Barbetti, V. v. Afzal, S.

J-S33012-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

VANESSA M. BARBETTI : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

SEYED EMAD ADIN KHAZRAEE :

AFZAL, MEHRNOUSH SOROUSH, :

JOSHUA F. DAYANIM, SUZANNE L. :

DAYANIM, SARAH SIAH A/K/A :

FOROUZAN SIAH-FALLAHI, :

COLDWELL BANKER PREFERRED - :

WAYNE, NRT PHILADELPHIA LLC : No. 32 EDA 2025

D/B/A COLDWELL BANKER REALTY, :

1927 POPLAR STREET :

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION :

Appeal from the Order Entered November 22, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at

No(s): 210600621

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 13, 2026

Vanessa M. Barbetti (“Ms. Barbetti”) appeals pro se from the order

granting the joint motion to enforce settlement agreement (the “Joint Motion”)

filed by Seyed Emad Adin Khazraee Afzal, Mehrnoush Soroush, Joshua F.

Dayanim, Suzanne L. Dayanim, and 1927 Poplar Street Condominium

Association (the “HOA”) (collectively, “Defendants”). We affirm.

This matter arises from Ms. Barbetti’s purchase of a condominium from

Defendants. Mr. Afzal and Ms. Soroush were the previous owners and the

sellers of the property Ms. Barbetti purchased, while Mr. and Mrs. Dayanim

are part of the HOA for the condominium, along with Ms. Barbetti. Shortly

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after her purchase, Ms. Barbetti filed a complaint against Defendants

asserting, inter alia, that they did not disclose certain material defects. 1

Specifically, Ms. Barbetti alleged that the sewer line, back patio area, patio

drain, property structure, stucco, roof, and sprinkler system were faulty and

had not been fixed upon her purchase of the property. See Joint Motion,

7/16/24, at Exhibit A.

____________________________________________

1 In her complaint, Ms. Barbetti also asserted claims against Sarah Siah A/K/A

Forouzan Siah-Fallahi, Coldwell Banker Preferred - Wayne, and NRT

Philadelphia LLC D/B/A Coldwell Banker Realty (collectively, “Additional

Defendants”). Ms. Siah was the real estate agent in this transaction, being

licensed by Coldwell Banker and NRT Philadelphia. Ms. Barbetti averred

against Additional Defendants fraud, negligence, and claims pursuant to the

Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and the

Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act. Additional Defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment asserting that none of Ms. Barbetti’s claims

against them had any merit, which the court granted. In its order, the court

stated that Additional Defendants’ motion was granted “in its entirety” but

dismissed Ms. Barbetti’s claims “without prejudice.” See Order, 9/21/23.

Summary judgment is governed by Rule 1035.2, which “sets forth the general

principle that a motion for summary judgment is based on an evidentiary

record which entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.”

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2, Note. Conversely, “a dismissal without prejudice is not

intended to be res judicata of the merits of the controversy. . . . [T]he phrase

‘without prejudice’ ordinarily imports the contemplation of further

proceedings.” Robinson v. Trenton Dressed Poultry Co., 496 A.2d 1240,

1243 (Pa.Super. 1985) (cleaned up).

To the extent that the court’s order granted Additional Defendants’ motion but

suggested that Ms. Barbetti was free to reassert claims against them, Ms.

Barbetti did not do so. She also did not appeal herein the order granting

Additional Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, no claims

against Additional Defendants remain in this case. Thus, the appealed-from

order enforcing Ms. Barbetti’s settlement agreement with Defendants was a

final order disposing of all claims as to all parties.

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On the morning of the scheduled jury trial, the parties attempted to

resolve the matter among themselves. Defendants via email proposed a

certain sum to Ms. Barbetti in exchange for “a general release.” Id. at Exhibit

B. Ms. Barbetti responded with a numerical figure, and some exchanges of

numbers followed without success. When the parties appeared for trial, the

court conducted a settlement conference mediated by the Honorable Judge

Caroline Turner. The court conducted confidential negotiations that resulted

in a settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court placed the following on the

record:

This . . . was a case concerning damages to property and the

settlement is for that property damage.

As part of the negotiation for settlement, all four lawyers and [Ms.

Barbetti] have agreed to the confidentiality of not only the

settlement itself but all settlement negotiations; things that were

said during settlement; and amounts being contributed by each of

the [D]efendants.

The settlement involves a release being issued today. Once [Ms.

Barbetti] has executed the release and notarized it, the monies

will be received by [Ms. Barbetti] within [thirty] business days.

The settlement agreement was negotiated by [Judge Turner].

. . . . [Judge Turner] will be retaining jurisdiction in this case to

make sure that any of the eventualities that could possibly go

wrong . . . are mediated and sorted out by [her].

Post-settlement agreement, [Ms. Barbetti] was very concerned

that some of the motions she had filed might be accessed by

members of the public at some later stage. [Judge Turner]

actually got the records that she was concerned about sealed.

....

[T]he settlement was for $175,000.

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N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 3-6 (the “Oral Agreement”). Counsel for Defendants

confirmed that the material terms of the agreement were accurately recited

by the court, as did Ms. Barbetti. The court concluded proceedings, with the

terms of the Oral Agreement to be reduced to writing for Ms. Barbetti’s

execution.

Later that day, Defendants emailed a proposed release to Ms. Barbetti

pursuant to the Oral Agreement, with the subject line “Barbetti v. Khazraee,

et al – Confidential General Release.” Joint Motion, 7/16/24, at Exhibit D.

The attached file was named the “Confidential General Release,” and the

document was titled “Confidential Settlement Agreement and General

Release” (the “Agreement”). Id. at Exhibits D and E. In sum, the Agreement

stated that in exchange for $175,000 from Defendants, Ms. Barbetti agreed

to forgo any and all claims relating to her purchase of the condominium

against them and any third-party. Mr. Afzal, Ms. Soroush, and Mr. and Mrs.

Dayanim specified that their insurance companies would pay their

contributions to the settlement.

Ms. Barbetti responded by email the following day, explaining that she

forwarded the Agreement to her accountant to confirm that she would not

have to pay taxes on the funds. See Response in Opposition to Joint Motion,

8/27/24, at Exhibit B. She further questioned the necessity of paragraph

seven, which stated that Ms. Barbetti would provide her personal information,

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such as her social security number, to Defendants to satisfy their insurance

obligations. Id.

One week later, Ms. Barbetti sent Defendants a revised version of the

Agreement with edits and comments. Generally, Ms. Barbetti disputed that

she agreed to release Defendants and third parties from future suits. She also

complained that the Agreement contained legalese with which she was

unfamiliar. The parties exchanged several emails disputing various terms.

Ms. Barbetti thereafter authored her own written release. Notably, she:

(1) stated that the settlement “shall dismiss only the allegations in the above-

captioned case against [Mr. Afzal, Ms. Soroush, Mr. and Mrs. Dayanim, and

the HOA], and does not settle other cases or matters;” (2) declared that she

had the right to pursue action against any non-settling defendant “that was

dismissed without prejudice during this lawsuit;” and (3) conserved her right

to initiate suit against Mr. and Mrs. Dayanim “for any actions or events that

occurred after the purchase of her home.” Id. at Exhibit D. Ms. Barbetti

signed and notarized her version of the agreement. Defendants did not

approve of this document.

In an effort to address Ms. Barbetti’s concerns, Defendants proposed a

simplified two-page agreement, which stated that, in exchange for $175,000,

Ms. Barbetti would,

release and forever discharge [Mr. Afzal, Ms. Soroush, Mr. and

Mrs. Dayanim, their insurance companies, and the HOA], their

successors, assigns, respective heirs, employees, agents,

personal representatives, affiliates, and any and all persons, firms

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or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable,

whether or not herein named, none of whom admit any liability to

[Ms. Barbetti], but all expressly denying liability, from any and all

claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of

any kind or nature whatsoever, which [Ms. Barbetti] now has or

may hereafter have, arising out of or in any way relating to the

purchase by [Ms. Barbetti] of the [condominium], and relating to

the claims which were asserted, or which could have been

asserted by [Ms. Barbetti] in a civil action filed by her in the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, entitled Vanessa Barbetti v.

Khazraee, et al, Docket No. 210600621, including any and all

damages of any and every kind, to both person and property, and

also any and all injuries and damages that may develop in the

future, as a result of or in any way relating to the property

purchase, including but not limited to alleged defects raised in the

[c]omplaint regarding the sewer line, roof, stucco, back patio

drain, back patio area, building structure and/or foundation,

sprinkler system[,] and/or any other alleged defects known or

unknown at the [condominium].

This release is not intended to release or absolve the respective

members of [the HOA], which is currently comprised of [Ms.

Barbetti] and [Mr.] and [Mrs.] Dayanim, from their duties to

maintain the common elements as defined within the Declaration

and Bylaws of the HOA, nor is this release intended to release or

absolve the respective members from their duties to pay for their

portions of any fees, dues or other assessments in furtherance of

the same pursuant to the Declaration and Bylaws of the HOA.

Joint Motion, 7/16/24, at Exhibit L (the “Amended Agreement”). When Ms.

Barbetti refused to acquiesce, Defendants sought to enforce the settlement

by filing their Joint Motion.

Judge Turner scheduled oral argument. However, Ms. Barbetti

contacted Judge Turner via email and demanded her recusal for exhibiting

bias and for allegedly sending two detectives to her home to investigate a fake

complaint. Ms. Barbetti also stated that Judge Turner exhibited fraud for

entertaining the Joint Motion. Judge Turner recused, cancelled oral argument,

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and assigned the matter to a different judge. Thereafter, the Honorable Judge

Denis P. Cohen issued a rule returnable as to why the Joint Motion should not

be granted.

Ms. Barbetti submitted a response in opposition to the Joint Motion and

raised additional issues by new matter. Pertinently, she argued that the trial

court should deny the Joint Motion because Defendants added terms not

present in the Oral Agreement, including the type and scope of the release.

See New Matter, 8/27/24, at ¶¶ 63, 69. She further averred that, despite

having Judge Turner recuse from the case, Defendants were evading their

obligation to mediate any disputes before that judge as set forth in the Oral

Agreement. Id. at ¶¶ 56-61.

On September 4, 2024, Judge Cohen held a hearing on the Joint Motion.

Counsel for Defendants explained that during the confidential settlement

negotiations with Judge Turner, they consistently communicated their desire

for a general release, and they were unaware of any dispute from Ms. Barbetti

regarding the scope of the release. During negotiations, they did not

communicate with Ms. Barbetti directly. However, Defendants maintained

that they continually asserted to Judge Turner that they desired a general

release, and they trusted that the judge accurately communicated that

information to Ms. Barbetti.

Also, Defendants explained that once the settlement had been reached,

Judge Turner brought them into her chambers for a “final colloquy” where a

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“general release” was discussed with all parties present, and Ms. Barbetti did

not question, object to, or state that she failed to understand the scope of the

general release. See N.T. Hearing, 9/4/24, at 10-14, 21. Defendants further

stated that at the conclusion of the colloquy, Judge Turner ordered Defendants

to reduce the Oral Agreement to writing and send it to Ms. Barbetti for

execution. Lastly, Defendants provided the court with copies of the email

exchanges on the morning of the settlement conference revealing that they

proposed a certain sum to Ms. Barbetti in exchange for a general release, and

her counter altered only the dollar figure.

For her part, Ms. Barbetti maintained that she never agreed to a general

release. She attested that Judge Turner “said to [her] that this release

[would] only [be] for the settling defendants . . . [b]ecause . . . two defendants

[were] dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at 16. Despite requesting Judge

Turner’s recusal, she complained that Defendants neglected to mediate

through Judge Turner when it became clear that she did not agree with the

terms Defendants proposed. Although Ms. Barbetti did not dispute that a

settlement had been reached, as she had reduced the Oral Agreement to

writing by printing and signing the transcript of it, she explained that the

agreement she drafted more accurately reflected the agreed-upon terms. She

further relied upon Wolf v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 840 A.2d 1004

(Pa.Super. 2003), to support her contention that the court could not order her

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to sign a contract with a release to which she did not agree. Finally, Ms.

Barbetti accused Defendants of taking advantage of her pro se status.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under

advisement and allowed Ms. Barbetti one week to procure additional evidence

that she did not agree to a general release. In a praecipe to supplement the

record, Ms. Barbetti produced, inter alia, two emails from June 2022 and

October 2023, wherein she stated that she was not interested in a global

release of Defendants because each party was responsible for differing

monetary amounts of damage. See Praecipe to Supplement Record, 9/12/24,

at Exhibits E and G.

By order of November 22, 2024, the court granted Defendants’ motion

and ordered Ms. Barbetti to execute a slightly modified version of the

Amended Agreement.2 This timely appeal followed, and Ms. Barbetti and the

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In her brief, Ms. Barbetti raises fifteen

issues:

I. The trial court erred in denying [Ms. Barbetti]’s new matter

to enforce the [Oral Agreement,] which includes all the essential

elements of a valid contract, including an offer, acceptance, and

consideration, and to which all parties agreed on the record to be

bound by the same.

II. The trial court erred in denying [Ms. Barbetti]’s new matter

to enforce the release that she executed, had notarized, and sent

____________________________________________

2 The court struck a non-disparagement clause because that term was not part

of the Oral Agreement, and a clause requiring Judge Turner to conduct any

mediations, given her recusal at Ms. Barbetti’s request.

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to [Defendants]’ counsel on August 6, 2024, which incorporates

the in-court settlement agreement, or, alternatively, the Oral

Agreement itself that [Ms. Barbetti] reduced to writing and

executed.

III. The trial court erred in ordering [Ms. Barbetti] to execute the

unilaterally drafted release[, the Amended Agreement,] when

[Ms. Barbetti] did not bargain for it and there is no evidence to

support that the [Oral Agreement] was intended to be replaced by

this new contract.

IV. The trial court erred in ordering [Ms. Barbetti] to execute

the [Amended Agreement,] which contains overly broad,

ambiguous language, it deviates from the agreement reached in

open court and is laden with legal jargon that [Ms. Barbetti] does

not understand.

V. The trial court erred in finding that a general release was

discussed with [Ms. Barbetti] and that [Ms. Barbetti] agreed to it,

when the record shows that only Judge Turner and judicial law

clerk Shawn Spellacy were privy to the settlement discussions

with [Ms. Barbetti] during mediation, and neither Judge Turner

nor Shawn Spellacy testified to such discussions at the evidentiary

hearing on September 4, 2024.

VI. The trial court erred in finding that [Ms. Barbetti] must

execute a general release, when the negotiations between [Ms.

Barbetti] and [Defendants] up until the eve of trial focused on

individual releases, and [Ms. Barbetti] had clearly stated in 2022

that she would not agree to a global release for any amount of

money due to her continuing business relationship with [Mr.] and

[Mrs.] Dayanim, as well as her active role as still a member of

[the HOA], and such an agreement does not make any sense in

this situation.

VII. The trial court erred in placing the burden of proof on [Ms.

Barbetti] to establish that she had not agreed to [the Amended

Agreement,] when the burden should have been on [Defendants]

to prove that such an agreement was formed, and [Defendants]

failed to meet that burden.

VIII. The trial court erred in placing greater weight on the

testimony and/or credibility of counsel for [Defendants], despite

[Ms. Barbetti] presenting compelling evidence that counsel for

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[Defendants] had knowingly deceived the court during motions in

limine on February 2, 2024 (Ctrl. No. 50-24061850) in order to

secure an unjust ruling, and that [Ms. Barbetti] alleged that

counsel for [Defendants] repeated this deceptive conduct during

the evidentiary hearing, and that a pattern of misconduct had

been previously recognized by this court, in which an order for

sanctions was entered by the trial court against counsel for

[Defendants] on September 1, 2022 (Ctrl. No. 80-22081080[).]

IX. The trial court erred by failing to order the payment of

interest pursuant to [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 229.1(c) for [Defendants]’

breach of contract, particularly in light of [Defendants]’ insertion

of at least one improper clause in [the Amended Agreement,]

and/or [Defendants]’ failure to accept one of two releases

executed by [Ms. Barbetti], as outlined in paragraph [four].

X. The trial court erred in ignoring [Ms. Barbetti]’s allegations

and the evidence that Judge Turner exhibited bias, unfairness,

and/or prejudice against [Ms. Barbetti], and that [Ms. Barbetti]

contends Judge Turner engaged in fraud on the court in her

handling of the settlement reached on July 1, 2024.

XI. The trial court erred in denying [Ms. Barbetti]’s new matter

to dismiss [Defendants]’ motion to enforce settlement without

first requiring mediation with the court, as explicitly agreed to in

the settlement reached on July 1, 2024.

XII. The trial court abused its discretion in granting

[Defendants]’ [Joint] Motion and denying [Ms. Barbetti]’s new

matter.

XIII. The trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by

competent evidence.

XIV. The trial court erred in its conclusions of law.

XV. The trial court’s decision is against the weight of the

evidence, and thus led to a legally incorrect decision.

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Ms. Barbetti’s brief 7, 9, 13, 25, 28, 30-34, 36, 39-41, 44-45 (some

capitalization altered).3

Initially, we note that in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2119, claims four

through eight, ten through twelve, and fourteen through fifteen fail to cite any

legal authority. We will not consider the merits of those underdeveloped

matters. See Kalili v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 330 A.3d 396, 406

(Pa.Super. 2024) (“The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that

each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis

of pertinent authority. Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules

may be considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately

developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately developed include those

where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention.

This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of

an appellant.”).

Also, Ms. Barbetti’s claim pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 229.1 is premature.

Therein, she seeks interest on the settlement funds as a sanction against

Defendants for untimely payment. The Rule states, in pertinent part:

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s brief fails to comply with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.

2111(a)(4) (statement of the questions involved); Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(5)

(statement of the case); Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(6) (summary of argument); and

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(8) (argument section). The statement of the case,

summary of the argument, and argument section are wholly omitted from the

brief, while the statement of the questions involved improperly includes

argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116. For ease of disposition, we have compiled a

statement of questions from the headings in Ms. Barbetti’s brief.

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(c) If a plaintiff and a defendant have entered into an agreement

of settlement, the defendant shall deliver the settlement funds to

the attorney for the plaintiff, or to the plaintiff if unrepresented,

within twenty calendar days from receipt of an executed release.

(d) If settlement funds are not delivered to the plaintiff within the

time required by subdivision (c), the plaintiff may seek to

(1) invalidate the agreement of settlement as permitted by

law, or

(2) impose sanctions on the defendant[.]

Pa.R.Civ.P. 229.1. Since Ms. Barbetti has yet to execute an agreed-upon

release, Defendants’ payment has not become due. Therefore, there is no

basis for sanctions at this juncture.

We therefore consider issues one, two, three, and thirteen, which have

been properly preserved and are substantiated by citations to legal authority

and the certified record. At bottom, Ms. Barbetti asks us to decide through

these four issues whether the court properly found that she agreed to a

general release of all Defendants.

We begin with an overview of the applicable legal precepts:

The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined

according to principles of contract law. Because contract

interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the

trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review over questions

of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our

review is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the entire

record in making its decision.

Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 517-18 (Pa.Super.

2009) (cleaned up).

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Ms. Barbetti does not dispute that a settlement was reached, but avers

that the terms were limited to those stated in the Oral Agreement. See Ms.

Barbetti’s brief at 7. The Oral Agreement, however, failed to define the scope

of the release. See N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 3 (“The settlement involves a

release being issued today”). Ms. Barbetti contends that she intended only to

absolve Defendants from the claims asserted in her complaint, while

Defendants maintain that the release was envisioned to be general. On that

note, “[a] court determines the effect of a release from its language, and we

give language its ordinary meaning unless the parties clearly intended a

different meaning.” Prof. Flooring Co., Inc. v. Bushar Corp., 152 A.3d

292, 299 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). We have explained that “[a] release

ordinarily covers only such matters as can fairly be said to have been within

the contemplation of the parties when the release was given.” Id. at 300

(cleaned up). However, neither the parties nor Judge Tuner was specific on

the record as to the scope of the release, negotiations were held confidentially,

and the mediating judge recused from this matter.

As in this case, where the formation of a contract is “wholly or partially

composed of oral communications, the precise content of which are not of

record, courts must look to the surrounding circumstances and course of

dealing between the parties in order to ascertain their intent.” Prieto Corp.

v. Gambone Const. Co., 100 A.3d 602, 609 (Pa.Super. 2014). When

negotiations are held off the record, “the issues of what was said, done, and

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agreed upon by the parties are ones of fact to be determined by the fact finder.

Also, the question of the intent of the parties is a factual one reserved to the

province of the fact finder.” Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania,

893 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa.Super. 2006). This Court “will not disturb the findings

of a trial judge sitting as fact finder unless we determine that the court’s

factual findings are not based on competent evidence of record.” Id. Under

these circumstances, “the evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable

to the party that prevailed below, rejecting all inferences arising from the

evidence that are unfavorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (cleaned up).

With these precepts in mind, we turn to Ms. Barbetti’s claim. She

contends that Defendants have attempted to supersede the Oral Agreement

with a “unilaterally drafted document that excluded key provisions [Ms.

Barbetti] had negotiated and inserted foreign, unfamiliar and unjustified terms

never discussed nor agreed to.” Ms. Barbetti’s brief at 7. Specifically, Ms.

Barbetti maintains that the Amended Agreement omits a statement that

settlement funds would be used to repair property damage and that identifying

information and records relating to her medical history would be sealed, and

also improperly “contains a sweeping general release.” Id. at 19, 21-22

(citing Wolf).

Based upon these accusations, Ms. Barbetti asserts that the trial court

erred in ordering her to execute the Amended Agreement over her own version

and claims that Defendants have not presented any evidence that she agreed

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to a general release. Id. at 8, 17-18. She criticizes the trial court’s reliance

upon the email exchanges on the morning of July 1, maintains that the court

erred in treating those emails as an agreement to settle in exchange for a

general release, and explains that they merely represented negotiations. Id.

at 16-17, 22, 42-43.

The trial court determined that “the parties agreed to a general release

as part of their settlement,” and therefore the release outlined in the Amended

Agreement was an accurate recitation of the parties’ intentions. See Trial

Court Opinion, 4/2/25, at 2. As evidentiary support, the court first looked to

the email exchanges between the parties preceding the settlement

conference, which stated that Defendants proposed “a general release” in

exchange for a certain sum. Id. at 2 (citing Joint Motion, 7/16/24, at Exhibit

B). The court observed that, in subsequent email responses, Ms. Barbetti did

not dispute the scope of the release and only negotiated the monetary amount

of the settlement. Id. The court also noted that Judge Turner stated on the

record that the settlement “involve[d] a release being issued” in exchange for

$175,000, the parties agreed that those were the essential terms of the

agreement, and Ms. Barbetti did not seek to qualify the scope of the release.

Id. (quoting N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 3).

The court then analyzed the evidence regarding the parties’ conduct

following the settlement conference. Defendants emailed the Agreement to

Ms. Barbetti with the subject line “Barbetti v. Khazraee, et al – Confidential

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General Release,” the file attached to the email was called the “Confidential

General Release,” and the document was titled “Confidential Settlement

Agreement and General Release.” Id. at 2-3. When Ms. Barbetti received

that copy, the court discerned that she failed to object to the scope of the

release and only questioned whether she needed to provide her social security

number. Id. at 3.

Finally, at the hearing on the Joint Motion, the court explained that

“[Defendants] asserted to [the c]ourt that they communicated all settlement

offers contingent on a general release.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court did

not find credible Ms. Barbetti’s assertion that she did not agree to a general

release. Rather, it believed that Ms. Barbetti’s complaints were “buyer’s

remorse.” Id. at 4.

Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that the parties’

agreed to a general release is supported by the record, and we discern no

error of law in its analysis. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Defendants, they have demonstrated their consistency in seeking a general

release as part of the settlement. Beginning with the emails preceding the

mediation on July 1, Defendants proposed a settlement figure contingent on

a “general release.” Joint Motion, 7/16/24, at Exhibit B. Contrary to Ms.

Barbetti’s belief, the trial court did not equate the email negotiations as an

agreement to settle. Rather, the court appropriately considered the emails as

evidence of the course of dealings between the parties to establish the scope

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of the undefined release. See Prieto Corp., 100 A.3d at 609. As such, it

found it compelling that Ms. Barbetti only negotiated the monetary amount of

the settlement, and not the scope of the release.

When Defendants reduced the Oral Agreement to writing and emailed

the Agreement to Ms. Barbetti, she had plainly reviewed the substance of it

since she questioned some of its detail. Yet, she expressed concern only with

Defendants’ request for her social security number. She failed to dispute, let

alone question, the scope of the release until one week later. Although the

release was patently comprehensive and broad, Ms. Barbetti did not raise any

disagreement, despite the subject line of the email, attachment, and

document specifying that it was a “general” release.

Furthermore, at the September 4 hearing, Defendants explained that in

reaching the Oral Agreement, they consistently expressed their desire for a

general release, believed that Judge Turner accurately communicated that

information to Ms. Barbetti, and used the term “general release” during the

final colloquy in chambers with Ms. Barbetti present. Defendants were

unaware of any objections or questions from Ms. Barbetti regarding the scope

of the general release.4

____________________________________________

4 Insofar as Ms. Barbetti claims that she lacked knowledge as to the scope of

a general release or the meaning of any legalese, her pro se status does not

garner relief. See, e.g., Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264

A.3d 755, 760 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“Any layperson choosing to represent

himself or herself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent,

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Meanwhile, there is a dearth of evidence in support of Ms. Barbetti’s

position. She attached a self-serving affidavit to her notice of appeal after the

court had issued the order in question. The opportunity to present additional

evidence of her refusal to enter into a general release, however, came with

her praecipe to supplement the record. Therein, she did not include this

affidavit. Instead, she attached two emails from July 2022 and October 2023.

The court did not credit these emails because they were too remote in time to

be relevant. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/25, at 10. Ms. Barbetti seemingly

agreed with the court that these emails were irrelevant since she stated at the

September 4 hearing that their relevance was attenuated. See N.T. Hearing,

9/4/24, at 40 (“It’s an email from a long time ago that, honestly, I think has

nothing to do with this motion.”).

At no time did Ms. Barbetti specify on the record that she wished to

preserve future claims against Defendants, and she failed to state that she

refused to agree to a general release.5 As the prevailing party, Defendants

____________________________________________

assume the risk that his or her lack of expertise and legal training will prove

his or her undoing.” (cleaned up)).

5 To the extent Ms. Barbetti relies upon her desire to pursue future claims

against Additional Defendants as evidence that she did not agree to a general

release, she has neglected to appeal the order granting Additional Defendants’

motion for summary judgment or reassert her claims against them in the trial

court. This issue was discussed at the September 4 hearing and revealed that

Ms. Barbetti was “[p]otentially” going to pursue claims against Additional

Defendants, but that she “ha[dn]’t made that decision.” N.T. Hearing, 9/4/24,

at 26.

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are entitled to favorable inferences deduced from the evidence. See Krebs,

893 A.2d at 783. Without any indication that Ms. Barbetti objected to a

general release when the Oral Agreement was reached, we cannot infer that

Judge Turner failed to communicate Defendants’ request for a general release

as part of the settlement. Id.

We also fail to find Ms. Barbetti’s reliance on Wolf persuasive. In that

case, Wolf filed a complaint against his employer pursuant to the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”). Prior to trial, the parties orally settled their

dispute on the record, but the agreement was “silent as to the execution or

terms of any release.” Wolf, 840 A.2d at 1005-06. Wolf’s employer,

however, included a general release in the proposed written agreement, which

Wolf refused to sign. We explained that “Wolf balked at signing the release

because [his employer] sought to make the in-court settlement agreement

hinge upon the execution of a release that contained terms that were not a

part of that agreement.” Id. at 1007. We found it relevant that a general

release would have violated FELA, Wolf “never had the opportunity to

negotiate” it, and his employer did not specify that the agreement was

contingent on Wolf’s “signature on a broad general release.” Id. at 1007-08.

This Court therefore held that the “trial court erred when it ordered [Wolf] to

sign a release, the terms of which he did not approve.” Id. at 1007.

Here, unlike in Wolf, Ms. Barbetti and Defendants agreed that the

settlement was dependent upon a release. Ms. Barbetti had the opportunity

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to negotiate the terms of the release prior to and during the mediation, and

when Defendants sent the Agreement. As noted, there is nothing on the

record indicating that Ms. Barbetti objected to a general release until one week

after the Oral Agreement had been reached. Further, the parties agreed that

Ms. Barbetti would receive the settlement funds once she signed the release.

See N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 3 (“Once [Ms. Barbetti] has executed the release

and notarized it, the monies will be received by [Ms. Barbetti] within [thirty]

business days.”). Cf. Pulcinello v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 784 A.2d 122,

124 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding that the oral settlement agreement was binding

despite the absence of a writing because “[t]he signing of the release was not

made a condition of the settlement and the tender of the release did not

reopen the agreement or make its execution a condition to the settlement

itself”). Thus, Wolf does not support Ms. Barbetti’s position.

Lastly, to the extent Ms. Barbetti laments that material terms of the

settlement were not included in the Amended Agreement, we do not agree.

The essential terms were that in exchange for $175,000, Ms. Barbetti agreed

to release Defendants. See Mastroni-Mucker, 976 A.2d at 518 (explaining

that the material terms of a contract include “an offer (the settlement figure),

acceptance, and consideration (in exchange for the plaintiff terminating his

lawsuit, the defendant will pay the plaintiff the agreed upon sum)”). These

provisions are present in the Amended Agreement. The sealing of certain

documents was not a term of the contract as it was a concern of Ms. Barbetti

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“[p]ost-settlement agreement.” N.T. Hearing, 7/1/24, at 4. Even so, Judge

Turner stated that she had those files sealed, and the parties agreed to the

confidentiality of their negotiations. Id. Additionally, nothing in the Oral

Agreement specified that the final written agreement must include that

settlement funds would be used to repair property damage. These arguments

are meritless.

Based on the aforementioned, the evidence supports the court’s

determination that a general release could “fairly be said to have been within

the contemplation of the parties when the release was given.” Bushar Corp.,

152 A.3d at 300 (cleaned up). Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order

granting the Joint Motion and directing Ms. Barbetti to execute a slightly

modified version of the Amended Agreement.

Order affirmed.

Date: 1/13/2026

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