Deeds on October 23,

2000. See id. at Exhibit C (“Mortgage”). In 2010, the line of credit was

extended for an additional ten years, maturing in October 2020. See SLV’s

Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/18/23, at 1 (unnumbered).

On September 16, 2020, SLV purchased the Mortgaged Premises at an

upset tax sale and became the record owner of said property by virtue of a

deed executed and recorded in the Greene County Office of the Recorder of

Deeds on December 15, 2020, at Book 542, Page 569. See id. at 2

(unnumbered); see also id. at Exhibit 2 (“SLV Deed”).

On June 21, 2022, PNC initiated an action against SLV, seeking an in

rem judgment in mortgage foreclosure in the amount of $33,575.09, plus

interest, fees, and costs. See generally Complaint at ¶¶ 1-12; see also id.

at ¶ 7 (alleging that SLV is in default under the terms of the line of credit and

mortgage “for failing to tender payments when due”). In response, SLV filed

preliminary objections to the complaint on four separate grounds, all of which

were ultimately denied by the trial court. See generally Preliminary

Objections, 8/15/22; see also Order, 1/11/23. Thereafter, SLV filed an

answer to the complaint along with new matter, to which PNC filed a reply. A

pretrial conference was held on March 28, 2023, and the trial court ordered

discovery to be completed by June 30, 2023.

On August 17, 2023, PNC filed a motion for summary judgment,

asserting that it was entitled to a judgment in foreclosure as a matter of law.

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See Motion for Summary Judgment, 8/17/23, at 1-2; Brief in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, 8/17/23, at 4-7 (asserting that PNC has pled

all elements necessary to obtain a judgment in mortgage foreclosure and that

SLV has failed to raise an issue of material fact). In its response, SLV argued

that the complaint baldly averred a principal balance due in the amount of

$30,696.07, and failed to aver that the Litwinoviches ever used any portion of

the line of credit. See SLV’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment,

9/18/22, at 2 (unnumbered). It explained:

Rather than provide for an automatic disbursement of funds, [the

line of credit executed by the Litwinoviches] merely granted

[them] the option to borrow periodically against their house, up

to a maximum of $31,000.00. … [T]here was no fixed monthly

payment due under the terms of the agreement. Instead, in the

event that the Litwinoviches made use of [the] line of credit, the

minimum payment due was set at 1.5% of the new balance, the

total finance charge depicted on the new statement, or $100.00

(or whatever portion of $100.00 is necessary to pay [National City

Bank] in full), whichever is the greatest. It therefore follows, that

if no use of the line of credit occurred, no monthly payment would

be due. If no monthly payment was due, then no default could

have ever occurred.

Id. at 5 (unnumbered; format altered; emphasis in original).

SLV further averred that it sought clarification from PNC regarding the

amount owed on the line of credit to no avail. Id. at 3. For instance, on July

27, 2022, SLV sent a qualified written request to PNC’s counsel for “certain

information required to be disclosed by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures

Act [(‘RESPA’), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617.]” Id. Yet no response was received.

Id. In addition, on May 25, 2023, SLV served PNC with discovery, which

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included a request for “a full payment history showing all payments made by

[the Litwinoviches] for the [m]ortgage at issue in this action.” Id. Again, SLV

indicated that PNC failed to produce the requested documents. Id.

The trial court agreed with SLV that PNC’s failure to include any evidence

of a disbursement of funds pursuant to the HELOC Agreement precluded the

entry of summary judgment. See Order, 1/5/24, at 2 (“As the disbursement

of funds is a genuine issue of material fact that has not been set forth in the

record, the right to summary judgment is far from clear and free from

doubt.”). Accordingly, it entered an order denying PNC’s motion for summary

judgment. Id. at 1-2.

Recognizing that the foreclosure action was ripe for litigation, the trial

court scheduled a pretrial conference for March 26, 2024, which was later

postponed to June 25, 2024. In the meantime, PNC filed a renewed motion

for summary judgment, in which it alleged that there was no longer a genuine

issue as to any material fact and that PNC is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/11/24, at 1. It

declared that since the entry of the trial court’s January 5, 2024 order denying

its original summary judgment motion,

[PNC] has supplemented its discovery and produced 717 pages of

statements and accounting dating back to December 2003. These

documents provide information on disbursements and payments

from 2003 through 2023[,] with final disbursements in 2019. The

documents evidence varying amounts advanced over the course

of nearly fifteen (15) years. A true and correct copy of [the]

account statements are attached to the Appendix as Exhibit “4[.”]

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Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/11/24, at 2;

see also id. at 2-3 (adding that the account statement for the period ending

on March 23, 2020, reflects $0.00 available credit, “meaning the borrower

maxed out the home equity loan”); id. at 3 (noting that the documents

produced confirm a payoff balance of $38,082.74, at the time PNC filed its

renewed motion for summary judgment); see also id. at 2 (concluding that

summary judgment is appropriate at this time, as “the sole issue that

previously precluded entry of summary judgment has been put to rest through

the evidence provided”).

