The opinion
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-68.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BROWN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2024-11-014
: OPINION AND
- vs - JUDGMENT ENTRY
: 1/12/2026
ERIC W. JONES, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CRI2023-2199
Zac Corbin, Brown County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary McMullen, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant.
____________
OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Eric Jones, appeals his conviction and sentence in the Brown
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County Court of Common Pleas for multiple sexual offenses. Upon review, we find that
two of Jones' convictions and sentences for kidnapping (Counts 5 and 9) must be vacated
due to violations of the rule prohibiting duplicity. One conviction and sentence for GSI
(Count 12) must be vacated due to insufficient evidence. Several other convictions
(Counts 2, 3, 7, 8, and 11) are supported by sufficient evidence, do not implicate concerns
of duplicity, and we therefore affirm. We affirm the trial court's judgment related to its
admission of victim-impact testimony and the introduction of evidence detailed in Jones'
third assignment of error. The record supports the trial court's findings related to imposing
consecutive sentences, and we affirm those findings. Two GSI convictions (Counts 6 and
10), which were previously merged with the now-vacated kidnapping counts (Counts 5
and 9), are no longer merged, and therefore Jones has not been sentenced for Counts 6
and 10.
{¶ 2} We vacate Jones' convictions for the kidnapping convictions for Counts 5
and 9, the GSI conviction for Count 12, and affirm the trial court's judgment in all other
respects. We remand the matter for resentencing consistent with this Opinion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} This case centers on the disclosure of sexual abuse involving three victims:
Alice, Beth, and Chloe.1 At the time of the offenses, Jones was a long-haul truck driver.
He typically traveled for work during the week and returned home on weekends. Jones
resided with his wife, Angela, who operated an in-home daycare from their residence, in
Brown County, Ohio.
{¶ 4} In 2022, Beth came forward with her account, prompting further inquiry and
1. We are using pseudonyms for the victims for the purposes of privacy and readability. State v. Kofron,
2024-Ohio-3233, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (12th Dist.). This opinion refers to "R.R." as Alice, "H.J." as Beth, and "H.S." as
Chloe.
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resulting in similar reports from Alice and Chloe. Following these disclosures, a Brown
County Grand Jury indicted Jones on 12 felony counts, including kidnapping, rape,
unlawful sexual contact with a minor, and gross sexual imposition ("GSI"). Jones entered
a plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The State alleged that Jones
abused Alice between 2000 and 2005 and abused Beth and Chloe between 2010 and
2018—all three girls would have been under the age of 13 when the alleged abuse took
place.
Alice
{¶ 5} Alice is Angela's younger sister, which makes Jones her brother-in-law.
There is a 14-year age gap between Alice and Angela, and as a result, Alice often viewed
her sister more as a mother-figure than a sibling. During her childhood, Alice frequently
visited Angela and Jones at their home. She recalled details about the house and her
interactions with neighborhood children. One of her memories included staying up late
and playing video games with Jones. However, she also remembered that Jones would
often ask her to rub his back—something that made her feel uncomfortable.
{¶ 6} As Alice got older, she noticed that Jones' behavior toward her became
more overtly sexual. She testified that the first incident of sexual abuse occurred one
evening while Angela was not home. Alice stated that she was in the bedroom shared by
Angela and Jones but could not remember how she got there. She testified "I just
remember being awake and him inserting his penis anally and me telling him it hurt. I
don't remember a lot afterwards or if he stopped right then and there. But I do remember
several times having to repeat myself like, 'This - - this hurts.'"
{¶ 7} Alice did not report the abuse immediately. However, around 2002 or 2003,
she confided in a friend, Courtney Scott, who reportedly shared the information with her
stepmother, Kristi Scott. At the time, Kristi was employed by the Brown County
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Department of Job and Family Services. Around this same period, Angela became aware
of the allegation and confronted Alice in the presence of Jones, Courtney, and Kristi.
During the confrontation, Alice recanted her allegation. Alice testified:
I did tell them that I was lying. And, what they didn't believe
me for I pushed and displaced blame to Courtney that she had
fabricated the rest. It was never revisited. Our families kind of
dropped it.
I do remember [Kristi] telling me, "Are you sure you're lying?"
That, "Due to my job, it's mandatory that I report this? I just
want to be certain." And I'm like, "Yes. Yes, I'm lying."
{¶ 8} After the initial disclosure, Alice stayed away from Angela and Jones for a
period of time. However, she eventually resumed visiting their home. During one of those
visits, Jones again sexually abused her. According to Alice:
We were in the living room. I don't know quite why I
cooperated. I didn't scream. I didn't kick. But, I was laying on
the floor in the living room over by what would have been the
end table. And, I remember [Jones] inserting his penis
vaginally, telling me he was going to take my virginity.
And, [afterwards] I remember him telling me I was going to
spot, which I did.
{¶ 9} Although Alice did not testify as to the specific dates that Jones inserted his
penis into her anus and vagina, she did testify that both incidents occurred before she
started her period, which occurred when she was around 13.
Beth
{¶ 10} Beth is the adopted daughter of Jones and Angela. She described having a
generally positive relationship with Jones and recalled how they would spend time
together building things, like wooden knives. However, she also remembered instances
when Jones behaved in ways that she recognized as inappropriate.
{¶ 11} Beth explained that Jones would take her into his bedroom and rub ointment
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on her vagina with his finger. Beth testified:
Q. When - - when he would take you to the bedroom, where -
- where would this happen, inside the bedroom?
A. On the bed.
Q. Do you know where your mom would be, at tho - - those
times?
A. No.
Q. Was she out of the house or in the house?
A. I think she was out.
Q. Okay. What would happen when he would put you on your
bed, would you - - do you remember? Did you have clothes
on?
A. I didn't have pants.
Q. Okay. How did your pants come off?
A. He would tell me to take 'em off.
...
Q. Okay. And when you would - - would - - when you would
take them off, what would he do?
A. He would rub the ointment.
Q. On your vagina?
A. Yeah.
Q. What part of his body would he use to do that?
A. His finger.
Q. Would he say anything to you about why he was doing
that?
A. He said I had a rash.
Q. Do you remember having a rash?
A. No.
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When asked how many times this abuse occurred, Beth stated that it occurred "multiple
times."
Q. When you say, "multiple," or, can you give me an idea? Are
we talking clearly more than two?
A. Yeah.
Q. More than five?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Would there be any - - would each time that that
happened, was it with the ointment or the cream?
