CenturyTel of Montana, Inc. v. NLRB

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 15, 2025 Decided January 13, 2026

No. 24-1346

CENTURYTEL OF MONTANA, INC., A SUBSIDIARY OF LUMEN

TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS

LOCAL UNION 768,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 24-1352

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order

of the National Labor Relations Board

Patrick R. Scully argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs was Monica J. Frascona.

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Jared D. Cantor, Senior Attorney, National Labor

Relations Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him

on the brief were William B. Cowen, Acting General Counsel,

Ruth E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Meredith

Jason, Assistant General Counsel, and Usha Dheenan,

Supervisory Attorney.

Jacob J. Demree argued the cause for intervenor in support

of respondent. With him on the brief was Jonathan D.

Newman.

Before: PAN and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Senior Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge: The National Labor

Relations Board ruled that CenturyTel of Montana, Inc.,

violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor

Relations Act (“the Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1), by failing

to furnish information requested by the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 768 (“the

Union”) on non-union technicians working within the Union’s

jurisdiction. CenturyTel petitions for review on several

grounds, in an attempt to show that the Board’s decision was

not supported by substantial evidence. For the following

reasons, the court denies the petition and grants the Board’s

cross-application for enforcement of its order.

I.

CenturyTel provides telephone and data services as a

subsidiary of Lumen Technologies, Inc., a national

telecommunications company. It has had a collective

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bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Union for decades.

The Union represents employees in northwest Montana who

perform installation, maintenance, and repair work for

businesses and residences. Among the attachments to the

operative CBA is a letter of understanding on crossing

jurisdictional boundaries, which states that CenturyTel “may

have employees from other bargaining units work within this

bargaining unit’s jurisdiction only when no employees from

this bargaining unit are available or to help during

emergencies.” Ltr. of Understanding, CenturyTel of

Washington, Inc., CenturyTel of Oregon, Inc., CenturyTel of

Montana, Inc. and Locals 89 and 768, IBEW, AFL-CIO, at 103

(July 1, 2020).

On July 27, 2021, the Union’s business manager, George

Bland, received an email from the Telecommunications

Council, a group of local member unions of the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”) that represent

employees of CenturyTel and other Lumen entities throughout

the United States. The email, sent to union representatives

across the country, referred to a report from a union local that

Lumen was using non-union National Technicians to perform

work in the local union’s area. Union locals in Missouri and

Texas responded that National Technicians were working in

their areas. On August 9, the Council sent Bland and other

locals a model information request regarding CenturyTel’s use

of National Technicians.

Bland sent the information request to Lumen’s regional

manager, John Bemis, on August 10. In a covering email,

Bland stated “the attached information request [was] regarding

National Techs working in Local 768’s jurisdiction,” and

Bemis should “call with any questions.” The request itself

stated the information was “for purposes of monitoring the

collective bargaining agreement between the parties and the

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investigation, preparation and processing of grievances in the

event the Union feels there has been a violation of any

provision(s) therein.” There were eighteen questions about the

number of National Technicians working in the Union’s

“jurisdiction,” how long they had worked there, the nature of

their work, and the job descriptions of certain Union positions.

Bemis called Bland upon receiving the email. The two

men had worked together for a number of years, and he was

curious whether there were outstanding grievances. During the

call, Bemis mentioned there were two National Technicians

working in Montana. Lacking details, Bemis forwarded the

information request to Arnell Anderson, the national team’s

manager for processing. A stream of emails followed. On

August 25, 2021, having heard nothing, Bland notified Bemis

and Anderson that the Union was filing an unfair labor practice

charge with the Board for “failure to provide or communicate

[CenturyTel’s] intent regarding this information request.”

Anderson promptly responded the team was working on the

request and would respond as soon as “appropriate

information” was available.