SLV filed a response, arguing, inter alia, that the documents produced

by PNC are untimely and therefore should be excluded. See SLV’s Response

to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/10/24, at 5-7. SLV contended

that, despite its qualified written request and demand for production of

documents,

PNC resisted producing the necessary statements until well after

the expiry of the June 30, 2023 discovery deadline. Now, only

after their first motion for summary judgment was denied, have

they attempted to ambush [SLV] with documents purportedly in

support of this renewed motion. [PNC’s] failure to comply with

discovery requests until well after the close of discovery must

have consequences; specifically, … such untimely produced

documents should be excluded.

Id. at 6 (cleaned up). SLV stated that, “[w]ithout these new documents, the

same genuine issue of material fact … remains[,]” i.e., whether disbursements

of funds were made to the original borrowers. Id.; see also Order, 1/5/24,

at 2.

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On September 3, 2024, PNC filed a reply brief, wherein it argued that

no sanctions are warranted, maintaining that it fully complied with all

discovery requests in this matter. See PNC’s Reply to SLV’s Response to

Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/3/24, at 2. It stated:

Discovery was scheduled to be completed on June 30, 2023[,]

with dispositive motions due on or before August 21, 2023[,] per

[the trial] court’s order of March 28, 2023. [SLV] waited almost

two entire months before serving its interrogatories and requests

for production of documents and related interrogatories [on] May

25, 2023. PNC sought and was granted an extension to respond

to these discovery requests by [SLV’s] counsel. PNC’s responses

were then served on July 20, 2023.

[SLV] did not contact PNC regarding any supposed deficiency with

these discovery responses, nor did [SLV] seek leave of court to

re-open the discovery process at that time. With discovery

completed and a dispositive motions deadline looming, PNC filed

its motion for summary judgment [on] August 17, 2023. [SLV]

filed its response to PNC’s motion for summary judgment on

September 15, 2023. On September 19, 2023, [the trial] court

entered an order scheduling argument on the motion for summary

judgment on November 15, 2023.

Yet[,] just six days before the scheduled hearing, on November 9,

2023, [SLV] claimed that it required additional discovery and

served an untimely motion to compel answers to interrogatories

and production of documents that was noticed for presentation on

November 16. The hearing on the motion for summary judgment

proceeded as scheduled[,] and [the trial] court ultimately issued

an order denying PNC’s motion for summary judgment on January

5, 2024[,] based on [SLV’s] argument that there was insufficient

evidence concerning the disbursement of funds. [SLV] never

actually presented its motion to compel and so the court never

ruled on any issues related to it.

PNC reviewed [the trial] court’s order denying summary

judgment, and on its own accord and without any renewed request

by [SLV], opted to supplement its document production with 717

pages of material setting forth the loan’s history and record of

disbursement[s]. These documents constituted the exact

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documents that [SLV] claimed were required before summary

judgment could be entered. They were delivered to [SLV’s]

counsel by federal express on or around March 19, 2024. In

similar fashion to the last time PNC served discovery responses

and documents, [SLV] did nothing upon receiving these

documents. Consequently, PNC filed its renewed motion for

summary judgment on June 11, 2024, nearly [three] months after

supplementing its document production to [SLV].

Id. at 2-4 (cleaned up).

PNC concluded that it

has fully complied with discovery obligations in good faith. PNC

has given all relevant and non-privileged material to [SLV,] and

the actual evidence of record has resolved any issue of fact

concerning the disbursement history of the loan that may have

existed at the time of PNC’s initial motion for summary judgment.

[SLV’s] own failure to proceed with diligence to obtain information

in support of its defenses is not PNC’s fault[,] and there are no

factual or legal grounds to support [SLV’s] request that [the trial]

court penalize PNC by excluding evidence.

Id. at 5.

On October 31, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting PNC’s

renewed motion for summary judgment. See Order, 10/31/24, at 1-3; see

also id. at 2 (“While we’re disappointed in the production which supports this

motion not having been provided with initial discovery, we are unable to see

any genuine issues of material fact which would prevent a grant of summary

judgment.”). SLV filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a timely, court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Subsequently, the trial court issued a statement pursuant to Rule 1925(a), in

which it relied on the reasoning set forth in its October 31, 2024 order and

indicated that no further Rule 1925(a) opinion would be filed.

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Issues

SLV presents the following questions for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to [PNC]

despite PNC’s failure to respond to [SLV’s] qualified written

request under [RESPA], where such failure deprived [SLV] of

critical loan information and potentially established affirmative

defenses and statutory claims under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)?

2. Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment while

disregarding PNC’s failure to comply with discovery obligations,

including withholding responsive documents until after the

denial of its initial summary judgment motion and beyond the

discovery deadline, thereby obstructing SLV’s ability to develop

its defenses?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by considering

voluminous loan documents belatedly[]produced by PNC in

support of its renewed summary judgment motion, effectively

rewarding PNC’s violations of discovery rules and RESPA?