A. Yeah.
Q. And so when you say, "more than two," you're saying at
least three?
A. Yeah.
Beth testified that she was also abused by Jones in a different way.
Q. Was there ever a time that something other than that [the
ointment] happened with him that you know was - - was
wrong?
A. Yeah.
Q. All right. Can you tell the Jury about that?
A. He rubbed himself on me.
Q. Okay. Where did that happen?
A. In the bed.
Q. How did you get to the bedroom; do you recall?
A. I don't know.
Q. It was his bed?
A. Yeah.
Q. How would you be positioned in the bed?
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A. I would be on my side.
Q. And how would he be? And we're talking about the
Defendant, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. How would he be positioned?
A. Behind me.
Q. Would - - would you have clothing on?
A. Yeah, my pants were pulled down.
...
Q. Did you have underwear on?
A. I think he pulled those down, too.
Q. And then what would he do after pulling down your pants
and underwear?
A. He would grab himself.
Q. What part of his body?
A. His penis.
Q. Would touch you where?
A. On my butt.
Q. Now, [Beth], I - - I know this is hard to talk about, but when
he would - - let's go back to - - when he would rub the ointment
on you, did his hand, his fingers, did they rub the outside of
your vagina or the inside?
A. Outside.
Q. But, bare skin to skin?
A. Yeah.
Q. And when he - - the - - the second incident you described
where he would lay behind you and his penis would touch your
butt, would his penis penetrate or just touch your butt?
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A. Just touch.
Q. How - - how - - how off - - how often did that happen, the
second incident?
A. Multiple, I don't know how many.
Q. So both these different types of things happened more than
once?
A. Yeah.
{¶ 12} Beth testified that she was "younger" when these incidents occurred and
remembers she was wearing blue kiddie PJs. She also testified that these incidents
occurred when they lived in the house on Fairground Drive and after Jones was injured
in 2016, when she was ten.
Chloe
{¶ 13} Chloe was one of the children enrolled in Angela's in-home daycare. She
also recalled instances where she was alone with Jones and felt pressured to do things
against her will. Chloe testified that these incidents began when she was about nine and
continued for a couple of years, but that they all occurred when she was under thirteen.
During her testimony, Chloe described a typical incident where Jones would isolate her
in his truck to facilitate the abuse:
Q. How would he get you to the semi?
A. Some of it, I don't remember. I feel like sometimes he took
me. Like, I was inside. I loved to clean, when I was little. And
he would tell me, "Let's go clean my semi." And then he would
take me in there. And, that's when everything would start
happening.
Chloe then explained what Jones would do:
A. He would - - he would si - - lay down on the back. There
was, like, when you walk in the back, there was beds back
there. And he would lay down. And he had, like, a hernia on
his belly button, or something like that, and he would take my
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hand and make me rub it. And then take my hand and make
it go down to his penis.
...
Q. Do you re - - do you remember how his pants would - -
would come down or how he would get his penis out of his
pants?
A. He unzipped it, and he would - - he unbuttoned it and
unzipped it. And he, like, put it down.
Q. What would he have you do, with his penis?
A. He would take his hand from his belly button and go down
and make me basically jack him off.
...
Q. Would he have an erection, when that would happen?
A. Yes, sir.
Though Chloe testified that the abuse occurred on more than one occasion, she was
unclear about the number of times it happened:
Q. [Chloe], how many times - - if you have any idea, how many
times did you go inside the Defendant's truck?
A. I'm not sure on the exact time, but I know it was at least
three different times, a handful of times.
Q. Okay. Would - - would the same thing happen each time?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So each time that - - that you went into that truck, he
would have you touch his penis?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The same way, as what you just described?
A. Yes, sir.
Chloe also recalled one specific incident when someone nearly caught them. In response,
Jones sprayed her hands with Windex to make it appear as though she had simply been
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cleaning.
Guilty Findings and Sentencing
{¶ 14} The State charged Jones with one count of kidnapping for each victim. In
addition, Jones faced two counts of rape (one vaginal and one anal) and one count of
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor involving Alice. The State charged him with three
counts of GSI involving Beth, and three counts of GSI involving Chloe. Although Jones
requested a bill of particulars, the State did not provide one.
{¶ 15} During the trial, the State called the three victims to testify, along with
medical and law enforcement personnel. Additional witnesses included Beth's sister,
Sarah, and their mother, Angela, both of whom provided background testimony. As
pertinent to a later assignment of error, the State asked the victims, along with Sarah and
Angela, to describe how the abuse allegations affected their family. Sarah testified that
the situation had "devastated" the family, and Angela described the experience as a
"nightmare." The victims offered similar descriptions of its impact.
{¶ 16} In his defense, Jones called "Chuck," a witness identified by Alice being
awake and in the same room with Jones and her when Jones vaginally raped her. Chuck,
however, denied witnessing any such conduct. Jones also called Kristi Scott, the
stepmother of Courtney Scott, who was an employee of the Brown County Department
of Job and Family Services. Kristi testified that she had never been informed of any abuse
involving Alice and stated that, had she been, she would have reported it in accordance
with her duties as a mandatory reporter of child sexual abuse.
{¶ 17} In its closing argument, the State asserted that the kidnapping charges were
connected to the incidents of sexual abuse. The State argued that multiple alleged
instances of abuse could independently support the kidnapping charges.
{¶ 18} During deliberations, the jury sought clarification regarding the charges
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related to Chloe, specifically asking whether the three counts of GSI pertained to separate
incidents. The trial court responded that this was a factual determination for the jury to
make based on the evidence presented during trial.
