Rapport

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISON

NATHAN RAPPORT, et al., ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-02071

)

) JUDGE CHARLES ESQUE FLEMING

Plaintiffs,

)

) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

v.

) REUBEN J. SHEPERD

)

MICHAEL CHAPIRO,

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

) APPLICATION TO CLERK FOR

Defendant. ) DEFAULT JUDGMENT

)

)

)

I. Introduction and Procedural History

On September 30, 2025, Plaintiffs Nathan Rapport and Radian Industries, Inc.

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint, with attachments in support, against Defendant

Michael Chapiro (“Chapiro”) raising 23 civil claims, among them violation of Plaintiffs’ trade

secrets, Lanham Act claims, RICO claims, contract claims, defamation, tortious interference with

business relationships, and Ohio state-law claims, among others. (See generally ECF Docs. 1, 2).

On October 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion to seal the exhibits to the complaint,

which Judge Fleming granted on October 6, 2025. (ECF Docs. 4, 6; see also ECF Docs. 7-9). On

October 29, 2025, the matter was referred to me for general pretrial supervision and resolution of

non-dispositive motions. (Non-document entry of October 29, 2025).

On October 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte Motion to permit alternative service on

Defendant (ECF Doc. 10), amended on October 29, 2025 (ECF Doc. 11), alleging that Defendant

has been avoiding service, despite Plaintiffs’ attorney’s attempts to serve him. (ECF Doc. 11). On

October 29, 2025, I denied Plaintiffs’ motion for alterative service without prejudice, and

instructed Plaintiffs’ attorney to effect service according to Local Rule 4.2. (Second non-

document entry of Oct. 29, 2025). On November 3, 2025, the Clerk placed the Summons and

Complaint in the U.S. mail for service by certified mail. (Non-document entry of Nov. 3, 2025).

On October 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”), (ECF Doc. 12), which Judge Fleming referred to me for preparation of a report and

recommendation, (non-document entry of Nov. 4, 2025), and on November 6, 2025, I

recommended that Judge Fleming deny the TRO, at least to the extent it was filed ex parte (ECF

Doc. 13). On November 21, 2025, I conducted a hearing intended to resolve the TRO, should

Chapiro appear. Rapport appeared at the hearing on behalf of Plaintiffs, represented by counsel;

Chapiro did not appear.

Plaintiffs have since filed a Return of Service (ECF Doc. 16), a Notice of Perfected

Service (ECF Doc. 17), and an Application to Clerk for Entry of Default (“Default Application”)

against Chapiro (ECF Doc. 18), which I now consider in issuing this report and recommendation.

II. Discussion

Plaintiffs have applied to the Clerk for an entry of default, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 55(a) against Chapiro, on the grounds that he has failed to plead or otherwise

defend this suit within the time permitted by law. (ECF Doc. 18, p. 1). According to Federal Civil

Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i), a defendant must answer within 21 days of service – which Plaintiffs

calculate as December 1, 2025, based on the certified mail receipt date of November 8, 2025.

(ECF Doc. 18, pp. 3-4). Plaintiffs filed the present Default Application on December 3, 2025.

(See generally id.).

Before it may enter default judgment against a defendant who has not appeared, a court

must first find it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant to ensure it does not render a void

judgment. After inquiry, it does not appear that service has yet been perfected against Chapiro,

and this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. For the reasons that follow, I recommend the

District Court deny Plaintiffs’ application for default for want of personal jurisdiction over

Defendant Chapiro.

A. The summons and complaint may not be served to a postal service for

purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction.

After this Court’s order directing Plaintiffs to serve Chapiro in accordance with Local

Rule 4.2(a), Plaintiffs’ counsel provided the packet containing the Summons and the Complaint

to the Clerk of Courts, who submitted to the United States postal service via certified mail on

November 3, 2025. (Non-document entry of Nov. 3, 2025). The Clerk of Courts has not docketed

a return receipt for the mailing, although Plaintiffs filed a Notice confirming that the packet had

been delivered and left with an individual on November 8, 2025. (ECF Doc. 17-1). Delivery

notwithstanding, there yet appears to be a fundamental problem with service of the summons and

complaint on Chapiro. Although Plaintiffs claim that the address is one Chapiro regularly uses

and lists on his legal contracts (ECF Doc. 17, p. 1), it does not appear to be a valid address for

purposes of service of process.

