pro se litigants are held to same standards as licensed attorneys
How later courts described this case
- pro se litigants are held to same standards as licensed attorneys
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Stephen C. Alexander, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Mt. Joy Township and its Board of :
Supervisors and Roadmaster, :
John Gormont Supervisor, :
David Updyke Supervisor, :
Dennis Bowman Supervisor, :
Jeffery Patterson Supervisor, :
Terry Scholle Supervisor, : No. 211 C.D. 2020
Bradley Shank Roadmaster : Submitted: December 8, 20251
BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: January 9, 2026
Stephen C. Alexander (Appellant) appeals, pro se, the January 30, 2020
order (Trial Court Order) of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County (Trial
Court) in which the Trial Court granted a motion to strike and sustained preliminary
objections filed on behalf of Mount Joy Township, the Mount Joy Township Board
of Supervisors and Roadmaster, John Gormont, David Updike, Dennis Bowman,
1
This matter was assigned to the undersigned for disposition on December 8, 2025. A
letter from the Court’s Prothonotary to Appellant and Appellees’ Counsel dated June 2, 2025,
indicated that the Court received Appellant’s brief on February 25, 2020, and directed Appellees
to file their appellate brief by July 2, 2025. No explanation exists in the record or docket for the
delay of over five years between the filing of Appellant’s brief and the Prothonotary’s June 2, 2025
letter, although none of the parties lodge a complaint in reference to this delay.
Jeffery Patterson, Terry Scholle, and Bradley Shank (collectively, Appellees), to
Appellant’s “Reinstated Complaint” and dismissed the Reinstated Complaint with
prejudice. Upon review, we affirm the Trial Court Order in part, reverse the Trial
Court Order in part, and remand the matter to the Trial Court to permit Appellant to
file an amended complaint.
I. Background and Procedural Posture
Appellant filed a complaint on August 19, 2019, against Mount Joy
Township, its Board of Supervisors, and its Roadmaster, specifically naming John
Gormont, David Updike, Dennis Bowman, Jeffery Patterson, Terry Scholle, and
Bradley Shank2 in their official and individual capacities. See Opinion, January 30,
2020 (Trial Court Opinion)3 at 1, Original Record (O.R.) Item No. 14;4 see also “A
complaint addressing the intentionally tortious acts of the Supervisors of Mt. Joy
Township and their Roadmaster” filed August 19, 2019 (Reinstated Complaint),5
O.R. Item No. 1. In brief, the Reinstated Complaint forwarded allegations relating
2
At the time Appellant filed the Complaint, Messieurs Gormont, Updike, Bowman,
Patterson, and Scholle served as members of Mount Joy Township’s Board of Supervisors, and
Mr. Shank served as Mount Joy Township’s Roadmaster. See Trial Court Opinion at 3.
3
The Trial Court incorporated and adopted the Trial Court Opinion as its opinion pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). See Opinion Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)
filed April 13, 2020.
4
No party filed a reproduced record in this matter. Thus, specific documents herein are
initially identified by the documents’ item numbers from the original record received from the
Trial Court.
5
Appellant failed to properly serve Appellees with the original complaint. See Trial Court
Opinion at 1. However, the Trial Court Prothonotary’s office reinstated the original complaint on
September 16, 2019. See id. The Trial Court therefore refers to the complaint in this matter as the
“Reinstated Complaint.” For consistency, this Court will also refer to Appellant’s complaint
herein as the “Reinstated Complaint.”
2
to Mount Joy Township’s upkeep of Barlow-Two Taverns Road, which is located
within Mount Joy Township. See Reinstated Compl. §§ 1, 8, 18 & 20-21.
Appellant’s wife owns the property located at 1735 Barlow-Two Taverns Road,
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Property); Appellant is not a record owner of the
Property. See Reinstated Compl. at Appendix E. The Reinstated Complaint
purported to raise eight claims sounding in Gross Negligence (Counts 1 & 4), Breach
of Duty (Counts 2 & 6), Breach of Public Trust (Count 3), and Breach of Statutory
Duty (Counts 5, 7 & 8). See Original Complaint §§ 23-174. The Reinstated
Complaint further alleged additional, unnumbered claims of trespass, harassment,
and intimidation perpetrated upon him by the Mount Joy Township’s road crew. See
Reinstated Compl. §§ 16-21.
