Com. v. Hart, J.

J-A27008-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JOHN HART :

:

Appellant : No. 2402 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 22, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001376-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 13, 2026

John Hart appeals from the judgment of sentence of sixteen to thirty-

two years in prison, followed by five years of probation, imposed upon several

convictions for his prolonged harassment of the victim, D.D. We affirm.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. D.D. moved from

Turkey to the United States in 2012 on a college student visa when she was

twenty-one years old. Her visa expired a few years later, but she stayed in

the country without documentation. In March of 2018, she met Appellant

during her shift at a sports bar. They exchanged cellphone numbers and

began texting. In May 2019, they met for brunch and discussed D.D.’s

separation from her now ex-husband and her immigration status. Appellant

falsely claimed to D.D. that he was an attorney who could help her with the

divorce and immigration. To facilitate that, D.D. disclosed several personal

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details to Appellant. She also shared that she and her ex-husband were

separated due to intimacy issues.

Over the course of the next few months, D.D. and Appellant occasionally

met for dinner or drinks, but Appellant expressed frustration when D.D. did

not respond promptly to his text messages or was busy. She also agreed to

spend the night with Appellant once in November 2019. Around that time,

D.D. began to receive aggressive texts from several unknown numbers. They

referenced her posts on Instagram, immigration status, relationship issues

between her and her ex-husband, and accused her of having had an abortion

and a cocaine addiction. The messages insulted D.D. on multiple occasions,

claiming that she was, among other things, a “selfish bitch,” “bad wife,” “slut,”

“evil,” “abusive,” “tramp,” “unfit mother,” “unfaithful,” and “selfish coke

whore.” N.T. Jury Trial, 8/1/23, at 97, 110-11.

At first, D.D. believed that her ex-husband sent these messages.

However, she began to suspect he was not the author because the language

did not match his typical vernacular and they had been separated for some

time. D.D. asked Appellant, whom she assumed was a lawyer, for help to

track down the source of these messages. As the texts continued, D.D.

became more frightened and told Appellant that she was too upset to socialize

with anyone, and that she did not want to date him. Nevertheless, D.D. and

Appellant kept in contact.

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In early December 2019, Appellant offered to drive D.D.’s mother to the

airport for her flight back to Turkey after a visit with D.D., and he additionally

gave her $100. Once Appellant dropped her mother off, D.D. asked to stop

at an ATM so she could pay Appellant back. They instead proceeded to a bar.

D.D. told Appellant that she was still not ready to be in a relationship, and

Appellant became visibly angry. He took D.D. home but did not say goodbye

once they arrived.

During a text exchange a few days later, Appellant offered D.D. a ride

home from work. She initially accepted, but then stated that she no longer

needed transportation. Appellant accused the victim of being “selfish” and

claimed that he was only “good enough to drive [her] mom to the airport or

spot [her] mom a hundred, or get a lawyer for [her] green card.” Id. at 122.

The next morning, Appellant apologized over text message for his outburst,

but the two continued to argue. D.D. also stated that she wanted to pay the

$100 back to Appellant. Appellant insisted on meeting her at her workplace

and informed her that:

If the feds found out about [D.D. using someone else’s tax

information] and investigated, they would not only arrest [her],

but [she] wouldn’t be able to get out of jail because immigration

would drop a detainer against [her]. [She] would serve whatever

sentence and then get deported immediately thereafter.

[Appellant] t[old her] this because if someone le[t] the feds know

about [her] situation, it[ would be] all over for [her].

Id. at 127.

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D.D. became scared that Appellant would seek to get her deported. The

bickering messages continued, and Appellant sent D.D. a picture of a bruise

on his arm. He accused her of hitting him, which D.D. claimed she did not do.

Appellant also sent her emojis of a hand waving, a Turkish flag, and a plane,

followed by an eggplant and a peach. Id. at 132-33. D.D. believed Appellant

was signifying that he would deport her to Turkey if she did not have sex with

him.

D.D. asked to meet Appellant that night at a restaurant to diffuse the

situation. While there, Appellant asked if he and D.D. could be friends but

have sex, which D.D. refused. She also rejected his attempt to kiss her.

Appellant stormed out of the bar screaming that the victim would see her

“mom a lot sooner than [she thought,] and the process [would start]

tomorrow.” Id. at 139.

D.D. called her friend on the phone as she walked home. In the

meantime, Appellant sent her multiple hostile text messages and called her

approximately twenty times. D.D. also had several missed calls from an

unknown number. Upon arrival at her building, she noticed that Appellant’s

car was parked there. D.D.’s neighbor was outside smoking a cigarette, and

he confirmed that a man fitting Appellant’s description had entered the

building. The neighbor escorted D.D. into the elevator, and when the doors

opened to her floor, Appellant was standing outside. D.D.’s neighbor told

Appellant to leave and the two began to engage in a physical altercation. D.D.

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was still on the phone with her friend, whom she asked to call the police.

Appellant then ran off.

He proceeded to repeatedly text message the victim that night, stating

that she had to “[g]ive [him] what [he] want[ed] or say goodbye. . . . [She]

ha[d] used guys [her] whole life, now it’s [Appellant’s] turn. . . . [She] made

the wrong, wrong, wrong choice.” Id. at 145. D.D. filed a police report that

evening. The following morning, Appellant texted D.D. informing her that he

could have reported her for domestic violence and have her “thrown in jail”

where she could not escape until she was deported, and “[t]hat’s the

difference between [her] and [Appellant].” Id. at 146.

