The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
SPECIAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS PANEL
AT JACKSON
July 15, 2021 Session
JAMES PRESCOTT V. PREMIER MANUFACTURING CORP.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Chester County
No. 2018-CV-1117 James F. Butler, Chancellor
____________________________
No. W2021-00052-SC-R3-WC – MAILED 9/21/21
FILED 11/18/21
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Employee sustained a back injury during his employment with Employer. Employee
subsequently resigned from his employment as a result of the injury and filed a workers’
compensation claim. The trial court determined the injury was compensable as an
aggravation of pre-existing back problems and awarded benefits. Employer has appealed,
asserting the trial court erred in finding the injury was compensable; in adopting the
impairment rating assigned by the authorized treating physician; and in applying a four
multiplier. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (applicable to injuries occurring prior to
July 1, 2014) Appeal as of Right;
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
ROBERT E. LEE DAVIES, SR. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S.
BIVINS, C.J. and DON R. ASH, SR. J., joined.
Jeffrey G. Foster & Benjamin J. Conley, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Premier
Manufacturing Corporation.
Spencer R. Barnes & Terri S. Crider, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, James Prescott.
OPINION
Factual and Procedural Background
James Prescott (“Employee”) worked as a tool and die technician for Premier
Manufacturing Corporation (“Employer”). On October 1, 2012, Employee suffered a right-
hand shrapnel injury when metal fragments ejected from a machine. Employee was treated
for his hand injury and returned to work on light duty. On or about October 24, 2012, while
lifting a thirty-pound bucket of metal with his left hand, Employee felt a sharp pain down
his back that extended to his buttocks, groin, leg, and right ankle.
Employee was initially examined by Dr. Adam Smith, who had treated Employee
for his hand injury. At the same time and continuing into 2014, Employee was treated
conservatively for his back pain at the Jackson Clinic. During this time, Employee resigned
from his employment, indicating he could no longer do his job. Employee was ultimately
referred to an authorized treating physician, Dr. Glenn Crosby, a board-certified
neurosurgeon. After physical examination and testing, Dr. Crosby’s impression was
“worsening lumbar disc disease and right lower extremity radiculopathy and nerve
damage.” He ultimately opined that Employee’s symptoms were related to his work injury
and were more than likely an aggravation of Employee’s pre-existing condition. Dr. Crosby
concluded Employee was not capable of returning to work and assigned an impairment
rating.
After exhausting the benefit review process, Employee filed his complaint for
worker’s compensation benefits.1 The trial court subsequently granted Employer’s motion
for an independent medical evaluation (IME) by Dr. James C. Varner, a board-certified
orthopedic surgeon. In preparation for trial, the parties deposed Employee, Dr. Crosby, and
Dr. Varner. These depositions were admitted as exhibits to the trial.
At the October 28, 2020 trial, Employee testified in person. Employee was sixty-six
years old at the time of trial and had an eleventh-grade education. Upon leaving high
school, he worked as a laborer in the heating and cooling business. Employee subsequently
took electronics courses and worked in television repair for almost twenty-four years. With
the onset of “cheap” televisions, Employee was essentially forced out of the repair
business. Employee next worked in the maintenance department at Volvo for five years
before accepting employment at Employer where he was a machinist in tool and die. In
1
A similar action was filed with regard to Employee’s hand injury. By agreement, the cases were
consolidated. The instant matter relates to the lower back injury.
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October 2012, Employee injured his right hand when metal fragments were ejected from
the machine. He was treated for his hand injury by Dr. Adam Smith and returned to work
with light-duty restrictions. One day while picking up a heavy bucket of points with his left
hand, Employee felt a sharp pain and burning sensation down his back that extended to his
buttocks, groin, right leg, and right ankle. Employee indicated that although he had suffered
from muscle spasms in the past, he had never experienced a similar pain or sensation.
Initially, Employee returned to Dr. Smith for treatment of his back injury but Employer
eventually referred him to Dr. Crosby. In the interim, Employee resigned from his job
because he could no longer do the work. According to Employee, Dr. Crosby discussed
two surgical options to relieve Employee’s lower back pain. Employee was amenable to
the first surgical option proposed by Dr. Crosby; however, the procedure was not approved.
Employee declined the more intrusive spinal fusion surgical option.