Appellees filed preliminary objections to the Reinstated Complaint
(First Preliminary Objections) on October 15, 2019. See Trial Court Opinion at 1;
see also Preliminary Objections, O.R. Item No. 4. On October 18, 2019, the Trial
Court ordered Appellant to file an answer to the First Preliminary Objections and a
brief in support of such answer. See Trial Court Opinion at 1; see also Order of
Court filed Oct. 18, 2019 (October 18 Order), O.R. Item No. 5. The Trial Court also
scheduled a hearing on the First Preliminary Objections. See Trial Court Opinion at
1; see also October 18 Order.
In response to the October 18 Order, on November 12, 2019, Appellant
filed three pleadings (collectively, November 12 Filings). First, Appellant filed a
“Precipe” [sic] (First Praecipe), which appears to be an introduction to the
“Plaintiff’s response to Defendants[’] Preliminary [O]bjections” (PO Response),
which was the second of the November 12 Filings. See Trial Court Opinion at 1-2;
see also First Praecipe, O.R. Item No. 8; PO Response, O.R. Item No. 7. The PO
3
Response purported to add two additional counts to the Reinstated Complaint.6 See
Trial Court Opinion at 1-2; PO Response. A third filing, also entitled “Precipe” [sic]
(Second Praecipe), which Appellant prefaced with a statement that explained that
“[t]his matter is private and confidential and for the eyes of the [Trial] Court only.”
See Trial Court Opinion at 1-2; see also Second Praecipe, O.R. Item No. 9. The
purported “private and confidential” information included with the Second Praecipe
was a document that contained an attached purported indenture from 2006 relating
to the Property apparently submitted to supplement the PO Response by illustrating
Appellant’s ownership interest in the Property. See Second Praecipe. Appellant did
not serve the Second Praecipe on Appellees or Appellees’ counsel. See Trial Court
Opinion at 2.
Following the November 12 Filings, on November 18, 2019, Appellees
filed a brief in support of the First Preliminary Objections as well as a “Motion to
Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Response to [the First] Preliminary Objections and
‘Precipe’ [sic] (“Confidential and Private Materials”)” (Motion to Strike). See Trial
Court Opinion at 2; see also Brief In Support of Preliminary Objections, O.R. Item
No. 12; Motion to Strike, O.R. Item No. 10. Also on November 18, 2019, uncertain
whether the Trial Court would treat Appellant’s November 12 filings as an amended
complaint, Appellees also filed their “Preliminary Objections to ‘Amended
Complaint’” (Second Preliminary Objections) (collectively with the First
Preliminary Objections, Appellees’ Preliminary Objections). See Trial Court
Opinion at 2; see also Second Preliminary Objections, O.R. Item No. 11. Appellees
6
The PO Response included “Count 1 Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Harassment,” “Count II
Breech [sic] of Fiduciary Duty: Amendment 2,” and “amendments” to various paragraphs of the
Reinstated Complaint. See PO Response at 15-22.
4
thereafter filed a brief in support of the Second Preliminary Objections on December
2, 2019. See Trial Court Opinion at 2; see also Brief In Support of Preliminary
Objections to Amendments to Reinstated Complaint, O.R. Item No. 13.
Following oral argument, on January 30, 2020, the Trial Court entered
its Order and Opinion. See Trial Court Order & Trial Court Opinion, O.R. Item No.
14. The Trial Court Order granted the Motion to Strike and sustained Appellees’
Preliminary Objections as follows:
1. [The] “[First] Precipe” [sic] and the portions of
Plaintiff’s Response to Preliminary Objections that
[Appellees] have challenged are stricken.
2. [The] “[Second] Precipe” [sic] [] is stricken.
3. [Appellees’] Preliminary Objections to [Appellant’s]
joinder of [Appellees] in their personal capacity,
[Appellant’s] lack of standing and th[e Trial] Court’s lack
of subject matter jurisdiction are sustained.
