noting, to establish necessity defense, “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, . . . the defense will fail.” (citation modified)
How later courts described this case
- noting, to establish necessity defense, “if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, . . . the defense will fail.” (citation modified)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 24-4394 Doc: 36 Filed: 01/13/2026 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4394
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARMAINE MIESHA BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:22-cr-00164-TDC-2)
Submitted: December 30, 2025 Decided: January 13, 2026
Before GREGORY, THACKER, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Stuart A. Berman, LERCH, EARLY & BREWER, CHARTERED, Bethesda,
Maryland, for Appellant. Kelly O. Hayes, United States Attorney, David C. Bornstein,
Assistant United States Attorney, Brandon K. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A federal jury found Charmaine Miesha Brown guilty of conspiracy to commit
passport fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 157(1); and
false statements in bankruptcy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3). The district court
sentenced Brown to 30 months’ imprisonment and Brown now appeals. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Brown married her codefendant, Andrews Oduro Brown (“Oduro”), in January
2014. Oduro is a Ghanaian national who entered the United States in May of 2013. Brown
and Oduro applied for United States passports for Oduro’s two Ghanaian children, falsely
claiming on the passport applications that Brown was the children’s biological mother.
Brown and Oduro also used the identity of another man to collect childcare subsidy
payments from the state of Maryland and to take out car loans and credit card loans. Brown
and Oduro then discharged the debt incurred under the false identity through bankruptcy
proceedings. Oduro pled guilty to several charges, and the district court sentenced him to
28 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Brown first challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for a
judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. We “review de novo a district court’s
denial of a Rule 29 motion.” United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2018).
We “must sustain a guilty verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “Substantial
evidence is that which a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
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to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation
modified). “Reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Wolf, 860 F.3d 175, 194 (4th Cir. 2017)
(citation modified).
“When a defendant raises specific grounds in a Rule 29 motion, grounds that are not
specifically raised are waived on appeal unless a manifest miscarriage of justice has
occurred.” United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified); see id. at 678 n.2 (explaining that arguments not raised in motion for judgment
of acquittal are properly considered forfeited, rather than waived, and can be reviewed for
miscarriage of justice). “Under [the manifest miscarriage of justice] standard, the court
assesses whether the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or the evidence on a
key element of the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” United
States v. Rao, 123 F.4th 270, 276 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Furthermore,
“[w]hether an affirmative defense is established is a factual issue that is usually a function
of the jury, and the trial court rarely rules on a defense as a matter of law.” United States v.
Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994).
At trial, Brown raised a necessity defense for the passport and wire fraud conspiracy
charges, and at the close of evidence moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29
based on her necessity defense. She argues on appeal that the district court should have
granted a judgment of acquittal based on the defense. Having reviewed the evidence in a
light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the district court did not err by
providing the jury with instruction on Brown’s necessity defense rather than granting her
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motion for a judgment of acquittal. Contrary to Brown’s assertions on appeal, she did not
establish her necessity defense beyond any doubt. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 410 (1980) (noting, to establish necessity defense, “if there was a reasonable, legal
alternative to violating the law, . . . the defense will fail.” (citation modified)). The court
thus properly allowed the jury to make the determination; the jury’s rejection of the defense
is supported by substantial evidence.
Because Brown failed to raise other challenges to the sufficiency of the
Government’s evidence in her motion for acquittal, the remaining issues she raises on
appeal are forfeited absent “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Duroseau, 26 F.4th at 678.
On appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence as to the wire
fraud conspiracy charge, her specific intent and lack of good faith for the bankruptcy fraud
and making false statements in a bankruptcy proceeding charge, and the materiality of the
false statements for the false statements in a bankruptcy proceeding charge. Having
reviewed the evidence, we conclude that the Government provided substantial evidence to
support these convictions and thus there was no material miscarriage of justice.
Brown also argues for the first time on appeal that her conviction for bankruptcy
fraud relied on what she claims is an invalid “trustee-victim” legal theory. As Brown raises
this claim for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. See Davis v. United States,
589 U.S. 345, 346-47 (2020). Under plain-error review, the defendant “must show (1) that
the court erred, (2) that the error is clear and obvious, and (3) that the error affected [her]
substantial rights, meaning that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”
United States v. McCabe, 103 F.4th 259, 279 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). However,
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“even when those plain error requirements have been satisfied, we will not correct the error
unless [the error] seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (citation modified).
Here, the indictment and the jury instructions charged that Brown devised a scheme
to defraud her creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. On appeal, Brown argues that a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 157 may not be sustained based on a theory that the defendant
defrauded the bankruptcy trustee. In support of this argument, Brown relies on
out-of-circuit precedent. However, “an error is only plain if the settled law of the Supreme
Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred.” United States v. Comer, 5 F.4th
535, 549 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Therefore, even if the out-of-circuit precedent
Brown cites stands for this proposition, she cannot rely on that precedent to demonstrate
plain error. This claim therefore fails.
Finally, Brown challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. We
review criminal sentences for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743, 748 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation modified).
Although Brown does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of her sentence, we
must nonetheless ensure that his sentence is procedurally sound. See United States v.
Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, we discern no procedural error, and
we conclude that Brown’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we evaluate “the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in
concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
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States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). “A sentence that is
within or below a properly calculated [Sentencing] Guidelines range is presumptively
[substantively] reasonable.” United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021)
(citation modified). “On appeal, such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
(citation modified).
On appeal, Brown argues that the disparity between her 30-month term of
imprisonment and her codefendant’s 28-month term of imprisonment renders her sentence
substantively unreasonable. However, the sentence is presumptively reasonable, as it falls
below the properly calculated Guidelines range. Moreover, the district court clearly
explained its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors during Brown’s sentencing hearing,
including Brown’s personal history and characteristics, the nature of the multiple fraud
charges, and the need to deter the types of fraud at issue. In addition, the district court
addressed the issue of a potential disparity in sentencing between the codefendants,
explaining that Brown’s codefendant had accepted responsibility, pled guilty, and did not
raise the issue of a necessity defense and, unlike Brown, had no criminal history. Brown,
on the other hand, went to trial before a jury and did not accept responsibility for her
offenses. The district court ultimately concluded that a 30-month term of imprisonment
for Brown would avoid a sentencing disparity. As the district court determined, we discern
no unwarranted sentencing disparity between Brown and Oduro, and the district court did
not abuse its discretion in sentencing Brown to a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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