Generally, service of a summons and complaint on an individual defendant must be made

by (1) delivery to the individual personally; (2) leaving a copy at “the individual’s dwelling or

usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there”; or (3)

delivering a copy to an authorized agent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Service through other means

may be available, should the means in Rule 4(e)(2) prove fruitless. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(e)(1); Local R. Civ. P. 4(c), (l); and Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.1 et seq. Service may also be made by

following state law for either the state where the case is brought or the state where service is

made.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). For certified mail service, Ohio rules provide that service must be

made on an “address,” and direct that the postal employee should “show to whom delivered, date

of delivery, and address where delivered.” Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.1(A)(1)(a).

“Service of process must be made in a manner reasonably calculated to apprise interested

parties of the action and to afford them an opportunity to respond.” Hook v. Collins, 2017-Ohio-

976, 2017 WL 1034605, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2017). For service on an individual

defendant, such as Chapiro, Ohio courts require that “[i]individuals must be served at their ‘usual

place of residence[.]’” Id., quoting Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.1(A). Service of process at an individual’s

business address may be proper, if the defendant has “such a habitual, continuous or highly

continual and repeated physical presence at the business address that the party ordering the

service of process would have reasonable grounds to calculate that the service would promptly

reach the party being served.” Hall v. Silver, 2018-Ohio-1706, 2018 WL 2074743, *3 (Ohio Ct.

App. May 2, 2018). A presumption of proper service may be rebutted by evidence that the

defendant did not reside or receive mail at the address to which the certified mail service of

summons and complaint was sent. Hook, 2017 WL 1034605, at *3.

On the Proof of Service form, counsel for Plaintiffs affirms that the summons and

complaint were mailed via certified mail to 300 Lenora Street, #787, Seattle, WA, 98121. (ECF

Doc. 16, p. 2). However, searching for that address returns the result of a business: The Mailbox

Seattle. See Google Maps results for 300 Lenora St., Seattle, WA at

1 Local Rule 4.1 looks to Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure for service of the summons and complaint, but does not

affect other means of service permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Looking to Washington State,

where Plaintiffs assert Chapiro maintains an address, Washington law states that service of a summons and

complaint may be made to the defendant’s “usual mailing address” but that the “‘usual mailing address’ does not

include a United States postal service post office box” for purposes of perfecting personal service. Wash. Rev. Code

§ 4.28.080(15).

https://maps.app.goo.gl/YT9HUXicX447JSCy5 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2026). And The Mailbox

Seattle advertises private mailbox services so that customers can “use a street address instead of

a residential address or P.O. Box” and will accept and/or forward mail on their customers’ behalf.

The Mailbox Seattle, Mailbox Rental, https://www.mailboxseattle.com/Home-Business/Mailbox-

Rental (last accessed Jan. 2, 2026). Thus, this address is not where Chapiro resides and is invalid

for personal service as his usual place of residence under Ohio rules.

It also does not appear that this address is a valid business address to satisfy Ohio and

Federal rules requiring that an address be “reasonably calculated” to reach Chapiro. Ohio courts

look to whether a party has a “highly continual and repeated physical presence at the business

address” to which service was sent. Hall, 2018 WL 2074743, at *3. But as Plaintiffs have

repeated in this case, Chapiro has a nomadic lifestyle and may not reside in any one location for

long. (ECF Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 8 “Defendant . . . has no known permanent residence and relocates

approximately every sixty days . . . .”). Moreover, it is not clear that this address at The Mailbox

Seattle is used as Chapiro’s business address. The jointly owned corporation at issue, which

Plaintiff Rapport names as co-plaintiff, Radian Industries, was incorporated in the state of

Wyoming and has an address for service in that state. (ECF Doc. 2-1, p. 10). Also, Plaintiff