4. [The] Reinstated Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
Trial Court Order. In the Trial Court Opinion, the Trial Court first explained that it
struck the objected-to paragraphs from the PO Response because they raised
additional claims not included in the Reinstated Complaint. See Trial Court Opinion
at 2-3. The Trial Court then explained that it sustained Appellees’ Preliminary
Objections relating to the individual Appellees in their individual capacities because
Appellant had failed to include information in the Reinstated Complaint regarding
how the Mount Joy Supervisors or Roadmaster were liable in their individual
capacities. See id. at 3-4. The Trial Court further stated that Appellant lacked
standing because the Reinstated Complaint did not allege an adequate property
5
interest held by Appellant in the Property. See id. at 4-5. The Trial Court also stated
that, even if viewed to have standing, Appellant failed to join the record owner of
the Property (his wife) as a necessary party to the action. See id. at 5. The Trial
Court additionally explained that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the relief
requested in the Reinstated Complaint, to wit, an order directing Mount Joy
Township to close Township roads or perform maintenance as requested. See id. at
5-6. The Trial Court further explained that it had already dismissed with prejudice
the claims contained in the Reinstated Complaint in previous litigation. See id.
Ultimately, the Trial Court sustained the Appellees’ Preliminary Objections and
dismissed the Reinstated Complaint with prejudice. See id. at 6; see also Trial Court
Order.
Appellant timely appealed the Trial Court Order to this Court. See
Notice of Appeal, O.R. Item No. 15.
II. Issues
On appeal,7 Appellant argues that the Trial Court erred by granting the
Motion to Strike and sustaining Appellees’ Preliminary Objections. See Appellant’s
Br. at 5 & 8-11. Specifically, Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred by
improperly striking the November 12 Filings and by sustaining Appellees’
Preliminary Objections based on the Appellees’ liability in their individual
capacities, Appellant’s standing, and by determining that the Reinstated Complaint
7
Where a trial court dismisses a complaint as a result of preliminary objections, this Court’s
review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. See Brown v. Wetzel, 179 A.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
6
is barred on res judicata grounds based on a prior lawsuit dismissed by the Trial
Court in 2014. See Appellant’s Br. at 58 & 8-11.
III. Discussion
A. Naming Appellees in Their Individual Capacities
First, Appellant alleges that the Trial Court erred by sustaining
Appellees’ Preliminary Objections pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1019(a). See Appellant’s Br. at 9. He is not entitled to relief.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(a) requires that averments
in pleadings state “[t]he material facts on which a cause of action or defense is
based[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(a). Regarding Appellant’s attempt to bring suit against
Mount Joy Township’s Supervisors and Roadmaster in their individual capacities,
after discussing prior litigation involving Appellant, Mount Joy Township, and the
Mount Joy Township Board of Supervisors, the Trial Court stated:
8
Appellant’s Statement of Questions Involved lists his issues for review as follows:
1. Was the [Trial] Court in error in dismissing [Appellant’s]
response to amendments made in response to [A]ppellee[]s[’
P]reliminary [O]bjections?
2. Was the [Trial] Court in error when it struck from the record
[Appellant’s] confidential and private materials from the record?
3. Was the [Trial] Court in error when dismissing [Appellant’s]
[Reinstated C]omplaint for naming the Supervisors of Mt. Joy
Township and their Roadmaster by name and in their professional
capacity?
4. Was the [Trial] Court in error when it stated it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction as a reason for dismissing [Appellant’s
Reinstated C]omplaint?
Appellant’s Br. at 5.
7
[Appellant] has again brought suit against Mt. Joy
Township and its Board of Supervisors. This time
[Appellant] goes farther by also suing the Township
Supervisors and the Township Roadmaster in both their
professional and personal capacities. [Appellees] raise a
Preliminary Objection to this pursuant to Pa.R.C[iv].P.
1028(a)(2), Failure of Pleading to Conform to Law or
Rule. [Appellants] specifically allege that [Appellant]
violated Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1019(a) by failing to include any
information as to how the Mt. Joy Supervisors and
Roadmaster are liable in their personal capacity. This
[c]ourt agrees with [Appellees], and during the hearing of
this matter, [Appellant] even acknowledged that he was
only suing Mt. Joy Township and its Supervisors and
Roadmaster in a professional capacity. Thus, [Appellant]
improperly included Mt. Joy Township’s Supervisors and
Roadmaster in a personal capacity in [the Reinstated]
Complaint.
