The opinion
J-A30001-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.A.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: T.H.G. :
:
:
:
: No. 1664 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-00000923-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 13, 2026
T.H.G. appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing, without prejudice, her petition to
adopt T.A.H. (Child) (born July 2015). After careful review, we quash.
Two days after Child’s birth, the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services (DHS) obtained an order of protective custody for Child and placed
Child with T.H.G., Child’s mother’s maternal cousin. Child’s mother and Child
had tested positive for marijuana. On August 19, 2015, Child was adjudicated
dependent. Subsequently, Child’s biological parents voluntarily relinquished
their parental rights to Child; the court entered decrees terminating their
parental rights in March 2016.
On February 6, 2017, Child was removed from T.H.G.’s home due to
safety concerns. T.H.G. was granted supervised visitation with Child at DHS
twice a week. On July 18, 2017, Child was placed back in T.H.G.’s care. On
J-A30001-25
December 22, 2017, Child was again removed from T.H.G.’s care, this time
with the assistance of the police, and placed into foster care. 1 At a status
review hearing, held on March 22, 2018, the dependency court heard
testimony from case managers and permanency workers and determined that
Child should not be returned to T.H.G.’s care and that T.H.G. had no standing
under the dependency petition. Id. at *5. Immediately following that
decision, T.H.G. filed a petition to adopt Child. See Petition For Adoption,
3/22/18. Aaron Mixon, Esquire, was appointed to represent T.H.G. in the
matter. Subsequently, maternal grandmother, C.S., was granted temporary
physical custody of Child.
T.H.G. filed an appeal from the dependency court’s order removing Child
from her care. This Court reversed that determination, concluding that
because T.H.G. had been declared a pre-adoptive resource prior to DHS’
decision to remove Child from her care, the dependency court erred by failing
to grant T.H.G. standing to challenge DHS’s removal decision. See In re
T.H., supra at *10. Our Court remanded the matter with instructions to hold
additional dependency proceedings and to permit T.H.G. to participate fully in
those proceedings with counsel. Id. at *11-*12.
____________________________________________
1 At this visit, like the prior home visits, the Community Umbrella Agency
(CUA) observed minimal to no food in T.H.G.’s kitchen cupboards, Child had
minimal clothing, and Child was sleeping on a small cot with a mattress and
no other furniture in her bedroom. See In re T.H., 1191 EDA 2018, *4-*5
(Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum decision), citing Trial Court
Opinion, 6/29/18, at 1-3.
-2-
J-A30001-25
Following a permanency review hearing, on January 15, 2019, the
dependency court entered an order granting C.S. unsubsidized permanent
legal custodianship (PLC) of Child, which effectively terminated court
supervision, discontinued DHS’ services, and discharged the dependency
petition. See In the Interest of T.A.H., 221 A.3d 326, *8 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(unpublished memorandum decision). On the same day, the adoption court
held a hearing on T.H.G’s outstanding adoption petition and ultimately denied
the petition as moot where the respondent, D.H.S., no longer had custody of
Child and after the dependency petition had been dismissed. Id. at * 9.
T.H.G. filed two notices of appeal contesting the orders of the
dependency court and the adoption court. This Court vacated both orders
concluding that: (1) the dependency court failed to follow our Court’s prior
instructions to hold further proceedings with T.H.G.’s full participation to
determine whether Child had been properly removed from her care; and (2)
without a proper determination of whether Child should have been removed
from T.H.G., neither the granting of PLC to C.S. nor the dismissal of T.H.G.’s
adoption petition as moot could stand. See id. at *21-*22. On remand, we
directed the dependency court to hold a new hearing, with instructions. See
id. at *21.
On September 24, 2019, the dependency court entered an order re-
adjudicating Child dependent, vacating C.S.’s PLC, transferring legal custody
to DHS, and granting C.S. temporary physical custody of Child. Following two
evidentiary hearings held in January and August 2020, the court found that
-3-
J-A30001-25
adoption remained the current placement goal for Child and that temporary
physical and legal custody should remain with C.S. The court also found that
DHS had properly removed Child from T.H.G.’s care and that the subsequent
placement of Child with C.S. was in Child’s best interests. The dependency
court referred T.H.G.’s adoption petition to the adoption court; the court again
declared the adoption petition moot because DHS no longer had custody of
Child where the court properly granted C.S. PLC. Id., 253 A.3d 319, *10 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum decision). See Order, 10/13/20
(trial court order listing “the matter in the Adoption Review Court to determine
how the adoption shall proceed [s]ince the removal issue [has been] decided
[and T.H.G.] is no longer a pre[-]adoptive parent”).