During this period, D.D. also discovered at least four Instagram

accounts impersonating her. One of the profiles had a biography stating that

she was “[j]ust an illegal alien trying to get a green card at US Department of

Homeland Security.” Id. at 146-47.

On December 10, 2019, D.D. filed for and obtained a temporary

protection from abuse (“PFA”) order against Appellant. Officers unsuccessfully

attempted to serve it at Appellant’s residence, and he subsequently arrived at

the police station to express agitation with the number of officers at his home.

The police served him with the PFA order at the station, and Appellant tried to

lodge a complaint against D.D., alleging that she abused him a few days

earlier. Since Appellant did not have injuries, the officers did not take further

action.

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Pursuant to D.D.’s police report, on December 11, 2019, Detective

Steven Parkinson of the Philadelphia Police Department met with her.1 D.D.

showed the detective some of the anonymous text messages and calls she

had been receiving, as well as the fake Instagram accounts. When he

researched the phone numbers, Detective Parkinson discovered that the

carrier was Google Voice, and he obtained warrants for each number. He

found that one of the numbers was registered to an email address with

Appellant’s first and last name, John.Hart215@gmail.com, and the others

were linked to an IP address at Appellant’s home.

That same day, Appellant obtained a temporary PFA order against D.D.,

alleging that she verbally and physically assaulted him, was a cocaine addict,

and was not a U.S. citizen. Officer Victoria Ayres of the Philadelphia Police

Department served the PFA order on D.D., who immediately began to cry and

stated that it was in retaliation for the PFA order she obtained against him.

D.D. informed the officer that she was staying with her friend and begged her

not to provide Appellant with her friend’s address. When Officer Ayres

returned to the station to file the report, Appellant was present and demanded

a copy. The officer redacted the friend’s address from Appellant’s version,

____________________________________________

1 The parties stipulated at trial as to Detective Parkinson’s expertise in

retrieving an internet protocol (“IP”) address, and the evidentiary significance

of IP addresses in identifying the source of online activity. The detective was

also involved in a previous investigation where Appellant was convicted of

stalking a different victim, E.K.

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and he became irate. He eventually left the station but later called and

demanded to know where D.D. was staying.

On December 14, 2019, D.D. received a phone call indicating that it was

from her ex-husband. When she answered the call, however, she immediately

recognized Appellant’s voice and hung up. D.D. then called her ex-husband,

but while on the phone with him, she had multiple calls appear with a caller

ID as her ex-husband. D.D. continued to receive phone calls that were

purportedly from her friends or her workplace, but when D.D. answered, the

caller was a man disguising his voice to sound like a woman, or it was clearly

Appellant’s voice. D.D. filed a police report alleging that Appellant violated

her temporary PFA order.

Later that night, Appellant arrived at the Haverford Township Police

Department to report that D.D. called him and threatened his life. Once again,

Appellant showed his phone to officers indicating that D.D. called him several

times. Appellant submitted a signed statement accusing D.D. of threatening

to kill him, and an officer prepared an application for an arrest warrant for

D.D. Officers called D.D. and ordered her to stop contacting Appellant, even

though she claimed she had not called or texted him.

On December 15, 2019, Appellant reported additional phone calls from

the victim to the Haverford Township Police Department. The responding

officer informed Appellant that they were in the process of obtaining an arrest

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warrant based on his complaints from the previous night, and Appellant was

angry that she had not already been arrested.

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 16, 2019, police received

multiple 911 calls from a female caller reporting screams coming from D.D.’s

apartment. However, D.D. was residing with her friend at that time. An officer

responded to D.D.’s apartment and failed to discern any disturbance or make

contact with anyone. The hearing for D.D.’s PFA petition against Appellant

was scheduled for later that same morning. When the victim arrived, she saw

Appellant speaking to sheriffs. He then winked at D.D. as the sheriffs

proceeded to arrest her. She was subjected to strip and body cavity searches,

and when she was permitted to make a phone call, she contacted Detective

Parkinson.

The detective had the warrant withdrawn, and the sheriffs released the

victim. Detective Parkinson and D.D. then discussed the phone calls she had

been receiving since their last meeting. He obtained records from D.D.’s AT&T

account to verify that she had never contacted Appellant after he obtained his

PFA order. The detective believed that the phone logs Appellant had been

showing to police officers, purporting to demonstrate calls from D.D., were

feigned. Based on this information, he suspected that spoofing was involved.

Detective Parkinson had experience with cases involving spoofing, which

occurs when a caller disguises his identity by falsifying the information that

appears on the caller identification. In these situations, Detective Parkinson

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always began his investigation by contacting Spoofcard, LLC (“Spoofcard”),

which is one of the “biggest” companies that provide spoofing services, and

he did so in this matter. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/4/23, at 82. Spoofcard

confirmed that Appellant had an account.