Employee continued to experience the same back problems, indicating his back was
“getting worse.” He can no longer participate in hunting or fishing and can no longer ride
a motorcycle. Employee has difficulty driving a vehicle, maintaining a small garden, and
mowing the lawn. Employee said he could no longer perform the jobs he had held in the
past.
On cross-examination, Employee was asked to reconcile certain responses from his
earlier deposition with 2012 pre-injury medical records from Dr. Glenn Barnett, who had
treated Employee for neck issues at the Semmes-Murphy Clinic. In his deposition,
Employee indicated he was not taking any type of pain medication when his October 2012
back injury occurred at work. Further, in his deposition and at trial, Employee said he had
not been treated for back pain prior to his injury in this case, describing the back pain he
experienced in October 2012 as unlike any pain he had previously experienced. Employer
presented Employee with Dr. Barnett’s medical record from March 29, 2012, which listed
hydrocodone as a “current medication” and contained a notation that “[Employee] also has
. . . lower back pain . . . [and] pain that radiates into his legs – pain and numbness in his
legs.” Employee was shown a similar note from April 5, 2012, that also listed hydrocodone
on the current medication list. Employee explained that he took hydrocodone “off and on”
during the time period primarily for his neck pain, and while admitting he had some type
of back pain with some numbness and tingling down his right leg prior to his work injury,
Employee insisted the back pain noted in the earlier records and the back pain he
experienced from his work injury were qualitatively different. Employee agreed that he
received social security disability and no longer worked.
According to Dr. Crosby’s deposition, he first saw Employee as a worker’s
compensation referral in September 2014. Dr. Crosby took Employee’s history, learning
specifics of the injury. He noted Employee’s complaint of constant back pain with a
radicular component in the right leg all the way to the foot with tingling dysesthesias. Dr.
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Crosby was aware of the conservative treatment provided thus far including physical
therapy and epidural steroid injections. The 2013 MRI Employee brought with him showed
a central disc rupture at L4. A physical examination that day revealed Employee had pain
with the straight-leg raise, suggesting compression of the nerve root. Dr. Crosby’s
impression that day was “worsening lumbar disc disease and right lower extremity
radiculopathy and nerve damage in setting of a work injury.” Dr. Crosby referred Employee
for current imaging, including an x-ray and a lumbar spine MRI. The new MRI revealed a
ruptured disc at L4 to the right that was causing neuroforaminal stenosis. Dr. Crosby also
noted that Employee was suffering from an annular tear of the disc. These findings were
consistent with Employee’s complaint that most of his pain was from the right side down
the right leg. Dr. Crosby offered a surgical procedure called a microdiscectomy to remove
part of the disc and take pressure off the nerve.
Employee returned in January 2016 having had no additional treatment. He
continued to complain of pain in the back and down the right leg. Dr. Crosby ordered
additional imaging that showed Employee had more degenerative findings at two levels,
L4-5 and L5-S1. Dr. Crosby felt Employee’s condition was worsening. At that point,
surgical considerations changed from microdiscectomy to possible fusion surgery.
However, Employee wanted to avoid surgery. Dr. Crosby placed Employee at maximum
medical improvement (MMI) on February 19, 2016. Dr. Crosby ordered a functional
capacity examination (FCE) that revealed Employee could not return to work at Premier
and met only the medium classification with a twenty to fifty pound occasional lift and ten
to twenty-five pound frequent lift. Dr. Crosby noted that Employee had been off work since
2013 and had been on disability for the past few years. Based on the Sixth Edition of the
AMA Guides, Dr. Crosby assigned an impairment rating of fifteen percent (15%) to the
body as a whole. Dr. Crosby wrote a letter to Employee’s counsel dated January 15, 2016,
referencing causation. Dr. Crosby opined that, based on the history, Employee’s symptoms
were related to his injury “and more than likely were an aggravation of an underlying
condition.” His opinion remained the same on the date of the deposition.
During cross-examination, Dr. Crosby explained that the patient history contained
in his original report came from Employee and was consistent with the history provided by
Dr. Smith, indicating the back symptoms and particularly the radiculopathy began after the
October 2012 work injury. Dr. Crosby acknowledged that he had not reviewed all of
Employee’s past medical records and had not reviewed any medical records that preexisted
the October 2012 work incident. Dr. Crosby also acknowledged that low back pain with
radicular symptoms prior to the work incident could indicate that the ruptured disc
preexisted Employee’s work injury. Dr. Crosby indicated his causation opinion was based
on Employee’s subjective complaints and truthfulness regarding when the symptoms
began, the imaging, and his examination. He agreed that if the history was incorrect, his
causation opinion could be impacted. As to the impairment rating, Dr. Crosby used Table
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17-4 Class 2 and 3 based on Employee’s disc herniation and two-level spondylosis with
radiculopathy.