On appeal, our Court affirmed the dependency court’s findings of fact
and credibility determinations in support of its decision to uphold Child’s
removal from T.H.G.’s care where her “home was not appropriate for Child
and [] removal from that home was[,] therefore[,] best suited for [Child’s]
protection and welfare.” Id. at *18. However, our Court concluded that the
adoption court incorrectly dismissed T.H.G.’s adoption petition as moot where
the record was unclear as to whom or what agency had legal custody of Child
and whether the dependency petition had properly been discharged. On
remand, the Court instructed the dependency court to “determine if an order
discharging the dependency petition and granting unsubsidized [PLC] to [C.S.]
is still in the best interests of Child and, if so[,] then the court shall enter an
order to that effect.” Id. at *23, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g). The Court
-4-
J-A30001-25
further stated that if, on remand, such an order is entered, then the court may
dismiss the adoption petition as moot. Id., 253 A.3d at *23-*24.2
On February 4, 2021, PLC was awarded to C.S. by the Honorable Allen
L. Tereshko, Sr. The PLC order notes that “said custody shall remain in effect
until further [o]rder of the [c]ourt or until the child attains the age of majority,
not to exceed the age of 21.” PLC Order, 2/4/21. In that same order, DHS’
dependency petition was discharged. See id. On July 7, 2021, the trial court
found that granting C.S. permanent legal custodianship was still in Child’s best
interest, see Order, 7/16/21, at 2, and, accordingly, ordered that T.H.G.’s
adoption petition be dismissed as moot. Id.
On April 25, 2024, T.H.G. filed another petition to adopt Child. In that
petition, T.H.G. represented that Child “resides with [her,] the legal guardian
. . . [that T.H.G. is the] only mother figure that she has known and that she
has] raised [C]hild since birth in this family planned adoption arrangement.”
Petition for Adoption, 4/25/24, at ¶¶ 14, 16-17.
On December 11, 2024, the trial court held a hearing where T.H.G.
testified that she no longer wanted Attorney Mixon to represent her, but
wished to proceed pro se with her adoption petition. See N.T. Hearing,
12/11/24, at 16. Following a colloquy, id. at 16-17, the court granted T.H.G.’s
request to proceed pro se and vacated Attorney Mixon’s appointment as
____________________________________________
2Our Court also stated that if the adoption court dismissed the petition as
moot, then “T.H.[G.] will have to file an adoption petition against [C.S.] as
Child’s legal custodian.” Id. at * 24.
-5-
J-A30001-25
counsel. Id. at 18. At the hearing, DHS’s counsel indicated that he needed
to be present because “if the PLC [is] vacated[,] then [C]hild comes back to
DHS.” Id. at 21. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered the
parties to brief what it deemed “an issue of first impression,” id. at 22, stating:
“Issue number one is, is the child free for adoption if PLC has been granted to
a person other than the petitioner for adoption [and i]ssue two [is, c]an a
person who only has PLC sign consent to an adoption petition filed by another
person?” Id. at 24. The court then directed the parties to file their briefs on
the two issues “with the adoption branch and send a copy to [Judge Jonathan
Q. Irvine’s] chambers[.]” Id.
On July 2, 2025, the trial court dismissed, without prejudice, T.H.G.’s
petition to adopt Child, recognized that unsubsidized PLC 3 of Child had been
awarded to maternal grandmother, C.S., and noted that “[a]ny modification
of th[e] order must be done through [the] Domestic Relations Branch
of Family Court[.]” Order Denying Petition/Motion, 7/2/25, at 1 (emphasis
added). The trial court concluded that the case should be transferred to the
dependency court for a determination as to whether T.H.G. should be granted
PLC of Child. Then, only if the court were to grant T.H.G. permanent legal
____________________________________________
3 Permanent legal custody is a placement option under the Juvenile Act that
places custody of a dependent child in a custodian, yet does not terminate the
parents’ parental rights. In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Under this placement option, “[w]hen deemed appropriate, the trial court has
the power to permit continued visitation by the [dependent] child’s natural
parents.” Id.
-6-
J-A30001-25
custody of Child, could she then properly petition to adopt Child. See Trial
Court Opinion, 8/1/25, at 8.