Detective Parkinson thereafter obtained a search warrant for “[a]ny and

all account information or associated with [the phone numbers D.D. received

calls and texts from, including] call logs, IP addresses, IP location, billing

information, [and] voice recordings.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/17/19,

Appendix A. He also named Spoofcard as the possessor of records. Notably,

Detective Parkinson did not include in the affidavit that he had contacted

Spoofcard the day prior to confirm that Appellant had an account. However,

Detective Parkinson detailed the above incidents as reported by D.D.,

specifically stating that she recognized Appellant’s voice in the calls and

alleged that he had “spoofed her cell phone number . . . to have evidence

against her for the violation of the PFA [order].” Id. at Appendix B.

The warrant was issued, and when it was executed, it was confirmed

that the phone numbers at issue were listed on an account with Spoofcard.

The account was registered using Appellant’s email address, a listed phone

number matched the one Appellant provided to police as his own, two other

listed phone numbers were linked to Appellant’s girlfriend, and the account

was paid for with a credit card in Appellant’s name. Accordingly, Detective

Parkinson believed that Appellant was the owner of this Spoofcard account.

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The activity history evinced that Appellant disguised his phone number

to call D.D., making it appear as though the calls were coming from her ex-

husband, friends, and workplace. It was also established that Appellant used

Spoofcard to create false logs, appearing as though D.D. called Appellant

multiple times between December 12 and December 16, 2019. Additionally,

Appellant used Spoofcard and voice-altering technology to make 911 calls the

night of December 16. Detective Parkinson also used the GPS on Appellant’s

ankle monitor2 and Spoofcard’s location services to determine that Appellant

was present in the same area when the Spoofcard account was utilized.

Officers therefore obtained an arrest warrant for Appellant and a search

warrant for his home. Upon execution, officers discovered a cellphone with a

dual-SIM card, which had two phone numbers matching the ones associated

with the Spoofcard account in question. Detective Parkinson also confirmed

that Appellant owned the Instagram accounts impersonating D.D. By way of

a grand jury, Appellant was indicted on a litany of offenses, and a jury trial

was scheduled.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the Spoofcard

records, contending that the search warrant was unsupported by probable

cause. During oral argument on the motion, the parties agreed to incorporate

the transcript from the grand jury proceeding wherein, inter alia, Detective

____________________________________________

2During the commission of the instant offenses, Appellant was required to

wear an ankle monitor as part of his sentence for stalking E.K.

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Parkinson and the victim testified. The court denied the motion, detailing its

determination in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

At the ensuing jury trial, D.D., E.K., and multiple detectives and officers,

including Detective Parkinson, established the above facts. Additionally, a

technology support agent from Spoofcard, James Marcano, attested to the

accuracy of the records Detective Parkinson obtained, and an investigator

from Citibank, Justin Davis, confirmed that Appellant used his credit card to

pay for Spoofcard services.

The jury convicted Appellant of one count each of intimidation,

retaliation, criminal use of a communication facility (“CUCF”), and

harassment; two counts each of indirect criminal contempt for violations of a

PFA order, false alarm to an agency of public safety, falsely incriminating

another, and fictitious reports and unsworn falsification to authorities; and

three counts of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. The court

deferred sentencing to obtain a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report.

At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth explained that if the

court were to sentence Appellant in the aggravated range for each offense and

ran them consecutively, it would amount to fifteen and one-half to thirty-one

years of imprisonment. However, it requested twenty-five to fifty years to

protect the public. Appellant advocated for two to four years. He presented

Frank Dattilio, Ph.D., an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, who

conducted a psychological evaluation of Appellant to determine whether he

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was receiving adequate medical treatment and supervision in prison. He

opined that if Appellant were released without treatment, he was at a

moderate to high risk of reoffending. With proper treatment, Dr. Dattilio

believed the risk could be reduced significantly, but stated that the programs

he recommended for Appellant were not available at the Department of

Corrections.

Appellant’s girlfriend also testified, and she provided to the court letters

on Appellant’s behalf. The victim gave a statement, explaining how fearful

she would be if Appellant were released back into the public, and the impact

his actions have had on her. The Commonwealth noted that Appellant had

harassed a female corrections officer while imprisoned, claiming that he could

access information about her and her family on the internet, and threatened

violence against his attorney. It further introduced recordings of phone calls

Appellant made to his girlfriend while in prison, during which he stated that

the jury and trial judge were incorrect and unintelligent, purporting to rebut

the assertion of Appellant’s counsel that Appellant was remorseful and took

responsibility. Finally, Appellant exercised his right to allocution and

contended that his statements during the prison phone calls did not accurately

reflect his true feelings.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court imposed an aggregate term

of sixteen to thirty-two years in prison, followed by five years of probation. In

sum, the court explained that Appellant’s pattern of stalking women, the

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sophisticated nature of his crimes, the seriousness of his offenses, the need

to protect the public, and the impact on the victim warranted an upward

deviation from the standard guidelines for each crime and consecutive

sentences.

Appellant timely filed an unsuccessful post-sentence motion averring

that his sentence was excessive in light of his non-violent crimes and that the

court considered impermissible sentencing factors. This appeal followed, and

Appellant and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.

