Elena Shchegoleva

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-23858-MOORE/Elfenbein

In re

ELENA SHCHEGOLEVA

DISCOVERY APPLICATION,

ELENA SHCHEGOLEVA,

Applicant,

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for

Judicial Assistance in Obtaining

Evidence for Use in a Foreign Proceeding.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Third Party Oleg Shchegolev’s (“Movant”) Motion

to Intervene and for Leave to Respond to Applicant’s Ex Parte Application to Take Discovery

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (the “Motion”), ECF No. [7]. The Honorable K. Michael Moore

referred this matter to me “to take all necessary and proper action as required by law with respect

to” the Application to Take Discovery Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (the “Application”), ECF No.

[1]. See ECF No. [3]. For the reasons explained below, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the

Motion, ECF No. [7], be GRANTED.1

1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a magistrate judge can issue a report and recommendation on dispositive

matters, while non-dispositive matters may be resolved by order subject to clear-error review. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b). The Eleventh Circuit has not squarely decided whether a motion to intervene is dispositive,

but it has noted that “the practice in at least some districts in our Circuit has been for a magistrate judge to

draft a report and recommendation for the district court when a motion to intervene is filed because “a

motion to intervene is a dispositive motion which must ultimately be decided by an Article III judge in the

absence of consent.” Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing

Newman v. Sun Capital, Inc., No. 09–CV–445, 2010 WL 326069, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2010)); see also

Smith v. Powder Mountain, LLC, Nos. 08–CV-80820, 08–CV–81185, 2010 WL 5483327, at *1 (S.D. Fla.

Dec. 8, 2010) (“[T]he motion presently before the Court is a motion to intervene, which, because of its

I. BACKGROUND

In the Application, Applicant ELENA SHCHEGOLEVA (“Applicant”) asks the Court

for an order authorizing discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in aid of a pending divorce

proceeding in Barcelona, Spain, initiated by Applicant’s husband, Movant, on February 20, 2025.

See ECF No. [1] at 2. The Application asserts that the couple’s net worth primarily derives from

SEMrush, a company for which Movant serves as the Chief Technology Officer. See id at 2.

Applicant alleges that Movant made false statements during the divorce proceedings concerning

whether substantial assets from SEMrush are marital property. Applicant further alleges that

Movant, with assistance from Andrew George Sukhin (“Sukhin”), Managing Director of AGS

Wealth Management Group (“AGS”) of Raymond James Financial, Inc. (“Raymond James”),2

Alexandra Agniya Hill (“Hill”) Senior Vice President of AGS, and trusts and estates counsel

Michael Bass (“Bass”) and others, has concealed and shielded marital assets. See id. at 1-2.

Applicant alleges that “Movant, Sukhin, Hill, Bass and others used financial instruments to

transact in hidden marital property including but not limited to AGS managed Raymond James

accounts, AGS managed Morgan Stanley accounts, and Movant’s American Express (‘Amex’)

credit cards.” See id. at 3. Applicant further alleges that Mariya Mikhaylovna Gavdyak, a/k/a

Mariia Mihaylivna Havdiak (“Havdiak”) has been romantically involved with Movant since mid-

2023 and has received travel and other discretionary expenditures funded by him. See id. at 10-

dispositive nature, cannot be decided by a magistrate judge absent the parties’ consent.”). Because no party

has consented to final disposition by a magistrate judge, the undersigned, out of an abundance of caution,

addresses the motion to intervene by report and recommendation. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. BKCoin

Mgmt., LLC, No. 23-CV-20719, 2024 WL 2874857, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2024), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 23-CV-20719, 2024 WL 3013632 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2024); Bake House

SB, LLC v. City of Miami Beach, No. 17-CV-20217, 2017 WL 2645760, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2017);

Abreu v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 21-CV-62122, 2022 WL 2341427, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 3, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted (Mar. 22, 2022).

2 Formerly Managing Director of Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“Morgan Stanley”).

11. Applicant alleges that Movant uses martial assets to fund Havdiak’s expenses. See id. at 11-

12.

Applicant alleges that she lacks access to U.S.-based financial records and witnesses

necessary to test those statements in the Spanish court. See id. Applicant represents that access to

relevant account statements, transactional records, communications, and third-party records

(including records from Havdiak regarding travel, lodging, and discretionary spending allegedly

funded by Movant) is necessary to trace assets and present evidence in Spain regarding equitable

distribution, alimony, and child support. See id. Applicant seeks leave to issue subpoenas duces

tecum to Sukhin, Hill, and Havdiak, and to obtain documentary records from Raymond James,

Morgan Stanley, and Amex (collectively, the “Respondents”), all for use in the pending divorce

proceeding in Barcelona, Spain. See id. at 1.