{¶ 19} Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Jones guilty on
all counts. At sentencing, the trial court merged several related charges and imposed an
aggregate prison term of 57 years to life. The table below summarizes the merged counts
and the corresponding sentences imposed by the court:
Count Victim Charge Sentence
1 Alice Kidnapping Merged with Count 2
2 Alice Rape Life with eligibility for parole after 10
(Anal intercourse) years
3 Alice Rape 5 years; consecutive to Count 2
(Vaginal intercourse)
4 Alice Unlawful Sexual Merged with Count 3
conduct with a minor
5 Chloe Kidnapping 15 years to life; consecutive to Counts 2
and 3
6 Chloe Gross sexual Merged with Count 5
imposition
(causing Chloe to touch
Jones' penis in the
truck)
7 Chloe Gross sexual 36 months; consecutive to Counts 2, 3,
imposition and 5
(causing Chloe to touch
Jones' penis in the
truck)
8 Chloe Gross sexual 36 months; consecutive to Counts 2, 3, 5,
imposition and 7
(causing Chloe to touch
Jones' penis in the
truck)
9 Beth Kidnapping 15 years to life; consecutive to Counts 2,
3, 5, 7, and 8
10 Beth Gross sexual Merged with Count 9
imposition
(Jones touching his
penis to Beth' buttocks)
11 Beth Gross sexual 36 months; consecutive to Counts 2, 3, 5,
imposition 7, 8, and 9
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(touching Beth's vagina
with ointment)
12 Beth Gross sexual 36 months; consecutive to Counts 2, 3, 5,
imposition 7, 8, 9, and 11
(touching Beth's vagina
with ointment)
{¶ 20} Jones now appeals his conviction and sentence, raising four assignments
of error for review.
II. Appeal
A. Merger and Lack of Final Appealable Order
{¶ 21} Both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution protect
criminal defendants from double jeopardy, and Ohio codified this constitutional protection.
See U.S. Const., amend. V, XIV; Ohio Const., art. I, § 10; R.C. 2941.25. Protection from
double jeopardy means that a criminal defendant may not be prosecuted for the same
offense after either acquittal or conviction, but it also means that a criminal defendant may
not receive multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶
10. If a defendant is charged with two or more counts of allied offenses of similar import,
based on the same conduct by the defendant, the defendant may be convicted of only
one of the counts. R.C. 2941.25(A).
{¶ 22} When a defendant has been found guilty on multiple counts, the court must
"merge" any allied offenses of similar import. The prosecution elects which offense it
wishes to pursue for sentencing, and the trial court sentences the defendant on that
elected offense. See State v. Sperry, 2025-Ohio-2626, ¶ 39 (12th Dist.). A "conviction
consists of a guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty." (Emphasis in
Original; Cleaned up.) State v. Whitfield, 2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 12. Merger impacts our
jurisdiction to review counts on appeal—this court only has the jurisdiction to review
counts that include both a guilty verdict and a sentence. Sperry at ¶ 39. "Absent the
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imposition of sentence on each and every offense for which a defendant was convicted,
there is no final appealable order." State v. Cottrell, 2023-Ohio-3932, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.)
(collecting cases); Crim.R. 32(C) ("A judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of
conviction and the sentence.") (Emphasis added.). Therefore, when one count is merged
into another, this court lacks the authority to review the unsentenced count for any
sufficiency or weight of the evidence argument. Sperry at ¶ 39.
{¶ 23} The jury found Jones guilty for one count of kidnapping related to Alice, but
the trial court did not sentence Jones for this offense because it merged with the anal
rape count for purposes of sentencing. The jury found Jones guilty of three counts of GSI
involving Beth and three involving Chloe. But the trial court did not sentence Jones for the
GSI conviction for Count 6 related to Chloe and the GSI conviction for Count 10, which
involved Jones touching his penis to Beth's buttocks. The trial court merged these GSI
convictions with the related kidnapping charges. The State elected to proceed on the
kidnapping offenses, and the trial court only sentenced Jones for the kidnapping offenses
for Beth and Chloe.
{¶ 24} Because the trial court imposed no sentence on the merged kidnapping
count involving Alice and the merged GSI counts involving Chloe and Beth, no final,
appealable orders exist for those convictions, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review
arguments related to those counts. Our lack of jurisdiction impacts several assignments
of error Jones asserts and will be noted where appropriate.
B. Kidnapping Convictions and Duplicity
{¶ 25} In his first assignment of error, Jones argues that his kidnapping convictions
were duplicitous and violated multiple constitutional and procedural protections.
Specifically, he contends that the charges contravened Criminal Rule 8(A), his right to be
indicted by a grand jury under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, his right to
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receive adequate notice of the charges under both Article I, Section 10 and the Sixth
Amendment, his right to a unanimous jury verdict, and his protection against double
jeopardy.
Standard of Review
{¶ 26} Before addressing the merits, we note that Jones argues the trial court erred
as a matter of law in permitting the duplicitous kidnapping charges to be prosecuted, so
a de novo standard of review should apply. State v. Faggs, 2020-Ohio-523, ¶ 13. The
State, on the other hand, contends that Jones failed to object to this issue at trial and
therefore waived all but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Warnock, 2024-Ohio-382, ¶
32 (12th Dist.). We agree de novo review should apply here.
{¶ 27} The State brought this case against Jones based on a short-form
indictment. Jones moved for a bill of particulars, which the State did not provide. "A bill of
particulars has a limited purpose to elucidate the conduct of the defendant alleged to
constitute the charged offense." State v. Fairbanks, 2007-Ohio-4117, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.).
From this, we can understand that the question of what conduct related to the charged
offenses was at issue in the earliest stage of this case.2
{¶ 28} During the State's opening and closing arguments, the State asserted that
Jones restrained the victims' liberty without specifying which underlying count of GSI it
related to. Trial counsel raised this issue at Jones' motion for acquittal hearing and again
during the arguments regarding merger. Specifically, trial counsel asserted that the
State's approach to proving kidnapping was flawed, stating "[i]f we were to follow the
State's logic on that, regarding the kidnapping, then I guess every Rape is a Kidnapping
2. While the request for a bill of particulars is persuasive in considering the context of the case, Jones
asserts no error regarding this request, and we do not base our decision on the standard of review on this
issue.
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. . . that appears to be what they're saying." Although counsel could have articulated the
issue more clearly as to each alleged victim, we conclude the same issue applied to the
charges for Alice, Beth, and Chloe. Trial counsel sufficiently preserved the question, and
we will therefore apply a de novo standard of review. See Fairbanks at ¶ 22.
Duplicity
{¶ 29} The prohibition against duplicity serves two key purposes: it protects an
accused's Sixth Amendment right to receive notice of the nature of the charge and
prevents confusion regarding the basis for the verdict. State v. Fisher, 2022-Ohio-1363,
¶ 19 (12th Dist.). Although most courts addressing this issue treat the concept as a single
doctrine, duplicity manifests in two distinct forms: (1) duplicity in the indictment, and (2)
duplicity in the charge. State v. Blankenburg, 2012-Ohio-1289, ¶ 130 (12th Dist.)