1925. Appellant now raises the following issues for our analysis:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to

convict Appellant of intimidation, retaliation, [CUCF], and falsely

incriminating another person, given that:

a. For intimidation, the Commonwealth failed to show

that Appellant did anything with the intent to interfere

with the administration of criminal justice or that he

did anything other than continue to stalk the

complainant after she broke up with him,

b. For retaliation, the Commonwealth failed to show

that Appellant engaged in any conduct because of the

complainant’s role as a victim or witness in the PFA

proceedings rather than because he was upset about

the status of their relationship,

c. For CUCF, the Commonwealth failed to establish

that Appellant acted at least recklessly with respect to

the fact that any of the other offenses would be

felonies given that they all could have been charged

as misdemeanors, and

d. For falsely incriminating another person, the

Commonwealth failed to show that Appellant

specifically used Spoofcard to commit the offenses as

required by the jury instructions given that the

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Spoofcard evidence was entirely unreliable,

contradicted by all other evidence, and

unauthenticated.

2. Should the trial court have instructed the jury that [CUCF]

requires that a defendant act at least recklessly with respect to

the felony gradation of the substantive offenses[?]

3. Whether the trial court should have granted the motion to

suppress Appellant’s Spoofcard phone records given that the

search warrant for the records did not contain probable cause and

Appellant had standing to challenge the search of his own phone

records, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his records,

he could not abandon the records after the illegal search, and the

Commonwealth called no witnesses and introduced no evidence

that would have established inevitable discovery.

4. Whether the trial court should have excluded the Spoofcard

records given their unreliability and the Commonwealth’s inability

to properly authenticate them.

5. Whether Appellant should receive a new sentencing hearing

because the trial court imposed an unreasonable, excessive

sentence and considered improper sentencing factors such as

arrests that did not result in convictions and expunged PFA

petitions.

Appellant’s brief at 6-8.

Appellant’s first group of challenges are to the sufficiency of the

evidence to convict him of intimidation, retaliation, CUCF, and falsely

incriminating another. We consider Appellant’s position mindful of the

following well-settled standard of review:

When reviewing a [sufficiency] claim, we face a question of law.

Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the

verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom

in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must

ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements

of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

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The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of

wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any

doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the

factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,

as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2023)

(cleaned up).

Starting with Appellant’s conviction for intimidation, the statute for this

offense provides, in relevant part:

A person commits an offense if, with the intent to or with the

knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent

or interfere with the administration of criminal justice, he

intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to:

(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law enforcement

officer, prosecuting official or judge concerning any information,

document or thing relating to the commission of a crime.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(1). This Court has explained that “[a]ctual intimidation

of a witness is not an essential element of the crime[,]” and an attempt to

intimidate is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Baker, 313 A.3d 1112, 1117

(Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up).

Appellant avers that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he “did

anything while acting with the intent to interfere with or the knowledge that

his actions would interfere with the administration of criminal justice.”

Appellant’s brief at 34. He contends that the evidence proved only that he

stalked the victim, which is not enough to convict him of intimidation. Id. at

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35-26. Also, since a petition seeking a PFA order is a civil matter and not a

criminal one, Appellant states that he cannot be convicted of intimidation for

interfering with a PFA order. Id. at 40. Finally, he argues that the

Commonwealth neglected to introduce evidence that he was aware that the

victim filed a police report or petitioned for a PFA order. Id.

The trial court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to uphold

Appellant’s conviction for intimidation. First, it explained that when Appellant

showed up at D.D.’s apartment on December 8, and she asked her friend to

call the police in his presence, Appellant sent her threatening text messages

the next day. Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/24, at 30. Then, the court noted that

when police served the PFA order on Appellant, he “spent the next six days

engaging in an extraordinary number of actions to interfere with the

administration of criminal justice, leading to D.D.’s arrest on the day of the

scheduled PFA hearing based on false allegations and fabricated charges made

by [Appellant] against D.D.” Id. In sum, the court found that there was

“overwhelming evidence” presented to the jury to convict Appellant of

intimidation. Id. at 29-30.

We agree. The record supports the court’s determinations, and we

discern no error of law. Based on the Commonwealth’s evidence, a jury could

conclude Appellant intended to intimidate D.D. to prevent her from reporting

his harassing behavior and his violations of the PFA order to police. We also

fail to find law in support of Appellant’s assertion that he could not be found

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guilty of intimidation because PFA petitions are civil matters. Rather, the

violation of a PFA order is a criminal offense, i.e. indirect criminal contempt.

Appellant repeatedly violated D.D.’s PFA order by communicating with her

while utilizing spoofing software. He also used Spoofcard to create false call

logs representing that D.D. violated his PFA order, which led to her arrest and

prevented her from testifying against him at her PFA hearing. Appellant’s

claims are therefore meritless.

Appellant next questions the sufficiency of the evidence for his

conviction of retaliation. “A person commits [this] offense if he harms another

by any unlawful act or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits

acts which threaten another in retaliation for anything lawfully done in the

capacity of witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4953(A).

Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to

show that he had “the intent to do anything to retaliate specifically because

[D.D.] filed a PFA petition against him[.]” Appellant’s brief at 42. He

maintains that the Commonwealth “showed only that Appellant engaged in a

pattern of stalking behavior that started long before the breakup and

continued afterwards until he was eventually arrested.” Id. Since his stalking

conduct “continued unabated” after the victim filed the PFA petition, Appellant

explains that he did not act “with the intent to retaliate because the

complainant filed the PFA [petition].” Id. at 43. Instead, his intent was

merely “to cause emotional distress.” Id. at 44.