4. Did the trial court err in finding no genuine issue of material

fact existed regarding the validity of the debt, the accuracy of

PNC’s accounting, and the occurrence of a default, particularly

given PNC’s failure to provide timely and complete discovery,

including disbursement records?

5. Did the trial court fail to properly apply the summary judgment

standard by not resolving all doubts and inferences regarding

material facts in favor of … SLV, especially concerning the

disputed debt and PNC’s discovery conduct?

6. Did the trial court err in entering summary judgment in

mortgage foreclosure against SLV without addressing SLV’s

distinct status as a successor owner via tax sale, which does

not entail personal liability for the original borrower’s debt?

SLV’s Brief at 5-6 (numbering added).1

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1 We note with disapproval SLV’s failure to conform its brief to the

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. In particular, the argument

section is not divided into appropriate subsections which correspond to the

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Standard of Review

We begin with our standard of review of a trial court order granting

summary judgment:

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only

where it is established that the court committed an error of law or

abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is

plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the

summary judgment rule, Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1035.2. The rule states

that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary

judgment may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears

the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his

pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment.

Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an

issue essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of

proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment

as a matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved

against the moving party.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation omitted).

To the extent that SLV’s claims present questions of statutory

interpretation, which are purely legal issues, our standard of review is plenary

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questions presented. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided

into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the

head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the

particular point treated therein….”). Nevertheless, as this defect does not

substantially impair our ability to review the issues presented, we will proceed

to address the merits of SLV’s claims and will do so in the order that they

appear in the argument section of SLV’s brief.

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and non-deferential. See Dahl v. AmeriQuest Mortg. Co., 954 A.2d 588,

593 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). As we explained in Dahl:

The objective of statutory interpretation and construction is to

ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. 1

Pa.C.S.[] § 1921(a). “Where the intent of the legislature is clear

from the plain meaning of the statute, there is no need to pursue

statutory construction.” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 811

A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, … 822 A.2d

703 ([Pa.] 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Packer, … 798 A.2d

192, 196 (Pa. 2002)). “Only when the language of the statute is

ambiguous does statutory construction become necessary.” Id.

When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,

the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of

pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.[] § 1921(b).

Id. at 593-94 (citation omitted).

Discussion

I. RESPA

SLV claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of PNC, “despite PNC’s clear violation of [RESPA].” SLV’s Brief at 20.

Specifically, it contends that PNC’s failure to respond to SLV’s qualified written

request (“QWR”)2 constitutes a violation of RESPA, and that such failure

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2 Section 2605 of RESPA defines a ‘qualified written request’ as:

[A] written correspondence, other than notice on a payment

coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer, that[:]

(i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer to identify, the

name and account of the borrower; and (ii) includes a statement

of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent

applicable, that the account is in error or provides sufficient detail

to the servicer regarding other information sought by the

borrower.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B) (format altered).

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“directly hampered SLV’s ability to investigate and challenge the alleged debt,

thereby leaving unresolved genuine issues of material fact essential to PNC’s

foreclosure claim.” Id.; see also id. at 22-24.

SLV explains:

RESPA imposes a clear duty upon mortgage loan servicers to

respond to borrower inquiries submitted in the form of a QWR.

See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). … Upon receipt of a QWR, the servicer

must provide a written acknowledgment within 5 business days

and, within 30 business days, must either make appropriate

corrections to the account or conduct an investigation and provide

a written explanation including the information requested or the

reasons why it is unavailable. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A), (e)(2).

On July 27, 2022, well before PNC moved for summary judgment,

SLV … sent a detailed QWR to PNC. This QWR clearly identified

SLV, referenced the loan and [Mortgaged Premises], stated [that]

SLV disputed the amount alleged due in PNC’s complaint, and

requested specific, itemized information essential to

understanding and verifying the alleged debt under the HELOC

Agreement. The requested information included, inter alia:

monthly principal, interest, and escrow breakdowns since the

loan’s inception; details of any alleged unpaid amounts; a

complete payment history showing application of funds; records

of all fees and charges assessed; [an] escrow account analysis;

and the current interest rate. This information was critical for SLV,

as a successor owner unfamiliar with the loan’s history, to

ascertain the validity of PNC’s claim.

Id. at 20-21 (cleaned up).

PNC contends, however, that it had no duty under RESPA to respond to

SLV’s qualified written request for information, because RESPA does not apply

to the HELOC at issue here. See PNC’s Brief at 10-14; see also id. at 11

(stating that both 10 Pa. Code § 59.3 and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31, which

implement RESPA, expressly exclude open-end lines of credit); id. at 12

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(arguing, alternatively, that even if RESPA did apply to the HELOC in this

matter, PNC would still not have been obligated to respond to SLV’s QWR

because SLV does not qualify as a “borrower” under RESPA).

For the following reasons, we agree with PNC. RESPA was enacted

based on congressional findings of the need for significant reform in the

residential real estate settlement process. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a).