(Ringland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{¶ 30} Duplicity in the indictment, the more common form, occurs when two or
more distinct offenses are alleged in a single count. Id.; State v. Bowling, 2015-Ohio-360,
¶ 18, fn. 2 (12th Dist.). The Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit this type of duplicity.
Crim.R. 8(A). This form of duplicity can be remedied with a motion to sever or a request
for separate trials upon a showing of prejudice. State v. Moshos, 2010-Ohio-735, ¶ 75 -
89 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 31} Duplicity in the charge, by contrast, arises when an indictment alleges only
one criminal act, but the State introduces evidence of multiple incidents at trial to prove
that single charged offense. Blankenburg at ¶ 132. Jones' assignment of error concerns
duplicity in the charge and, specifically, whether the jury's verdict was unanimous with
respect to the kidnapping convictions. Jones argues that the State presented multiple
acts to establish a single count of kidnapping for each victim.
{¶ 32} Ohio law regarding duplicity in the charge questions remains largely
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unresolved. Given the lack of legal clarity surrounding duplicity in the charge, this court
looks to the analysis in a case in which the Supreme Court was not addressing duplicity
directly, but in a closely related issue. That is, whether jury unanimity is required in
"multiple acts" cases—a theory similar to that of duplicity in the charge. Blankenburg at ¶
139, citing State v. Gardner, 2008-Ohio-2787. In Gardner, the Court explained that if a
single offense can be committed in more than one way, the jury must unanimously agree
on the defendant's guilt, but it does not have to unanimously agree on the means the
defendant used to commit the crime if substantial evidence supports each of the
"alternative means." Id. at ¶ 49. However, the same is not true if the State alleges the
defendant engaged in differing acts, any one of which could constitute the crime charged.
Id. at ¶ 50. In that type of "multiple acts" case, the State must elect the particular act it will
rely on for conviction, because the jury must be unanimous that the State proved the
defendant committed that particular underlying act beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Beth and Chloe
{¶ 33} After merger, this court only has jurisdiction to consider duplicity as it relates
to Jones' kidnapping convictions involving Beth and Chloe.3 The State alleged that Jones
sexually abused Beth on three occasions: once by placing his penis on her buttocks
(Count 10)4 and twice by rubbing ointment on her vagina (Counts 11 and 12). The State
alleged that Jones sexually abused Chloe three times by having her masturbate him in
his truck (Counts 6, 7, and 8). Specifically, the State indicted Jones for kidnapping Chloe
3. Jones’ kidnapping conviction for Alice merged with one of his convictions for rape, and the state elected
to proceed on the rape charge. The trial court never sentenced Jones for kidnapping related to Alice, and
that conviction is not subject to a final appealable order. Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to consider
Jones’ arguments related to it. See Sperry, 2025-Ohio-2626, at ¶ 39.
4. Count 10, the GSI related to Jones placing his penis on Beth’s buttocks merged into the kidnapping
conviction for Count 9. As such, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider Count 10 (and Jones did
not challenge his conviction for Count 10), but we include this description for context relevant to the duplicity
argument.
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and Beth (Counts 5 and 9, respectively) pursuant to R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) (prohibiting, as
relevant here, moving a person or restraining the liberty of a person under the age of 13
for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity against the victim's will). The State indicted
Jones for GSI against Chloe and Beth pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) (prohibiting sexual
contact with a person under the age of 13). The trial court merged Count 10 (GSI) related
to Beth into Count 9 (Kidnapping) and Count 6 (GSI) related to Chloe into Count 5
(Kidnapping) and sentenced Jones for each of these kidnapping charges. Although the
record reflects that Jones filed a request for a bill of particulars, the State did not provide
one.
{¶ 34} During its closing argument, the State argued that Jones committed
kidnapping each time the alleged incidents of sexual abuse occurred. With respect to
Count 5, involving Chloe, the prosecutor stated "Count Five is another kidnapping. This
one with respect to [Chloe]. Same definitions apply for that kidnapping. That's - - that's
for taking her to that truck where he would sexually assault her." Regarding Count 9,
involving Beth, the prosecutor stated that "rubbing . . . a child's vagina . . . that's restraint
of that child's liberty for a period of time." Jones argues that this amounts to duplicity
because the State presented [as relevant here, six] possible acts for the [two] kidnapping
counts.5
{¶ 35} The State maintains duplicity does not apply to Jones' kidnapping
convictions because it could have charged Jones with a separate count of kidnapping
corresponding to each sex offense and that its decision to charge only one count per
victim ultimately benefitted Jones. This argument amounts to "no harm, no foul." We
5. Jones argues the State alleged there were eight possible Kidnapping offenses for the three Kidnapping
counts, but as noted, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider arguments related to Alice's
Kidnapping, due to merger and the resulting lack of a final appealable order for that count.
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disagree.
{¶ 36} The State's contention ignores the issue presented by Jones and relies on
speculation as to how a jury might have reached its decision under different charging
circumstances. The relevant issue is not whether a jury would have found Jones guilty of
additional offenses, but whether the State improperly presented multiple acts in support
of a single charged offense. In such a case, the State must either "elect the particular act
upon which it relies for a conviction, or the trial court must instruct the jury that it must
unanimously agree on the same underlying criminal act proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." Gardner, 2008-Ohio-2787, at ¶ 50. Here, the State did neither, so there is no way
to verify the jury unanimously agreed that the State proved the defendant committed a
single, particular act of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶ 37} We agree the kidnapping counts related to Beth and Chloe suffered from
duplicity in the charge because the State did not prove Jones committed a particularized
act of kidnapping sufficient to verify jury unanimity. But the State argues any duplicity in
the charge problem should be excused.
State's Alternative Justifications for Duplicity—Course of Conduct and Extending Logan
{¶ 38} The State appears to assert two additional justifications to excuse charging
Jones with one kidnapping offense for multiple acts it alleged could support Jones'
conviction. First, it urges this court to excuse any alleged duplicity in the charge because
the kidnapping related to a course of conduct of GSI with victims who were children.
Second, it asks this court to find kidnapping "incidental" to each charge of GSI, by
expanding the reasoning found in State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 130 (1979). We
decline to permit either justification in this case because of significant evidentiary
concerns or sentencing consequences downstream from those evidentiary concerns.
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Course of Conduct
{¶ 39} The State argues the kidnapping charged here was for the purposes of
engaging in sexual activity and with a sexual motivation, and "Ohio courts have permitted
course-of-conduct prosecutions in cases involving multiple acts of sexual abuse
perpetuated against child victims." Blankenburg, 2012-Ohio-1289, at ¶ 20.