On September 5, 2025, Movant filed the Motion to Intervene under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a) and for leave to respond to the Application, asserting he is the underlying target

of the requested discovery and therefore has a direct interest in the requested relief. See ECF No.

[7] at ¶¶4-5. Movant requests ten (10) days to respond to the Application. See id. at 3. Movant

also previews his arguments on the merits of the Application. See id. at 2-4. Specifically, Movant

argues that § 1782 discovery is improper because: (1) it appears directed to issues of asset

distribution that are allegedly not presently under consideration by the Spanish court; (2) Applicant

has made the same requests to the Spanish court that she makes now to this Court without awaiting

the Spanish court’s resolution; and (3) a petition for dissolution of the Shchegolev’s marriage has

also been filed, and remains pending, in Florida state court and the Spanish and Florida courts have

yet to “decide which is the proper forum to exercise subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the

parties’ marriage and adjudicate the related financial issues. . .” See id.

On September 18, 2025, Applicant filed her Opposition to the Motion to Intervene (the

“Response”), arguing the Court should deny intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

24 and permit the § 1782 application to proceed ex parte. See ECF No. [9] at 1. Applicant

contends Movant seeks intervention primarily to drain Applicant’s limited resources and delay

evidence needed for the Spanish proceeding, for which the Spanish court has already set an

evidentiary hearing on January 22, 2026. See id. at 1-2. Applicant cites to the Eleventh Circuit

standard on intervention, requiring the party seeking intervention to show that: “(1) his application

to intervene is timely; (2) he has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

subject of the action; (3) he is so situated that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may

impede or impair his ability to protect that interest; and (4) his interest is represented inadequately

by the existing parties to the suit.” Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989)

(citing Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir.

1982)).

Applicant concedes that Movant’s intervention is timely but asserts the second factor is not

satisfied because Movant lacks a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the discovery,

which Applicant claims pertains to financial records and trust-related materials belonging to her

or to trusts in which she was a beneficiary and investment advisor. See id. at 4. For this reason,

Applicant argues the third factor also fails because Movant purportedly will not be practically

disadvantaged by allowing Applicant to obtain discovery that rightfully belongs to her. See id. at

5. Applicant further argues Movant fails to show Respondents, including Movant’s long-term

partner, Havdiak, inadequately represent his interests, rendering intervention unnecessary and

duplicative. See id. Applicant also briefly addresses Movant’s substantive arguments regarding

the Application and opposes them. See id. at 6-7.

Movant thereafter filed his Reply in Support of his Motion to Intervene (the “Reply”), but

now cites to Rule 24 subsections (a) and (b) (as of right and permissive intervention, respectively).

See ECF No. [10] at 3. He argues Applicant’s Response does not defeat intervention under Rule

24, contending that denial of intervention would practically disadvantage him in the Spanish

proceedings as he is the adverse party there and that the subpoena Respondents do not adequately

represent his interests because he is the only party in the Spanish proceedings. See id. at 4-6.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides for intervention “as of right” under Rule

24(a)(2) when the proposed intervenor establishes four conjunctive requirements: “(1) [the]

application to intervene is timely; (2) [the proposed intervenor] has an interest relating to the

property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) [the proposed intervenor] is so

situated that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or impair [the proposed

intervenor’s] ability to protect that interest; and (4) [the proposed intervenor’s] interest is

represented inadequately by the existing parties to the suit.” Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213 (citing

Athens, 690 F.2d at 1366). If each requirement is established, “the district court must allow”

intervention. See id.

Timeliness is assessed with flexibility and turns on factors including: “(1) the length of

time during which the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of the interest

in the case before moving to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result

of the proposed intervenor’s failure to move for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably

should have known of its interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the proposed intervenor if the

motion is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a

determination that their motion was timely.” In re Martinez, 736 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1200 (S.D.

Fla. 2024) (quoting Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002)

(cleaned up)). In the § 1782 context, courts in this District have found intervention timely even

when filed weeks after an order granting the application, particularly where the intervenor’s notice

was tied to subpoena service and there is no showing of meaningful prejudice from the timing.

See id.