On September 1, 2021, Lumen Senior Human Resources

Advisor Keller Noble responded. Noble stated she was

working on the requested job descriptions and would provide

them once they were available. In an attached letter, Noble

confirmed two National Technicians were working in

Montana, provided an overview of their responsibilities, and

stated National Technicians were not performing unit

bargaining work. Ltr. from Keller Noble to George Bland

(Sept. 1, 2021). With respect to the questions about the number

and length of time National Technicians were or had worked in

the northwest Montana area, Noble asked “[w]hy is this

information relevant to administering your Collective

Bargaining Agreement when these Lumen employees are not

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represented by [the Union] and are not performing bargaining

unit work?” Id.

Bland replied on September 13. He appreciated “the

Company’s assertion” that the National Technicians were “not

performing bargaining unit work,” but pointed out “the Union

has the right to make an independent determination” of whether

the technicians were performing such work or had done so in

the past and for how long. He inquired whether Noble had the

requested job descriptions. Noble provided one job description

that day and three more nine days later. When Bland then

inquired the following day about answers to the remaining

unanswered questions, Noble responded that the requested

information about the National Technicians was “outside the

scope of [the Union’s] jurisdiction as outlined in the collective

bargaining agreement” because they were not part of the

bargaining unit. Bland replied the Union’s request would be

within the scope of its jurisdiction if “non-bargaining unit

members are performing the work of employees who are

covered by the CBA.” Bland renewed again the request for

information, with a response by September 29.

On October 1, 2021, the Union filed an unfair labor

practice (“ULP”) charge with the Board. Thereafter the Board

General Counsel filed a complaint on April 27, 2022, alleging

that CenturyTel violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by

failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith

with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the

unit, due to its failure to respond to the Union’s request for

information, which was “necessary for, and relevant to, the

Union’s performance of its duties.” Compl. ¶ 6(b). Following

an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

found that the General Counsel had met the burden to prove the

allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. CenturyTel of

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Mont., Inc., Case No. 19-CA-283839, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 6,

2022) (“ALJ Dec.”).

Bland, Bemis, and Noble testified at the ULP hearing. As

relevant, Bland testified that Bemis had admitted during his

August 2021 call there were “a couple” of National

Technicians that were either working or had worked in the

Union’s “jurisdiction” or in its “area.” Hearing Tr. 51-52, 130

(June 14, 2022). Bemis testified that he called Bland upon

receiving the August 10 email to find out whether there were

any forthcoming grievances of which he was unaware, and that

he did not “believe” he referred to the Union’s “jurisdiction” in

responding there were two National Technicians working in

Montana. Hearing Tr. at 141-42. “On balance,” the ALJ

credited Bland’s version of the call “as far more likely, given

the stated subject matter of the email that inspired [Bemis] to

initiate the call . . . .” ALJ Dec. at 5. (The ALJ noted the terms

“area” and “jurisdiction” were used “interchangeably” by the

parties. Id. at 5 n.8.) It was “undisputed that the parties had a

history of disagreement over what constituted work within [the

Union’s] jurisdiction or ‘area,’” id. at 12; the Union had filed

and settled two grievances in 2018 alleging that CenturyLink

(a predecessor company) violated the CBA by using non-union

personnel in 2017 and 2018 to perform bargaining unit work in

the Union’s Market Area. And Bemis, the ALJ observed, “did

not deny that unit work was being performed by the National

[Technicians] but instead obfuscated, admitting they had

‘been’ in the Union’s jurisdiction ‘a few times.’” Id. The ALJ

therefore concluded the relevance of the requested information

should have been apparent to CenturyTel. Id. (citing Murray

Am. Energy, 366 NLRB No. 80, slip op. at 29).

The ALJ rejected as meritless CenturyTel’s objections that

(1) it was not obligated to respond to the information request

because the Union failed to establish “an objective factual basis

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for its belief that the [National Technicians] were, in fact,

performing unit work,” and (2) alternatively, CenturyTel had

provided “every piece of information outlined” in the General

Counsel’s complaint. Id. (citation, emphasis, and internal

quotation marks omitted). The ALJ also overruled

CenturyTel’s objections to admission of the

Telecommunications Council’s August 9 email (attaching a

model information request that Bland used as a template) and

the 2018 grievances, on the ground the Union had produced

neither in response to a pre-hearing subpoena. Stating that

preservation or diversion of unit work is a subject of mandatory

bargaining under the Act, the ALJ found that the Union’s

information requests “were plainly aimed at ascertaining

whether [CenturyTel] had been violating the parties’ contract

by utilizing the National [Technicians] to perform [Union]