Trial Court Opinion at 3-4.
In his brief, Appellant appears to agree with the Trial Court’s
assessment. See Appellant’s Br. at 9. In his argument on this point, Appellant
concedes that he “chose not to include[] Appellees in their personal capacity[.]”
Appellant’s Br. at 9. Appellant also acknowledged in his argument that he conceded
during the hearing before the Trial Court that he was suing the Mount Joy Township
Supervisors and Roadmaster only in their professional capacities. See Appellant Br.
at 9 (“That [Appellant] informed the [Trial] Court that his intent at the time was to
limit [Appellees’] liability to their professional capacities . . . . Page 4 of the [Trial]
Court[ O]pinion notes [Appellant’s] intention and any confusion was quickly and
easily resolved.”).9
9
The entirety of Appellant’s argument on this issue is as follows:
8
Our review of the Reinstated Complaint confirms the Trial Court’s
assessment that Appellant failed to specifically aver adequate facts to bring suit
against Mount Joy Township’s Supervisors or Roadmaster in their individual
capacities. Moreover, Appellant’s statements/concessions confirm the Trial Court’s
determination. Accordingly, we find no error in the Trial Court sustaining
Appellees’ Preliminary Objections to this extent.
B. Motion to Strike
Appellant next alleges that the Trial Court erred by granting Appellees’
Motion to Strike the November 12 Filings. See Appellant’s Br. at 8. To the extent
discernable, Appellant argues that the November 12 Filings should have been
considered an amended complaint filed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 1028(c)(1) requiring a response pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 1028(f). See id.
3. Improper Joinder of Parties
That [Appellant] is aware that each of the Supervisors and their
Roadmaster are in fact stripped of their immunity and face personal
liability as a result of the actions described by [Appellant].
However, as the acts of the Township are repairable, [Appellant]
chose not to include[] Appellees in their personal capacity, as
damages, if awarded, would undoubtedly result in the loss of
Appellees[’] homes, vehicle, savings, etc. That [Appellant]
informed the [Trial] Court that his intent at the time was to limit
their liability to their professional capacities, a decision, that, as
[Appellant] been [sic] forced to actually consider Appellees[’]
actions, he regrets, and would alter if allowed, as his is an
undeserved kindness. However, Page 4 of the [Trial] Court[
O]pinion notes [Appellant’s] intention and any confusion was
quickly and easily resolved.
Appellant’s Br. at 9 (footnote omitted).
9
Initially, we observe that,
[u]nder Pennsylvania law, pro se litigants are subject to
the same rules of procedure as are represented litigants.
See Commonwealth v. Williams, [] 896 A.2d 523, 534
([Pa.] 2006) (pro se litigants are held to same standards as
licensed attorneys).
Although the courts may liberally construe materials filed
by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit
upon a litigant, and a court cannot be expected to become
a litigant’s counsel or find more in a written pro se
submission than is fairly conveyed in the pleading.
Kozicki v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 299 A.3d 1055, 1063 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) (original
brackets omitted)).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(c)(1) provides that “[a]
party may file an amended pleading as of course within twenty days after service of
a copy of preliminary objections. If a party has filed an amended pleading as of
course, the preliminary objections to the original pleading shall be deemed moot.”
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(1). Thus, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1028(c)(1), litigants are allowed to amend a complaint within 20 days after receiving
preliminary objections. See id. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(f) then
instructs that “[o]bjections to any amended pleading shall be made by filing new
preliminary objections.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(f).
The Trial Court observed the following in reference to the November
12 filings:
On November 12, 2019, [Appellant] filed a pleading
labeled “Precipe” [sic], a pleading labeled “Plaintiff’s
10
response to Defendants Preliminary objections”, and a
third pleading labeled “Precipe” [sic] in which [Appellant]
stated “This matter is private and confidential for the eyes
of the [Trial] Court only” and had attached to it an
indenture. This “Precipe” [sic] was never served on
Defense Counsel, Susan J. Smith, Esq.