According to Dr. Varner’s deposition, he conducted an IME on August 20, 2019 at
Employer’s request. He took Employee’s history and discussed the October 2012 work
incident. Dr. Varner reviewed the medical records of the Jackson Clinic, Dr. Hugh Barnett,
Dr. Adam Smith, Dr. Glenn Crosby, Work Plus Rehab, along with diagnostic imaging
including an April 2012 MRI from the Jackson-Madison County General Hospital; a March
2013 MRI from Sports Medicine and Spine; and a November 2014 MRI from Hardin
Medical Center. According to Dr. Varner, records from the Jackson clinic dating back to
1988 and continuing into 2005 mentioned lower back and/or right leg pain. These records
show that by 2001, Employee required pain medication for lower back pain. Dr. Varner
also noted that Employee was seen by Dr. Barnett in March 2012 with a description of
lower back and bilateral leg pain and numbness. He observed that after the October 2012
work incident, Employee was initially seen by Dr. Smith and had an evaluation by an
orthopedic surgeon with conservative treatment at the Jackson Clinic. Dr. Varner also
reviewed Dr. Crosby’s report.
During his physical examination, Dr. Varner observed that Employee walked with
a limp and ambulated with a cane. Employee described pain with straight-leg raise on the
right. Dr. Varner saw no evidence of radiculopathy. X-rays revealed degenerative disc
findings at both the L4-5 and L5-S1 levels. In his assessment, Dr. Varner noted
degenerative disc disease predating the October 2012 injury. In his opinion, based on the
history and description provided by Employee, Employee’s described work injury
“exacerbated underlying pre-existing degenerative disc changes with attendant increase in
preexistent symptoms.” Dr. Varner noted, however, that no pathology on the MRI studies
could definitively be identified as posttraumatic. Based on the AMA Guides, Table 17-4
Class 1, Dr. Varner assigned an impairment rating of seven percent (7%) to the body as a
whole, based on degenerative disc disease. Dr. Varner explained that Employee was
assigned a Class 1 impairment for documented disc pathology at multiple levels with non-
verifiable radicular components.
On cross-examination, Dr. Varner acknowledged that Employee provided him with
a history of pre-existing low back problems. He agreed that the October 2012 incident in
all likelihood exacerbated Employee’s underlying condition but without resulting in an
anatomical change. Dr. Varner estimated he spent between thirty-eight and forty-five
minutes in total with Employee.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the matter under advisement. On
November 5, 2020, the court issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law. In short,
the court found that Employee’s back injury arose out of and in the course of Employee’s
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employment with Employer; that the back injury was compensable as an aggravation of
Employee’s pre-existing condition; and that the back injury was the primary reason
Employee resigned from employment. In awarding benefits, the court chose Dr. Crosby’s
fifteen percent (15%) impairment rating and applied a multiplier of four, having concluded
Employee did not make a meaningful return to work. Employer has appealed.
Analysis
Standard of Review
A reviewing court must presume the trial court’s factual findings are correct unless
the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2)
(applicable to injuries occurring prior to July 1, 2014). When the trial judge has had the
opportunity to observe a witness’ demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, considerable
deference is given to the trial court’s factual findings. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn.,
Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). When the record contains expert medical
testimony presented by deposition, the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions with
respect to the weight and credibility of the evidence. Foreman v. Automatic Sys., Inc., 272
S.W.3d 560, 571 (Tenn. 2008).
Causation/Compensability
Employer first argues the trial court erred in its determination that Employee
sustained a compensable work injury. Indeed, “an employee seeking workers’
compensation benefits must prove that the injury . . . both arose out of and occurred in the
course of employment. Foreman, 272 S.W.3d at571 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
102(12)(A)(i) (2008)). “In the course of employment” means that the injury occurs while
the employee is performing a duty he is hired to perform. Id. (focusing on the time, place,
and circumstances of the injury). “Arising out of employment” refers to causation, meaning
there is a “causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to
be performed and the resulting injury.” Id. at 571-72. Employee carries the burden of
proving every element of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 572.