{¶ 40} This court does recognize that a victim of continual sexual abuse may not
have a distinct memory of details associated with numerous occasions of such abuse.
State v. Workman, 2017-Ohio-8638, ¶ 46 (12th Dist.). Therefore, "it is within the confines
of due process to permit the state to charge the accused with at least one criminal offense
for a specific time period." Id. But a kidnapping charge that is incidental to an underlying
GSI, without providing more than general, ambiguous claims of the facts supporting the
kidnapping, does not avoid such due process concerns. A kidnapping course of conduct
charge defeats the jury's ability to determine whether the State met its burden to prove
kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt because of unavoidable evidentiary issues.
{¶ 41} Our review of the record here makes the problems inherent in considering
a kidnapping incidental to an underlying GSI as a "course of conduct" offense obvious.
The indictments listed the identical time frames for each offense, the State failed to
respond to Jones' request for a bill of particulars, and at trial, the State argued that multiple
acts could support each kidnapping charge involving Beth and Chloe, with very little
evidentiary detail. Beth testified that the incidents of GSI generally happened in Jones'
bedroom, but she testified she could not remember how she came to be in his bedroom.
The State, in its closing argument, asserted that rubbing ointment on Beth's vagina was
"a restraint of that child's liberty for a period of time." Closing arguments are not evidence,
so the prosecutor's statements regarding Jones' restraint of Beth cannot support the
kidnapping charge. State v. Frazier, 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 338 (1995). Chloe testified that
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Jones took her to her truck under the guise of cleaning it, for the purpose of sexually
abusing her. While the victims' testimony regarding the facts supporting kidnapping was
non-specific, the same cannot be said for the testimony regarding the GSI charges.
{¶ 42} The State elicited testimony which provided specific evidence related to
Jones' conduct that it argued supported the GSI charges (rubbing ointment, touching
penis to buttocks, compelling masturbation), other situational details (in the bedroom, in
the truck, arrival of other child, applying Windex), as well as evidence supporting the
relevant time periods sufficient to establish the alleged victims were under the age of 13.
This type of evidence can support at least one course of conduct GSI charge because
the State tied it to repeated instances of child sexual abuse, supported by enough detail
and within a defined time period. Workman, 2017-Ohio-8638, at ¶ 46.
{¶ 43} While this court does not require the same sort of specificity of evidence for
course of conduct childhood sexual abuse charges as it does for other criminal charges,
it does require more than "general, ambiguous" claims related to the conduct alleged.
Workman at ¶ 49. The State did not provide this type of specific evidence to support a
course of conduct kidnapping charge alleged to be merely "incidental" to the underlying
alleged GSI. Instead, it supported only the type of "general, ambiguous" evidence
distinguished in Workman.
{¶ 44} In addition to these evidentiary issues, expanding the holding in Logan
leads to sentencing consequences downstream from those evidentiary concerns.
Expanding Logan
{¶ 45} The Supreme Court of Ohio found that "implicit within every forcible rape . .
. is a kidnapping," State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 130 (1979). The State urges this
court to extend Logan to instances where the underlying charge is not forcible rape, but
GSI with a victim under 13 (which does not require proof of force).
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{¶ 46} The State's argument that we should find the kidnapping "implicit" to GSI in
the same way the Logan court found it "implicit" to forcible rape ignores the problem
created by the required merger of the two offenses. Logan's central question involved
whether forcible rape and kidnapping were allied offenses of similar import, requiring
merger under R.C. 2941.25. The Logan court found when the "restraint or movement of
the victim is merely incidental" to the separate, underlying crime of forcible rape, a
separate conviction for kidnapping could not be justified. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 135.
Therefore, the court held the trial court must merge such a kidnapping offense into the
rape offense before sentencing. Id.
{¶ 47} When a defendant is found guilty of two allied offenses, the court "must
accept the state's choice [of which offense to sentence] and merge the crimes into a single
conviction for sentencing." State v. Whitfield, 2010-Ohio-2, ¶ 24, citing State v. Brown,
2008-Ohio-4569, ¶ 41. It strains credulity to imagine the State choosing to proceed to
sentencing for the crime which carries the lesser penalty.
{¶ 48} Under Logan, a defendant will receive a sentence for committing forcible
rape, for which the State provided evidence sufficient to meet its burden of proof. While
the defendant may be found guilty of the "incidental" kidnapping, he receives no sentence
for that crime because the crimes are merged under the law. But when an "incidental"
kidnapping merges with GSI, the State will elect to proceed to sentencing on the
kidnapping offense and the opposite result occurs. A defendant will receive a sentence
for the "incidental" crime of kidnapping, but will not be sentenced for the GSI, even though
that is the crime for which the State offered most, if not all, of its specific evidence. That
is exactly what happened to Jones—the State provided evidence proving the specific
elements of GSI, and the jury convicted him based on that proof. Yet, he received the
greater punishment for the "incidental" kidnapping, for which the State did not offer the
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type of specific evidentiary support required even for course of conduct sexual abuse
crimes.
{¶ 49} Neither the course of conduct or expansion of Logan urged by the State
address the fundamental problem of duplicity here, and both proposed justifications
present significant evidentiary or sentencing concerns. Given these deficiencies, we
agree that the kidnapping charges involving Beth and Chloe were duplicitous. We vacate
Jones' kidnapping convictions in Counts 5 and 9. Since the kidnapping conviction related
to Alice (Count 1) merged into one of the rape convictions (Count 2), this court has no
jurisdiction to review that conviction for duplicity. Therefore, we sustain Jones' first
assignment of error in part and find we do not have jurisdiction to consider it in part.
C. Specificity and Sufficiency of the GSI Convictions
{¶ 50} In his second assignment of error, Jones challenges five of the six GSI
convictions—two involving Beth and all three involving Chloe—as being contrary to law.
He contends that the State failed to identify distinct incidents of abuse either in the
indictment or through its presentation at trial. Although Jones references due process,
double jeopardy, and notice concerns, the core of his argument is that the convictions are
not supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶ 51} In support, Jones relies on Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir.2005),
and State v. Hemphill, 2005-Ohio-3726 (8th Dist.).
Valentine and Hemphill
{¶ 52} In Valentine, the defendant was charged with 20 counts of child rape and
20 counts of felonious penetration, all allegedly occurring over a 10-month period.
