City of Gilroy v. Superior Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

CITY OF GILROY,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY,

Respondent;

LAW FOUNDATION OF SILICON VALLEY,

Real Party in Interest.

S282937

Sixth Appellate District

H049552

Santa Clara County Superior Court

20CV362347

LAW FOUNDATION OF SILICON VALLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY,

Respondent;

CITY OF GILROY,

Real Party in Interest.

S282950

Sixth Appellate District

H049554

Santa Clara County Superior Court

20CV362347

January 15, 2026

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Evans, and

Stratton* concurred.

Justice Groban filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices

Corrigan and Kruger concurred.

*

Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

District, Division Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

S282937

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

“The California Legislature in 1968, recognizing that

‘access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s

business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person

in this state’ [citation], enacted the California Public Records

Act, which grants access to public records held by state and local

agencies [citation]. . . . The act has certain specific exemptions

[citation], but a public entity claiming an exemption must show

that the requested information falls within the exemption.”

(Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (2014)

59 Cal.4th 59, 66–67 (Long Beach Police Officers).) In these

consolidated appeals, we address two issues involving this

statute. First, does the California Public Records Act (CPRA;

Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.) authorize a superior court to

grant declaratory relief for violations of its provisions when it is

undisputed that an agency has disclosed all existing records

that are responsive to a records request and not exempt from

disclosure?1 Second, when an agency responds to a CPRA

request by asserting that the requested records fall under a

statutory exemption from disclosure, does the CPRA require

that the agency retain the records for three years from the date

the exemption is invoked?

1

All further statutory references are to the Government

Code unless otherwise stated.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

As to the first issue, we conclude from the statutory text,

considered in light of the CPRA’s purpose of “increasing freedom

of information” (Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th

419, 425 (Filarsky)), that declaratory relief under the CPRA is

available in at least some circumstances in which all existing

responsive, nonexempt records have been disclosed in response

to a records request. An agency’s disclosure of those records

does not necessarily moot a request for declaratory relief that

would “enforce that person’s right under this division to inspect

or receive a copy of any public record or class of public records.”

(§ 7923.000.) At a minimum, declaratory relief is available

under the CPRA where the declaration would resolve an ongoing

dispute regarding the parties’ rights and obligations in a

manner that has some likelihood of affecting future requests for

public records or future conduct relating to such requests. We

therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion insofar as the Court of Appeal construed the

statute more narrowly as not providing “for declaratory relief

other than to determine a public agency’s obligation to disclose

records.” (City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th

818, 833 (City of Gilroy).)

As to the second issue, we agree with the Court of Appeal

that the CPRA does not “impose a duty upon public agencies to

preserve all documents responsive to a public records request

that have been withheld as exempt” for a period of three years,

commencing from when a public agency invokes a statutory

exemption as a reason to withhold the records. (City of Gilroy,

supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.) The CPRA, an otherwise

detailed statute, is silent regarding any preservation

requirement, suggesting that no such requirement exists. And

additional considerations — including the statute’s legislative

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

history, the broad scope of the preservation obligation argued to

exist, and the presence of retention requirements in other

statutes, juxtaposed against the lack of any such direction

here — counsel against recognizing this kind of implied

preservation duty.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff, the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley (the Law

Foundation), is a nonprofit legal services organization. (City of

Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 823.) Beginning in fall 2018,

“[a]fter receiving complaints from homeless persons that their

personal property was being destroyed during cleanups of

homeless encampments” that the Gilroy Police Department

(GPD) assisted with, the Law Foundation filed a series of public

records requests with the City of Gilroy (the City). (Id. at

p. 825.)

The three requests submitted by the Law Foundation in

October and November 2018 referenced enforcement actions

that had been taken. For instance, one of the requests was for

“[a]ny and all public records constituting, reflecting or relating

to the Zero Tolerance Policy regarding the homeless and Quality

of Life violations between January 1, 2015 through the present.”

None of these requests specifically mentioned footage captured

by body-worn cameras (bodycam footage).

The City responded to the requests by releasing some

records while withholding others. With respect to records

relating to enforcement by the GPD, the City informed the Law

Foundation that “[t]he GPD’s law enforcement records

generally, and Quality of Life criminal code enforcement records

specifically, are exempt from disclosure under . . . [C]PRA”

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section 7923.600.2 (See § 7923.600, subd. (a) [“this division does

not require the disclosure of . . . investigations conducted by . . .

any state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security

files compiled by any other state or local police agency, or any

investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or

local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing

purposes”].) The Law Foundation did not object to the City’s

final responses to its 2018 public records requests.

In May 2019, the Law Foundation submitted another

request, this time focusing specifically on the police

department’s bodycam recordings. (See City of Gilroy, supra,

96 Cal.App.5th at p. 826.) The City “subsequently provided

some responsive materials with a June 11, 2019 letter from the

assistant city attorney, which informed [the] Law Foundation

that its request for GPD bodycam video footage from the

homeless encampment sweeps was denied because the bodycam

videos were exempt from disclosure.” (Ibid.)

The Law Foundation objected to the City’s 2019 response.

On August 12, 2019, “the Law Foundation notified [the] City

that it intended to file a petition for writ of mandate seeking a

court order to compel [the] City to release GPD video and audio

recordings of encampment sweeps occurring between January 1,

2016, through the present.” (City of Gilroy, supra,

2

The Legislature recently recodified the CPRA. (See

§ 7920.005; Stats. 2021, ch. 614, § 2.) The recodification, which

took effect in January 2023, renumbered CPRA provisions but

did not substantively change the law. (See §§ 7920.100–

7920.120.) We refer to the current section numbers in the

discussion below, cross referencing as necessary when

discussing case law and other authorities that predate the

recodification.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

96 Cal.App.5th at p. 826.) “Due to [the] Law Foundation’s

stated intention of filing a writ petition to obtain release of the

bodycam video footage, on August 22, 2019, GPD voluntarily

placed a ‘ “litigation hold” ’ on the footage to preserve it beyond

the one-year retention period” mandated under the City’s

official retention policy. (Ibid.)

Although still contending that the bodycam footage was

exempt from disclosure, the City “release[d] GPD bodycam video

footage from encampment sweeps that did not relate to citations

or arrests.” (City of Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 827.)

The City represented that it did so “[t]o avoid dispute with the

Law Foundation regarding the scope of applicable exemptions

and to further accommodate its request for records.” (See

§ 7921.500 [“Unless disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law,

the provisions listed in Section 7920.505 [setting forth

exemptions to the duty to disclose] do not prevent any agency

from opening its records concerning the administration of the

agency to public inspection”]; CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d

646, 652 [“exemptions are permissive, not mandatory”].) All

released footage related to encampment cleanups that occurred

in 2018 and 2019. The City withheld as exempt footage “that

showed two encounters [in 2018] in which GPD officers issued

citations.” (City of Gilroy, at p. 827.) A trial court later ruled

that “the exemption was valid and the footage was properly

withheld.” (Ibid.) That decision is not contested here.

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The City also informed the Law Foundation that it had no

other responsive, nonexempt records to disclose.3 The City

stated that all bodycam footage taken before early 2018 had

been destroyed pursuant to the City’s records retention policy,

which required bodycam footage to be retained for only one

year.4

B. Procedural Background

In late 2020, the Law Foundation “filed a verified first

amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for

equitable relief . . . alleging that [the] City had committed

several violations of the CPRA” in handling its 2018 and 2019

records requests.5 (City of Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at

p. 827.) The Law Foundation alleged that, in contravention of

3

According to a declaration filed by counsel for the Law

Foundation, the City only revealed in June 2020 that it had

destroyed older bodycam footage after the Law Foundation had

filed its initial complaint. Counsel stated the communication

occurred during a “meet and confer” conference ordered by the

court. In response, the City pointed out that its one-year records

retention policy was adopted “at a publicly noticed meeting in

February 2014,” presumably suggesting the Law Foundation

should already have been aware the older bodycam footage no

longer existed.

4

Two records had not been destroyed, although they fell

outside the one-year retention period. Those records showed

“encounters by Gilroy police in which citations had been issued,”

and the records “had been flagged for retention, and therefore

had been preserved beyond the one-year retention period in the

Retention Policy.” As noted above, the City withheld these

records as exempt.

5

The initial complaint filed in January 2020 focused solely

on the Law Foundation’s 2019 records request and did not allege

that the City violated the CPRA in responding to the 2018

requests.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

the CPRA, the City “failed to search for responsive records,

delayed searching for responsive records, improperly withheld

responsive records, and destroyed responsive records while the

Law Foundation’s requests for those records were pending.” The

Law Foundation sought a writ of mandate directing the City to

produce the subject records. The Law Foundation also prayed

for a declaration of “the rights of the parties, including [the Law

Foundation’s] right to proper responses to its CPRA requests

that comply with the time limits and rules for extensions set

forth in the CPRA and that at the time of [the Law Foundation’s]

request, [the City of] Gilroy failed to produce responsive records

that existed at the time and were subsequently destroyed.”