work.” Id. (citing New York & Presbyterian Hosp. v. NLRB,

649 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Further, “[e]ven

assuming that the relevance of the Union’s request was not

apparent to [CenturyTel] upon its receipt” of the information

request on August 10, “the Union was hardly acting on a ‘mere

suspicion’ when it continued to pursue the requested

information,” “especially considering Bemis’ admission that

the National Techs had been present in [the Union’s] ‘area’”

during his subsequent phone call with Bland. Id. at 13-14. The

ALJ therefore ruled that CenturyTel violated Section 8(a)(5)

and (1) by failing to supply relevant requested information to

the Union and ordered CenturyTel to cease and desist, provide

the remaining information as alleged in the complaint, and post

a notice describing the violation. CenturyTel filed exceptions,

and the General Counsel filed an answering brief to which

CenturyTel responded.

The Board affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, factual findings,

and conclusions of law, as clarified, and adopted the Order, as

modified. CenturyTel of Montana, Inc., 373 NLRB No. 128,

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at 1 & n.2 (Oct. 10, 2024). The Board agreed the Union had

established that the requested information about National

Technicians was relevant to its duties at the time of the request.

First, the Union established and demonstrated to CenturyTel

the relevance of the requested information about the National

Technicians on August 10, upon making its information

request. Id. at 3. The Board adopted the ALJ’s “well-reasoned

credibility determinations,” finding Manager Bemis had made

a “contemporaneous admission” on August 10 that “National

Technicians had worked in the Union’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 3.

Second, the relevance of the information request should have

been “readily apparent” to CenturyTel “under the

circumstances on August 10” based on the Bland-Bemis call.

Id. at 4. Third, the Union demonstrated the relevance of the

requested information at the ULP hearing with evidence of the

August 10 Bland-Bemis call, the 2018 grievances and

settlements, and Telecommunications Council reports that

National Technicians had been performing bargaining unit

work in two other states. Acknowledging CenturyTel had

learned of some of this evidence for the first time at the ULP

hearing, the Board pointed to its “longstanding” precedent that

“a union is not obligated to disclose the factual basis for its

information request at the time of the request.” Id. at 3 (citing

Cannelton Indus., Inc., 339 NLRB 996, 997 (2003); Brazos

Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 241 NLRB 1016, 1018-1019 (1979),

enf’d. in relevant part 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980)). “Rather,

it is sufficient that the General Counsel demonstrate at the

hearing that the union had, at the relevant time, a reasonable

belief.” Id. (quoting Cannelton Indus., Inc., 339 NLRB at 997).

The Board noted CenturyTel did not request the Board to

overrule its longstanding precedent allowing the General

Counsel to demonstrate relevance at the ULP hearing, and that

even if it had, the result would be the same. Id. at 4-5.

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One Member dissented. He concluded the Union failed to

establish relevance because it had not provided CenturyTel,

prior to the ULP hearing, with “objective evidence underlying

its belief that the information was relevant.” Id. at 6 (Member

Kaplan, dissenting). He urged the Board to adopt the standard

in Hertz Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 868, 874 (3d Cir. 1997), to

require a union to provide factual evidence of relevance when

making a request for information. Id. at 6, 8.

II.

CenturyTel petitions for review, and the Board cross-

applies for enforcement of its Order.

A.

Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the

Act”) provides that it is an “unfair labor practice for an

employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the

representatives of his employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).