Rapport names his residential address in Cleveland as the “principal place of business for

hardware” for co-plaintiff Radian Industries, and has mailed a document to Chapiro purporting to

fire him for cause to that Cleveland address. (Id. at p. 12; ECF Doc. 2-3, pp. 1-7). It thus appears

that Chapiro has used other addresses in connection with his business dealings, and Plaintiff

Rapport has used other business addresses in prior attempts to reach Chapiro. Without

commenting on the validity of the other addresses, it nonetheless appears that the Seattle address

does not appear to be of the type where Chapiro maintains a “highly continual and repeated

physical presence” for purposes of satisfying Ohio rules for service at an individual’s business.

Chapiro may yet reside elsewhere. Appended to Plaintiffs’ complaint is a document that

they purport to be Chapiro’s resume posted on LinkedIn. While that document does not list an

address, it does state that Chapiro is in the “Denver Metropolitan Area.” (ECF Doc. 2-3, p. 8).

This also leans against Plaintiffs’ effecting proper service at the Lenora address in Seattle.

In all, it is not clear where Chapiro resides or regularly conducts business. However, it is

apparent that delivery to the Lenora address in Seattle does not comport with service of process

under federal, local, Ohio, or Washington rules of civil procedure. Service has not yet been

perfected against Chapiro.

B. Even if service is perfected, personal jurisdiction may still be lacking

My inquiry does not end with the perfection of service issue. Because Plaintiffs have

asked the court to enter judgment against a defendant who has not appeared, this Court must first

satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant before it may enter default. Ford

Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 845 (E.D. Mich. 2006). “Personal jurisdiction over a

defendant is a threshold issue that must be present to support any subsequent order of the district

court, including entry of the default judgment.” Citizens Bank v. Parnes, 376 F. App’x 496, 501

(6th Cir. 2010). This is particularly so where the defendant cannot assert his rights, because

“personal jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause. . . . [and] it should not be waived

unwittingly.” Blessing v. Chandrasekhar, 988 F.3d 889, 898 (6th Cir. 2021). Furthermore, I am

mindful that “the due process rights of a defendant should be the courts’ primary concern where

personal jurisdiction is at issue.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir.

1996).

Here, Plaintiffs assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under both federal

question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction – with diversity jurisdiction vesting because

Plaintiff Rapport is domiciled in Ohio and Plaintiff Radian has its principal place of business in

Ohio, Defendant is not domiciled in Ohio, and the controversy exceeds $75,000. (ECF Doc. 1,

Compl., ¶¶ 2, 8).

A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant only if a court of the forum state could do so.2 Blessing, 988 F.3d at 901. Determining

whether a state court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a two-step process:

first, the cause of action must arise from the type of conduct listed in Ohio’s longarm statute;

next, if the longarm statute is satisfied, the court must determine whether its exercise of personal

jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant comports with his federal due process rights. Id.

Ohio’s longarm statute provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an

individual in a cause of action arising from that person’s “transacting any business in this state.”

Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A)(1).

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant “designated Plaintiff’s Cleveland address as the business

location,” including in the original governing document between the parties. (ECF Doc. 1,

Compl., ¶ 10). Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant has purposefully availed himself of Ohio such

that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this district for “conduct

2 A state may invoke either general or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Power Invs., LLC v. SL EC,

LLC, 927 F.3d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 2019), citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) and Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). General jurisdiction applies when the defendant’s contact with the

forum state are “so continuous and systematic as to render the defendant essentially at home” there. Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Plaintiffs make no allegations that Chapiro is

“essentially at home” in Ohio such that general jurisdiction would apply (see ECF Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶ 5, 7-8); I

therefore focus this discussion on specific jurisdiction.

undertaken in his corporate capacity on behalf of an Ohio-based company,” i.e., Radian

Industries, Inc. (Id. ¶ 11).