In this case, Employee reported that he suffered a back injury on or about October
24, 2012, while lifting a thirty-pound bucket of metal during the performance of his job
duties. However, citing past medical records, Employer maintains Employee had a long
history of lower back pain and suggests Employee’s purported back injury did not arise out
of or occur in the course of his employment. Employer introduced medical records
indicating Employee was evaluated for some type of back pain as early as 1988. In the
ensuing years, Employee was treated for various complaints of lower back pain and was
prescribed hydrocodone for the pain. In March 2012, Employer saw Dr. Barnett, who had
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performed neck fusion surgery on Employee in 2007. Dr. Barnett noted that Employee had
lower back pain, indicating Employee reported “a pain that radiates into his legs and
numbness of his legs.” In a follow-up visit in April 2012, Dr. Barnett indicated Employee
had “degenerative dis[c] disease.”
Employer submits that despite these medical records, Employee made unreliable
and incorrect statements about his medical history to Drs. Smith, Crosby, and Varner, and
while testifying under oath. Employer argues that based on these inconsistencies, the trial
court erred in relying on Employee’s testimony. Likewise, Employer asserts that the value
of the medical opinions of Drs. Crosby and Varner was reduced because of their reliance
on Employee’s misstatements. As to Employee’s testimony, it is well settled that when the
trial judge has seen and heard the witness testify in person, the judge’s credibility findings
are given considerable deference because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
witness’ demeanor and hear the in-court testimony. See Foreman, 272 S.W.3d at 571
(citing Whirlpool Corp. v. Nakhoneinh, 69 S.W.3d 164, 167 (Tenn. 2002)). In this instance,
the trial court chose to accredit Employee’s distinction between his past and present back
problems and resolved any conflicts in Employee’s favor. Having accredited Employee’s
testimony, the trial court was therefore not required to reject the deposition testimony of
Drs. Crosby and Varner simply because they relied on Employee’s representations. In fact,
although Dr. Crosby, who had not seen the past medical records, indicated during cross-
examination that pre-existing lower back symptoms could affect his opinion, Dr. Crosby’s
opinion was not seriously challenged or otherwise undermined during cross-examination.
Similarly, Dr. Varner, who had the opportunity to view the past medical record, nonetheless
did not alter his ultimate opinion that Employee’s symptoms reflected an aggravation of
his pre-existing condition. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in
accrediting Employee’s testimony.
Employer next contends that even with Employee’s unreliable testimony, the trial
court erred in finding Employee sustained a compensable aggravation of pre-existing back
problems. An employer takes an employee “as is” and assumes the responsibility for a
work-related injury which aggravates a pre-existing injury. Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co.,
274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn. 2008). In Trosper v. Armstrong Wood Prods., 273 S.W.3d
598 (Tenn. 2008), the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted the following rule when an
employee seeks compensation based on an aggravation of a pre-existing condition:
We reiterate that the employee does not suffer a compensable injury where
the work activity aggravates the pre-existing condition merely by increasing
the pain. However, if the work injury advances the severity of the pre-
existing condition, or if, as a result of the pre-existing condition, the
employee suffers a new, distinct injury other than increased pain, then the
work injury is compensable.
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Id. at 645. As noted, the medical proof came from the deposition testimony of Dr. Crosby
and Dr. Varner and accompanying exhibits. Both physicians agreed Employee’s work
injury aggravated his pre-existing condition; however, they held slightly different opinions
as to the nature and extent of the aggravation. Based on Dr. Crosby’s lengthy treatment of
Employee and his status as a surgeon, the trial court accepted Dr. Crosby’s opinion that
Employee’s back condition was advanced and aggravated. Because Drs. Crosby and
Varner testified by deposition, the Panel can draw its own conclusions. See Foreman, 272
S.W.3d at 571.
From our own review of the record, we observe that an MRI referenced in Dr.
Bennett’s April 2012 records indicated Employee had degenerative disc disease and
narrowing of disc spaces described by Dr. Bennett as “not a surgical problem.” A 2013
MRI taken after Employee’s October 2012 work injury showed a central disc rupture at
L4. After reviewing the 2013 MRI and examining Employee in September 2014, Dr.