Violation of subsection (a)(5) “results in a derivative violation

of section 8(a)(1),” which provides that employers who

“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of

the[ir] rights guaranteed by the [Act] have committed an unfair

labor practice.” Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 976 F.3d

276, 284 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Although the text of the Act does not expressly require

employers to provide relevant information upon request, the

Board construed the Act to include this requirement shortly

after the Act was enacted. In Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1

NLRB 837, 842 (1936), employees sought a revised wage and

hourly scale and the employer responded with a reduced wage

scale and increased hours. When collective bargaining

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commenced after some employees had formed a union, the

employer claimed that it could not offer higher wages or

reduced hours because of its poor financial condition, but it

offered no evidence or alternative proposal and declined the

union’s request to produce its books or have them audited. Id.

at 842-43. The Board found that the employer was on notice

of the requested pay and hourly scale and therefore was

obligated under the Act to meet with the union, and did not do

so until considerable time had passed. Id. Further, the

employer’s “attitude was peremptory and non-conciliatory

even though the employees had been on strike for several

months.” Id. at 843. Given the employer’s “assertion that the

[company’s] financial condition was poor,” and a refusal

“either to prove [the] statement, or to permit independent

verification,” the Board concluded the employer’s refusal to

bargain with the employees’ representative interfered with,

restrained, and coerced the employees in the exercise of the

rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, id., which include

the right to organize, form or join a union, and bargain through

their representatives with the employer, 29 U.S.C. § 157.

In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153

(1956), the Supreme Court addressed similar circumstances.

As in Pioneer Pearl Button Co., the employer refused to

provide information about the financial ability to pay increased

wages, arguing that the requested information was irrelevant to

the bargaining process and related to matters exclusively within

the province of management. Id. at 151. The Court affirmed

the Board’s reasoning that good-faith bargaining necessitates

both sides having access to information bearing on the

bargaining process. Id. at 152-53 (citing Pioneer Pearl Button

Co., 1 NLRB at 842-43).

The Board and the Supreme Court have adhered to this

interpretation of the Act. See, e.g., NLRB. v. Acme Indus. Co.,

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385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) (citing Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.

149) (enforcing Acme Indus. Co., 150 NLRB 1463 (1965)).

The requirement to provide requested information, therefore,

“derive[s] from the statutory duty to bargain.” Public Serv. Co.

of New Mexico v. NLRB, 843 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(enforcing Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 360 NLRB 573

(2014)).

B.

CenturyTel challenges each of the grounds on which the

Board found that the General Counsel had established the

relevance of the requested information. It contends broadly

that “the Board disregarded substantial evidence and departed

from established precedent” by removing “any requirement

that relevance must be based on a reasonable belief or

supported by objective evidence.” Pet’r’s Br. at 20. It contends

specifically that the Board lacked substantial evidence to find

(1) the August 10 Bland-Bemis phone call demonstrated the

relevance of the Union’s information request, (2) the

circumstances on August 10 made the relevance of the

information apparent, and (3) in any event, the evidence at the

ULP hearing established relevance. Id. 20, 26, 31-41. The

court will overturn the Board’s decision “only if the Board’s

factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or

the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying

established law to the facts of the case.” Windsor Redding

Care Ctr., LLC v. NLRB, 944 F.3d 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A Board

finding is supported by substantial evidence so long as ‘a

reasonable mind might accept a particular evidentiary record as

adequate to support a conclusion.’” CP Anchorage Hotel 2,

LLC v. NLRB, 98 F.4th 314, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999)).

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The Union bears the burden of establishing that it sought

relevant information because it was seeking information about

non-union employees. New York & Presbyterian Hospital v.

NLRB, 649 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Presbyterian

Hospital is a hallmark decision in this circuit. “A union’s bare

assertion that it needs information” would be insufficient;

instead “the union must explain to the employer why the

information is relevant.” Id. (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979)). “[T]he threshold for

relevance is low,” however, and “the union need not

demonstrate the existence of some particular controversy or the

need to dispose of some recognized problem.” Teachers

College, Columbia Univ., 902 F.3d at 302 (quoting

Presbyterian Hosp., 649 F.3d at 730). Instead, relevance is

assessed under “a discovery-type standard,” where the “fact

that the information is of probable or potential relevance” to

the Union’s responsibilities “is sufficient to give rise to an

obligation” to provide it. Presbyterian Hosp., 649 F.3d at 730

(quoting Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 437; then quoting Oil,

Chem. & Atomic Workers Loc. Union No. 6-418, AFL-CIO v.

NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Relevance is

“examined as of the time of the demand and refusal.” Id. at

731 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 916 F.2d 1163, 1169 (7th

Cir. 1990)).