Valentine at 629. The indictment used identical statutory language for each count, and
the bill of particulars merely stated that the offenses occurred in the defendant's home.
Id. at 634. The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief, finding that the indictment and trial
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evidence failed to establish the factual basis for 40 distinct incidents. Id. at 632. The only
evidence regarding the number of encounters came from the victim, who described a
typical abusive episode and estimated how often it occurred. Id. at 632-633. The court
found that "[g]iven the way that Valentine was indicted and tried, it would have been
incredibly difficult for the jury to consider each count on its own." Id. at 633.
{¶ 53} In Hemphill, the defendant was convicted of 22 counts each of rape and
gross sexual imposition with sexually violent predator specifications, 7 counts of rape
without specifications, and 22 counts of kidnapping with sexual motivation specifications.
Hemphill at ¶ 49. Relying on Valentine, the Eighth District Court of Appeals held that the
State failed to adequately differentiate the counts and, with few exceptions, did not
present individualized proof for each charge. Id. at ¶ 88, ¶ 112. The court found that the
majority of the charges were based on a "numerical estimate unconnected to individual,
distinguishable events." Id. at ¶ 88.
{¶ 54} We disagree that Valentine or Hemphill is dispositive authority for Jones. In
fact, this court, along with other Ohio districts, has frequently distinguished Valentine and
Hemphill, or highlighted contrasts between the ambiguous testimony in those cases and
the more detailed accounts presented in others. See State v. Morgan, 2010-Ohio-1720,
¶ 24 (12th Dist.) (victim provided context for the repeated instances of sexual abuse by
referencing her age, school year, and homes in which she resided); State v. Stanforth,
2017-Ohio-4040, ¶ 43 (12th Dist.) (noting that, unlike Valentine and Hemphill, the State
presented evidence linked to each count, enabling the jury to evaluate each charge
independently); State v. Scott, 2011-Ohio-6534, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.) (distinguishing Hemphill
because the victim offered specific and unambiguous testimony regarding the abuse);
State v. Palmer, 2021-Ohio-4639, ¶ 24 (7th Dist.) ("As appellant acknowledges, we are
not bound by Valentine and do not follow Valentine.").
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{¶ 55} Moreover, this court had held that even general testimony may suffice to
support a conviction when abuse spans multiple years. In Workman, this court stated,
"[w]hen the state is faced with a victim of continual sexual abuse who does not have a
distinct memory of details associated with numerous occasions, it is within the confines
of due process to permit the state to charge the accused with at least one criminal offense
for a specific time period." Workman, 2017-Ohio-8638, at ¶ 46. The victim in Workman
described repeated instances of abuse in relation to specific time frames, homes she lived
in, and locations where the abuse occurred. Thus, although the testimony was more
general in nature, it was more than the "general, ambiguous" claims of abuse present in
Hemphill and therefore was sufficient to support the convictions. Id. at ¶ 49. See
Blankenburg, 2012-Ohio-1289, at ¶ 28 (no error where the counts were differentiated by
the type of offense alleged and the time period).
{¶ 56} The State must be able to meet its burden of proof for each count charged.
With victims who were children when continuous sexual abuse allegedly occurred,
sufficient evidence of numerous occasions of such abuse within a specified time period
can support at least one criminal offense. But if more than one criminal offense is charged
for actions the defendant allegedly committed against a child victim, the State must
provide sufficient, differentiated evidence to prove each separate offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶ 57} "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction, an
appellate court examines the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed,
would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Madden, 2024-Ohio-2851, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Paul, 2012-Ohio-3205,
¶ 9 (12th Dist.). Therefore, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in
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a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61
Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 58} In this case, Beth and Chloe testified that Jones engaged in sexual contact
with them when they were under 13 years old.6 Based on the evidence presented, the
jury convicted Jones for three counts of GSI involving Beth and three counts involving
Chloe. Because this court vacated the kidnapping counts related to Beth and Chloe due
to duplicity, the trial court has not sentenced Jones for the previously merged GSI
convictions and there is no final and appealable order subject to our review for those
convictions (Counts 6 and 10).
Beth
{¶ 59} Beth testified to experiencing two distinct forms of abuse. In the first, Jones
applied ointment to her vagina while they were in his bedroom. In the second, Jones
pulled down both his and her underwear and touched his penis to her buttocks.7 However,
apart from the foregoing, no additional evidence was presented regarding specific
incidents of abuse. Beth explained that Jones would take her into his bedroom when her
mom was out of the house, tell her to take off her pants, and then would rub ointment on
her vagina with his finger because he said she "had a rash." Beth testified she did not
remember having a rash on her vagina during the relevant time period, and no medical
evidence substantiated Beth was treated for a vaginal rash during this time period. When
6. We do not list the elements of the offense here, as Jones presents a limited argument focused on the
differentiation of the offenses. However, GSI is defined under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), which prohibits sexual
contact with a person under the age of 13. The term "sexual contact" is separately defined in R.C.
2907.01(B) to include any touching of the genitals, buttocks, or pubic region.
7. For purposes of resolving this assignment of error, we note that, with respect to Beth, Jones only
challenges Counts 11 and 12, which relates to allegations that he touched her vagina with his hand. Since
this court has no jurisdiction to decide sufficiency related to touching his penis to her buttocks (Count 10)
due to merger, we would not analyze a sufficiency claim for that count even if Jones had raised it.
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asked how many times, this abuse occurred, Beth stated that it occurred "multiple times,"
which she agreed meant "at least three" times.
Chloe
{¶ 60} Chloe also testified about the abuse she suffered. She explained that, as a
child, she enjoyed cleaning, and Jones exploited this by luring her out to his truck under
the pretense of helping. Once inside the truck, Chloe stated that Jones would lay back
and have her rub his erect penis. Chloe confirmed this happened "at least three different
times." Unlike Beth, Chloe testified that she experienced only one form of abuse. i.e.,
Jones having her touch his penis. However, Chloe recalled that one time someone else
nearly caught them and Jones sprayed Windex on her hands so they would smell as
though she had simply been cleaning.
Analysis
{¶ 61} Upon reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
including the testimony and evidence detailed in the factual background section of this
opinion, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of GSI proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to three counts: one involving Beth and two
involving Chloe.
{¶ 62} Regarding Beth, the jury convicted Jones for two reviewable counts of GSI,
which correspond to her testimony describing the abuse where Jones applied ointment
to her vagina when she was under the age of 13 (Counts 11 and 12). The State only
provided sufficient evidentiary support for one count. See Hemphill, 2005-Ohio-3726, at
¶ 88; Rodriguez, 2025-Ohio-53, at ¶ 46. The State's attempt to charge two counts of GSI
appears to rest solely on Beth's general statement that Jones rubbed ointment on her
vagina "multiple" times, and her agreement that this meant "at least three" times. The
second GSI conviction is not anchored in specific testimony or undifferentiated,
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contextualized details. Morgan, 2010-Ohio-1720, at ¶ 24 (12th Dist.); Stanforth, 2017-
Ohio-4040, at ¶ 43 (12th Dist.). Moreover, unlike in Workman, where the State
distinguished offenses by year, the prosecution made no such effort in the present case.
Workman, 2017-Ohio-8638, at ¶ 46 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 63} When the victim was a child and evidence establishes the relevant time
frame, evidence regarding multiple, undifferentiated incidents of abuse can support one
count of the same offense. Blankenburg, 2012-Ohio-1289, at ¶ 28-31. But here, the State
tries the opposite. It argues evidence of multiple incidents of abuse, undifferentiated by
time, place, or other contextual details can support multiple counts of the same offense.
Not so. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have only found the essential elements of GSI proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, as it relates to one count of Jones rubbing ointment on Beth's vagina.
Therefore, we find sufficient evidence supported the GSI conviction for Count 11, but we
vacate Jones' conviction for Count 12 due to insufficient evidence. The multiple counts of
GSI related to Chloe fare better.
{¶ 64} Chloe testified that Jones abused her by having her touch his erect penis in
his semitruck, stating this occurred "at least three different times" and included enough
detail about the time period to establish she was under the age of 13. Pursuant to
Workman and Blankenburg, this evidence supports one count of GSI related to multiple,
undifferentiated incidents. In addition, she provided a specific detail which differentiated
one incident from the others—when someone nearly discovered them in Jones' truck,
prompting Jones to spray her hands with Windex. Therefore, in viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find sufficient evidence to support the two,
reviewable GSI convictions—Counts 7 and 8—related to Chloe: one for the multiple,
undifferentiated incidents and one for the Windex incident.
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{¶ 65} The State provided sufficient evidence to support Jones' conviction for one
count of GSI involving Beth and two counts of GSI involving Chloe. We vacate one GSI
conviction related to Beth (Count 12) and affirm two GSI convictions related to Chloe
(Counts 7 and 8). Therefore, we sustain Jones' second assignment of error in part and
overrule it in part.
D. Admission of Unduly Prejudicial Evidence
{¶ 66} In his third assignment of error, Jones contends that the State elicited
improper victim-impact testimony and introduced irrelevant and unduly prejudicial
evidence. He concedes that no objection was raised at trial; therefore, this court's review
is governed by the plain-error standard.
{¶ 67} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Plain
error exists where there is an obvious deviation from a legal rule that affected the
defendant's substantial rights by influencing the outcome of the proceedings. State v.
Myers, 2020-Ohio-59, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.). "Plain error does not exist unless it can be said
that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would clearly have been otherwise." Id.
Notice of plain error is taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances,
and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Harner, 2020-Ohio-1184, ¶
31 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 68} Victim-impact evidence that relates solely to a victim's personal
characteristics or the emotional effect on the victim's family is generally inadmissible at
trial. State v. Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 126. While such evidence may be admissible if
it pertains to facts surrounding the offense, trial courts typically exclude it when it is
irrelevant to the determination of guilt and serves primarily to inflame the jury's emotions.
Id., citing State v. Fautenberry, 1995-Ohio-209, ¶ 17; State v. Priest, 2007-Ohio-5958, ¶
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41 (8th Dist.). Nevertheless, victims may testify about how the crime affected their lives
when those circumstances are relevant to understanding the offense as a whole. Priest
at ¶ 41, citing State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4164, ¶ 43.
{¶ 69} Several nonexclusive factors determine whether victim-impact evidence is
too prejudicial to be admissible: (1) the length of the testimony, (2) whether there were
visible emotional reactions, (3) whether the victim-impact witness used emotionally
charged language, and (4) the number of victim-impact witnesses. State v. Graham,
2020-Ohio-6700, ¶ 126.
{¶ 70} Jones argues that the State improperly elicited victim-impact testimony from
several witnesses during trial. Specifically, he challenges the testimony of Beth's sister,
Sarah, and their mother, Angela, who were asked about the impact the abuse had on the
family. Sarah testified that the situation had "devastated" the family, while Angela
described the ordeal as a "nightmare." The State posed similar questions to the victims.
Beth responded that the experience was "not good." Alice testified that the abuse had
caused intimacy issues with her husband, and Chloe described a lingering fear of rest
stops and semi-trucks. Jones further asserts that the State introduced further improper
character evidence through testimony suggesting he was a poor father, viewed
pornography, and lacked character.8
{¶ 71} Following review, we find Jones' arguments to be without merit. In this case,
Jones' defense theory was that he was innocent and that the victims fabricated the
8. Jones also offers a cursory, one-sentence argument in this assignment of error, asserting that the jury
heard improper evidence and argument regarding the kidnapping charge involving Alice. He claims that the
statute of limitations began to run before Alice reached the age of majority, alleging that Kristi Scott—
Courtney's stepmother and an employee of a children's services agency—had been informed of the abuse.
However, this argument is undeveloped. App.R. 16(A)(7); App.R. 12(A)(2). Moreover, even if the charge
was time-barred, Jones fails to explain how the admission of this testimony constituted plain error or why it
was otherwise inadmissible. See State v. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1403, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.) (other-acts evidence
may be admissible even in the absence of a conviction).
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allegations. Accordingly, testimony regarding the impact of the abuse was relevant to
assess the victims' credibility and to rebut the defense theory. Moreover, the testimony
was brief and not overly emotional or inflammatory. See State v. Milam, 2006-Ohio-4742,
at ¶ 74-77 (8th Dist.) (victim testimony describing humiliation, bullying, and suicidal
ideation deemed not unduly prejudicial). Additionally, Jones fails to articulate how the
admission of this testimony meets the standard for plain error.
{¶ 72} We likewise reject Jones' remaining claims. Evidence that Jones showed
Beth pornography was admissible to demonstrate grooming behavior. State v. Boles,
2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.). Further, Jones fails to identify any specific testimony
supporting his assertions that the State portrayed him as a poor father or lacking
character. His citations to the transcript lack explanation and fail to establish plain error.
Under App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant must present arguments with supporting citations
and reasoning, and App.R. 12(A)(2) permits this court to disregard undeveloped
assignments of error. State v. Philpot, 2024-Ohio-2596, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.). It is not the role
of this court to search the record and construct arguments on Jones' behalf.
{¶ 73} Accordingly, we overrule Jones' third assignment of error.
E. Sentencing
{¶ 74} In his fourth assignment of error, Jones argues that his sentence was
contrary to law. A felony sentence is reviewed under the standard in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
Warnock, 2024-Ohio-382, at ¶ 64. That provision states that an appellate court may
modify or vacate a sentence if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the
sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. Gable, 2024-Ohio-293, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 75} A consecutive sentence is contrary to law where the trial court fails to make
the consecutive sentencing findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Wood,
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2020-Ohio-422, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage
in a three-step analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive
sentences. Id. Specifically, the trial court must find that (1) the consecutive sentence is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) consecutive
sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to
the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) [as relevant here]:
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as
part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused
by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so
great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct
adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶ 76} The record reflects that the trial court made the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). Nonetheless, Jones argues that the trial court erred in ordering Jones to
serve his time for the sentences related to Beth consecutive to the sentences related to
Chloe, which in turn were ordered to be served consecutively to the sentences related to
Alice. We disagree.
Course of Conduct
{¶ 77} Jones first contends that the offenses were not committed as part of course
of conduct. While he acknowledges that the offenses shared a common sexual
motivation, he argues that they were distinct in nature because they were committed
years apart, involved different victims, and encompassed different types of sexual acts.
Therefore, he maintains that the statutory criteria for a course of conduct were not met.
{¶ 78} Despite Jones' arguments, courts have consistently held that a "course of
conduct" may be established by "some connection, common scheme, or some pattern or
psychological thread that ties offenses together." State v. Cooper, 2021-Ohio-4057, ¶ 53
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(11th Dist.), citing State v. Summers, 2014-Ohio-2441, ¶ 14, (2d Dist.); State v. Sapp,
2004-Ohio-7008, syllabus.
{¶ 79} In this case, the record demonstrates that Jones sexually abused three
minor children on numerous occasions over several years, exploiting their vulnerabilities
based on age, lack of knowledge, and inability to protect themselves. State v.
MacPhereson, 2024-Ohio-5359, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.) (finding three courses of conduct
supported consecutive sentences where the defendant engaged in repeated sexual
abuse of two pre-teen girls); State v. Jewell, 2021-Ohio-32, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.) (a course of
conduct supported where the defendant sexually abused three minor children over
several years); State v. Bulger, 2020-Ohio-4602, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.) (sexual abuse of two
stepdaughters over several years constituted a course of conduct).
{¶ 80} After this court's findings related to merger, duplicity, and sufficiency, Jones'
two rape convictions related to Alice, two GSI convictions related to Chloe, and one GSI
conviction related to Beth remain. As analyzed above, Alice testified as to the two rapes,
and Beth and Chloe testified as to multiple, undifferentiated instances of sexual abuse
within a defined time period, sufficient to sustain at least one "course of conduct" GSI
conviction for each. See supra at B. and C. Therefore, the record supports a finding of
three courses of conduct—one against Alice, one against Beth, and one against Chloe.
{¶ 81} And "at least two of the multiple offenses committed" were part of at least
"one [ ] course of conduct." The two Rape offenses were part of the course of conduct
Jones committed against Alice. Two GSI offenses were part of the course of conduct
Jones committed against Chloe. Another GSI offense was part of the course of conduct
committed against Beth.
{¶ 82} Slight factual differences between the offenses do not preclude the finding
of a course of conduct. Cooper at ¶ 54. That Jones committed different sexual acts on
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the victims, years apart, does not undermine this conclusion. Jones repeatedly acted with
a sexual motivation and preyed upon the victims to whom he had access, often engaging
in grooming behaviors such as showing them pornography or requesting back rubs. He
would then isolate the victims and commit prohibited sexual conduct.
{¶ 83} Although we vacated several of Jones' convictions based on duplicity or
insufficient evidence, the sentences remaining were subject to the trial court's finding that
"[a]t least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of
conduct." Likewise, the remaining sentences were all included in the trial court's order
that Jones serve his time for the sentences related to Beth consecutively to the sentences
related to Chloe, which in turn were ordered to be served consecutively to the sentences
related to Alice.
{¶ 84} Therefore, this court's judgment vacating the convictions for Counts 5, 9,
and 12 will need to be addressed upon remand, but this judgment does not disturb the
trial court's findings supporting consecutive sentences. In all other respects, the trial
court's judgment on the remaining convictions is affirmed. See Workman, 2017-Ohio-
8638, at ¶ 93.
Remaining Arguments
{¶ 85} Jones raises two additional issues for review. First, he argues that his prison
term of 57 years to life is disproportionate. Second, he contends that the trial court erred
by failing to merge the GSI convictions with the kidnapping convictions related to Beth
and Chloe. These arguments are moot because several of Jones' convictions and
corresponding sentences have been vacated, including those for kidnapping Chloe and
Beth.
{¶ 86} Therefore, we overrule Jones' fourth assignment of error in part and find it
moot in part.
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Conclusion
{¶ 87} Judgment reversed and vacated in part, as it relates to Jones' convictions
and sentences for kidnapping Beth and Chloe (Counts 5 and 9) and one conviction and
sentence for GSI related to Beth (Count 12). See supra at B. and C.
{¶ 88} Judgment affirmed in part, as it relates to the trial court's admission of
victim-impact testimony and the introduction of evidence detailed in Jones' third
assignment of error. See supra at D.
{¶ 89} Judgment affirmed in part, as it relates to Jones' convictions and sentences
for Counts 2, 3, 7, 8, and 11. Two GSI convictions (Counts 6 and 10), which were
previously merged with the now-vacated kidnapping counts (Counts 5 and 9), are no
longer merged, and therefore Jones has not been sentenced for Counts 6 and 10. See
supra at B., C., and E.
{¶ 90} We remand this matter for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
BYRNE, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is
the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same
hereby is, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this cause is remanded for resentencing
consistent with the above Opinion.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Brown County Court of Common
Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and
Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed 50% to appellant and 50% to appellee.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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