The trial court granted the Law Foundation partial

declaratory relief. Specifically, the court declared “(1) that the

City violated the CPRA by conducting an inadequate search

related to the Law Foundation’s 2018 Public Records Act

Requests”; “(2) with respect to the 2018 requests, the City had a

duty to, but did not, watch the bodycam footage before asserting

a blanket exemption when the details of the footage were

unclear on their face in order to determine whether the

exemption applies, separate the exempt and nonexempt

material, if any, and share information derived from the exempt

records with the requester as to why any withheld records were

exempt rather than a boilerplate response that parrots the law”;

and (3) the City’s “response to the November 2018 CPRA

request was not timely, occurring 33 days after the request was

received.”

By contrast, the trial court found no violations of the

CPRA regarding the City’s handling of the 2019 records request.

The court also concluded that the CPRA did not impose a

retention requirement and “the City did not violate the CPRA

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

by failing to preserve responsive records upon receipt of the Law

Foundation’s multiple 2018 and 2019 Public Records Act

requests.” The court also denied the request for a writ of

mandate, ruling that the writ “does not lie to compel production

of records.” The court thus found, at least implicitly, that there

were no other responsive, nonexempt records to produce.

Both parties appealed. The City argued that “the trial

court erred in granting declaratory relief since the court did not

order production of records and no additional responsive,

nonexempt records can be produced.” (City of Gilroy, supra,

96 Cal.App.5th at p. 831.) The Court of Appeal agreed,

concluding that “the matter is moot and declaratory relief is not

available under the circumstances of this case.” (Id. at p. 832.)

According to that court, “ ‘[T]he CPRA provides no . . .

remedy . . . that may be utilized for any purpose other than to

determine whether a particular record or class of records must

be disclosed.’ ” (Ibid., quoting County of Santa Clara v. Superior

Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 119, 127.) The court emphasized

that “it is undisputed . . . [the] City has produced all responsive

nonexempt GPD bodycam video footage in its possession.” (City

of Gilroy, at p. 833.) The court concluded that, as a result, it

could not grant the Law Foundation “any effective relief under

the CPRA,” and the “Law Foundation’s claims regarding the

propriety of [the] City’s past conduct in responding to [the] Law

Foundation’s public records requests are moot.” (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal rejected the Law Foundation’s

argument that the matter was “not moot because the trial court

had broad authority to grant declaratory relief with respect to

whether [the] City’s past conduct in responding to [the] Law

Foundation’s public records requests violated the CPRA.” (City

of Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 833.) The Court of Appeal

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determined that “[s]ince the CPRA does not provide for

declaratory relief other than to determine a public agency’s

obligation to disclose records, [the] Law Foundation may not

seek declaratory relief under the CPRA with respect to the

propriety of [the] City’s past conduct in responding to [the] Law

Foundation’s public records requests.” (Ibid.)

The Law Foundation, meanwhile, sought review of the

trial court’s ruling that the CPRA does not impose a records

retention requirement. According to the Law Foundation,

“[T]he CPRA should be broadly interpreted to impose a duty

upon public agencies to preserve all documents responsive to a

public records request that have been withheld as exempt for

three years, pursuant to the three-year limitations period

provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 338.”6 (City of

Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.) The Court of Appeal

rejected this argument, reasoning that “the CPRA is not a

records retention statute since the CPRA lacks any provisions

pertaining to records retention.” (Id. at p. 836.) The court

perceived different provisions of the Government Code and the

Penal Code as “provid[ing] the statutory retention periods” (City

of Gilroy, at p. 836) applicable to the materials sought by the

Law Foundation. (Id. at pp. 836–837, citing Gov. Code,

§§ 34090, subd. (d) [providing that a city’s records generally

should not be destroyed “less than two years” from their date of

creation], 34090.6, subd. (a) [“Notwithstanding the provisions of

Section 34090, the head of a department of a city or city and

6

Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a)

prescribes a period of three years for bringing “[a]n action upon

a liability created by statute.” Throughout this opinion, we

assume, but do not decide, that this provision applies to actions

brought under the CPRA.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

county, after one year, may destroy recordings of routine video

monitoring, and after 100 days may destroy recordings of

telephone and radio communications maintained by the

department”]; Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (b)(5) [specifying that

“nonevidentiary data including video and audio recorded by a

body-worn camera should be retained for a minimum of 60 days,

after which it may be erased, destroyed, or recycled” while

“[e]videntiary data including video and audio recorded by a

body-worn camera under this section should be retained for a

minimum of two years” under certain circumstances].)

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Law Foundation’s

argument that unless it construed the CPRA as including a

preservation requirement, “public records that are potentially

responsive to a public records request may be deleted while the

request is pending.” (City of Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at

p. 837.) The court ultimately found such concerns insufficient

to overcome its interpretation of the statute. (Id. at pp. 837–

838.)

II. ANALYSIS

Both of the issues presented here involve a disagreement

over how the CPRA should be interpreted. In statutory

interpretation cases, “we begin by looking to the statutory

language.” (National Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020)

9 Cal.5th 488, 498 (National Lawyers Guild).) “We construe

statutory language in the context of the statutory framework,

seeking to discern the statute’s underlying purpose and to

harmonize its different components.” (Ardon v. City of Los

Angeles (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1176, 1183 (Ardon).) “If the language

is clear in context, our work is at an end. If it is not clear, we

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may consider other aids, including the statute’s legislative

history.” (National Lawyers Guild, at p. 498.)

A. Overview of the CPRA

“The Legislature enacted the CPRA in 1968. (Stats. 1968,

ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2945.) It was modeled after the 1967 federal

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). [Citation.] The

CPRA explains that ‘access to information concerning the

conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary

right of every person in this state.’ ([Former] § 6250 [now

§ 7921.000].) To promote this fundamental right, the CPRA

provides that ‘every person has a right to inspect any public

record, except as hereafter provided.’ ([Former] § 6253,

subd. (a)[7].) ‘In other words, all public records are subject to

disclosure unless the Legislature has expressly provided to the

contrary.’ ” (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v.

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032, 1038–1039 (American

Civil Liberties Union).)

“Proposition 59, a measure submitted to the voters in

2004, enshrined the CPRA’s right of access in the state

Constitution: ‘The people have the right of access to information

concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and, therefore,

the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials

and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.’ (Cal. Const.,

art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1), added by Prop. 59, as approved by voters,

Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004).) The state Constitution implemented

this right of access with the general directive that a ‘statute,

7

Former section 6253 is now section 7922.525, which is

substantively the same. (See § 7922.525, subd. (a) [“every

person has a right to inspect any public record, except as

otherwise provided”].)

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court rule, or other authority . . . shall be broadly construed if it

furthers the people’s right of access, and narrowly construed if

it limits the right of access.’ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3,

subd. (b)(2).)” (American Civil Liberties Union, supra, 3 Cal.5th

at p. 1039.) “In CPRA cases,” therefore, “th[e] standard

approach to statutory interpretation is augmented by [this]

constitutional imperative.” (City of San Jose v. Superior

Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 617 (City of San Jose).)

“Although the CPRA provides for a broad right of access,

it ‘recognizes that certain records should not, for reasons of

privacy, safety, and efficient governmental operation, be made

public . . . .’ ” (American Civil Liberties Union, supra, 3 Cal.5th

at p. 1039.) The CPRA thus provides for “numerous exceptions

to the requirement of public disclosure.” (International

Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21,

AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 329.) This

includes the investigative exemption relied upon by the City in

this case, which is intended to “protect . . . law enforcement’s

ability to effectively perform its duties.” (National Lawyers

Guild, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 493.)

The CPRA prescribes detailed procedures governing an

agency’s response to a public records request. These include the

requirement that an agency, “upon a request for a copy of

records, shall, within 10 days from receipt of the request,

determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies

of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and

shall promptly notify the person making the request of the

determination and the reasons therefor.” (§ 7922.535,

subd. (a).) An agency is further required to “state the estimated

date and time when the records will be made available” if the

agency “determines that the request seeks disclosable public

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records.” (Ibid.) The 10-day deadline may be extended only in

specified “unusual circumstances” and, in any case, cannot

“result in an extension for more than 14 days.” (Id., subd. (b).)8

Other provisions of the CPRA impose a general duty on

agencies to act promptly. (See, e.g., §§ 7922.500 [“Nothing in

this division shall be construed to permit an agency to delay or

obstruct the inspection or copying of public records”], 7922.530,

subd. (a) [“Except with respect to public records exempt from

disclosure by express provisions of law, each state or local

agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably

describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the

records promptly available to any person upon payment of

fees”].)

When an agency withholds a responsive record, the agency

must “justify [its] withholding . . . by demonstrating that the

record in question is exempt under express provisions of this

division, or that on the facts of the particular case the public

interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs

the public interest served by disclosure of the record.”