Trial Court Opinion at 1-2.
The Trial Court then explained the following regarding the November
12 Filings:
This [c]ourt notes that [Appellant] has failed to comply
with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure when
filing his pleadings, and thus has created a situation where
there are two Preliminary Objections by [Appellees],
essentially to the same Reinstated Complaint, and
[Appellees’] Motion to Strike [Appellant’s] Response and
the Precipes [sic]. During oral argument, [Appellees’]
Counsel indicated that the substance of [Appellees’]
different Preliminary Objections remained the same, and
that [Appellees’] Counsel filed both a second Preliminary
Objection and a Motion to Strike the Response and
“Precipe” [sic] as a cautionary measure, as [Appellees’]
Counsel was unsure how this [c]ourt would treat
[Appellant’s] Responsive pleadings.
Trial Court Opinion at 2. The Trial Court continued in its analysis of the November
12 Filings, stating:
In response to [Appellees’ First] Preliminary Objections
[], [Appellant] filed a “Precipe” [sic] that was intended to
be an introduction to his [PO Response], and an additional
“Precipe” [sic] in an effort to supplement the [Reinstated]
Complaint. Additionally, in [the PO Response], a number
of paragraphs contain factual averments that were not
stated in the Reinstated Complaint and added attachments
that were not attached to [the] Reinstated Complaint both
11
in an attempt to raise additional claims through these
“Precipes [sic].” The filings are not proper responsive
pleadings and are not in accordance with Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure. [Appellant] has not filed a
proper [a]mended [c]omplaint. Therefore, for these
reasons [the] Motion to Strike [] is granted.
Trial Court Opinion at 2-3.
We find that the Trial Court properly characterized the First Praecipe
as an introduction to Appellant’s responsive pleading to the PO Response, that the
PO Response itself contained averments outside the Reinstated Complaint, and
further, that the Second Praecipe was an attempt to supplement the PO Response.
We further observe that the PO Response purports to amend the Reinstated
Complaint by adding various allegations. See PO Response at 15-22. While these
amendments do not strictly comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(1) in that they are not
a separate filing of an amended complaint, the PO Response and Second Praecipe
clearly evidence Appellant’s intent and attempt to amend the Reinstated Complaint
in response to Appellees’ Preliminary Objections. Accordingly, we believe that the
Trial Court should have viewed the November 12 Filings as an obvious attempt by
a pro se litigant to amend the Reinstated Complaint and allowed Appellant an
opportunity to do so in compliance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(1).10
10
This determination is made in consideration of the long accepted notion that “pro se
litigants are subject to the same rules of procedure as are represented litigants.” Kozicki v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 299 A.3d 1055, 1063 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014)). We observe, however, that our
conclusion that the Trial Court should have viewed the November 12 Filings as a less-than-perfect
attempt to amend the Reinstated Complaint would have applied equally had the November 12
Filings been drafted and filed by a licensed attorney.
12
C. Standing
Appellant next claims that the Trial Court erred by sustaining
Appellees’ Preliminary Objections that he lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. See
Appellant’s Br. at 9. We agree.
Our Supreme Court has explained the following regarding standing:
In Pennsylvania, a party to litigation must establish as a
threshold matter that he or she has standing to bring an
action. Standing in Pennsylvania is a jurisprudential
matter. In our Court’s landmark decision on standing, we
explained that a person who is not adversely impacted by
the matter he or she is litigating does not enjoy standing to
initiate the court’s dispute resolution machinery. This is
consistent with our jurisprudential approach that eschews
advisory or abstract opinions, but, rather, requires the
resolution of real and concrete issues. As we [have]
explained [], the party to the legal action must be
“aggrieved.”
In determining whether a party is aggrieved, courts
consider whether the litigant has a substantial, direct, and
immediate interest in the matter. To have a substantial
interest, the concern in the outcome of the challenge must
surpass the common interest of all citizens in procuring
obedience to the law. An interest is direct if it is an interest
that mandates demonstration that the matter caused harm
to the party’s interest. Finally, the concern is immediate if
that causal connection is not remote or speculative. The
keystone to standing in these terms is that the person must
be negatively impacted in some real and direct fashion.