“RESPA’s principal purpose is to protect home buyers from material

nondisclosures in settlement statements and abusive practices in the

settlement process, both in the actual settlement process and in the servicing

of a federally related mortgage loan.” Bordoni v. Chase Home Finance

LLC, 374 F.Supp.3d 378, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).3

As of July 21, 2011, the responsibility for administering and enforcing

RESPA was transferred from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development (“HUD”) to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),

pursuant to Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.

1376. See Michelle L. Evans, J.D., Litigation of Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C.[] §§ 2601 et seq., in 171 Am. Jur. Trials

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3 “While we recognize that federal district court cases are not binding on this

[C]ourt, Pennsylvania appellate courts may utilize the analysis in those cases

to the extent we find them persuasive.” Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151,

159 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).

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79 at § 3 (2021) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the CFPB adopted new

regulations to implement RESPA, which are codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.1-

1024.41 (“Regulation X”). See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.1; see also 10 Pa. Code §

59.1 (stating that Chapter 59 of Title 10 of the Pennsylvania Administrative

Code, adopted on April 28, 2018, “is intended to set forth mortgage servicing

criteria and standards that incorporate the [CFPB’s] mortgage servicer

regulations in [Regulation X], Subpart C (relating to mortgage servicing)”).

Pertinent to this appeal, Section 2605 of RESPA imposes duties on

servicers of federally related mortgage loans in receipt of a QWR from a

borrower. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). Those duties were implemented by the

CFPB in Section 1024.36 of Regulation X, Subpart C (12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30-

1024.41). See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36; see also 10 Pa. Code § 59.8

(incorporating the criteria set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36). Notably,

Regulation X, Subpart C applies to “any mortgage loan, as that term is defined

in § 1024.31[,]” subject to a few exceptions, which are not applicable here.

12 C.F.R. § 1024.30. Section 1024.31 defines ‘mortgage loan,’ for the

purposes of Subpart C, as “any federally related mortgage loan, as that term

is defined in [Section] 1024.2 subject to the exemptions in [Section]

1024.5(b),[4] but does not include open-end lines of credit (home equity

plans).” 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Pennsylvania

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4 For the purposes of this appeal, we need not reproduce the definition of a

‘federally related mortgage loan’ as set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2, or the

related exemptions enumerated in 12 C.F.R. § 1024.5(b).

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Administrative Code expressly states that, for the purposes of Title 10,

Chapter 59, the term ‘mortgage loan’ “does not include open-end lines of

credit (home equity plans).” 10 Pa. Code § 59.3 (emphasis added).

Because the foregoing statutes and regulations that implement the

duties imposed by RESPA unequivocally exclude HELOCs, we conclude that

PNC was not obligated under RESPA to respond to SLV’s QWR.5 Nevertheless,

even if RESPA did apply, SLV has failed to convince us that such a violation

would preclude the entry of summary judgment in PNC’s favor. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 2605(f) (providing for monetary damages to compensate a borrower for

actual damages incurred as a result of a servicer’s failure to comply with

Section 2605); Evans, supra at § 52 (“Failure to comply with Section 2605 of

RESPA can result in liability for damages to the borrower for each failure[;

h]owever, the borrower must not already be in default when the QWR is

sent.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc.,

875 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that RESPA does not

provide for injunctive relief and, therefore, a RESPA claim cannot stop a

foreclosure; “actual damages and … statutory damages[] are the only

remedies available when a servicer violates the … provisions [of Section

2605]”).

To the extent that SLV argues that our interpretation of RESPA —

namely, that HELOCs are excluded from the duty imposed by RESPA on

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5 Due to our disposition, we need not address PNC’s alternative argument that

SLV does not qualify as a borrower under RESPA.

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mortgage loan servicers to respond to a QWR — is “overly narrow[,]” we deem

this argument meritless. SLV contends that “certain RESPA regulations may

contain specific exemptions for HELOCs in other contexts,” but insists that

a servicer’s duty under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e) to respond to QWRs “applies

broadly to ‘federally related mortgage loans’” and that the HELOC at issue in

this matter “squarely falls within [the] definition” of a ‘federally related

mortgage loan’ for the purposes of Section 2605. SLV’s Reply Brief at 3

(emphasis added). In support of its position, however, SLV relies solely on

the definition of a ‘federally related mortgage loan’ as set forth in 12 U.S.C. §

2602(1),6 and ignores the definitions stated in Regulation X and the

Pennsylvania Administrative Code, which explicitly exclude HELOCs. See 12

C.F.R. § 1024.31; 10 Pa. Code § 59.3.

SLV makes no attempt to reconcile these definitions or to explain why

the express language of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31 and 10 Pa. Code § 59.3 does not

apply here, nor does it provide any legal authority to support its argument. It

is not the job of this Court to develop arguments for the appellant. See

Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 168 n.11 (Pa. 2015) (“Where an appellate

brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant

authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable

of review, that claim is waived. It is not the obligation of an appellate court

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6 See SLV’s Reply Brief at 3 (“A ‘federally related mortgage loan’ is defined

under 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) to include, inter alia, any loan secured by a first or

subordinate lien on residential real property designed for occupancy by one to

four families.”).