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The court stated that Appellant’s “argument ignores the evidence

presented at trial that [Appellant] obtained a PFA [order] against D.D. the day

after she obtained one against him, and that [Appellant] did so unlawfully

based on false allegations that D.D. had hit him.” Trial Court Opinion,

11/5/24, at 31. The court concluded that “there was ample evidence for the

jury to” convict Appellant of retaliation. Id.

The court’s conclusions are apt. Merely because Appellant engaged in

stalking and harassing behavior prior to D.D. obtaining a PFA order does not

negate the fact that his continued conduct afterward could be found to be

retaliation against her for having done so. In fact, Appellant threatened to

report D.D.’s immigration status and unsupported domestic violence before

she had filed a PFA petition, but he did not. Rather, it was not until after

Appellant had been served with a copy of the PFA order protecting D.D. that

he obtained one for himself. He thereafter engaged in a course of conduct to

punish D.D. for filing her PFA petition, as detailed above. Based on the

sequence of events, the jury could properly conclude that Appellant retaliated

against D.D. for acting as a claimant in the PFA process, which is a civil matter.

Appellant next avers that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden in

proving he committed CUCF. Pertinently, “[a] person commits a felony of the

third degree if that person uses a communication facility to commit, cause or

facilitate the commission or the attempt thereof of any crime which constitutes

a felony under this title[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512. Our Court has recently

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reiterated the elements of this offense: “(1) a defendant knowingly and

intentionally used a communication facility, (2) with the intent to commit,

cause, or facilitate an attempted underlying felony, and (3) the underlying

felony was attempted or committed.” Commonwealth v. Aguilar, 340 A.3d

311, 322 (Pa.Super. 2025) (citation omitted).

Appellant claims that CUCF requires the Commonwealth to prove that

he knew or acted recklessly “with regard to the possibility that his criminal

use of a communications facility would amount to the commission of some

other felony instead of a misdemeanor.” Appellant’s brief at 44. He contends,

without relevant legal authority, that he cannot be convicted of CUCF where

he was unaware that he was in the process of committing a felony, not just a

misdemeanor. Id. at 47. He summarizes that the evidence was insufficient

to convict him of this offense where “[t]he Commonwealth showed only that

Appellant stalked [the victim], he had been convicted of stalking before, and

th[at prior] conviction was graded as a misdemeanor.” Id. at 47-48.

The court found Appellant’s argument regarding the mens rea of CUCF

unpersuasive, and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict him

of this crime. The court explained that “the mens rea requirements for CUCF

are satisfied when a person knowingly and intentionally uses a communication

facility, and knowingly, intentionally or recklessly facilitates an underlying

felony.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/24, at 32 (cleaned up). The court stated

succinctly that “the evidence showed that [Appellant] knowingly used a

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cellphone, and that he did so to intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly

facilitate three separate felony offenses – witness intimidation, retaliation

against a victim or witness, and stalking.” Id.

We agree with the court and find no merit in Appellant’s position that an

element of CUCF includes knowledge that his actions would culminate in the

commission of a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor. There is no such

requirement in the statute governing CUCF, and we therefore “decline

[Appellant’s] invitation to add omitted language to an unambiguous statute.”

Aguilar, 340 A.3d at 323. Further, it is clear that the evidence supports each

part of CUCF where Appellant knowingly used his cellphone, Spoofcard, and

Google to stalk, intimidate, and retaliate against the victim. This argument

therefore lacks basis in law or fact.

Finally, Appellant calls into question the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain his conviction for falsely incriminating another. “[A] person who

knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement officer with intent

to implicate another commits a misdemeanor of the second degree.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 4906(a). This Court has established the four elements of this

offense as follows: “(1) the defendant must have made the statement to a

law enforcement officer; (2) the defendant’s statement must be false; (3) the

defendant must know the statement is false; and (4) the defendant must

intend to implicate another.” Commonwealth v. Soto, 650 A.2d 108, 110

(Pa.Super. 1994).

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Appellant argues that “the Commonwealth failed to show that [he]

committed th[is] offense specifically by using Spoofcard[.]” Appellant’s brief

at 49 (emphasis omitted). Although Appellant acknowledges that the

Commonwealth “introduced Spoofcard records, credit card records, cell phone

records, the testimony of the Spoofcard customer service technician, the

testimony of Detective Parkinson, and the testimony of the Citi[bank]

investigator[,]” he claims that this evidence was “so contradictory and

unreliable that it is simply impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that Appellant actually committed the offense by using Spoofcard.” Id. at 51.

The trial court determined that the Commonwealth presented “ample

evidence” that Appellant falsely incriminated the victim using Spoofcard’s

services. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/24, at 33. It stated that Appellant

“used Spoofcard to make it falsely appear that D.D. was calling him[,] in

violation of a PFA [order].” Id. The court further noted that the email address

for the Spoofcard account at issue was composed of Appellant’s initials and

date of birth, each of the three IP addresses through which the account was

accessed was linked to Appellant, and the credit card used to pay for the

Spoofcard account was in Appellant’s name. Id. at 33-34. Additionally, it

explained that GPS records confirmed that Appellant was present at the

location when the Spoofcard application was being used, and D.D.’s AT&T

records failed to show that her phone called Appellant when he had claimed

to police officers that she had. Id. at 34.

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The trial court is correct that the Commonwealth provided the jury with

adequate evidence to convict Appellant of falsely incriminating another. As

explained above with regard to the other crimes Appellant challenges, the

record supports the court’s finding that Appellant used Spoofcard to falsify

phone records to appear as though D.D. violated Appellant’s PFA order. No

further discussion is necessary, and no relief is due as to any of Appellant’s

sufficiency claims.

Appellant next insists that the trial court omitted the requisite mens rea

in its charging instruction for CUCF. In that vein:

[When] examining jury instructions, our standard of review is to

determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of

discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of the case.

A charge will be found adequate unless the issues are not made

clear, the jury was misled by the instructions, or there was an

omission from the charge amounting to a fundamental error.

Moreover, in reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction the entire

charge is considered, not merely discrete portions thereof. The

trial court is free to use its own expressions as long as the

concepts at issue are clearly and accurately presented to the jury.

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 232 A.3d 747, 759 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned

up). This Court has also repeatedly stated that “[w]here the trial court’s

instructions track the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury

Instructions, it is presumed such instructions are an accurate statement of the

law.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 321 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Similar to his sufficiency claim as to CUCF, Appellant maintains that the

trial court should have instructed the jury that for Appellant to be convicted

of CUCF, he had to have “intended to commit a felony or knew that stalking

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would be a felony” as opposed to a misdemeanor. See Appellant’s brief at

55. In essence, Appellant believes that “the facilitation of a felony is a material

element of the offense” such that “a defendant must act at least recklessly as

to whether the facilitated crime could be a felony.” Id. at 57.

The trial court stated in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that “contrary to

[Appellant]’s position, the Commonwealth is not required to show that a

defendant had knowledge of the felony grading assigned to the crime he

committed through the use of a communication facility.” Trial Court Opinion,

11/5/24, at 40. It also pointed out that it used the standard jury instruction

for CUCF. Id.

We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law. The trial court issued

a presumptively accurate instruction for CUCF. As mentioned, we find no

support, and Appellant has presented none, for his contention that an element

of CUCF includes the offender having knowledge that his actions would

culminate in the commission of a felony. This claim lacks credence.

Appellant additionally challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress the Spoofcard records. He raises a plethora of arguments on this

topic, including that he had a privacy interest in the Spoofcard records. See

Appellant’s brief at 73-79. For the sake of brevity, we focus upon the

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dispositive issue of whether the search warrant was supported by probable

cause.3

The following legal precepts apply to our analysis of this issue:

[O]ur standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is

de novo and is limited to determining whether the suppression

court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Our

scope of review is to consider only the evidence of the

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the

suppression record as a whole. When the sole issue on appeal

relates to a suppression ruling, our review includes only the

suppression hearing record and excludes from consideration

evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Ochoa, 304 A.3d 390, 396 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned

up).

A warrant must be supported by probable cause, which “exists where

the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he

____________________________________________

3 Our High Court has recently analyzed a similar issue as the one herein. In

Commonwealth v. Kurtz, ___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 3670767 (Pa. 2025), the

Court considered whether (1) a privacy interest exists in one’s unprotected

search inquiries on Google, and (2) a warrant for those records was supported

by probable cause. The Court issued a split decision. In the Opinion

Announcing the Judgment of the Court, Justice Wecht, joined by Justices

Dougherty and Brobson, addressed the privacy question and concluded that

no such privacy interest exists. However, Chief Justice Todd, joined by

Justices Mundy and McCaffery, found that the question concerning the warrant

preceded the privacy-interest question. Since the warrant was supported by

probable cause, these Justices did not find it necessary to reach the

constitutional question. Finally, Justice Donohue dissented, finding both a

reasonable expectation of privacy and a lack of probable cause. We therefore

address the determinative issue of whether the warrant was supported by

probable cause.

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has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant

a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 655 (Pa. 2010) (cleaned up).

Additionally, “a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo review of the

issuing authority’s probable cause determination, but is simply to determine

whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the

decision to issue the warrant.” Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, “a search

warrant may be used as an investigative tool” where it is granted pursuant to

the confines of Pa.R.Crim.P. 201. Id. at 658 (emphasis omitted). That Rule

provides that “[a] search warrant may be issued to search for and to seize . . .

property that is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal

offense.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 201(b).

Appellant claims that “[b]ased solely on the affidavit[,] . . . the

Commonwealth failed to establish that the magistrate had a substantial basis

for concluding that probable cause existed because [it] was devoid of any facts

from which the issuing authority could have found that Spoofcard was used in

the planning or commission of a crime.” Appellant’s brief at 64. Appellant

complains that the suppression court relied heavily upon “an assertion that

Detective Parkinson called Spoofcard to verify that Appellant used it before he

obtained the search warrant, but that information is not [in] the affidavit.”

Id. Additionally, Appellant maintains that “the warrant does not contain any

information as to the detective’s experience, any reason to believe that

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Spoofcard in particular was used, or any explanation of why evidence would

be found in Spoofcard’s records even if Spoofcard was used.” Id. at 69.

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the suppression court

determined that the affidavit was supported by probable cause. See Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5/12/21, at 6. Highlighting that warrants are

to be viewed in a “practical, nontechnical” fashion, the court noted that the

warrant specified Spoofcard, LLC, as the possessor of records and found that

it was specific enough to support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 6-8.

Viewed in a commonsense manner, the affidavit provided the magistrate

with specific facts to conclude that evidence of Appellant’s crimes would be in

Spoofcard’s records. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the affidavit states

that Detective Parkinson had fifteen years of experience “investigating

financial/economic crimes[.]” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/17/19, at

Appendix B. The detective also explained in the affidavit that D.D. had been

receiving calls purporting to be from her ex-husband and friends, but when

she answered she recognized Appellant’s voice. Further, he indicated that

Appellant obtained a PFA order against D.D. after she filed one against him,

and Appellant had “spoofed her cell phone number” to claim to authorities that

D.D. violated Appellant’s PFA order. Id. Although the warrant failed to include

that Detective Parkinson contacted that company the day prior to confirm that

Appellant had a Spoofcard account, the affidavit otherwise included sufficient

detail to deduce that Appellant was using spoofing technology as the means

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to harass, stalk, intimidate, and retaliate against the victim. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

201(b).

Appellant further takes issue with the admission of the Spoofcard

records at trial because “they were not properly authenticated or reliable.”

Appellant’s brief at 82. “Our standard of review for a trial court’s evidentiary

rulings is narrow, as the admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of

the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 489 (Pa.Super.

2020) (citation omitted).

Rule 901 governs the admissibility of evidence, and provides that

“[u]nless stipulated, to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying

an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E.

901(a). For example, a witness with knowledge may authenticate an item

with “[t]estimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1).

Some evidence may be self-authenticating, however, including:

The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the

requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of

the custodian or another qualified person that complies with

Pa.R.C.P. No. 76. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must

give an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to

offer the record--and must make the record and certification

available for inspection--so that the party has a fair opportunity

to challenge them.

Pa.R.E. 902(11). In that vein, Rule 803 relevantly provides that the following

is not excluded by the rule against hearsay:

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(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record

(which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation in any

form) of an act, event or condition if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from

information transmitted by--someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted

activity of a “business”, which term includes business, institution,

association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,

whether or not conducted for profit; [and]

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity[.]

Pa.R.E. 803.

Although the Commonwealth presented a Spoofcard employee, Mr.

Marcano, and a certification pursuant to Rule 803(6), Appellant argues that

“the Commonwealth failed to show that the records were real.” Appellant’s

brief at 82. Appellant acknowledges that “[e]vidence may be authenticated

by a witness with knowledge that the item is what it is claimed to be.” Id. at

82-83 (citing Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1)). He avers, however, that Mr. Marcano “did

not qualify as a person with direct knowledge of anything” because he was not

a custodian of records or involved in the preparation or maintaining of the

records, and therefore he could not authenticate the Spoofcard evidence. Id.

at 84.

The court determined that it was within its discretion to admit the

Spoofcard documents “as records of a regularly conducted activity based on a

certification by Spoofcard’s custodian of records[.]” Trial Court Opinion,

11/5/24, at 38. The court explained that “[c]ontrary to [Appellant]’s claims

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otherwise, the Spoofcard records were self-authenticating under Rule 902(11)

based on the certification by the custodian of records.” Id. at 38-39.

Additionally, it maintained that Appellant’s “contention that [Mr. Marcano] was

not a custodian of records is inapposite – the records were properly admitted

pursuant to the certification, not based on the testimony of the Spoofcard

witness.” Id. at 39.

The court did not abuse its discretion. The Spoofcard records were self-

authenticating in accordance with Rule 902(11). The Commonwealth provided

the certifications to Appellant prior to trial, and he in fact objected to them.

See Appellant’s brief at 84 (stating that he contested the certifications “at

every turn,” including motions in limine). The certifications confirmed that

the records Detective Parkinson obtained were made at or near the time that

the information was transmitted, created and kept in the ordinary course of

business, and authored by a person with knowledge. See Commonwealth’s

Exhibit C-83; Pa.R.E. 803(6). No relief is due.

Finally, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

To invoke this Court’s review of the merits of this issue, an appellant must

satisfy the following four-pronged test:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the

time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (2) the appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise

statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a

substantial question for our review.

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Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 272 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

Appellant has preserved his objection in a post-sentence motion, timely

appealed, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Additionally, he

has raised a substantial question by averring that “the trial court imposed a

manifestly excessive sentence, double-counted Appellant’s prior record and

the offense gravity scores of the offenses charged, and considered improper

sentencing factors[.]” Appellant’s brief at 28. See Commonwealth v.

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“[A] claim that the court

double-counted factors already considered in the sentencing guidelines raises

a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 808

(Pa.Super. 2015) (“[A] claim that the sentence is manifestly excessive,

inflicting too severe a punishment, does present a substantial question.”);

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“[An]

assertion that the sentencing court considered improper factors in placing the

sentence in the aggravated range . . . presents a substantial question on

appeal.”). Therefore, we address the merits of Appellant’s argument.

It is well-settled that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Salter,

290 A.3d 741, 748 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). In imposing a sentence,

the court must consider “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense

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as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Where a

court orders a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, we presume that it

was aware of and properly considered all mitigating factors. See Watson,

228 A.3d at 936.

Generally, “[i]t is impermissible for a court to consider factors already

included within the sentencing guidelines as the sole reason for increasing or

decreasing a sentence to the aggravated or mitigated range.” Id. at 937

(cleaned up, emphasis omitted). We have confirmed that courts, however,

“can use information included in the guidelines to supplement other peripheral

sentencing information,” including “prior convictions in conjunction with past

unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate, or the fact that the new crimes violated

parole, or that the defendant’s ongoing criminal record demonstrated a threat

to public safety . . ., even though the guidelines take into account those prior

convictions.” Id.

Appellant states that the court imposed an excessive sentence that was

outside the sentencing guidelines and “erred in considering unproven arrest

records and ex parte PFA orders, as well as other factors which were not

supported by the record.” Appellant’s brief at 87. Relying upon

Commonwealth v. Berry, 323 A.3d 641 (Pa. 2024), Appellant contends that

a trial court cannot consider “an arrest that did not result in a conviction as a

factor at sentencing.” Id. at 88. Since the court stated that it “considered all

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of the information presented” at the sentencing hearing, Appellant equates

that to the court impermissibly using Appellant’s prior arrests that did not

result in convictions as the reason to deviate upwards from the standard

guidelines. Id. at 91. He acknowledges that the court cited “several

aggravating factors on which it based its sentence, including the extreme

manipulation of the victim, the infliction of extreme mental cruelty on the

victim, the use of sophisticated means to commit the crimes, and the criminal

conduct that ‘far exceeded’ what was necessary to prove the elements of the

offenses.” Id. at 97. Nevertheless, Appellant claims that “the trial court

imposed an excessive sentence given Appellant’s non-violent criminal record,

the non-violent nature of the offenses, and Appellant’s need for rehabilitation.”

Id. at 94.

The court recited the reasoning for Appellant’s sentence at the

sentencing hearing. Namely, it considered Appellant’s “extensive history and

pattern of targeting, harassing[,] and stalking women, [as well as] his conduct

in this case, which . . . all indicate very strongly that [he] presents a grave

danger to the public and especially to women.” N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/24, at

102. Further, it “recognize[d] that his convictions and criminal history have

already been factored into the sentencing guidelines” but explained that it was

considering “the pattern of his criminal history . . . that is seen over the course

of years starting at the age of [twenty-six].” Id. Specifically, the court noted

that Appellant had “multiple convictions for harassment[,] for stalking, for

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making terroristic threats[,] for intimidation of a witness or victim[,] and a

number of violations of probation or parole for those cases.” Id. Additionally,

the court listened to the victim’s impact statement and concluded that

Appellant’s “criminal conduct against her caused her to experience extreme

fear, anxiety, trauma.” Id. at 103.

Furthermore, the court explained that Dr. Dattilio opined that Appellant

would be at a moderate to high risk of recidivism if promptly released. Id. at

111-12. Additionally, the court found significant that Appellant harassed a

female corrections officer while imprisoned, threatened violence against his

attorney, committed these offenses while wearing an ankle monitor for his

stalking conviction against E.K., and feigned his remorse. Id. at 110-13.

The court also outright rejected Appellant’s contention that it considered

his prior arrests that did not lead to convictions. Plainly, the court stated that

“[t]he record shows that at no point during the sentencing hearing did the

[c]ourt make any reference to any arrests that did not lead to criminal

convictions.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/24, at 47. Additionally, it explained

that it “never referenced any PFA[ petitions] against [Appellant,] dismissed or

otherwise,” other than the one D.D. filed. Id.

We fail to note any abuse of discretion. The court placed ample

reasoning on the record as to why it deviated upwards from the standard

range of the sentencing guidelines. In fact, its explanation spanned fourteen

pages of the sentencing hearing transcript. See N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/24, at

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100-14. The court appropriately considered the severity of Appellant’s

conduct, the impact on the victim, Appellant’s need for rehabilitation, and the

need to protect the public. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). As detailed supra,

although the guidelines took into account Appellant’s prior convictions, the

court properly weighed Appellant’s “prior convictions in conjunction with past

unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate[,]” that he committed these offenses

while on supervision, and his “ongoing criminal record demonstrated a threat

to public safety[.]” Watson, 228 A.3d at 937. Although the Commonwealth

advocated for an even harsher sentence, the court had a PSI report and

presumably considered all mitigating factors to arrive at the sentence it

imposed. Id. at 936.

Appellant’s reliance on Berry is also inapt, as that case is easily

distinguishable. There, the defendant was being sentenced for a first

conviction. See Berry, 323 A.3d at 644. However, the sentencing court

specifically stated that it considered his previous arrests, which did not result

in convictions, as a reason to deviate upwards from the standard guidelines.

Id. Here, the record fails to reflect any indication that the court considered

Appellant’s arrests that did not lead to convictions. Rather, it specifically

stated that Appellant had been repeatedly arrested and convicted of multiple

harassment-related crimes. See N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/24, at 104.

For all of the foregoing reasons, none of Appellant’s many claims

warrants relief. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 1/13/2026

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