(§ 7922.000.) When a record contains both exempt and

nonexempt information, an agency must make a reasonable

effort to segregate and redact the record so that “[a]ny

reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for

8

As noted, the trial court found the City violated section

7922.535 by responding to the Law Foundation’s November

2018 request “33 days after the request was received” instead of

the maximum permitted 24 days.

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inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of

the portions that are exempted by law.” (§ 7922.525, subd. (b).)9

Most relevant here, the CPRA also “sets forth specific

procedures for seeking a judicial determination” regarding an

agency’s compliance with its provisions. (Filarsky, supra,

28 Cal.4th at p. 426.) Section 7923.000 allows a person to

“institute a proceeding for injunctive or declaratory relief, or for

a writ of mandate, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to

enforce that person’s right under this division to inspect or

receive a copy of any public record or class of public records.”

Pursuant to section 7923.100, “Whenever it is made to appear,

by verified petition to the superior court of the county where the

records or some part thereof are situated, that certain public

records are being improperly withheld from a member of the

public, the court shall order the officer or other person charged

with withholding the records to disclose those records or show

cause why that person should not do so.” (See also § 7923.110

[stating that a court shall “make [a] record public” or “return the

record . . . without disclosing its content” depending on whether

the court finds that the decision to refuse disclosure was

justified]; Filarsky, at pp. 426–427 [discussing other aspects of

judicial review under the CPRA, including appellate

procedures].)

9

Here, the trial court found that the City failed to “separate

the exempt and nonexempt material, if any, and share

information derived from the exempt records with the requestor

as to why any withheld records were exempt rather than a

boilerplate response that parrots the law.”

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B. Availability of Declaratory Relief Under the

CPRA

The first issue before us concerns the scope of declaratory

relief available under the CPRA. The Law Foundation contends

that the declaratory relief authorized by section 7923.000

sweeps broadly. It perceives an extensive array of declarations

addressing whether a public agency’s past actions violated the

CPRA as appropriate “to enforce” a requester’s right “to inspect

or receive a copy of any public record or class of public records.”

(§ 7923.000.) The Law Foundation reasons that declaratory

relief addressing the lawfulness of an agency’s past conduct may

function “to enforce” these rights by deterring future unlawful

conduct, even if no particularized circumstances suggest that

the challenged conduct is likely to recur. (Ibid.)

The City advances a much narrower interpretation of

section 7923.000. According to the City, section 7923.000 places

“a limitation on declaratory relief to whether there is a duty to

disclose particular records.” In other words, in the City’s view

the declaratory relief available under the statute is limited to an

agency’s ongoing responsibilities to disclose existing records in

response to a pending request. In making this argument, the

City stresses that sections 7923.100 and 7923.110 empower the

courts to compel production of only “certain public records”

(§ 7923.100) or to “make . . . public” specific records (§ 7923.110,

subd. (a)). In the City’s view, “the CPRA does not authorize

declaratory relief specifying whether a records search was

inadequate or should have been done in a particular manner, or

whether an agency’s initial response . . . was allegedly late by a

few days, or whether an automatic document deletion schedule

should have been halted once an agency received a CPRA

request.”

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We agree with the Law Foundation that the CPRA

authorizes declaratory relief in at least some circumstances in

which an agency already has disclosed all nonexempt records

responsive to a records request. Without attempting to

delineate all circumstances in which declaratory relief may be

available under the CPRA, we conclude that, at a minimum,

declaratory relief is appropriate in situations in which an agency

is reasonably likely to repeat past conduct that allegedly

violates the CPRA in response to future records requests. It is

apparent here that the first two of the trial court’s declarations,

which concerned the City’s responses to public records requests

involving bodycam footage captured by law enforcement,

addressed contested issues regarding the City’s handling of

records requests that were sufficiently likely to recur;

declaratory relief is appropriate in these circumstances to help

guide the parties’ future conduct and inform their rights and

responsibilities under the CPRA.

1. Statutory text

Section 7923.000 provides that “[a]ny person may

institute a proceeding for injunctive or declarative relief, or for

a writ of mandate, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to

enforce that person’s right under this division to inspect or

receive a copy of any public record or class of public records.”

This language reveals some basic flaws with the City’s

interpretation. The City argues that declaratory relief under

the CPRA is restricted to whether a requester is entitled to

certain records, or classes of records, that have not yet been

made available by an agency. But the statute does not set out

any such limitation. It refers more generally to enforcing a

“person’s right under this division to inspect or receive a copy of

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any public record or class of public records.” (§ 7923.000.) This

language is reflective of a more expansive use of declaratory

relief to vindicate the broader right to inspect or receive records,

including in response to a pending request or one that might be

made in the future. Furthermore, under the City’s reading, the

declarations authorized by section 7923.000 would be limited to

declarations that a requester is entitled to certain records or

classes of records, notwithstanding the fact that courts could

already order the production of those records under sections

7923.100 and 7923.110.

Contrary to the City’s position that no effective relief can

be provided under the circumstances of this case, it is not

difficult to see how a declaration could “enforce” a right to public

records. (§ 7923.000; see Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed. 1968) p. 621,

col. 2 [defining “enforce” as “[t]o put into execution,” “to cause to

take effect,” “to make effective,” or “to compel obedience to”];

Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1961) p. 751, col. 2 [defining

“enforce” as to “compel” or “cause to take effect” (capitalization

omitted)]; accord, California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City

of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 347 [in construing a

statute, relying on the dictionary meaning of the word “enforce”

and stating “the word ‘enforce’ is defined as to ‘give effect to’ ”].)

Most obviously, at least when there is an ongoing dispute

between the parties, a declaration of rights and responsibilities

could avoid the recurrence or continuation of assertedly

unlawful conduct that frustrates a “person’s right under this

division to inspect or receive a copy of any public record or class

of public records.” (§ 7923.000.) An interpretation of the statute

as concerned with such practices would harmonize with case law

explaining that declaratory relief is available under Code of

Civil Procedure sections 1060 and 1061 to resolve uncertainties

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regarding legal duties and past conduct that might be

perpetuated absent a judicial declaration. (See, e.g., City of

Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79 (City of Cotati) [a

plaintiff can generally seek “ ‘declaratory relief . . . when the

parties . . . dispute whether a public entity has engaged in

conduct or established policies in violation of applicable law’ ”];

Bess v. Park (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 49, 52 [declaratory relief is

available “to liquidate doubts with respect to uncertainties or

controversies which might otherwise result in subsequent

litigation”]; Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d

719, 729 [“The purpose of a declaratory judgment is ‘to serve

some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or

disputed jural relation’ ”].)

As noted, the Law Foundation interprets the declaratory

relief provision under the CPRA more expansively as generally

allowing for declarations based solely on prior conduct by an

agency even without any further indication that this conduct

might recur.10 We do not have to decide here all of the

circumstances for which declaratory relief under the CPRA may

be available. As previously recited, the trial court issued three

declarations — the first declaring that the City violated the

CPRA by conducting an inadequate search for records; the

second declaring that the City breached various duties in

asserting an exemption for bodycam footage sought by the Law

10

In advancing this interpretation of the statute, the Law

Foundation has conceded some possible limits to the declaratory

relief available under the CPRA. Among them, at oral argument

counsel for the Law Foundation took the position that the CPRA

allows for a declaration regarding an agency’s belated

production of records only when that untimeliness “deprived a

requester of their constitutionally protected rights.”

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Foundation; and the third declaring that the City’s response to

the November 2018 request was untimely, “occurring 33 days

after the request was received.” The first and second of these

declarations were appropriate regardless of whether, when past

conduct is at issue, the CPRA’s declaratory relief provision is

limited to circumstances in which this conduct has some

likelihood of recurring. Both of these declarations addressed

contested claims regarding the City’s alleged responsibilities

under the CPRA, given the City’s consistent view concerning the

CPRA’s application to certain bodycam recordings that it

continues to generate. Declaratory relief was appropriate to

provide guidance to the parties and resolve their ongoing

disputes. We decline to address the third declaration and

whether it would have supported an action for declaratory relief

if raised in isolation. Given the existence here of other, valid

subjects of declaratory relief, we need not evaluate this

declaration regarding the timeliness of agency responses in

order to answer the legal question before us.11

2. Purpose and constitutional mandate

Our construction of the statute is also supported by the

CPRA’s overarching purpose and the constitutional mandate

that a “statute . . . shall be broadly construed if it furthers the

people’s right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the

right of access.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).)

11

Upon remand, the Court of Appeal can consider whether

the trial court’s third declaration is authorized under the CPRA,

assuming the parties wish to further pursue the matter in light

of the concession made by the Law Foundation.

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The CPRA “was enacted for the purpose of increasing

freedom of information by giving members of the public access

to information in the possession of public agencies.” (Filarsky,

supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 425.) Even in circumstances in which all

records responsive to a specific request have been produced or

destroyed, declarations that function to guide the parties’

conduct, resolve ongoing disputes, and facilitate future

inspection or receipt of records “increas[e] freedom of

information” (ibid.) and “further[] the people’s right of access”

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)).