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to formulate an appellant’s arguments for him.”) (cleaned up). Thus, no relief

is due on this claim.

Additionally, SLV asserts:

The fundamental purpose of the QWR provisions — to empower

borrowers (or those standing in their shoes with a direct property

interest) to request and receive critical information about their

loan servicing and to correct errors — is paramount, especially

when a property owner faces the drastic consequences of

foreclosure. To deny this crucial informational right based on a

hyper-technical reading of ‘mortgage loan’ type, particularly

when the servicer’s actions and claims directly and imminently

threaten SLV’s ownership of the property, runs contrary to

RESPA’s explicitly stated consumer protection objectives, which

include ensuring that consumers “are provided with greater and

more timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement

process and are protected from … abusive practices[.]” 12 U.S.C.

§ 2601(a).

SLV’s Reply Brief at 3-4 (cleaned up; emphasis added). As SLV offers no legal

authority in support of the foregoing claim, we deem this argument waived.

See Banfield, supra. Notwithstanding, we note that absent an ambiguity,

we will not ignore the plain language of the controlling statutes. See Koken

v. Reliance Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 70, 82 (Pa. 2006) (“Where [statutory

language] is unambiguous, the plain language controls, and it cannot be

ignored in pursuit of the statute’s alleged contrary spirit or purpose.”).

II. Discovery

Next, SLV avers that the trial court abused its discretion in “granting

summary judgment based on evidence that PNC produced months after the

discovery deadline and only after its initial summary judgment motion was

denied.” SLV’s Brief at 24. It contends that in doing so, the trial court

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“undermined fundamental principles of procedural fairness and effectively

rewarded PNC’s discovery violations.” Id.; see also id. at 26 (stating that

the trial court’s ruling “rewarded PNC for its discovery violations by allowing it

a ’second bite at the apple’ for summary judgment”). However, SLV fails to

cite any authority in support of its position, nor does it engage in any

meaningful discussion of the law. Instead, much of its argument consists

merely of a regurgitation of the procedural history in this matter.

SLV makes one reference to our Rules of Civil Procedure, stating:

“Pennsylvania courts possess the authority under Pa.R.C[iv].P. 4019 to

impose sanctions for failure to make discovery, including the preclusion of

evidence that was not timely disclosed.” Id. Yet, again, this statement is not

followed by any analysis of Rule 4019 or discussion of the law as it relates to

this case. Rather, SLV makes only one additional, unsupported, conclusory

statement in its reply brief: “The trial court’s decision to accept and rely upon

the[] late-produced documents without imposing any sanction on PNC or even

formally acknowledging the significant prejudice to SLV … constitutes a clear

abuse of discretion.” SLV’s Reply Brief at 12.

Due to SLV’s failure to develop its argument, we deem this claim waived.

See Umbelina, 34 A.3d at 161 (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide

any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop

the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is

waived.”); see also Banfield, supra (stating that this Court will not develop

an argument on behalf of the appellant).

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Notwithstanding waiver, we would deem SLV’s claim that the trial court

should have excluded PNC’s 717-page document production from its

consideration of PNC’s renewed summary judgment motion to be meritless.

The record establishes that PNC was granted an extension to respond to SLV’s

discovery requests. PNC then served its discovery responses on SLV in

compliance with the new deadline. On November 9, 2023, six days before the

scheduled hearing on PNC’s original motion for summary judgment, SLV

served counsel for PNC with a motion to compel answers to interrogatories

and production of documents, along with a notice of presentation, indicating

that the motion to compel would be presented to the trial court on November

16, 2023. However, according to PNC, SLV never actually presented the

motion to compel, and so the trial court never ruled on the issues raised

therein. See PNC’s Brief at 16; see also Gr.Co.R. G208.3(a) (governing

Greene County’s motions practice).7, 8

____________________________________________

7 SLV does not expressly assert that it presented its motion to compel in

compliance with the local rules. See generally SLV’s Brief at 24-30.

Moreover, based on our cursory review, we are unaware of any evidence in

the record that the motion to compel was presented in compliance with

Gr.Co.R. G208.3(a)(1)(b)(ii) (requiring that a motion “be presented in person

in Motions Court after being filed with the appropriate court filing office”).

8 To the extent that SLV argues the trial court erred in failing to address its

motion to compel, see SLV’s Brief at 27-30, we are constrained to deem this

claim waived due to SLV’s failure to include the issue in its “Statement of the

Questions Involved.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered

unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested

thereby.”); Wirth v. Com., 95 A.3d 822, 858 (Pa. 2014) (“[Rule 2116(a)] is

to be considered in the highest degree mandatory, admitting of no exception;

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Subsequently, the trial court issued an order denying PNC’s request for

summary judgment, agreeing with SLV that there was insufficient evidence

concerning the disbursement of funds to the original borrowers. PNC contends

that after reviewing the trial court’s order, it decided “on its own accord and

without any renewed request by [SLV] … to supplement its document

production with 717 pages of material setting forth the loan’s history and

record of disbursements.” PNC’s Brief at 16; see also id. at 16-17

(emphasizing that SLV “did nothing after receiving these documents[,]” and

noting that PNC waited nearly three months after supplementing its document

production before filing its renewed motion for summary judgment).