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that

the Union had “a reasonable belief, supported by objective

evidence,” that the information sought from CenturyTel was

“relevant to the performance of its duties as the bargaining

representative.” DirectSat USA LLC v. NLRB, 925 F.3d 1272,

1278 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB

1256, 1258 (2007)). Although the Board relied on new

evidence of the Union’s reasonable belief at the ULP hearing,

Board precedent permits that practice, and CenturyTel forfeited

any challenge to that precedent.

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The Board agreed with the ALJ that the Union had

demonstrated to CenturyTel the relevance of the information

request about National Technicians when it made the request

on August 10. CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 3. Reviewing the

testimony before the ALJ — when Manager Bemis had

responded on August 10 to Bland’s question whether any

National Technicians had been working in the Union’s

jurisdiction, “a few times but not very many” — the Board

concluded Bemis’s “contemporaneous admission” established

the relevance of the requested information and was

unpersuaded by CenturyTel’s and the dissenting Member’s

attempts to minimize the significance of the August 10 call. Id.

In the Board’s words: “Of course, Manager Bemis was aware

of his own admission and that the Union sought the information

to protect unit work from diversion,” and there was “no reason

to disturb the judge’s well-reasoned credibility

determinations.” Id. Further, “the Union can hardly be faulted

for its assiduousness in pursuing the request for information

regarding exactly what work the National Technicians

performed when Bemis admitted that they had been working in

the Union’s area.” Id. at 3-4.

CenturyTel acknowledges that “[a] hint of relevance

possibly may have attached if the parties had in fact been using

the terms ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘area’ interchangeably.” Pet’r’s Br.

39. That is what the ALJ found, ALJ Dec. at 5 n.8, and what

the Board confirmed, CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 3. Regardless,

“[w]hen confronted with competing versions of evidence, [the

court will] defer to the Board’s credibility determinations

absent the starkest error.” Constellium Rolled Prods.

Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB, 45 F.4th 234, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2022)

(citation omitted). CenturyTel points to no such error.

The Board’s findings and reasoning refute CenturyTel’s

other challenges to the Decision as well. On the ground that

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the relevance of the Union’s information request was not

apparent to Manager Bemis on August 10, Petitioner’s Br. 31,

the Board explained why “the relevance of the requested

information should have been readily apparent to

[CenturyTel]” on August 10: Manager Bemis called Bland

upon receiving the August 10 email, and having been put “on

notice that the Union was seeking information regarding a

possible diversion of unit work,” Bemis told Bland that

National Technicians had worked in the Union’s “jurisdiction.”

CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 4. On the ground that substantial

evidence to support the Board’s findings was not presented at

the ULP hearing, the evidence before the Board included

Bland’s August 10 email to Bemis attaching the information

request; Bemis’ phone call to Bland on August 10 regarding

the Union’s information request; the prior

Telecommunications Council emails advising Bland that

National Technicians were performing local bargaining unit

work in Texas and Missouri, and that he should inquire about

whether this was occurring in his Union’s “jurisdiction”; and

the 2018 grievances filed and settled with a predecessor

company alleging unlawful diversion of Union bargaining unit

work to non-union personnel in northwest Montana.

CenturyTel nonetheless contends that the General Counsel

“cannot establish relevance for the first time at the unfair labor

practice hearing.” Pet’r’s Br. at 22. In petitioning for review,

CenturyTel does not contest its statutory obligation to provide

information necessary for the Union to carry out its

representational responsibilities. Nor does it adopt the

dissenting Member’s position that the Board should abandon

its precedent allowing the General Counsel to show relevance

of requested information at the ULP hearing and require the

Union, as in the Third Circuit in Hertz Corp., 105 F.3d at 874,

“to apprise [CenturyTel] of facts tending to support its request

for non-unit information.” CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 6

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(Member Kaplan, dissenting) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); see Pet’r’s Reply Br. at 2 n.1. Instead,

CenturyTel contends evidentiary and procedural failures

require reversal of the Board’s decision. It would have the

court overlook the sources of evidence underlying the Board’s

conclusion that the Union’s information request was based on

“a reasonable belief” that CenturyTel may have been diverting

work. CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 4 (quoting Bentley-Jost Elec.

Corp., 283 NLRB 564, 568 (1987)).

In CenturyTel’s view, the Board could not rely on the 2018

grievances, the Telecommunications Council’s information

request template, and correspondence between Bland and

Noble because this evidence was not produced in response to

the pre-hearing subpoena. This contention doubly fails.

CenturyTel did not include this objection in the exceptions to

the Decision, much less show an abuse of discretion by the ALJ

in admitting this evidence, Cadillac of Naperville, Inc. v.

NLRB, 14 F.4th 703, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2021), or that the ALJ was

required to disregard as irrelevant any material not produced as

called for in the subpoena, see, e.g., Hearing Tr. at 44-51, 53-

55, 90. Moreover, the court has no occasion to address

CenturyTel’s claim that its due process rights were violated

when the Board relied on evidence introduced for the first time

at the ULP hearing. Pet’r’s Br. 24-25. CenturyTel did not raise

this in exceptions to the Decision, nor in a petition for Board

rehearing, and offers no explanation for the failure to do so.

See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); HealthBridge Mgmt, LLC v. NLRB,

798 F.3d 1059, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

So too CenturyTel may have forfeited its argument that the

Union acted in bad faith when, in responding to the pre-hearing

subpoena, it failed to disclose that it had not drafted the

information request. Pet’r’s Br. at 32-34. Bland acknowledged

on cross examination that he had mistakenly failed to produce

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the Telecommunications Council’s August 9 email in response

to the subpoena. Hearing Tr. 55. Neither the ALJ nor the

Board found bad faith. CenturyTel did not expressly reference

noncompliance with the subpoena in its exceptions. Even now,

CenturyTel fails to explain how the Union acted in bad faith

absent a requirement to disclose such evidence prior to the

hearing.

CenturyTel also challenges the Board’s reliance on the

2018 grievances, which it characterizes as “distant, sparse, and

irrelevant,” having occurred several years ago involving its

predecessor. Pet’r’s Br. 34-35. Yet the Board reasonably

focused on them because they involved the same type of

“allegations of unilateral subcontracting of work and the use of

non-unit employees to perform bargaining unit work in

Northwest Montana.” CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 4.

CenturyTel’s challenges therefore fail in view of the

substantial evidence of relevance, considered in light of the

surrounding circumstances, which permitted the Board to find

that Bland’s August 10 email to Manager Bemis as well as

Bemis’s response put CenturyTel on notice of sufficient

relevant facts that explained the objective basis for “the

information request regard[ing] whether ‘National Techs

[were] working in [the Union’s] jurisdiction.’” CenturyTel,

373 NLRB at 2 (alterations in original); see Brazos, 241 NLRB

at 1018. Unlike Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB at 1258, on

which CenturyTel relies, Pet’r’s Br. 28, both the August 10

email and phone call informed CenturyTel management “that

the Union sought the information to protect unit work from

diversion.” CenturyTel, 373 NLRB at 3. Likewise misplaced

is CenturyTel’s reliance on the concurring opinion in Teachers

College, 902 F.3d at 308 (Silberman, J., concurring), given the

evidence in support of the Board’s finding that the purpose of

the Union’s information request was apparent on August 10 to

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Bemis, who was Lumen’s regional manager. CenturyTel, 373

NLRB at 4. Because the Board properly concluded that the

evidence and context supported a reasonable belief regarding

diversion of Union work, id., CenturyTel’s reliance on San

Diego Newspaper Guild, Local No. 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863,

869 (9th Cir. 1977), and G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., 369

NLRB No. 7, at *2 (Jan. 9, 2020), is misplaced. In Newspaper

Guild, Local No. 95, the request was “apparently grounded

only upon the Union’s suspicion that some contract violation is

or has been taking place,” 548 F.2d at 869, and G4S Secure was

similarly based on “suspicion alone,” 369 NLRB, at *2.

Accordingly, the court denies CenturyTel’s petition and

grants the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.