Crosby’s impression was “worsening lumbar disc disease, right lower extremity
radiculopathy, and nerve damage in setting of a work injury.” A 2014 MRI revealed a
ruptured disc at L4 on the right causing neuroforaminal stenosis. Dr. Crosby also noted
Employee was suffering from an annular tear of the disc. At this juncture, Dr. Crosby
recommended microdiscectomy surgery. Although unclear, Employee testified the surgery
was not approved. When Employee returned to Dr. Crosby in 2016, additional imaging
indicated Employee’s disc disease had worsened with degenerative findings at L4-5 and
L5-S1. Employee declined fusion surgery. On the other hand, Dr. Varner described the
aggravation as “attendant increase in pre-existing symptoms, adding that the MRIs
demonstrated no pathology that could be definitively identified as posttraumatic.”
Again, both highly-qualified physicians concluded Employee’s symptoms resulted
from an aggravation of his pre-existing condition. Although Dr. Varner suggested that the
work injury merely increased Employee’s pain, we are persuaded by Dr. Crosby’s
testimony that Employee’s condition had advanced to such a degree that Dr. Crosby offered
surgical intervention. We note that just months earlier, Dr. Barnett indicated Employee’s
then-existing condition was not a “surgical problem.” We recognize Dr. Crosby was not
privy to the past medical records and that, during cross-examination, he indicated his
opinion could be affected by such records. However, in our view the cross-examination did
not undermine Dr. Crosby’s ultimate opinion. For these reasons, we conclude Employee
established he suffered a compensable work injury.
Impairment Rating
In its next issue, Employer contends the trial court erred in using Dr. Crosby’s
fifteen percent (15%) impairment rating instead of Dr. Varner’s seven percent (7%)
impairment rating to determine Employee’s permanent partial disability benefits. Both
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experts utilized the AMA Guides.
Dr. Crosby used Table 17-4 of the AMA Guides. He determined that Class 2 and 3
apply to Employee’s condition. Accordingly, his fifteen percent (15%) rating was based on
Employee’s “disc herniation, two level spondylosis with radiculopathy,” recognizing that
the spondylosis (or degeneration) was not caused by the work accident but opining that the
radiculopathy resulted from the work injury. Dr. Varner used Table 17-4 but applied Class
1 in assigning his seven percent (7%) rating for “documented disc pathology at multiple
levels with non-verifiable radicular complaints.”
Employer maintains the trial court should have used Dr. Varner’s impairment rating
because (1) Dr. Crosby incorrectly applied the AMA Guides; and/or (2) Dr. Varner noted
no pathology on the MRI studies that could be identified as posttraumatic. Employer’s
arguments stem from a difference in diagnosis as to the degree of aggravation. The
interpretation of the AMA Guides as to anatomical impairment is the job of medical
experts. Strickland v. U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc., No. E2014–00917–SC–R3–WC, 2015 WL
2066007, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Apr. 27, 2015) (citations omitted). When the
medical testimony differs, the trial judge must choose which expert to accredit considering
among other things the experts’ qualifications, the circumstances of their examinations,
and the information available to the experts. See id. (citing Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc.,
929 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tenn.1996)). In this case, each medical expert used Table 17-4 but
disagreed on whether Employee should be placed in Class 1 or Class 2 or 3. Each expert
chose the placement based on his own diagnosis. Thus, Dr. Crosby did not incorrectly apply
the AMA Guides. Instead, he simply made a different diagnosis than Dr. Varner.
The trial court accredited Dr. Crosby’s diagnosis and, in turn, adopted Dr. Crosby’s
impairment rating based in large part on Dr. Crosby’s qualifications as a neurosurgeon and
the length of time he provided care and treatment to Employee. Having conducted our own
review of the expert testimony, we conclude the trial court did not err in adopting Dr.
Crosby’s fifteen percent (15%) impairment rating.
Multiplier
Finally, Employer argues any multiplier applied to Employee’s impairment rating
“should be low” because Employee’s failure to return to work was due in large part to
factors not related to his work injury, such as his pre-existing back condition. Our analysis
encompasses the concept of “meaningful return to work” and includes an assessment of
Employee’s vocational disability.