PNC persuasively argues:

There is nothing in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Local Rules of Greene County or Pennsylvania case[]law that

prevents a party from unilaterally serving documents on the other

party to cure a supposed deficiency in evidence that had

prevented entry of summary judgment. Nor is doing so accurately

characterized as a discovery violation.

____________________________________________

ordinarily no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement

of questions involved or suggested thereby.”). The only two questions

presented by SLV pertaining to discovery are issues 2 and 3. See SLV’s Brief

at 5-6. Issue 2 inquires whether the trial court erred “by granting summary

judgment while disregarding PNC’s failure to comply with discovery

obligations…[.]” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Issue 3 questions whether the

trial court abused its discretion “by considering voluminous loan

documents belatedly[]produced by PNC…, effectively rewarding

PNC’s violations of discovery rules and RESPA[.]” Id. (emphasis added).

Both of these issues are directed at PNC’s alleged discovery violations; neither

issue mentions SLV’s motion to compel whatsoever, or the trial court’s failure

to rule on said motion.

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***

Here, [SLV] had no actual defense to prevent summary judgment

other than to seek to preclude PNC’s evidence based on imagined

discovery violations that never occurred. It was [SLV], not PNC,

that failed to pursue discovery appropriately, whether through

depositions, motions practice or otherwise.

Id. at 18.; see also id. at 17 (stating “there has never been a [c]ourt ruling

… that PNC’s discovery responses were deficient, much less that a discovery

violation had occurred”). Nonetheless, even if PNC had committed a discovery

violation, “the decision whether to sanction a party for a discovery violation

and the severity of such a sanction are matters vested in the sound discretion

of the trial court.” Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305, 316 (Pa. Super.

2003); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 4019(a)(1) (providing that the court “may, on

motion,” impose sanctions on a party for any of the discovery violations

enumerated in subsection (a)(1)) (emphasis added).

III. Genuine Issue of Material Fact

SLV claims that the trial court erred in granting PNC summary judgment,

because, “despite PNC’s belated production of voluminous records, genuine

issues of material fact persist regarding essential elements of its foreclosure

claim.” SLV’s Brief at 30-31; see also id. at 32 (asserting that the “complex

records” produced by PNC “raise more questions than they answer”). More

specifically, SLV complains that PNC’s document production did not include

“copies of checks, withdrawal slips, or other primary evidence documenting

the specific advances allegedly taken by the Litwinoviches.” Id. at 32. It

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argues that without these underlying documents, it is unable to adequately

verify whether advances actually occurred in the amounts claimed. Id.

Additionally, SLV questions the general accuracy of PNC’s accounting

and the calculation of the amount claimed due. Id. at 33; see also id. at 35

(asserting that “[a]mbiguities or potential errors in the[] belatedly-produced

records must be construed against PNC…”). Finally, SLV contends that a

genuine issue exists as to whether and when a default occurred, as “it is

impossible to determine from the current record … precisely when a required

payment was missed or if PNC’s declaration of default and acceleration was

proper under the contract terms.” Id. at 33. SLV concludes that “the trial

court improperly resolved these factual disputes in favor of PNC, the moving

party, rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to SLV.”

Id. at 32-33.

In considering the merits of SLV’s claim, we are guided by the following:

[T]he holder of a mortgage has the right, upon default, to initiate

a foreclosure action. Additionally, the mortgage holder is entitled

to summary judgment if the mortgagor admits that the mortgage

is in default, the mortgagor has failed to pay on the obligation,

and the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount.

Gerber v. Piergrossi, 142 A.3d 854, 859 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “This is so even if the mortgagors

have not admitted the total amount of the indebtedness in their pleadings.”

Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Super. 1998).

“In response to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party

cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts

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demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.” Bank of America, N.A. v.

Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also Pa.R.Civ.P.

1035.3(a)(1) (dictating that the adverse party may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must identify “one or more issues

of fact arising from evidence in the record controverting the evidence cited in

support of the motion”); Gruenwald v. Advanced Computer Applications,

Inc., 730 A.2d 1004, 1009 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“It is the nonmoving party’s

responsibility to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists….”)

(citation omitted). “Bald unsupported assertions of conclusory accusations

cannot create genuine issues of material fact.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Lehman, 743 A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted).