Markham v. Wolf, 136 A.3d 134, 140 (Pa. 2016) (internal quotation marks, citations,
and footnote omitted).
Regarding Appellant’s standing in the instant matter, the Trial Court
explained:
13
[Appellant] fails to aver in his pleadings that he is the
owner of 1735 Barlow-Two Taverns Road, and instead
claims he resides at the [P]roperty and “is the [P]roperty’s
primary (outdoor) caretaker, and has an unperfected
interest, survivor[’]s right, as well as other interests in the
[P]roperty. Through [Appellant’s] “confidential and
private [‘]Precipe[’]”, he attempted to present th[e Trial]
Court with an indenture in an attempt to show that
[Appellant] is the [P]roperty owner. That indenture is not
recorded, and was not attached to or referenced in the
[Reinstated] Complaint. Contrary to the “Precipe”
information, public records show that [Appellant] does not
have an ownership interest in the [P]roperty, and the
indenture alleging his part ownership is not recorded in the
Adams County Recorder of Deeds office. As previously
stated, th[e Trial] Court is striking the “Precipe” and the
indenture attached to it, leaving [Appellant] no factual
averments to show his ownership interest in the [P]roperty.
Because [Appellant] has no ownership interest in the
[P]roperty, he lacks substantial, direct, and immediate
interest to bring this complaint. As such, [Appellant] lacks
standing to bring his Reinstated Complaint.
Trial Court Opinion at 4-5.
We do not agree with the Trial Court’s standing assessment. While the
deed attached to the Reinstated Complaint does not list Appellant as an owner of the
Property,11 the Reinstated Complaint alleges that Appellant resides at the Property12
and, to the extent discernible, is apparently attempting to plead negligence and tort
claims purportedly perpetrated by Appellees against Appellant himself. Appellant
claims that Mount Joy Township used its road crews “to harass and intimidate [him
11
See Reinstated Complaint, Appendix E.
12
See Reinstated Complaint ¶ 1.
14
in acts both petty and serious[.]” Reinstated Complaint ¶ 16. He appears to claim
that Appellees’ negligence has damaged his fence, created a health hazard, and
deprived him of the use of his property. See Reinstated Complaint ¶¶ 53, 61 & 113.
Such claims allege immediate injuries specific to Appellant and his property.
Otherwise stated, the Reinstated Complaint seemingly attempts to make allegations
of negligence and torts that purportedly have a real and direct negative impact on
Appellant. If true, Appellant would be aggrieved by the actions claimed in the
Reinstated Complaint, which are personal to Appellant, independent of his
ownership interest in the Property or that of his wife. The Trial Court accordingly
erred by determining that Appellant lacked standing regarding these claims.
Markham, 136 A.3d at 140.
Regarding the averments in the Reinstated Complaint that allege that
Appellants’ actions resulted in a diminution of the Property’s value,13 the Reinstated
Complaint, as it currently exists, fails to definitively state Appellant’s equitable
interest in the Property. The Reinstated Complaint alleges that Appellant resides at
the Property with his wife and that the pair purchased the Property for its location
on a quiet and gently used country road. However, the Reinstated Complaint does
not include allegations or attachments that clarify Appellant’s ownership interest in
the Property either by title deed or as marital property held by Appellant and his
wife.14 Accordingly, we will remand the matter to the Trial Court to allow Appellant
20 days or such other period prescribed by the Trial Court as provided by Rule
13
See, i.e., Reinstated Complaint ¶¶ 53, 113.
14
We observe that the PO Response also alleges that Appellant “has an unperfected
interest, survivors [sic] right, as well as other interests in th[e P]roperty.” PO Response at 7. The
Second Praecipe’s attachment purports to support this claim with an unrecorded indenture. See
Second Praecipe.
15
1028(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(e), to
amend the Reinstated Complaint consistent with this opinion.
D. Failure to Include Necessary Party
We further find that the Trial Court erred by granting Appellees’
Preliminary Objections challenging Appellant’s failure to join his wife, Sally
Alexander, as a party to the litigation.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2227, entitled “Compulsory
Joinder,” provides:
(a) Persons having only a joint interest in the subject
matter of an action must be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants.