The applicable statute provides that if an employee makes a meaningful return to
work, his permanent partial disability benefits are capped at one and one-half (1 ½) times
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the medical impairment rating. On the other hand, if an employee does not make a
meaningful return to work, he may receive benefits up to six (6) times the medical
impairment rating. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-241(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (applicable to injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 2004 but before July 1, 2014). In considering whether an
employee made a meaningful return to work, we examine “the reasonableness of the
employer in attempting to return the employee to work and the reasonableness of the
employee in failing to either return to work or remain at work.” Woods v. Ace-American
Ins., No. E2013-01916-SC-R3-WC, 2014 WL 4049867, at *5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.
Panel Aug. 15, 2014) (quoting Tryon v. Saturn Corp., 254 S.W.3d 321, 328-29 (Tenn.
2008)). The “touchstone” of the analysis is “reasonableness” guided by the following
factors: (1) whether the injury rendered the employee unable to perform his job; (2)
whether the employer declined to accommodate work restrictions ‘arising from’ the injury;
and (3) whether the injury caused too much pain to permit the continuation of the work. Id.
In this case, Employee resigned from his employment. If an employee resigns for
reasons that are reasonably related to his work injury, the higher cap in section 50-6-
241(d)(2)(A) applies. However, if the employee retires for personal or other reasons not
reasonably related to his work injury, the lower cap in section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) is
triggered. Id. Thus, the meaningful return to work inquiry is fact-intensive, and resolution
of the issue hinges on the trial court’s assessment of the employee’s credibility. Id.
In this case, Employee submitted his resignation letter on July 11, 2013. In his letter,
Employee mentioned an unrelated carpal tunnel diagnosis, his hand injury, and his lower
back problem. Employee indicated that he could no longer do his job. At trial, Employee
emphasized that his resignation was attributable to his lower back problems. He said he
could no longer get to work much less perform the tasks required in his job as a tool and
die machinist. The trial court accredited Employee’s testimony and found that Employee
acted reasonably in resigning.
We find similarities between Employee’s resignation and the resignation of the
employee in Woods. In Woods, the employee, who had also been under medical treatment
for symptoms related to her work-related back injury, ultimately resigned from her job
because could not tolerate the physical activities required of her. The trial court found the
employee acted reasonably in resigning, and the Woods panel affirmed. Id. at *6 (citing
Howell v. Nissan North America, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 467, 472-73 (Tenn. 2011) in which the
employee resigned because she was not physically capable of working on an assembly
line). In the instant case, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the
trial court’s finding that Employee acted reasonably in resigning and therefore did not make
a meaningful return to work.
Finally, we consider the extent of Employee’s vocational disability and the
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appropriate multiplier. The proof established that Employee was age fifty-nine at the time
of his injury. He completed the eleventh grade and later obtained his GED. Employee took
computer and electronics courses and had a forklift license. In his early years, Employee
worked as a laborer in the heating and cooling industry. Subsequently, he worked in
television repair and for a short time operated his own television repair shop. When the
repair business fizzled, Employee worked in maintenance at Volvo Penta. In hopes of
making a greater income, Employee went to work in tool and die for Employer. Employee
has not been employed since his injury, and he now receives Social Security disability.
Dr. Crosby ordered a functional capacity evaluation and determined that Employee
was not capable of returning to work at Employer. He acknowledged Employee could
return to work at a “medium level.” However, Employee’s employment prospects are
clearly limited, and Employee cannot realistically return to any of his former jobs. As
noted, the trial court had the authority to apply a multiplier up to six times the medical
impairment rating. Under these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in
applying a multiplier of four.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
____________
ROBERT E. LEE DAVIES, SENIOR JUDGE
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11/18/2021
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JAMES PRESCOTT v. PREMIER MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Chancery Court for Chester County
No. 2018-CV-1117
___________________________________
No. W2021-00052-SC-WCM-WC
___________________________________
JUDGMENT ORDER
This case is before the Court upon the motion for review filed by Premier
Manufacturing Corporation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(5)(A)(ii), the entire record, including the order of referral to the
Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel’s Opinion setting forth its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
It appears to the Court that the motion for review is not well taken and is, therefore,
denied. The Panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated by
reference, are adopted and affirmed. The decision of the Panel is made the judgment of
the Court.
Costs are assessed to Premier Manufacturing Corporation, for which execution may
issue if necessary.
It is so ORDERED.
PER CURIAM
Jeffrey S. Bivins, J., not participating