The “interest” required for intervention of right must be “direct, substantial, [and] legally

protectable,” with a flexible analysis that “focus[es] on the particular facts and circumstances”

presented. See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213-14. The “impairment” inquiry states that intervention is

warranted where the absent party would be “practically disadvantaged” by exclusion, including

where the action’s outcome may have meaningful practical effects on the intervenor’s ability to

protect the interest asserted. See Huff v. Comm’r of IRS, 743 F.3d 790, 800 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing

Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chiles, 865 F.2d at

1214)). The inadequate representation requirement imposes only a minimal burden; it “is satisfied

if the [proposed intervenor] shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate” and the

Supreme Court has explained that “the burden of making that showing should be treated as

minimal.” See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1214 (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America,

404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)). “The fact that the interests are similar does not mean that

approaches to litigation will be the same.” Id. at 1214-15 (citing Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539).

Where an existing party seeks the same objectives as the proposed intervenor, there is a

presumption of adequate representation, but that presumption is “weak” and may be overcome

with evidence to the contrary. In re Martinez, 736 F. Supp. 3d at 1201.

III. DISCUSSION

To recap, Movant argues that his intervention is timely in this § 1782 proceeding, that he

has a direct and legally protectable interest because he is the “underlying target” of the requested

discovery for use in the Spanish and Florida divorce proceedings, that he would be practically

disadvantaged if the Court authorizes discovery without his participation, and that the subpoena

Respondents cannot adequately represent his interests. See ECF Nos. [7] and [10]. Applicant does

not dispute timeliness, but she contends Movant lacks a substantial protectable interest because

the discovery she seeks concerns records she claims belong to her or to trusts in which she was a

beneficiary and advisor. See ECF No. [9]. Applicant also argues that production of what she

characterizes as her own records will not practically disadvantage Movant, and that Respondents,

specifically Havdiak, adequately represent his interests. See id. The Court finds that Movant has

satisfied all four factors warranting intervention.

First, the Court finds the Motion was timely filed. Applicant filed her § 1782 application

on August 27, 2025, seeking discovery for use in a pending divorce proceeding in Barcelona,

Spain. See ECF No. [1]. Movant retained counsel on September 2, 2025 and filed the Motion on

September 5, 2025 — approximately nine days after the Application was filed and at the outset of

the federal proceeding. See ECF No. [7]. This short interval weighs strongly in favor of timeliness

under the flexible timeliness framework, particularly because § 1782 applications are frequently

presented ex parte and the practical notice to an interested party commonly arises only after

counsel learns of the filing and/or impending subpoena service. In re Martinez, 736 F. Supp. 3d

at 1200 (quoting Georgia, 302 F.3d at 1259).

Second, the Court finds Movant has a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the

subject of the § 1782 proceeding. The Application seeks documents and records from third parties

in this District for use in the foreign divorce case, including discovery directed to individuals and

entities associated with Movant and his financial affairs. See ECF No. [1]. The Application alleges

that Movant, working with Sukhin, Hill, Bass, and others, caused hundreds of millions of dollars

of alleged marital assets to be placed into trust structures presented as estate planning. See id. at

2-3, 7-9. Applicant also expressly alleges that Movant and Respondents concealed that the trust

structures were designed so that Applicant’s beneficiary status and any claim to trust assets would

terminate if Movant filed for divorce. See id. at 2-3, 9. The Application further alleges Applicant

was only nominally appointed “Trust Advisor” to create the appearance of her consent and to allow

Movant to disclaim beneficial ownership, while she was misled about the trusts’ true workings and

denied meaningful information about trust assets. See id. at 8-9, 10-11. According to the

Application, Movant and the professionals diverted trust assets into “secret sub-trusts” for

Movant’s exclusive benefit — including through “qualified disclaimers” that allegedly triggered

provisions routing disclaimed assets to a sub-trust for Movant’s exclusive control — thereby

giving him effective access and control notwithstanding contrary representations. See id. at 3, 7-

10. Finally, the Application alleges that she is unable to trace or prove ownership and control

without third-party records. See id.

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, intervention of right requires a “direct, substantial, [and]

legally protectable” interest and a fact-specific, flexible inquiry; an interest is sufficient where the

intervenor is a real party in interest in the transaction or subject matter at issue. See Chiles, 865

F.2d at 1213 (citing Athens, 690 F.2d at 1366). Given that the discovery is sought for use against

Movant in the Spanish divorce proceeding, and is aimed at information concerning him, Movant’s

interest satisfies Rule 24(a)(2)’s “interest” requirement. Applicant’s argument that the discovery

she seeks concerns records she claims belong to her or to trusts in which she was a beneficiary and

advisor does not negate Movant’s own interest in financial documents that relate to Movant’s own

finances and spending. Applicant’s own allegations make clear that she is not the sole owner of

the subject financial documents, so her argument does not negate Movant’s own interest in them.