Notably, “[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is

required are admitted when not denied specifically or by necessary

implication.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(b). Absent certain exceptions which are not

applicable here, “[a] general denial or a demand for proof … shall have the

effect of an admission.” Id.; see also Gibson, 102 A.3d at 466-67 (noting

that responsive pleadings in a mortgage foreclosure action must contain

specific denials). Moreover, “in mortgage foreclosure actions, general denials

by mortgagors that they are without information sufficient to form a belief as

to the truth of averments as to the principal and interest owing must be

considered an admission of those facts.” First Wis. Trust Co. v. Strausser,

653 A.2d 688, 692 (Pa. Super. 1995). This is because the mortgagors and

the mortgagee are the only parties with sufficient knowledge upon which to

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base a specific denial. See id. (citing N.Y. Guardian Mortg. Corp. v.

Dietzel, 524 A.2d 951, 952 (Pa. Super. 1987)); see also Wilmington Sav.

Fund Soc’y, FSB as Tr. of CSMC 2019-RPL5 Trust v. Mills, No. 181 MDA

2023, unpublished memorandum at 7-8 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 28, 2023)

(rejecting the appellant’s argument that the proposition established in

Strausser — namely, that a general denial as to the amounts owed under a

mortgage constitutes an admission — is inapplicable as to the executor of the

estate of the mortgagor who “was not a party to payments on the

mortgage”).9

Here, PNC averred in its complaint that, as successor by merger to

National City Bank, it is the current holder of the underlying mortgage in this

matter. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 5; see also id. at Exhibit A (certifying that

National City Bank merged with PNC). It further averred that in October of

2000, the Litwinoviches executed a mortgage in the principal amount of

$31,000.00, as security for the HELOC Agreement, and that said mortgage

was recorded in the Greene County Office of the Recorder of Deeds. See id.

at ¶ 4. Copies of the HELOC Agreement and the Mortgage are attached to

PNC’s Complaint. See id. at Exhibit B; id. at Exhibit C. SLV effectively

admitted the foregoing averments by failing to specifically deny them. See

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1029(b); Answer, 2/1/23, at ¶¶ 1, 4-5 (containing only boilerplate

____________________________________________

9 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive

value).

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language generally denying the corresponding averments in the Complaint,

e.g., “SLV is without knowledge, information or recollection sufficient to form

a belief as to the truth or falsity of the averments[;]” “Specific proof thereof

is demanded at trial[;]” “the averments … make reference to a document that

speaks for itself, and [SLV] denies any mischaracterization thereof”). PNC

also asserted, and SLV admitted, that SLV is now the current owner of the

Mortgaged Premises. See Complaint at ¶ 6; Answer at ¶ 6; see also SLV’s

Response to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment at 8 (acknowledging

that, as a successor to the prior owners of the Mortgaged Premises, it is bound

by the obligations of the Mortgage).

Additionally, PNC stated that the Mortgage is in default “for failing to

tender payments when due[,]” Complaint at ¶ 7, and that the total amount

due and owing at the time it filed its complaint was $33,575.09, id. at ¶ 11.

SLV provided the following responses to these allegations:

7. Denied as stated. By way of further Answer, to the extent

that this paragraph contains conclusions of law, no response

thereto is required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure. To the extent that the averments in this

paragraph are deemed factual, [SLV] specifically denies said

averments. Specific proof is demanded at trial. By way of

further Answer, the averments in this paragraph make

reference to a document that speaks for itself, and [SLV]

denies any mischaracterization thereof.

***

11. Denied as stated. By way of further Answer, it is specifically

denied that the amount [PNC] has characterized as “the

amount due and owing” represents a true and accurate

accounting of the credits and/or debits applicable to the

subject account, to the extent any such credits and/or debits

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exist. Specific proof of all components of [PNC’s] demand

amount, including interest, fees of any kind and all debits

and/or credits, is demanded at trial. By way of further

Answer, to the extent that this paragraph contains

conclusions of law, no response thereto is required under the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that the

averments in this paragraph are deemed factual, [SLV]

specifically denies said averments. Specific proof is

demanded at trial.

Answer at ¶¶ 7, 11.

Because SLV’s responses again consist mostly of boilerplate language

constituting general denials and it failed to articulate specific reasons as to

why the allegations in paragraphs 7 and 11 of the complaint are not true, we

conclude that SLV has effectively admitted these allegations as well. See

Jones v. Dubuque Fire & Marine Inc. Co., 176 A. 208, 209 (Pa. 1934)

(determining that a statement was an insufficient denial where it “simply

denied [the] averment without giving any reason or any figures to contradict

the statement”). Hence, the essential elements of PNC’s mortgage foreclosure

claim are deemed admitted, entitling it to summary judgment. See Gerber,

supra.

Notwithstanding, we observe that in support of SLV’s argument that

genuine issues of material fact persist, SLV only makes bald, unsupported,

conclusory accusations against PNC. See Lehman, 743 A.2d at 937 (“Bald

unsupported assertions of conclusory accusations cannot create genuine

issues of material fact.”). It fails to provide any specific examples of

inaccuracies in the account statements provided by PNC, nor does it point to

any evidence in the record to contradict PNC’s assertion that the Mortgage is

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in default. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)(1). Thus, SLV failed to meet its burden

to identify any genuine issue of material facts that would preclude the entry

of summary judgment. See Gibson, supra; Gruenwald, supra.

Whereas, based on our review, we discern that PNC’s allegation

regarding the default on the Mortgage to be adequately supported by the

record. For example, the account statements included in PNC’s supplemental

production of documents reflect that, as of April 25, 2005, there was a $0.00

balance on the HELOC. See Appendix in Support of Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment at Exhibit 4 (“Supplemental Document Production”) at

23. However, the statement for the period ending on June 24, 2005, reflects

two withdrawals that the Litwinoviches made on the HELOC, totaling $520.82.

Id. at 24. The dates and reference numbers for each of these transactions

are included in the statement. Id. The supplemental documents reveal that,

over the course of the next fifteen years, the Litwinoviches continued to

withdraw against the HELOC and to make payments towards the outstanding

balance, until the HELOC was maxed out in March of 2020. See generally

id. at 25-518; see also id. at 518 (indicating $0.00 available credit). There

is no record of any further payments on the account from that point forward.

See generally id. at 522-710. PNC also produced an affidavit of a PNC

employee, declaring that the total amount due and owing on the Mortgage as

of May 29, 2024, was $38,082.74. See id. at Exhibit 5 (“Affidavit of Amount

Due and Owing”) at ¶ 3.

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Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to SLV, the

nonmoving party, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial

court’s determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact that

would preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Murray, supra; Order,

10/31/24, at 2.10

IV. Successor Owner Status

Finally, SLV claims that “the trial court failed to adequately consider or

acknowledge the specific legal status of SLV as a purchaser of the [Mortgaged

Premises] at an upset tax sale, which fundamentally distinguishes SLV’s

position from that of the original borrowers….” SLV’s Brief at 40. While SLV

acknowledges that it purchased the Mortgaged Premises subject to PNC’s

mortgage lien, see id. at 41 (citing In re Balaji Investments, LLC, 148 A.3d

507, 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (noting that property purchased at upset tax

sale is acquired “subject to the lien of every recorded obligation, claim, lien,

estate, mortgage, ground rent and Commonwealth tax lien not included in

upset price”)), it avers that it did not assume personal liability for the

Litwinoviches’ debt. See id. (noting that SLV was not a party to the original

HELOC Agreement and never assumed personal responsibility for the

underlying debt).

____________________________________________

10 To the extent that SLV argues that the trial court erred in relying on “PNC’s

self-serving affidavit in violation of the Nanty-Glo Rule[,]” we deem this claim

waived due to SLV’s failure to include the issue in its “Statement of the

Questions Involved.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); Wirth, supra; SLV’s Brief at

36-39; see also Borough of Nanty-Glo v. Am. Surety Co. of N.Y., 163 A.

523 (Pa. 1932).

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This distinction is of no moment, as PNC did not seek, nor was it granted,

an in personam judgment. PNC specifically requested that the trial court

“enter a [j]udgment in rem against [SLV] and for the foreclosure and sale of

the premises.” Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

at 4 (unnumbered; emphasis added); see also Order, 10/31/24, at 3

(granting PNC’s renewed motion for summary judgment); Complaint at 3

(demanding “[j]udgment, in rem only, in mortgage foreclosure”) (emphasis

added). In fact, “[i]t is well-established that an action in mortgage foreclosure

is strictly in rem and thus may not include an in personam action to enforce

personal liability.” Rearick v. Elderton State Bank, 97 A.3d 374, 383 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (citation omitted); see also id. (noting that “the purpose of a

judgment in mortgage foreclosure is solely to effect a judicial sale of the

mortgaged premises”) (citations omitted). Hence, no relief is due on this

claim.11

____________________________________________

11 SLV further argues in its brief that its status as a tax sale purchaser “creates

enhanced obligations for PNC to provide clear notice and information about

the alleged debt[,]” SLV’s Brief at 43, and that the trial court’s failure to

consider SLV’s unique informational needs “effectively deprived SLV of a

meaningful opportunity to defend its property interest,” id. at 44. We are

constrained to deem this argument waived due to SLV’s failure to include this

issue in its “Statement of the Questions Involved.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a);

Wirth, supra.

Likewise, to the extent that SLV argues that the “cumulative effect” of

PNC’s statutory violations, its discovery misconduct, the persistence of

genuine factual disputes, and the trial court’s procedural missteps precludes

summary judgment, we deem this issue waived due to SLV’s failure to include

this issue in its “Statement of the Questions Involved.” See Pa.R.A.P.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s October 31, 2024 order granting

summary judgment in favor of PNC.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 1/15/2026

____________________________________________

2116(a); Wirth, supra. Notwithstanding waiver, we would conclude that our

disposition in this matter renders this issue moot. See In re J.G., 320 A.3d

1286, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“Generally, this Court will not decide moot or

abstract questions.”).

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