This is true even though, as the Law Foundation

acknowledges, “a declaratory judgment cannot bring back

records that a public agency has already destroyed.”

Notwithstanding such destruction, a declaration of whether

challenged policies and practices comport with the statute

furthers the statute’s goals insofar as the declaration clarifies

whether the challenged policies or practices are permissible

under the statute. Such clarifications will then assist agencies

in fulfilling their obligations in responding to future public

records requests.

Conversely, adopting the City’s position would create a

heightened risk of limiting access to public records in the

manner provided by statute. Under the City’s approach, an

agency’s full production of records after the requester files suit

would categorically preclude any declaratory relief even in

situations involving repeated stonewalling or other policies or

practices that hinder or frustrate the exercise of rights conferred

under the CPRA. We avoid this construction of the CPRA in

light of “the public’s presumptive right of access [citation], and

the constitutional imperative to broadly construe this right.”

(City of San Jose, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 624; see Judicial Watch,

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Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec. (D.C. Cir. 2018) 895 F.3d

770, 780 [“Our precedent on policy or practice claims disposes of

any suggestion that Congress intended the repeated filing of

lawsuits to be a practical requirement for obtaining records from

an agency flaunting the statute”].)

3. Case law

No court has directly answered the question of whether

the CPRA authorizes a superior court to grant declaratory relief

for violations of its provisions when it is undisputed that all

existing responsive, nonexempt records have been disclosed.

Nonetheless, the interpretation of the CPRA that we adopt is

consistent with other judicial decisions addressing similar

issues under state and federal law.

In Community Youth Athletic Center v. City of National

City (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1385 (Community Youth), the

plaintiff submitted public records requests to the City of

National City (National City) in connection with the city’s plans

to redevelop areas within its borders “based on certain

designations of physical and economic blight.” (Id. at p. 1394.)

The plaintiff sued under the CPRA when National City failed to

produce “certain documents about . . . two types of underlying

raw data” that had been requested. (Community Youth, at

p. 1396.) As it turned out, National City did not disclose these

raw data because it no longer had them. Some of the data were

misplaced, and some had been lost because National City’s

consultant “routinely purged its records.” (Id. at p. 1403.)

Ruling in the plaintiff’s favor, the trial court “issued declaratory

relief on the ground that the City had violated the [C]PRA, by

failing to produce at the request of [the plaintiff] certain

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documents . . . which the City had used to justify its blight

claims.” (Id. at p. 1396.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that “[t]he trial

court’s declaratory relief that there had been violations of the

[C]PRA was justified.” (Community Youth, supra,

220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429.) As the Court of Appeal stated, “No

bad faith finding was required to support the finding there was

a [C]PRA violation.” (Id. at p. 1428.) National City violated the

CPRA because in its search for records, it “gave up too soon and

did not press the matter sufficiently, to a reasonable extent, at

a time when most of the [underlying raw data] . . . still existed.”

(Community Youth, at p. 1428.) The court further concluded

that the plaintiff might qualify for an attorney fee award

because it “sought and obtained declaratory relief that there had

been [C]PRA violations” (id. at p. 1447) even though “the subject

requested records were never produced” (id. at p. 1446).

Community Youth is analogous to the case before us in

several aspects. In Community Youth, as here, requested

records had been lost because of a routine records deletion. Like

the instant matter, there did not appear to be any contention

that the lost records in Community Youth could still be

produced. Despite that circumstance, the Court of Appeal

affirmed the trial court’s ruling declaring that National City

violated the CPRA because it failed to properly respond to the

plaintiff’s public records request.

The Court of Appeal below found Community Youth to be

“distinguishable” — a contention the City echoes. (City of

Gilroy, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) According to the court,

“no issue was raised in Community Youth . . . regarding whether

the public records requests were moot or whether declaratory

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relief was authorized under the CPRA.” (Id. at pp. 834–835.) It

therefore concluded that Community Youth “does not support

[the] Law Foundation’s contention that a trial court has broad

authority to grant declaratory relief regarding the propriety of a

city’s past acts in responding to public records requests under

the CPRA where, as here, a public agency’s obligation to disclose

public records is not at issue.” (Id. at p. 835.)

It is true that the reviewing court in Community Youth did

not specifically address mootness. Nonetheless, it upheld the

trial court’s grant of declaratory relief while fully cognizant that

the requested records were lost and “never produced.”

(Community Youth, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446.)

Moreover, like the plaintiff in Community Youth, the Law

Foundation contends that the City was obligated to locate and

disclose the requested records “at a time when most of the

[documents] still existed.” (Id. at p. 1428.) The City’s

“obligation to disclose public records” thus underpins the Law

Foundation’s claim here, just as a similar duty formed the basis

for the plaintiff’s claim in Community Youth. (City of Gilroy,

supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.) While we express no view

regarding whether the court in Community Youth reached the

right result under the circumstances of that case, its reasoning

suggests that courts have not generally understood the CPRA’s

declaratory relief provision in the limited manner that the City

suggests.

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Cook v. Craig (1976)

55 Cal.App.3d 773 (Cook) also demonstrates how declaratory

relief may enhance the right to access public records even when

a complete disclosure has been made in circumstances where, as

here, an agency produces requested records without conceding

an obligation to do so. The plaintiffs in Cook sought “pursuant

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to the Public Records Act [citation] . . . to be allowed to inspect

and make copies of the rules and regulations of the California

Highway Patrol (CHP) governing the investigation and

disposition of citizens’ complaints of police misconduct.” (Id. at

p. 777, fn. omitted.) The trial court sustained a demurrer to the

complaint, ruling that the CPRA “does not compel disclosure of

the CHP’s procedure for investigating citizen complaints.” (Id.

at p. 778.)

The plaintiffs appealed. While their litigation was

pending, the Attorney General informed the plaintiffs that the

CHP had been persuaded to make complaint investigation

procedures available due to “ ‘a new legislative policy favoring

availability of information concerning the manner in which law

enforcement agencies handle complaints against their

personnel.’ ” (Cook, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 779.)

Despite the CHP’s new policy, the Court of Appeal was not

convinced that the lawsuit had been rendered moot. As the

court reasoned, a “defendant’s unilateral decision to disclose its

complaint investigation procedures is also unilaterally

rescindable,” and “[g]iven the position of defendant that it has

no legal obligation to disclose these procedures, and its

voluntary disclosure only after litigation was commenced, we

cannot say that the dispute will not recur.” (Cook, supra,

55 Cal.App.3d at p. 780.) The court therefore held that

“voluntary disclosure does not resolve plaintiffs’ action for

‘declaratory relief’ as to whether the procedures are required to

be disclosed under the [C]PRA.” (Ibid.; see also, e.g., Gray

Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Charlotte (N.C. 2023) 892 S.E.2d 629,

636; Spokane Research v. City of Spokane (Wash. 2005) 117 P.3d

1117, 1124.)

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Before turning to federal case law, we note that the federal

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), like

the CPRA, provides a mechanism for records requesters to seek

judicial review. Unlike the CPRA, the federal law does not

expressly provide for declaratory relief. Instead, courts have

granted such relief under “courts’ equitable powers in enforcing

[the FOIA’s] terms.” (Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. (D.C.

Cir. 1988) 837 F.2d 486, 494 (Payne) [citing Renegotiation Bd. v.

Bannercraft Clothing Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 1, 19–20].)

In interpreting the CPRA, we are not bound by decisions

interpreting the FOIA. Nonetheless, they remain informative

insofar as they reveal that courts interpreting the federal law

have recognized the availability of declaratory relief in certain

circumstances, even when all records responsive to a request

have been produced. (See, e.g., Times Mirror Co. v. Superior

Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1338 (Times Mirror) [“judicial

construction of the FOIA . . . ‘serve[s] to illuminate the

interpretation of’ ” the CPRA]; American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 451 [finding

parallel construction of the two statutes appropriate with

respect to the question presented and circumstances of the case];

cf. Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 351–354

[clarifying that a general sensitivity to judicial construction of

the FOIA does not mean the CPRA and FOIA should be

interpreted as imposing the same requirements in all

instances].)

Here, both parties rely on Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services (2016) 811 F.3d 1086 (Hajro), a federal

case addressing when FOIA claims become moot. In Hajro, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that there are “two

separate claims that complainants can bring against an agency

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under FOIA.” (Hajro, at pp. 1102–1103.) The first type of claim

is “a suit where a plaintiff attacks a specific agency action for

(1) ‘improperly’ (2) ‘withheld’ (3) ‘agency records.’ ” (Id. at

p. 1103.) For this type of claim — referred to as “specific FOIA

request claims” — the court determined that “after the agency

produces all non-exempt documents and the court confirms the

agency’s proper invocation of an exemption, the specific FOIA

claim is moot because the injury has been remedied.” (Ibid.)

The City relies on this language to support its position that the

Law Foundation’s claim is moot and no declaratory relief could

be granted.