Accordingly, Movant satisfies the second factor.

Third, the Court finds that disposition of the Application without Movant’s participation

may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect his interests. The Application is

the vehicle through which the requested subpoenas, and document production, would be

authorized and enforced in this District. The Eleventh Circuit frames this element in practical

terms: “[a]ll that is required” is that the would-be intervenor be “practically disadvantaged” by

exclusion, and courts recognize that the action’s practical consequences can supply the impairment

needed for intervention. See Huff, 743 F.3d at 800 (citing Stone, 371 F.3d at 1309–10; Chiles, 865

F.2d at 1214). Because the requested discovery is directed at information about Movant for use in

foreign litigation, denying intervention would risk authorizing and executing discovery affecting

Movant’s asserted privacy and litigation interests without affording him an opportunity to be heard

before production occurs. Similar to the second factor, Applicant’s argument that Movant is not

practically disadvantaged by production of what she characterizes as her own records is not

persuasive as her allegations clearly explain that she is not the sole owner of the subject financial

documents. Accordingly, her argument does not negate Movant’s own interest. Movant,

therefore, satisfies the third factor.

Fourth, the Court finds Movant has met the minimal burden to show that existing parties

may not adequately represent his interests. The inadequate representation element is satisfied

where representation “may be” inadequate, and the burden “should be treated as minimal,” such

that intervention should be allowed unless it is clear the existing parties will provide adequate

representation. See Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1214; Huff, 743 F.3d at 800. Here, Applicant is Movant’s

adversary in the underlying Spanish divorce proceeding, and the Application targets non-parties

to the Spanish divorce proceeding whose incentives and defenses are not necessarily aligned with

Movant’s interests. Indeed, Respondents are parties with no liability or interest in the Spanish

proceeding. Applicant’s principal adequacy argument — that Movant’s long-term partner,

Havdiak, is already a Respondent and her interests “align” with Movant’s — does not eliminate

the risk of inadequate representation under the governing “minimal burden” standard. Even if

Havdiak shares a general preference to resist disclosure, her incentives and defenses as a subpoena

recipient may differ from Movant’s incentives and defenses as the asserted “target” of the

discovery. For example, Havdiak may focus on burden, privacy, or her own account records or

Movant’s accounts that affect her, while Movant may seek to litigate broader relevance, scope, or

limitations tied to his asserted interests against the other Respondents and accounts not linked,

controlled, or of interest to Havdiak. In other words, as in Huff, alignment on a broad “litigation

position” does not compel a finding of adequate representation where the intervenor’s interests

and practical stakes are different in kind and degree. See Huff, 743 F.3d at 800. Therefore, Movant

has satisfied the fourth requirement. For these reasons, and because Rule 24(a)’s requirements are

met, intervention as of right3 is warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion, ECF No.

[7], be GRANTED. If the District Judge adopts this Report and Recommendation, I further

3 Movant raises permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) for the first time in his Reply. The Court declines

to consider an argument presented belatedly in that manner. “Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of the Southern

District of Florida provides that a reply memorandum ‘shall be strictly limited to rebuttal of matters raised

in the memorandum in opposition without re-argument of matters covered in the movant's initial

memorandum of law.’” Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 145 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1181 (S.D. Fla. 2015),

aff'd, 839 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)). “Thus, ‘[a] reply memorandum may

not raise new arguments or evidence . . .’” See id. (quoting Baltzer v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 14–

CV-20140, 2014 WL 3845449, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2014)). In any event, the Court need not reach

permissive intervention because Movant satisfies Rule 24(a)(2) and is entitled to intervene as of right. The

Reply’s permissive intervention request does not alter the analysis supporting intervention as of right.

CASE NO. 25-CV-23858-MOORE/Elfenbein

recommend that Movant BE ORDERED to file his response to the Application no later than ten

(10) days from the order adopting it.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the Parties will have ten (10) days from the date

of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written

objections, if any, with the Honorable K. Michael Moore, United States District Judge. Failure to

timely file objections shall bar the Parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of

an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the Parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if

necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149

(1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on January 9, 2026.

MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ce: All counsel of record

1]