T.H.G. filed a timely notice of appeal and contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i). T.H.G. raises the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying adoption
when Judge Murphy found all requirements satisfied on July 12,
2024?
(2) Did the trial court violate due process by stating “my order is
final” then informing Superior Court it was “interlocutory”?
(3) Did the trial court err by relying on a document that was never
properly entered into the record and never served on the PLC
holder?
(4) Did the trial court err by imposing contested adoption
procedures on an uncontested private family adoption?
(5) Did the trial court violate due process through ex parte
hearings and false attendance records?
(6) Did the trial court violate the ADA by denying accommodations
to [T.H.G.] while granting them to [a]ttorneys?
(7) Did the trial court err by allowing DHS participation through
Michael Mon as "Amicus Curiae" when DHS lacks standing?
(8) Did the trial court violate best interests by ignoring the child’s
statement[,] “I’m here for my adoption”?
(9) Did the trial court err by ignoring Judge Grey’s 2019 ruling
that contested adoption was “moot”?
(10) Does the pattern of judicial misconduct require recusal?
Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12 (unpaginated).
In matters arising under the Adoption Act, “our plenary scope of review
is of the broadest type; that is, an appellate court is not bound by the trial
-7-
J-A30001-25
court’s inferences drawn from its findings of fact and is compelled to perform
a comprehensive review of the record for assurance the findings and credibility
determinations are competently supported.” In re Adoption of K.B., 311
A.3d 1166, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). Additionally, our
standard of review is for an abuse of discretion. “This Court will not conclude
that there is an abuse of discretion merely because we would have reached a
different conclusion.” Id., citing In re K.D., 144 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Super.
2016) (citation omitted).
Prior to addressing the merits of T.H.G.’s claims on appeal, we must first
determine whether she has properly invoked our appellate jurisdiction. Under
Pennsylvania law, an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order
certified by the trial court as a final order, see Pa.R.A.P. 341; (2) an
interlocutory order as of right, see Pa.R.A.P. 311; (3) an interlocutory order
by permission, see Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b); or (4) a
collateral order, see Pa.R.A.P. 313. A final order is any order that disposes of
all claims and all parties or is entered as a final order pursuant to the trial
court’s determination. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), (3).
Notably, the trial court states in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that:
As this Court has found that this case should be heard in the
Domestic Relations Branch of Family Court, the substantive merits
of the case have not been heard. As such, this court does not
possess testimony and evidence for all the remaining errors
complained of on appeal. . . . Accordingly, based on the long
history of this case, the inconsistencies and questions raised by
the [T.H.G.]’s actions and, ultimately, the best interest of the
child, the trial court’s order entered on July 2, 2025 transferring
-8-
J-A30001-25
jurisdiction to the Domestic Relations Branch of Family Court, PLC
court, should properly be affirmed.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/25, at 8, 8 n.2 (emphasis added).
First, the trial court specifically states (and the record bears out) that
its order did not dispose of the substantive claims in T.H.G.’s adoption petition.
Thus, it is not final under Rule 341, and the trial court has not certified it as
such. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(3), (c). Second, no one argues that this is a
collateral order under Rule 313, and it clearly does not fit within that rubric
where the issues in this appeal are not separate from or collateral to the
underlying dependency proceeding. See in the Interest of J.S.C., 851 A.2d
189 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Finally, under Rule 311(c), “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from
an order in a civil action or proceeding . . . transferring the matter to another
court of coordinate jurisdiction[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) (emphasis added).
Here, while there may be coordination between court divisions in a county, in
Philadelphia, the Family Court Division, or Family Court, is one of three major
divisions of the Court of Common Pleas. The Family Court consists of two
branches: Juvenile and Domestic Relations. While the Juvenile Branch deals
with adoption proceedings, among other things, the Domestic Relations
Branch deals with custody. See https://courts.phila.gov/common-
pleas/family/ (last visited 12/3/25). See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 (“The
court of common pleas of each county shall exercise through the appropriate
division original jurisdiction over . . . adoption proceedings.”). Thus, the two
branches are not courts of coordinate jurisdiction, but, rather, are separate
-9-
J-A30001-25
courts that handle their own cases independently and, sometimes,
concurrently. Therefore, the order does not qualify as an interlocutory order
appealable as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c).
Instantly, the order on appeal implicates not only T.H.G.’s adoption
petition (which is under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Branch in Philadelphia),
but also C.S.’s permanent legal custodianship. See PLC Order, 2/4/21 (order
stating “said custody shall remain in effect until further [o]rder of the [c]ourt
or until the child attains the age of majority, not to exceed the age of 21”).
Moreover, the court’s order specifically states that “any modification of th[e
PLC] order must be done through the Domestic Relations Branch of Family
Court.” Order Denying Petition/Motion, 7/2/25, at 1 (emphasis added). Thus,
the effect of the order T.H.G. has appealed is to transfer the adoption matter
to the proper court—the Juvenile Branch. As the trial court acknowledges, the
order neither disposes of nor considers the merits of T.H.C.’s adoption petition.
See Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/25, at 8, 8 n.4 (trial court stating “the substantive
merits of the case have not been heard”); see also Appellee’s Brief, at 10
(“This action was not a denial on the merits but a jurisdictionally appropriate
response to unresolved procedural and custodial issues. [Child remains under
the jurisdiction of the dependency court, and the trial court correctly
recognized that any attempt to override or modify the existing PLC
arrangement must be addressed in the originating forum.”). Accordingly,
because the order is not final, collateral, or interlocutory as of right or by
permission, we lack jurisdiction to review T.H.G.’s appeal.
- 10 -
J-A30001-25
Appeal quashed.4
____________________________________________
4 We recognize the lengthy journey this case has taken since Child’s placement
two days after her birth, and we do not diminish the need for stability and
permanency for Child. However, under both the Juvenile Act and the Adoption
Act, the best interests of the child remains the focal point. Thus, we trust that
by transferring this matter to the correct branch of the Family Court, a full
and proper review of T.H.C.’s petition will take place forthwith and the relevant
issues will be properly resolved under the best interest standard. As the Court
stated in In re Adoption of J.E.F., 902 A.2d 402 (Pa. 2006):
We read the[] provisions [of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2711(a)(5) and
2713(2)], which must be construed together, as making clear that
the trial court, and not the Agency or any other person or entity
with a power of consent (save the adoptee), is to determine what
role a conferred, or withheld, consent should have upon the
adoption proceedings. See Hess, 608 A.2d at 14 (“the Act makes
clear that the court has the final burden of determining whose
consent is necessary;” notion that [] opinion of [] custodial agency
“will somehow control the outcome of the adoption is therefore
baseless”) (citing [23 Pa.C.S.A. §] 2713(2)). This statutory
construct makes sense since it is the court, and not an agency or
any other entity, which has the ultimate responsibility to
determine what will be in the best interests of the adoptees. At
all stages of the proceedings, the best interest of the child is the
paramount consideration. Hess, 608 A.2d at 13, citing 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2902(a). See also Hess, 608 A.2d at 14 (“the Act
clearly focuses on the needs of the child, reflecting the policies
expressed at common law;” “[t]he agency’s wishes, therefore, are
to be considered in light of that objective.”). The Act decidedly
does not award the very keys of the courthouse door to the
custodial agency.
Id., at 412. Similarly here, the trial court is the entity that must determine
what weight to accord the PLC’s purported consent in any adoption
proceedings instituted by T.H.G. Where the court has the discretion to
dispense with the consent requirement, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2713(2), a PLC
should not dictate whether T.H.G. prevails in her petition to adopt. Rather,
“as part of [it]s overall substantive evaluation of whether it is in the best
interest of [C]hild” to proceed with the petition for adoption, the trial court
should consider, as relevant, both the PLC’s and the agency’s involvement and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 11 -
J-A30001-25
Date: 1/13/2026
____________________________________________
familiarity with Child over the life of these dependency and permanency
matters. It is established that DHS no longer supervises Child; custody has
been awarded to C.S. on a permanent, albeit modifiable, basis. It is, however,
worth emphasizing that the basis for DHS’ filing the PLC petition was due to
the fact that T.H.G. was no longer a safe placement for Child. Implicit in
granting PLC, a court must first determine that neither reunification nor
adoption is suited to a child’s safety, protection[,] and physical, mental, or
moral welfare. S.B., supra at 983-84. Likewise, to grant T.H.G.’s petition to
adopt, the court would have to determine that the current PLC placement is
no longer in Child’s best interests, in addition to finding that it is in Child’s
best interests to be adopted by T.H.G. See PLC Order, 2/4/21 (order noting
“said custody shall remain in effect until further [o]rder of the [c]ourt”).
- 12 -