It could be that Plaintiff Radian Industries, Inc. maintains a presence in Ohio sufficient to

establish that “transacting any business” on its behalf would confer personal jurisdiction on

Chapiro. But I also note that Radian Industries, Inc. was registered as a for profit corporation in

the State of Wyoming, with a registered agent in Sheridan, Wyoming, and listed Chapiro (and the

Lenora address) as its incorporator. (ECF Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 2; ECF Doc. 2-1, p. 10). On other

documents, Rapport and Chapiro list Plaintiff Rapport’s address in Cleveland, Ohio as the

“principal place of business for hardware.” (Id. at p. 12). Assuming arguendo that Radian

Industries maintained a location in Ohio and that Chapiro may have conducted business on its

behalf using the “principal place of business for hardware” address, Ohio’s longarm statute may

be satisfied.

But even presuming that Ohio’s longarm statute is narrowly satisfied, federal due process

may not be.

“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a State’s power to bind an

out-of-state defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Power Invs., LLC v. SL EC, LLC, 927 F.3d

914, 917 (6th Cir. 2019), citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291,

(1980). The Sixth Circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether the exercise of personal

jurisdiction comports with due process: First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of

the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence there; second, the claims must

arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum; and third, the acts of the

defendant or consequences caused by him must have a substantial enough connection with the

forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Sullivan v. LG

Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651, 670 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted).

The defendant must “purposefully avail” himself of “the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal citations omitted). Purposeful

availment means that the “contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and not ‘random,

isolated, or fortuitous.’” Sullivan, 79 F.4th at 671, quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth

Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021). The contacts “must show that the defendant deliberately

‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploiting a market’ in the forum State or

entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359, quoting

Walden, 571 U.S. at 285.

And because the defendant is not “at home” in the forum state, the plaintiff’s claims must

arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at

359, quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127. This claims-based determination is interrelated with the

purposeful-availment prong, and looks to whether the defendant’s deliberate actions in Ohio

have a sufficient connection to the alleged harms caused here. See Malone v. Stanley Black &

Decker, Inc., 965 F.3d 499, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2020). The out-of-state defendant may be subject to

the forum state’s jurisdiction if the defendant’s “efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward

residents of another State.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. Notably, this determination

depends on the defendant’s contact with the forum state, “not the defendant’s contacts with

persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). With respect to a

plaintiff’s allegations of tortious conduct, jurisdiction may be established if the defendant

intentionally committed a tortious action that was expressly aimed in the forum state. See Calder

v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). But it is well-settled that injury to an in-state resident alone is

insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g., Blessing, 988 F.3d at

904-05.

And this is where my due process analysis becomes troubling. My review of Plaintiffs’

claims does not show that Chapiro intended to avail himself of the Ohio forum. Rapport emailed

Chapiro seeking business advice. (ECF Doc. 1, Compl., ¶ 31). After the two became engaged in

business dealings together, Chapiro incorporated Radian in the state of Wyoming, not Ohio. (Id.

at ¶¶ 2, 18; ECF Doc. 2-1, pp. 4). Radian’s corporate documents show that the parties agreed to

be governed by the laws of the State of Wyoming. (ECF Doc. 2-1, p. 46). Later licensing

agreements between the parties also invoke the laws of the State of Wyoming. (Id. at p. 49). And

although he entered into a business with Rapport and may have used Rapport’s address in Ohio

for certain business-related documents, (id. at p. 56), those documents do not show that Chapiro

intended to avail himself of the benefits and protections of Ohio law or that he intentionally

reached out beyond his home state. Rather, using Rapport’s address shows he was in business

with an officer who resides in Ohio. My review of the documents does not reveal that Chapiro

was ever present in Ohio, directed any marketing in Ohio, or had contact with any resident of

Ohio other than Plaintiff himself. This is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the

first two prongs.