(b) If a person who must be joined as a plaintiff refuses to
join, he or she shall, in a proper case, be made a defendant
or an involuntary plaintiff when the substantive law
permits such involuntary joinder.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 2227. Additionally, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(5)
permits a party to file a preliminary objection based on a nonjoinder of a necessary
party. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(5). “[A] necessary party is one whose presence, while
not indispensable, is essential if the court is to resolve completely a controversy and
to render complete relief.” Podolak v. Tobyhanna Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 37 A.3d
1283, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila., 651 A.2d 177, 184 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)).
Here, regarding the non-joinder of Appellant’s wife, the Trial Court
stated:
[Appellant] has failed to join a necessary party in his wife
Sally Alexander. Mrs. Alexander is the recorded owner
16
of 1735 Barlow-Two Taverns Road. [] As an owner of the
property in question, Mrs. Alexander has at least a joint
interest in this litigation and should have been named as a
party. Pa.R.C[iv].P. 2227(2). Mrs. Alexander has not
joined this litigation. As such, [Appellant] has failed to
conform to a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure for his
failure to join his wife as an indispensable party to his
Reinstated Complaint. Pa.C[iv].P. 1028[(a)](2), (5).
Trial Court Opinion at 5 (emphasis in original).
However, as discussed supra, certain of the allegations contained in the
Reinstated Complaint are specific to Appellant, independent of his wife or
consideration of his (or her) ownership interest in the Property. Therefore,
Appellant’s failure to join his wife as a party to this matter does not warrant dismissal
of the Reinstated Complaint in its entirety.15
E. Res Judicata
Finally, Appellant claims that the Trial Court improperly determined
that the Reinstated Complaint was barred by res judicata. See Appellant’s Br. at 10.
We agree.
As this Court has explained:
Res judicata encompasses two related, yet distinct
principles: technical res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Technical res judicata provides that where a final
judgment on the merits exists, a future lawsuit on the same
cause of action is precluded. Collateral estoppel acts to
foreclose litigation in a subsequent action where issues of
15
To the extent Appellant’s wife need be joined in relation to the other claims that concern
an alleged diminution in value of the Property or other Property based claims, we leave such
questions for after Appellant files an amended complaint as provided above and Appellees file
motions based thereon, if appropriate.
17
law or fact were actually litigated and necessary to a
previous final judgment.
Technical res judicata requires the coalescence of four
factors: (1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2)
identity of the causes of action; (3) identity of the persons
or parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality or
capacity of the parties suing or being sued. Res judicata
applies to claims that were actually litigated as well as
those matters that should have been litigated. Generally,
causes of action are identical when the subject matter and
the ultimate issues are the same in both the old and new
proceedings.
Similarly, collateral estoppel bars a subsequent lawsuit
where (1) an issue decided in a prior action is identical to
one presented in a later action, (2) the prior action resulted
in a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the
prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action,
and (4)[] the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in the prior action.
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 794 A.2d 936, 939 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).
Here, the Trial Court discussed the previous case of Alexander v. Board
of Supervisors of Mount Joy Township and Zoning Hearing Board of Mount Joy
Township, Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Docket No. 2013-S-118
(Alexander I), in which Appellant previously requested that the Trial Court order the
closure of Barlow-Two Taverns Road. See Trial Court Opinion at 3-5; Alexander I.
In Alexander I, the Trial Court determined that Appellant lacked standing as a result
of not owning the Property. See Alexander I, slip op. at 4-5. The Trial Court also
noted that Appellant failed to meet necessary elements for mandamus relief and that,
18
even if he had met such elements, he still would lack standing because he failed to
allege a beneficial interest distinct from that of the general public. See id., slip op.
at 5-6. The Trial Court continued, observing that Appellant, as neither owner, nor
tenant, nor holder of a legally cognizable interest, also lacked standing to bring a
claim sounding in trespass. See id., slip op. at 6. Ultimately, the Trial Court found
Appellant’s requested relief to be a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine,16
granted the preliminary objections filed by the Board of Supervisors of Mount Joy
Township and the Mount Joy Township Zoning Hearing Board, and dismissed the
matter with prejudice. See id., slip op. at 7 & Order.