By contrast, the Law Foundation focuses on the next part

of Hajro’s discussion, in which the Ninth Circuit elaborated

upon the second type of FOIA claim that may be brought. The

court stated: “A FOIA requester may also assert a FOIA pattern

or practice claim — a ‘claim that an agency policy or practice will

impair the party’s lawful access to information in the future.’ ”

(Hajro, supra, 811 F.3d at p. 1103.) Because this type of alleged

FOIA violation is not “merely an isolated incident,” “a pattern

or practice claim is not necessarily mooted by an agency’s

production of documents.” (Hajro, at p. 1103; see also, e.g.,

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (9th Cir.

2019) 935 F.3d 858, 874 [“policy or practice claims stem from an

agency’s policy of violating FOIA rather than from the results of

a particular request . . . . [A]n agency cannot moot a pattern or

practice claim by providing the requested documents”]; Newport

Aeronautical Sales v. Dept. of the Air Force (D.C. Cir. 2012)

684 F.3d 160, 164 [“ ‘even though a party may have obtained

relief as to a specific request under the FOIA, this will not moot

a claim that an agency policy or practice will impair the party’s

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lawful access to information in the future’ ” (some italics

omitted)].)

Hajro’s discussion regarding a pattern and practice claim

follows a line of precedents that began with Payne. In Payne, a

requester, Payne Enterprises, Inc. (Payne), was frustrated when

“officers at Air Force Logistics Command (‘AFLC’) bases refused

to supply [it] with copies of bid abstracts . . . . The base officers

perfunctorily invoked FOIA Exemptions . . . in justifying their

denials. Payne appealed these denials to the Secretary of the

Air Force, who without exception ordered disclosure . . . .

Nevertheless, AFLC officers continued to refuse Payne’s FOIA

requests for bid abstracts, thereby necessitating further — and

invariably successful — administrative appeals. The delay

occasioned by these appeals injured Payne’s business by

frustrating its clients’ desire for the prompt delivery of

information on contract bids.” (Payne, supra, 837 F.2d at

p. 487.) Payne eventually filed suit “challenging the Air Force’s

practice of unjustified delay and seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief to compel the defendants to release abstracts of

negotiated acquisitions.” (Ibid.) “Payne’s suit was dismissed,

however, on the ground that it had received all of the material

it had requested through the administrative appeals procedure

specified by the FOIA.” (Id. at p. 488.)

On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the

district court had abused its discretion in denying Payne

equitable relief. (Payne, supra, 837 F.2d at p. 494.) The

appellate court reasoned, “For almost two years, officers at

AFLC bases refused to fulfill Payne’s requests for copies of bid

abstracts . . . , thus forcing Payne to seek administrative review.

In every case, the Secretary of the Air Force released the

information Payne requested. . . . The AFLC officers, however,

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continued to deny Payne’s requests, and the Secretary refrained

from taking firm action to end their recalcitrance. The

Secretary’s inability to deal with AFLC officers’ noncompliance

with the FOIA, and the Air Force’s persistent refusal to end a

practice for which it offers no justification, entitle Payne to

declaratory relief.” (Id. at p. 494.) The Court of Appeals thus

reversed and directed the district court to enter declaratory

judgment in favor of Payne. (Id. at p. 495.)

In short, Payne involved an agency’s egregious

noncompliance with federal records disclosure law that

continued notwithstanding the requester’s repeated resort to

internal agency remedies. The requester sought a judicial

declaration that the complained-of conduct was unlawful, and

the Court of Appeals agreed declaratory relief was appropriate

under the circumstances. The City’s interpretation of the CPRA

would reach the opposite result here, rejecting any claim for

declaratory relief under the statute if the requesting party “had

received all of the material it had requested.” (Payne, supra,

837 F.2d at p. 488.) We reject such an interpretation as

inconsistent with the CPRA’s text, read in light of its animating

purposes.

4. Countervailing policy arguments

The City also invokes public policy concerns in support of

its interpretation. (Accord, Commission on Peace Officer

Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278,

290 [“ ‘To the extent [an] examination of the statutory language

leaves uncertainty, it is appropriate to consider “the

consequences that will flow from a particular

interpretation” ’ ”].) The City’s primary contention is that the

Law Foundation’s construction will encourage strategic

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litigation. The City notes that the CPRA requires a public

agency to pay “court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the

requester” “[i]f the requester prevails in litigation filed pursuant

to [the CPRA].” (§ 7923.115, subd. (a).) Based on this, the City

argues that “[t]o permit claims for declaratory relief based on

some alleged technical violation of the CPRA such as a delayed

initial response, even where an agency has otherwise fully

complied with a request and produced appropriate records,

would generate litigation meant not to enforce a right to view

public records, but solely to recover attorney’s fees.”

We find the City’s policy arguments unpersuasive. First,

the City’s position assumes that affirmative declaratory relief

and attorney fees are available in response to merely “technical”

violations of the statute. While future cases may present that

question, as previously discussed we need not interpret the

statute so expansively in order to resolve the case before us. Our

narrower holding today — that the statute allows for

declaratory relief at least when it functions to address an

ongoing dispute and guide the parties’ future conduct with

respect to the parties’ rights and responsibilities under the

CPRA — should not threaten the tidal wave of litigation that

the City forecasts.

There are also limits regarding the availability and size of

attorney fees under the CPRA. An award of fees is authorized

by statute only “[i]f the requester prevails in litigation”

(§ 7923.115, subd. (a)), and those that bring “clearly frivolous”

cases are required to pay “court costs and reasonable attorney’s

fees to the public agency” (id., subd. (b)). In addition, a court is

obligated to award only “reasonable attorney’s fees” to a

prevailing requester. (Id., subd. (a), italics added.) If the court

concludes that a requester engaged in unreasonable litigation

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

tactics in order to recover attorney fees, the court may take this

into consideration in determining what constitutes a reasonable

fee award. (See, e.g., Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d

647, 654 [stating that a trial court “determine[s] whether the

fees sought by the prevailing party are reasonable in light of the

work required to be done and, if not, . . . fix[es] an amount that

is reasonable. . . . ‘The requirement that such fees be reasonable

should adequately safeguard against an excessive award’ ”].) In

other words, insofar as our ruling raises concerns about the

amount of attorney fees, a court is not statutorily obligated to

award fees in the amount requested by prevailing counsel. 12

For the reasons provided above, we hold that the CPRA

authorizes declaratory relief that a public agency has violated

its provisions even in some circumstances when it is

uncontested that there are no existing nonexempt records to

disclose. Under any reasonable interpretation of the statute, at

least two of the declarations rendered by the trial court below

were permissible because they resolve an ongoing dispute about

the parties’ respective statutory rights and obligations and thus

serve to guide their future conduct. We do not address the third

12

Agencies, too, have some degree of control over the amount

of attorney fees that may be reasonably incurred. In this case,

for example, it has been argued that the City might have

successfully limited the scope of litigation by informing the Law

Foundation at an earlier point in time that it no longer

possessed certain bodycam footage the Law Foundation seeks.

As the Law Foundation alleged in the operative complaint, it

was “[b]ecause [the City] continued to assert that it was

withholding records under the investigative exemption rather

than disclosing that the records no longer existed, the Law

Foundation was forced . . . to file a writ petition to enforce its

rights under the CPRA.”

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declaration, concerning the untimeliness of the City’s response.

Nor do we reach the parties’ other contentions regarding the

availability of declaratory relief. In particular, we express no

view as to the Court of Appeal’s holding that the declaratory

relief granted by the trial court here was unauthorized under

Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. (Compare City of Gilroy,

supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833–834 with City of Cotati, supra,

29 Cal.4th at p. 79.)

C. Retention Obligation Under the CPRA

As to the second issue presented, we reject the Law

Foundation’s claim that the CPRA imposes a retention period of

three years commencing from the time an agency asserts an

exemption to withhold records. We base this conclusion on

several grounds. First, the CPRA’s text does not include a

retention obligation, an omission that is particularly noteworthy

given how detailed the statute is and the improbability of

legislation by implication on this subject. Second, the CPRA’s

legislative history indicates that the Legislature did not

perceive it as imposing a retention requirement. Third, the

presence of retention periods in other statutes applicable to

records commonly sought through CPRA litigation, and the

penalties for spoliation in the litigation context, assuage

concerns about the absence of a retention obligation and

reinforce the conclusion that the failure to include a

preservation requirement in the CPRA was intentional.

1. Statutory text

Although “the CPRA describes its procedures and

exceptions ‘in exceptionally careful detail’ ” (Haynie v. Superior

Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1061, 1073 (Haynie)), none of its

provisions specifically requires a public agency to retain any

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record under any particular circumstance. The only time the

CPRA addresses record preservation is within section 7921.010,

a provision that prohibits agencies from avoiding their

obligations under the statute by transferring public records to

private entities. And far from requiring any sort of retention,

that provision states that “[n]othing in this section prevents the

destruction of a public record pursuant to law.” (§ 7921.010,

subd. (c).)

The absence of any retention requirement within the

CPRA suggests that no such requirement exists. (Accord, Long

Beach Police Officers, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 72 [concluding that

“silence” on the part of a statute “is important”].) It would be

highly unusual for the Legislature to have intended for this

court not only to infer a retention requirement within the

statutory scheme but also to devise all of the details necessary

to make such a requirement coherent, such as when a duty

would be triggered and when it would terminate.

Our own precedent supports this conclusion. In Haynie,

we held that the CPRA does not require a public agency to

“create a list and description of documents withheld” prior to

litigation. (Haynie, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1074.) We first noted

that the CPRA “contains no . . . provision describing an agency’s

duty to create a log of documents exempt from disclosure.”

(Haynie, at p. 1073.) We also observed that such a duty “has the

potential for imposing significant costs on the agency.” (Id. at

p. 1074.) We thereafter declined to read such a duty into the

CPRA. (Haynie, at p. 1075.) We likewise hold in the present

case that a preservation duty does not exist under the CPRA.

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In urging us to reach a different conclusion, the Law

Foundation contends that its proposed records retention

requirement derives from the CPRA’s judicial review provisions,

including sections 7923.000, 7923.100, 7923.105, 13 and

7923.110. The Law Foundation reasons that “[t]he necessary

implication of these statutory provisions is that the withheld

records will be preserved long enough for a court to

independently review the public agency’s reasons for

withholding the records.”

We are unpersuaded that by providing for judicial

oversight in the CPRA, the Legislature intended to require the

retention of records for three years, commencing with the

assertion of a statutory exemption. In essence, the Law

Foundation’s argument is that the CPRA imposes a records

retention requirement because the CPRA allows for litigation.

But if litigation is what justifies preservation, then it seems

unlikely that the Legislature intended for broad preservation of

potentially responsive public documents given that, as the

parties here agree, public records requests rarely result in

litigation.

The breadth of the Law Foundation’s proposed records

retention requirement further undermines its position that the

Legislature intended such a requirement by way of inference.

Taken to its logical end, this requirement could result in

agencies having to retain all records indefinitely. Consider, for

example, a scenario in which a requester asks an agency to

13

In relevant part, section 7923.105 reads, “The court shall

decide the case after the court does all of the following: [¶] (a)

Examine the record in camera, if permitted by subdivision (b) of

Section 915 of the Evidence Code.”

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produce “all records” and the agency states that it will not be

releasing “all records” because “on the facts of the particular

case the public interest served by not disclosing the record

clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the

record.” (§ 7922.00; accord, Times Mirror, supra, 53 Cal.3d at

p. 1345 [“whatever merit disclosure might otherwise warrant in

principle is simply crushed under the massive weight of the . . .

request in this case”].) Having relied on this catchall exemption,

the agency would be obligated, under the Law Foundation’s

reading, to retain all records for a period of three years. On the

eve of the expiration of that period, the requester could again

ask for all records, and the agency would presumably be

required to retain all its records for another three years. We are

“not persuaded that any identifiable public interest supports

such a wholesale [retention] of documents.” (Times Mirror, at

p. 1345; see also Ardon, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1189.)

We therefore conclude that had “the Legislature . . .

intended to” include a records retention requirement within the

CPRA, “ ‘it would have been done . . . more clearly and

explicitly.’ ” (Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189,

199; accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715

[referencing the “no-elephants-in-mouseholes canon”].)

2. Legislative history

The Law Foundation’s reading of a retention requirement

into the statute is also inconsistent with the CPRA’s legislative

history. Our review of this history reveals one discussion of a

retention requirement in connection with the CPRA’s initial

enactment — in which the author of the measure through which

the CPRA was enacted (Assem. Bill No. 1381 (1968 Reg. Sess.))

expressly stated that the statute did not contain such a

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

requirement. The author received unanimous consent to

include a statement by him in the Assembly Journal for

August 2, 1968 — the day the bill received final approval in the

Assembly. The statement provided in relevant part, “In order

to indicate more fully its intent with respect to AB 1381, the

Assembly Judiciary Committee and the author make the

following statement: [¶] The intent of AB 1381 is to enact a

comprehensive law relating to disclosure of public records, and

not to affect the provisions of existing law in regard to the

destruction of public records.” (4 Assem. J. (1968 Reg. Sess.)

p. 7150, italics added.)14 This statement of the intent behind the

bill corroborates our assessment that the statute does not

include a retention requirement.

3. Other remedies and statutes

Because the Law Foundation is not arguing that the

CPRA imposes an obligation on agencies to institute litigation

holds,15 it is unnecessary to extensively explore that issue here.

14

The author’s statement also provided, “The Assembly

Judiciary Committee intends to give further consideration to

revision of the law relating to destruction and retention of

records during the 1969 general session of the Legislature and

appropriate recommendations will be made at that time.”

(4 Assem. J., supra, at p. 7150.) Express legislation to govern

the “destruction and retention of records” under the CPRA did

not materialize in 1969 or thereafter, however. (4 Assem. J.,

supra, at p. 7150.)

15

A litigation hold describes “[t]he duty to preserve relevant

evidence [that] is triggered when the party is objectively on

notice that litigation is reasonably foreseeable, meaning

litigation is probable and likely to arise from an incident or

dispute and not a mere possibility.” (Victor Valley Union High

School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121,

1133.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Nonetheless, we observe that statutes other than the CPRA

already create preservation duties relating to litigation and

other retention requirements that help to assuage any concerns

regarding the possible destruction of records while a CPRA

request is pending.

For example, in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior

Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), we examined statutes

that prohibit and penalize the destruction of evidence relevant

to litigation, including Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010

(Code Civ. Proc., former § 2023). As we explained, “Destroying

evidence in response to a discovery request after litigation has

commenced would surely be a misuse of discovery within the

[prohibition] of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 2023[.010], as

would such destruction in anticipation of a discovery request.”

(Cedars-Sinai, at p. 12.) Not only would “destruction in

anticipation of a discovery request” violate the law, but it would

also draw “potent” “sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure

section 2023[.010].” (Ibid.) Our decision in Cedars-Sinai also

discussed other provisions of law that deter the spoliation of

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

evidence, such as Evidence Code section 413 16 and Penal Code

section 135.17 (Cedars-Sinai, at pp. 11, 13.)

Thus, to the extent that the Law Foundation is concerned

that CPRA provisions authorizing judicial oversight “would be

frustrated if a public agency can thwart judicial review of its

decision to withhold records by destroying those records in the

ordinary course, even after the agency is on notice that the

requesting party disagrees with the agency’s justification for

withholding,” those concerns are already addressed in the law,

at least when litigation is reasonably foreseeable. (See, e.g.,

Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 11–12.) It is not

necessary to infer that the CPRA itself imposes a preservation

obligation in these circumstances.18

16

Evidence Code section 413 states that “[i]n determining

what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case

against a party, the trier of fact may consider, among other

things, the party’s failure to explain or to deny by his testimony

such evidence or facts in the case against him, or his willful

suppression of evidence relating thereto, if such be the case.”

The provision thus creates an “evidentiary inference that

evidence which one party has destroyed or rendered unavailable

was unfavorable to that party.” (Cedars-Sinai, supra,

18 Cal.4th at p. 11.)

17

Penal Code section 135 states, “A person who, knowing

that any book, paper, record, instrument in writing, digital

image, video recording owned by another, or other matter or

thing, is about to be produced in evidence upon a trial, inquiry,

or investigation, authorized by law, willfully destroys, erases, or

conceals the same, with the intent to prevent it or its content

from being produced, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

18

The Legislature also recently enacted Penal Code section

832.5. This provision specifies procedures for investigation of

complaints against law enforcement personnel. In relevant

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We also agree with the Court of Appeal that the existence

of other retention statutes counsels against finding an implicit

retention requirement in the CPRA. These statutes (which

postdate the CPRA) impose minimum retention periods for

categories of records that capture materials the Law Foundation

sought from the City in this case. (See §§ 34090, subd. (d)

[excepting “[r]ecords less than two years old” from a general

authorization to destroy city records], 34090.6, subd. (a)

[“Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 34090, the head of

a department of a city or city and county, after one year, may

destroy recordings of routine video monitoring, and after

100 days may destroy recordings of telephone and radio

communications maintained by the department”]; Pen. Code,

§ 832.18, subd. (b)(5)(A) [stating that data recorded by a body-

worn camera “should be retained for a minimum of 60 days[, or

longer under specified circumstances], after which it may be

erased, destroyed, or recycled”].)

These statutes are relevant here in a few respects. First,

they demonstrate that the Legislature has imposed express

retention requirements in other contexts, making the absence of

any such requirement in the CPRA all the more notable. (See,

e.g., In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [“ ‘where a

statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision,

the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning

part, it provides, “A record [e.g., complaints and any reports or

findings relating to these complaints] shall not be destroyed

while a request related to that record is being processed or any

process or litigation to determine whether the record is subject

to release is ongoing.” (Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (b).) The

Legislature has thus expressly required a hold for certain types

of records.

38

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

a related subject is significant to show that a different legislative

intent existed with reference to the different statutes’ ”].)

Second, these statutes provide for the retention of certain public

records for specified minimum periods of time. Although these

timeframes are shorter than the three-year retention period

urged by the Law Foundation, they nevertheless provide the

public with an understanding of when a records request seeking

covered records must be presented to an agency, tempering

concerns that agencies might frustrate a public records request

through the immediate destruction of records. Third, none of

these statutes suggests that the CPRA might require the

retention of records that could otherwise be destroyed, a shared

omission that, again, suggests that the CPRA does not impose

any such requirement. (See, e.g., People v. Frahs (2020)

9 Cal.5th 618, 634.) 19

19

Penal Code section 832.18, enacted just over a decade ago,

does mention the CPRA. (See Pen. Code, § 832.18, subd. (d)

[“This section shall not be interpreted to limit the public’s right

to access recorded data under the California Public Records

Act”].) This reference, however, does not allude to any

preservation requirement. The history of the enacting

legislation confirms that it is concerned with the CPRA’s

disclosure requirements, rather than any duty to retain records.

(See, e.g., Assem. Com. Privacy & Consumer Protection,

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 69 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Apr. 21, 2015, pp. 2, 4 [discussing the CPRA, stating

that it “requires” “public agencies [to] disclose a government

record to the public upon request” and mentioning various facets

of the law, but without suggesting any retention requirement].)

In short, the Law Foundation has not offered any basis for this

court to infer that the Legislature understands the CPRA to

impose a preservation requirement.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

4. Constitutional mandate

Consideration of the constitutional provision calling for a

broad construction of the CPRA “if it furthers the people’s right

of access” does not compel a different conclusion. (Cal. Const.,

art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).) “To the extent legislative intent is

ambiguous, this [constitutional] provision requires us either to

broadly or to narrowly construe the Public Records Act,

whichever way will further the people’s right of access.

[Citation.] But this rule of construction does not require the

courts to resolve every conceivable textual ambiguity in favor of

greater access, no matter how implausible that result in light of

all the relevant indicia of statutory meaning.” (Ardon, supra,

62 Cal.4th at p. 1190.)

5. Case law

Finally, the Law Foundation relies on Golden Door

Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733

(Golden Door) to support its argument that a duty to preserve

records should be implied from the judicial oversight provisions

of the CPRA. We conclude that Golden Door is distinguishable.

In Golden Door, the Court of Appeal interpreted Public

Resources Code section 21167.6, part of the California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code,

§ 21000 et seq.). Public Resources Code section 21167.6 specifies

that “[a]t the time that [a CEQA] action or proceeding is filed,

the plaintiff or petitioner shall file a request that the respondent

public agency prepare the record of proceedings relating to the

subject of the action or proceeding.” (Pub. Resources Code,

§ 21167.6, subd. (a).) Public Resources Code section 21167.6

also specifies the contents of such a “record of proceedings,”

enumerating 11 different types of documents that must be

40

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

included in the record. (See id., subd. (e).) The question before

the Golden Door court was whether “by mandating the contents

of the record of proceedings, [Public Resources Code] section

21167.6 necessarily requires that such writings not be destroyed

before the record is prepared.” (Golden Door, supra,

53 Cal.App.5th at p. 762.) The court answered that question in

the affirmative, holding that “a lead agency may not destroy, but

rather must retain writings [Public Resources Code] section

21167.6 mandates for inclusion in the record of proceedings.”

(Id. at p. 764.)

The Law Foundation cites Golden Door as an instance in

which a court found that “a duty to preserve may be implied

even if the statute does not expressly provide for retaining

records.” But the CEQA section addressed in Golden Door

differs from the CPRA provisions at issue here. The code section

involved in Golden Door requires an agency to prepare a

particular type of record (the record of proceedings) “[a]t the

time that” the agency is sued under CEQA. (Pub. Resources

Code, § 21167.6, subd. (a).) Public Resources Code section

21167.6 makes clear what written materials are part of this

record of proceedings, divesting the agency (and court) of any

discretion to exclude materials expressly required. (Golden

Door, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 762–764.) This specific

direction regarding what must be contained in the record of

proceedings made it reasonable for the Golden Door court to

conclude that the Legislature wanted these materials to be

retained even ahead of any litigation. The CPRA, by contrast,

lacks any comparable direction.

Moreover, in holding that Public Resources Code section

21167.6 “requires the lead agency to retain [the] writings” that

make up the “record of proceedings,” the Court of Appeal relied

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

on the fact that “[p]reparing a record under [Public Resources

Code] section 21167.6 is not an end in itself, but rather the

means for judicial review of CEQA determinations.” (Golden

Door, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 747.) Accordingly, “[a]

thorough record is fundamental to meaningful judicial review.”

(Ibid.) The court also emphasized that the burden of retention

is not overly onerous, as “CEQA contains short limitations

periods.” (Id. at p. 779; see ibid. [“an action alleging that an EIR

does not comply with CEQA must be filed within 30 days after

the agency files a notice of determination. [Citation.] If no

notice of determination is filed, the action must be filed within

180 days after the agency approves the project”].)

Neither of these considerations is present in the context of

CPRA litigation. Unlike the “record of proceedings” of Public

Resources Code section 21167.6, CPRA records are “an end in

[themselves]” and not just “the means for judicial review of

[statutory] determinations.” (Golden Door, supra,

53 Cal.App.5th at p. 747.) Moreover, in contrast to the brief

limitation periods under CEQA, the Law Foundation urges us

to adopt a retention period of at least three years (that begins

when an agency invokes a statutory exemption). And notably,

the legislative history of CEQA does not contain any statement

of the type found here indicating that the statute was intended

to leave unaffected rules governing records destruction or

retention. (4 Assem. J., supra, p. 7150.)

In light of these differences, the fact that the court in

Golden Door found that a retention duty was implied by the

specific text of a provision of the Public Resources Code provides

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

little ground for us to conclude that different provisions of the

CPRA likewise impose a preservation requirement. 20

III. DISPOSITION

The Court of Appeal correctly held that the CPRA does not

“impose a duty upon public agencies to preserve for three years

all documents responsive to a public records request that have

been withheld as exempt.” (City of Gilroy, supra,

96 Cal.App.5th at p. 838.) No such duty exists. We reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeal, however, insofar as it unduly

limited the scope of declaratory relief available under the CPRA,

and we remand the case to the Court of Appeal for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

EVANS, J.

STRATTON, J.*

20

In concluding that the CPRA does not require the

preservation of records in this case, we have considered

circumstances where records are destroyed in connection with

the normal adoption, implementation, and operation of routine

records retention practices and policies. We have no occasion to

address intentional destruction of records in other contexts that

may reflect some type of deliberate misconduct.

*

Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate

District, Division Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

43

CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

S282937

Concurring Opinion by Justice Groban

I agree with the majority’s holding that declaratory relief

is available under the California Public Records Act (CPRA)

(Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.) where the declaration would

resolve an ongoing dispute regarding the parties’ rights. (Maj.

opn., ante, at p. 2.) I also appreciate the majority’s conclusion

that, for the purpose of deciding the present dispute, we need

not “delineate all circumstances in which declaratory relief may

be available under the CPRA.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 15.) I write

separately to elaborate on the circumstances that, in my view,

would — and would not — warrant declaratory relief under the

CPRA.

The linchpin of the majority’s holding is its statement

that, “[a]t a minimum, declaratory relief is available under the

CPRA where the declaration would resolve an ongoing dispute

regarding the parties’ rights and obligations in a manner that

has some likelihood of affecting future requests for public records

or future conduct relating to such requests.” (Maj. opn., ante, at

p. 2, italics added.) Declaratory relief under the CPRA should

be understood to carry the same meaning and scope that courts

have long attributed to the general declaratory relief statute,

Code of Civil Procedure section 1060. As courts have long

concluded, “ ‘[d]eclaratory procedure operates prospectively, and

not merely for the redress of past wrongs. It serves to set

controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of

obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs; in short,

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CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

Groban, J., concurring

the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to

declare rights rather than execute them.’ ” (Babb v. Superior

Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848.) Consistent with this

understanding, the CPRA does not authorize declaratory relief

for the sole purpose of declaring that an agency’s past conduct

violated the CPRA where there is no evidence of a pattern or

practice of violations or where the agency does not dispute its

legal obligations under the CPRA.

The accepted understanding of declaratory relief, at least

as provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, is that it

“advance[s] preventive justice” and “declare[s] rather than

execute[s] rights.” (Kirkwood v. California State Automobile

Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.) It

“serves a practical purpose in stabilizing an uncertain or

disputed legal relation, thereby defusing doubts which might

otherwise lead to subsequent litigation.” (Ibid.) Declaratory

relief is generally not proper where a party wishes to declare

only that the other party’s past conduct breached a contractual

or legal obligation. (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v.

DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 366.)

It is similarly improper where an act by the counterparty

deprives the claim of a present controversy, such as where the

counterparty voluntarily ceases the allegedly wrongful conduct

prior to the lawsuit. (TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato

(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 140, 152 (TransparentGov).) An

exception to this general rule exists where “there is a reasonable

expectation the allegedly wrongful conduct will be repeated,”

such as where the counterparty continues to assert that its past

conduct was lawful or has a pattern and practice of violating the

law. (Center for Local Government Accountability v. City of San

Diego (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1157 (Center for Local

2

CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

Groban, J., concurring

Government Accountability); accord, California Alliance for

Utility etc. Education v. City of San Diego (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th

1024, 1030.)

To illustrate, in Center for Local Government

Accountability, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim for

declaratory relief for a city’s past Brown Act violations was not

moot where the city continued to assert that its past conduct did

not violate the law. (Center for Local Government

Accountability, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) By contrast,

the court in TransparentGov held that declaratory relief was not

proper where, prior to the litigation, the city had adopted several

remedial measures in response to the plaintiff’s letter

complaining of past Brown Act violations. (TransparentGov,

supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 145–146.) The court explained that

“resolving whether the discussions that took place at [a past]

meeting violated the Brown Act is unnecessary to guide any

future behavior that is realistically likely to occur.” (Id. at

pp. 152–153.)

Here, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley is not, of course,

seeking declaratory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section

1060, but instead relies upon section 7923.000 of the CPRA.

Nevertheless, if the Legislature had intended declaratory relief

under the CPRA to depart from its usual prospective function —

by authorizing declarations that a party’s past, nonrecurring

conduct violated the CPRA — I would expect a more explicit

expression of that intent in the statute’s text or legislative

history. The need for an express desire to deviate from our

default rule is especially crucial given that, “if a person initiates

a proceeding under the [CPRA], he or she must be awarded

attorney fees and costs if he or she prevails,” whereas “in a

declaratory relief action [under Code of Civil Procedure section

3

CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

Groban, J., concurring

1060], a member of the public seeking disclosure cannot recover

attorney fees if he or she prevails.” (Filarsky v. Superior Court

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 429, italics added.) Since attorney’s fees

are mandatory under the CPRA when a party prevails in a

declaratory relief action, we should be certain that the

Legislature intended to make it easier to prevail in CPRA

declaratory relief actions. The Legislature expressed no such

intent.

The CPRA provides that “[a]ny person may institute a

proceeding for injunctive or declarative relief, or for a writ of

mandate, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to enforce that

person’s right under this division to inspect or receive a copy of

any public record or class of public records.” (Gov. Code,

§ 7923.000.) As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 17),

the word “enforce” is defined as “[t]o put into execution,” “to

cause to take effect,” “to make effective,” or “to compel obedience

to.” (Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed. 1968) p. 621, col. 2; accord

Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 751, col. 2

[defining “enforce” as to “compel” or “cause to take effect”];

California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 347 [relying on dictionary definition of

“ ‘enforce’ ” as meaning “ to ‘give effect to’ ”].) The word “enforce”

therefore has a “coercive connotation[]” and is forward-looking

in that it forces a party to do something it refuses to do. (Comite

De Padres De Familia v. Honig (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 528, 532.)

Given this language, and consistent with the majority’s

interpretation, my view is that declaratory relief is available

under the CPRA where an agency continues to contest a person’s

legal “right . . . to inspect or receive” certain records (Gov. Code,

§ 7923.000), even if it has already destroyed or voluntarily

produced the records. (See Center for Local Government

4

CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

Groban, J., concurring

Accountability, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157 [city’s change

in practices did not moot claim for declaratory relief because city

continued to assert that its past practices did not violate the

Brown Act]; Cook v. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 780

[declaratory relief under the CPRA was warranted since the

defendant, though it produced its complaint investigation

procedures, continued to deny any legal obligation to do so].) In

addition, and again consistent with the majority’s holding,

declaratory relief is available under the CPRA where the agency

has a pattern and practice of impeding a requestor’s right to

public records, such as where an agency repeatedly refuses or

delays access to requested documents in a manner that is

detrimental to the requestor. (See Californians for Native

Salmon etc. Assn. v. Department of Forestry (1990)

221 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1422 [declaratory relief appropriate

“when it is alleged that the agency has a policy of ignoring or

violating applicable laws and regulations”]; Payne Enterprises,

Inc. v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1988) 837 F.2d 486, 491 [declaratory relief

proper under the federal Freedom of Information Act because

the agency had a policy and practice of delaying the release of

the requested records].) Under either scenario, declaratory

relief is appropriate because, absent such relief, the agency is

likely to repeat the unlawful practice in the future.

Applying my interpretation to the facts of this case, I

would find, as does the majority, that the first two aspects of the

trial court’s declaratory relief — declaring that the City violated

the CPRA by conducting an inadequate search for records and

that the City breached various duties in asserting an exemption

for bodycam footage — were proper under the CPRA because

they resolved contested legal rights and obligations of the

parties. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18–19.) Throughout the

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CITY OF GILROY v. SUPERIOR COURT

Groban, J., concurring

litigation, the City continued to assert that all bodycam footage

was exempt from production. It is therefore likely that the City,

and perhaps other agencies as well, would assert blanket

exemptions covering the production of bodycam footage in the

future, absent declaratory relief.

I conclude, however, that the CPRA does not entitle a

party to declaratory relief where the relief sought is not likely to

affect future requests for public records or future conduct

relating to such requests. Permitting such broad relief could

improperly incentivize members of the public to seek

declaratory relief not for the purpose of addressing an actual

harm, but merely to obtain attorney’s fees. Such an unbounded

rule could also discourage agencies from reconsidering their

initial legal positions regarding the public’s right to the

requested records, because agencies might remain liable for

attorney’s fees even if they voluntarily produce all documents

before litigation. Declaratory relief should not be used to resolve

moot issues. Rather, such relief must declare a legal right or

obligation capable of affecting future requests for records under

the CPRA.

GROBAN, J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

KRUGER, J.

6

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion City of Gilroy v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 96 Cal.App.5th 818

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion Nos. S282937, S282950

Date Filed: January 15, 2026

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Santa Clara

Judge: Nahal Iravani-Sani

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Law Offices of William D. Ross, William D. Ross, David Paul Schwarz,

Kypros Gabriel Hostetter; Berliner Cohen, Andrew L. Faber, Jolie

Houston and Thomas P. Murphy for Petitioner and Real Party in

Interest City of Gilroy.

Donald A. Larkin, City Attorney (Morgan Hill), for the League of

California Cities and the California Special Districts Association as

Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Party in Interest City of

Gilroy.

Jennifer Bacon Henning for the California State Association of

Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Party in

Interest City of Gilroy.

Goodwin Procter, Indra Neel Chatterjee, Monte Cooper, Megan D.

Bettles, Wendell Lin, Faraz Behnamjou; Disability Rights Advocates,

Thomas Zito, Brian Nichols, Hai Dao, Karen Elizabeth Kontz; and

Tristia Bauman for Petitioner and Real Party in Interest Law

Foundation of Silicon Valley.

Claudia Center and Erin Neff for Disability Rights Education and

Defense Fund, Asian Americans Advancing Justice Southern

California, Bay Area Legal Aid, California Advocates for Nursing

Home Reform, California Rural Legal Assistance, Centro Legal de la

Raza, Child Care Law Center, Community Legal Aid SoCal, Disability

Rights California, Eviction Defense Collaborative, Family Violence

Appellate Project, Impact Fund, Justice in Aging, Lawyers’ Committee

for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, La Raza Centro Legal,

Legal Aid Association of California, Legal Aid Foundation of Los

Angeles, Legal Aid of Marin, The Legal Aid Society of San Diego, Legal

Aid of Sonoma County, Legal Services of Northern California, The

National Health Law Program, The National Homeless Law Center,

The National Housing Law Project, OneJustice, Public Interest Law 3

Project, Public Counsel, Senior Advocacy Network, Western Center on

Law and Poverty, UnCommon Law and Youth Law Center as Amici

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Party in Interest Law

Foundation of Silicon Valley.

Cannata, O’Toole & Olson, Aaron R. Field, Zachary E. Colbeth; David

Loy and Annie Cappetta for First Amendment Coalition, LA Times

Communications LLC, The McClatchy Company LLC, California

Newspapers Partnership, Californians Aware, Electronic Frontier

Foundation, Freedom of the Press Foundation, Society of Professional

Journalists and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as

Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Party in Interest Law

Foundation of Silicon Valley.

No appearance for Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Andrew L. Faber

Berliner Cohen LLP

10 Almaden Boulevard, 11th Floor

San Jose, CA 95113

(408) 286-5800

Indra Neel Chatterjee

Goodwin Procter LLP

245 Lytton Avenue, Suite 150

Palo Alto, CA 94301

(650) 422-6708