Furthermore, the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction requires that a

nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to comport with “traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

(1945) quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Physical presence in the forum state

is not required, although it is relevant to the inquiry. Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. But “the plaintiff

cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum,” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. An out-

of-state defendant’s business transactions causing harm to an Ohio plaintiff may be enough to

confer personal jurisdiction under the reasonableness prong, even if it is not met under the

purposeful availment prong. See generally Blessing, 988 F.3d at 905 (collecting cases where

personal jurisdiction was found in nonresident defendants’ online business dealings in the forum

state). However, the Sixth Circuit has cautioned that the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction

should consider whether the defendant’s contacts in the forum state were based on a preexisting

relationship with the plaintiffs, whether the forum state was the “focal point” of the

communications, whether the business transaction was over a substantial period of time, and

similar considerations regarding the extent of the relationship between the defendant and his

dealings with a plaintiff in the forum state. See id.

It is insufficient to rely on a defendant’s “‘attenuated contacts’” with persons affiliated

with the forum state, or on the plaintiff’s “‘unilateral activity’” there. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.

at 286, quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253

(1958) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984) (same).

And this is again the issue I cannot satisfactorily resolve. Rapport states that Chapiro

used Rapport’s Cleveland address for his business dealings on Radian’s behalf and that those

contacts were substantial enough that Chapiro should understand himself to be amenable to suit

here. But the documents appended here demonstrate that Chapiro’s dealings with the Ohio forum

were centered around Rapport himself, not Radian as a business, or Chapiro’s transactions on its

behalf. Rapport points to the SAMS notice to show that Chapiro used his address for Radian

business dealings. (See ECF Doc. 2-1, p. 56). But on Radian documents, including the articles of

incorporation and the founder’s agreement, the Lenora address is listed. (ECF Doc. 2-1, pp. 10,

47, ECF Doc. 2-2, p. 2). Neither were Chapiro’s contacts with investors on Radian’s behalf

directed to investors in Ohio, even if his alleged contacts caused harm to Rapport here. (See

generally ECF Doc. 2-9, describing Chapiro’s alleged sabotage of funding opportunities and

reputational harm to Rapport). I also note that Rapport attempted to notice Chapiro of his

performance review and termination letter by directing it to Radian Industries, Michael Chapiro

– and lists his own Cleveland address in both the return and subject lines. (ECF Doc. 2-3, pp. 1-

7).

The few contacts Chapiro has had in Ohio, even those related to his business dealings for

Radian, appear to be of an attenuated nature. Although Chapiro is alleged to have caused harm to

Rapport in Ohio, and conducted business on behalf of Radian, also located here in some respects,

those contacts were all done through Rapport himself, and Rapport’s address. Radian did not

maintain an address in Ohio separate from Rapport’s address. In effect, Rapport is Chapiro’s only

link with the Ohio forum. And that link, regardless of the extent of the harm, does not appear to

be enough to confer this federal district court with personal jurisdiction over Chapiro.

That said, a plaintiff is not required to allege personal jurisdiction in the complaint.

Walker v. Concoby, 79 F. Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ohio 1999). This Court presently has only

Plaintiffs’ initial filings before it. And even though the complaint and its addenda are extensive,

they may not be exhaustive. From what is presently available, personal jurisdiction over Chapiro

appears lacking, and any judgment the court might render against him would be void.

I therefore recommend that the District Court deny Plaintiffs’ Application for Default for

want of personal jurisdiction.

C. Deadline for Perfecting Service

Notwithstanding the above recommendation, personal jurisdiction over Chapiro may yet

result. Furthermore, personal jurisdiction is an individual right and may be waived by a

defendant, should he choose to avail himself of this forum. E.g., Days Inns Worldwide, Inc., 445

F.3d at 905. I therefore return to the court’s present problem: ensuring proper service on Chapiro.

The complaint in this case was initially filed on September 29, 2025. Under Rule 4(m), if

service is not perfected against the defendant within 90 days, a court may dismiss the plaintiff’s

case without prejudice or order that service be made within a specified time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

The dismissal can be on the court’s own motion “after notice to the plaintiff.” Id.

If plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to serve, then the court “must extend the time

for service for an appropriate period.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has set forth the following balancing

test for extending time for service:

(1) whether an extension of time would be well beyond the timely service of

process;

(2) whether an extension of time would prejudice the defendant other than the

inherent prejudice in having to defend the suit;

(3) whether the defendant had actual notice of the lawsuit;

(4) whether the court's refusal to extend time for service substantially prejudices

the plaintiff, i.e., would the plaintiff's lawsuit be time-barred;

(5) whether the plaintiff had made any good faith efforts to effect proper service of

process or was diligent in correcting any deficiencies;

(6) whether the plaintiff is a pro se litigant deserving of additional latitude to correct

defects in service of process; and

(7) whether any equitable factors exist that might be relevant to the unique

circumstances of the case.

United States v. Oakland Physicians Med. Ctr., LLC, 44 F.4th 565, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2022). But

“good cause” for failing to meet Rule 4(m)’s 90-day requirement means more than mere

inadvertence or miscommunication. Koehn v. 313 Presents, LLC, 649 F. Supp. 3d 465, 467 (E.D.

Mich. Jan. 4, 2023).

The 90 days for perfecting service on Chapiro expired on December 29, 2025. However, I

determine that factors exist to counsel granting an extension for Plaintiffs to perfect service on

Chapiro. I first note that Plaintiffs have been diligent in attempting to perfect service on Chapiro,

and have responded to this Court’s earlier orders on the matter. (See generally Docket.). The

mistake in sending to an invalid address is not readily apparent on its face – indeed, The Mailbox

Seattle advertises its services specifically to avoid appearing as if mail is being sent to a P.O.

Box. As of the time of this writing, less than two weeks have passed since the expiration of the

90-day deadline, so it does not appear that Chapiro will be unduly prejudiced by the delay.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ counsel has represented that he has emailed documents to Chapiro

throughout this case, again demonstrating minimal prejudice to Chapiro. (See, e.g., ECF Doc.

11). Finally, I note that Ohio rules provide for up to six months to perfect service. Ohio R. Civ. P.

4(E). All these reasons countenance extension.

However, with this extension, I urge Plaintiffs to be mindful that any re-attempt at service

must be made such that it confers personal jurisdiction over Chapiro according to the applicable

rules of procedure. Even though Chapiro or his counsel may be aware of this lawsuit in the

Northern District of Ohio, notice alone does not suffice to confer this Court’s exercise of

personal jurisdiction over a defendant. And even though Chapiro may not have a regular

residential address for more than a few weeks at a time, email service of the summons and

complaint does not comport with the Ohio rules of civil procedure, nor does it satisfy the Court’s

exercise of personal jurisdiction. Ohio requires that the summons and the complaint must be

personally served in accordance with Rule 4.1 et seq. Only thereafter may a defendant agree to

service of other papers by email. McLemore v. Clinton Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 214 N.E.3d 723, 738

(Ohio Ct. App. 2023) (explaining that Ohio rules require that a summons and complaint be

issued in strict compliance with Rule 4.1 through 4.6, and that emailed attempts or personal

attempts by the party to serve the complaint on the defendant were insufficient).

Therefore, pursuant to the referral order conferring pretrial management authority to me,

(non-document entry of Oct. 29, 2025), I extend the time for Plaintiffs to perfect service on

Defendant until March 30, 2026. Plaintiffs are hereby noticed that I will recommend dismissal

without prejudice should service not be perfected by that date.

HI. Conclusion

I recommend that the District Court deny Plaintiffs’ application to clerk for entry of

default (ECF Doc. 18) for want of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Chapiro. Plaintiffs have

until March 30, 2026 to perfect service, or else risk a recommendation of dismissal without

prejudice.

Dated: January 9, 2026 SY

REUBEN J. SHEPERD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OBJECTIONS

Objections, Review, and Appeal

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation, a party

may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations of

the magistrate judge. Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; see also 28

U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.3(b). Properly asserted objections shall be reviewed de novo

by the assigned district judge.

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15

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or waiver

of the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds to the report

and recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be

specific and not merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the report and

recommendation; “a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to object.” Howard

v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Objections should focus

on specific concerns and not merely restate the arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate

judge. “A reexamination of the exact same argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge

without specific objections ‘wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary

to the purpose of the Magistrates Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL

3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) quoting Howard. The failure to assert specific objections

may in rare cases be excused in the interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d

868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).