Here, the Trial Court determined that the principles of res judicata
prevented it from determining Appellant’s Prayer for Relief No. 2, which requests:
That the traffic on Barlow[-]Two Taverns is a danger and
[Appellant] would ask that it be closed to all through
traffic, save deliveries, from Patterson to 97, that the speed
limit be lowered to 35 MPH and, that the Township make
accommodations with the Pennsylvania State Police to
enforce the same; and that the Township remove all the
offending results of their tar and chipping and that the
16
The well-recognized Separation of Powers Doctrine
is inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution and is essential to our
tripartite governmental framework consisting of a legislative,
judicial, and executive branch. The doctrine makes manifest that
the three branches of government are co-equal and independent and
divides power accordingly, with the underlying rationale of the
doctrine being that it prevents one branch of government from
exercising, infringing upon, or usurping the powers of the other two
branches. This prohibition is also related to the system of checks
and balances, which prevents one branch from acting unchecked.
Crawford v. Commonwealth, 326 A.3d 850, 857 (Pa. 2024) (internal citations, quotation marks,
and brackets omitted).
19
cartway of the road be restored to its original width and
the shoulders be restored.
Reinstated Complaint at 24. The Trial Court suggested that Appellant previously
requested the same relief in Alexander I. See Trial Court Opinion at 5-6. The Trial
Court then stated:
Nothing has changed since 2014 when Judge Kuhn
sustained the [p]reliminary [o]bjections against
[Appellant] while dismissing [Appellant’s] claim with
prejudice. ([E]mphasis added). Thus, res judicata would
apply to prevent th[e Trial] Court from ruling any
differently. U.S. Nat. Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 487
A.2d 809, 813 (Pa. 1985). Th[e Trial] Court, through
Judge Kuhn, has already determined there is no subject
matter jurisdiction which would allow it to grant
[Appellant’s] requested relief. That decision is final.
Trial Court Opinion at 5-6.
We do not agree with the Trial Court’s determination. While the instant
matter partially concerns requested relief regarding Barlow-Two Taverns Road
similar to that denied by the Trial Court in Alexander I,17 the Reinstated Complaint
raises different claims from the mandamus claims presented in Alexander I and
requests slightly different relief. While the Separation of Powers Doctrine may
again provide Appellees with a defense to the Reinstated Complaint, the causes of
action and relief sought in the Reinstated Complaint are not identical to those of
Alexander I. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred to the extent it determined that all
claims contained in the Reinstated Complaint were barred by res judicata.
17
See Alexander I, slip op. at 2-3.
20
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the Trial Court Order to the extent it
sustained Appellants’ Preliminary Objections regarding Appellant suing Appellees
in their individual capacities. However, we reverse the Trial Court Order to the
extent it granted the Motion to Strike and sustained Appellees’ Preliminary
Objections based on Appellant’s standing, failure to join a necessary party, and res
judicata. We remand the matter to the Trial Court to allow Appellant an opportunity
to amend the Reinstated Complaint consistent with the foregoing opinion.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
21
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Stephen C. Alexander, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Mt. Joy Township and its Board of :
Supervisors and Roadmaster, :
John Gormont Supervisor, :
David Updyke Supervisor, :
Dennis Bowman Supervisor, :
Jeffery Patterson Supervisor, :
Terry Scholle Supervisor, : No. 211 C.D. 2020
Bradley Shank Roadmaster :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of January, 2026, the January 30, 2020 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County (Trial Court) is AFFIRMED to the
extent it sustained Appellants’ Preliminary Objections regarding Appellant suing
Appellees in their individual capacities. The Trial Court Order is REVERSED to
the extent it granted the “Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Response to [the
First] Preliminary Objections and ‘Precipe’ [sic] (“Confidential and Private
Materials”)” and sustained Appellees’ Preliminary Objections based on Appellant’s
standing, failure to join a necessary party, and res judicata. The matter is
REMANDED to the Trial Court to allow Stephen C. Alexander to amend his
pleadings consistent with the attached memorandum opinion. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge