Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LARRY D. JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:24-CV-1806-MAB

)

ANGELA WALTER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Angela Walter’s Motion for

Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion (Doc. 51) and Plaintiff Larry Johnson’s

Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 52). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion is DENIED (Doc. 51) and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED as MOOT (Doc. 52).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initially filed this civil rights action on May 24, 2024, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred while he was

incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (see Doc. 1; see also Case No. 24-cv-1385-

DWD). Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint, which the Court conducted a

preliminary review of on July 31, 2024 (Id.). At that time, the deliberate indifference claim

Plaintiff is currently proceeding upon against Defendant was severed into this distinct

action for the reasons stated in the Court’s Order (see Doc. 1 at pp. 10-11). Accordingly,

on July 31, 2024, this action was initiated, and Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed (Doc. 2).

As applied to Plaintiff’s claim in this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he had

EKGs taken after he began suffering from extreme chest pain at Menard (Doc. 10, p. 2).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conducted EKGs on November 24, 2023, and

February 1, 2024, after Plaintiff was removed from his cell due to a medical emergency

(Id.). After conducting the EKGs, Defendant told Plaintiff she did not know what was

causing his pain, but it was not his chest (Id.). Plaintiff alleges Defendant provided no

further treatment and conducted no further investigation into his medical condition. (Id.).

As a result, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer from severe pain in his neck, chest,

right shoulder, arm, hand, and back (Id.).

The Court conducted a preliminary review of the severed Complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A in August 2024 (Doc. 10). Ultimately, Plaintiff was permitted to proceed

on the following claim:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

[Angela Walter] for refusing to further investigate Johnson’s

chest pain in November of 2023 and February of 2024.

(Id. at p. 10).1

On May 21, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on

the Issue of Exhaustion, along with a partial record of supporting exhibits (see Doc. 51 at

p. 2, fn. 3; Docs 51-1 thru 51-6). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition, which contained

numerous supporting exhibits therein, on June 10, 2025 (Doc. 53).

1 The Court’s Merit Review Order named Jane Doe #2 as the defendant this claim was raised against (see

Doc. 10 at p. 1). Plaintiff later identified and substituted Defendant Angela Walter for Jane Doe #2 (see Docs.

26, 27, 38).

Meanwhile, on June 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, which also contains several supporting exhibits (Doc. 52). Defendant then

filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on June 16, 2025 (Doc. 54). Neither

party filed a reply brief in further support of their respective motion.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF EXHAUSTION

I. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). In making that determination, the Court “generally will construe all facts and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Apex Digital,

Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013). This means courts cannot

resolve factual disputes in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. See Tolan v.

Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is not to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there

is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However,

“[t]he nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010).

II. Exhaustion Requirements

As outlined in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[a] prisoner may not bring a

federal suit about prison conditions unless he first has exhausted all available

administrative remedies.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). A remedy has not been exhausted if the prisoner failed to abide by the

procedures for pursuing relief. Id. Thus, to properly exhaust one’s administrative

remedies, “a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the

prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.

2002).

However, an inmate is not required to exhaust administrative remedies that are

not actually available to him. Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016)

(“Remedies that are genuinely unavailable or nonexistent need not be exhausted.”). The

Seventh Circuit has “found remedies unavailable in a number of instances in which the

inmate, through no fault of his own, could not have accessed the grievance procedure.”

Lanaghan v. Koch, 902 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, the failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that the defendants carry the burden

of proving. See Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2018). “To meet their burden,

the defendants must show beyond dispute that remedies were available.” Id. at 533-34.

III. IDOC Grievance Procedures

Individuals incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) are

required to follow the grievance procedure outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code

to exhaust their administrative remedies. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.800, et seq. (2017).

To initiate the normal grievance process, an inmate must file a grievance with their

institutional counselor within 60 days of the discovery of the incident. Id. at § 504.810(a).

After the counselor provides a response, an inmate may submit his grievance to a

grievance officer who is to report his or her findings and recommendations to the Chief

Administrative Officer (the “warden”) within two months. Id. at 504.830(e). The warden

reviews the grievance officer’s findings and recommendations, and then provides a

written decision. Id. If an inmate is unsatisfied with the warden’s decision, he has 30 days

from the date of the warden’s decision to appeal to the Administrative Review Board

(ARB). Id. at § 504.850(a). The ARB then submits a written report to the Director of the

IDOC, who makes a final decision within six months, when reasonably feasible. Id. at §

504.850(e).

Alternatively, an inmate can request for his or her grievance to be handled on an

emergency basis by submitting the grievance directly to the warden. Id. at § 504.840. If

the warden determines the grievance should not be handled as an emergency, the inmate

is notified in writing that he or she may resubmit the grievance in accordance with the

standard grievance process. Id. at § 504.840(c). However, if the warden determines the

grievance is an emergency, the warden must expedite processing of the grievance and

respond by indicating what action shall be or has been taken. Id. at § 504.840(b).

Additionally, if an inmate appeals the warden’s decision on an emergency grievance, the

ARB is also required to expedite processing of the emergency grievance. Id. at § 504.850(f).

IV. Analysis of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion

Defendant argues she is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to

fully exhaust any relevant grievance prior to initiating this action (see generally Doc. 51).

In response, Plaintiff avers that he filed a grievance, Grievance No. K4-1123-1772, which

directly identified his claim against Defendant, but administrative remedies were

subsequently made unavailable to him based upon the prison’s lengthy delay in

reviewing his grievance (see generally Doc. 53).

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 identifies

both Defendant Walter and Plaintiff’s claim against her. For instance, in that Grievance,

Plaintiff grieved that he was sent to the HCU on November 24, 2023, and was treated by

Nurse Angie “who performed an EKG.” (Doc. 53 at p. 22). Defendant told Plaintiff that

his injury and pain was not the result of a heart condition, as “determined by the EKG.”

(Id. at p. 23). She then put Plaintiff on a long waitlist to see a doctor, gave him some

Ibuprofen and Tylenol, and sent him back to his cell (Id.). Grievance No. K4-1123-1772

later states, “If Nurse Angie believes that my pains are from injuries outside of a heart

condition from her performing an EKG, she should have either given me further medical

treatment to find the source of the pain … or sent me to an outside hospital consider my

statements to her, injuries, pain and the fact that I was sent to the HCU on as an

emergency and not on any list.” (Id.). The Court will not belabor the point, Grievance No.

K4-1123-1772 plainly identified Defendant Angela Walter (i.e., “Nurse Angie”) and

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim raised against her (Id.).

Therefore, the only question is whether Plaintiff exhausted his available

administrative remedies for Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 prior to filing suit. Defendant

argues neither Grievance No. K4-1123-1772, nor any other grievance filed by Plaintiff,

exhausted Plaintiff’s administrative remedies because none were appealed to the ARB

prior to Plaintiff filing his Complaint in this action on July 31, 2024 (see Doc. 51 at p. 6).

Notably, Plaintiff concedes that he did not appeal Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 to the ARB

prior to filing suit (see generally Doc. 53). However, Plaintiff argues that he was no longer

required to exhaust each subsequent step of the administrative process for Grievance No.

K4-1123-1772 because more than eight months had passed without a response from

prison officials by the time his Complaint was filed in this action (Id.).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Pertinently, Plaintiff filed Grievance No. K4-1123-

1772 on November 29, 2023 (Doc. 53 at pp. 22-23). It was marked as received by the

Warden on November 30, 2023, and subject to expedited review because it was deemed

an emergency (Id.). After being deemed an emergency, Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 was

forwarded to the Grievance Officer for expedited review on December 4, 2023 (Id. at pp.

20-21). Yet, inexplicably, as of June 6, 2024, when Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint

in Case No. 24-cv-1385-DWD, he had not received any further response to Grievance No.

K4-1123-1772. Likewise, when his claim against Defendant was severed into this case on

July 31, 2024, Plaintiff still had not received a facility-level response to Grievance No. K4-

1123-1772 (see Docs. 1, 2). Finally, on November 20, 2024, approximately one year after

filing Grievance No. K4-1123-1772, the Grievance Officer and Warden finally reviewed

and returned Plaintiff’s grievance (Doc. 53 at p. 21).2

This Court dealt with a similar issue in Bentley v. Morris, wherein more than eight

months passed before the plaintiff received a response to his grievance from the

grievance officer and the warden. See 3:23-CV-48-MAB, 2025 WL 894947 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 24,

2 The Grievance Officer’s report even acknowledges that Plaintiff’s grievance was filed on November 29,

2023, but not reviewed until November 19, 2024 (Doc. 53 at p. 21). And, while not relevant to the Court’s

instant analysis because the process was rendered unavailable by the lengthy delay, the Court also notes

that the decision of the Grievance Officer and Warden is confusing at best (Id.). For instance, the Grievance

Officer stated that Internal Affairs had opened and closed a case and found it to be “substantiated.” (Id.).

Yet, the Grievance Officer then recommended Plaintiff’s grievance be denied and the Warden concurred

(Id.). It is not clear to the Court why a grievance would be denied when the reviewing officials learned that

the case addressing it had been substantiated.

2025). Pertinently, given the lengthy delay, this Court found the plaintiff’s grievance

should be treated as having been procedurally exhausted because:

Pursuant to section 504.830(e) of the Illinois Administrative Code,

“[t]he Grievance Officer shall consider the grievance and report his or her

findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief Administrative

Officer within two months after receipt of the written grievance, when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” As the Seventh Circuit has

explained, however, section 504.830(e)’s two-month deadline is

“aspirational,” not mandatory, and parties should not make a beeline for

the courts when they don’t receive a response within two months. Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004). “An aspiration to act quickly

‘whenever possible’ does not mean that the prison system tosses out the

papers and closes the files after two months[.]” Id. Conversely, however,

the Seventh Circuit has more-recently emphasized that how long a prisoner

must wait for an administrative response also depends upon the

complexity of the issue being grieved and any information or updates

conveyed to the grievant. See Tullis v. Shaw, 676 Fed. Appx. 580, 582 (7th

Cir. 2017); Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding a two-

month period of silence rendered administrative remedies unavailable

specifically because the prisoner had no other reason to believe anyone was

looking into his grievance). For this reason, the Seventh Circuit held in

Tullis that “[g]iven the scant record in this case, we think it premature to

decide whether, under Ford, Tullis should have waited longer for the

Director to act on his appeal before he filed suit.” Tullis, 676 Fed. Appx. at

582. “Tullis received no communication regarding his pending appeal for

almost nine months. Yet the defendants have never offered any explanation

why the appeal took so long.” Id.

Here, Defendants have not mentioned Grievance No. 57-1-22 in their

motions, let alone attempted to explain why it took over eight months for

Plaintiff to receive a response to this grievance. Therefore, given this

lengthy delay and Defendants’ failure to provide a justification for it (or to

provide other documents demonstrating that prison officials updated

Plaintiff as to the status of this grievance), the Court will treat Grievance

No. 57-1-22 as having been procedurally exhausted.

Id. at *4.

The same analysis and conclusion apply here. Plaintiff filed his grievance in

November 2023 (Doc. 53 at pp. 22-23). Yet, at the time of this action’s initiation, more than

eight months had passed without a response to Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 (Id. at pp.

21-23).3 Under such circumstances, the Court finds the administrative review process was

rendered unavailable to Plaintiff and therefore, Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 was

exhausted by the time Plaintiff initiated this action. See id.

Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff

knew how to fully exhaust a grievance as demonstrated by the numerous, other

grievances he filed during the same time frame which he fully exhausted by appealing to

the ARB (see generally Doc. 51). Crucially, rather than support Defendant’s argument, this

fact further demonstrates why Plaintiff was justified in treating the grievance process as

having been rendered unavailable for Grievance No. K4-1123-1772. Specifically, by seeing

many of his other grievances be addressed in a significantly shorter timeframe, Plaintiff

could reasonably conclude that the administrative review process had been rendered

unavailable as to Grievance No. K4-1123-1772. See, e.g., Lomeli v. Jones, 3:23-CV-2518-

MAB, 2025 WL 2337273, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2025) (“Plaintiff filed Grievance No. 207-

10-22 over a week before filing Grievance No. 276-10-22. Yet, he received a response to

Grievance No. 276-10-22 and appealed it to the ARB long before he heard back on his

earlier-filed grievance. Under such circumstances, the administrative review process had

been rendered unavailable as to Grievance No. 207-10-22 because the administrative

scheme had become so confusing that no ordinary prisoner would know how to navigate

3 And in fact, while not directly relevant to the question of whether Plaintiff exhausted his remedies by the

time of filing, he would still have to wait another three and a half months before finally receiving any

response (see Doc. 53 at p. 21).

it.”). Here, as in Lomeli, the delay in responding to Grievance No. K4-1123-1772, combined

with the drastically shorter facility-level response times for Plaintiff’s other grievances,

rendered the administrative process so confusing that no ordinary prisoner would know

how to navigate it. See Id.

Significantly, Defendant’s motion does not address Grievance No. K4-1123-1772

and Defendant did not file a Reply in Support of her motion. Had Defendant believed

some other reasonable justification existed for the eight month delay in responding to

Plaintiff’s grievance before this action was initiated, Defendant had the opportunity to

make that argument.4 In this regard, the Court also questions how Defendant concluded

that it was an undisputed, material fact that “[t]he grievance records show that, during

the relevant time period, Plaintiff did not submit any grievances against Defendant

regarding EKGs performed on or about either November 24, 2023, or February 1, 2024.”

(Doc. 51 at p. 3, para. 8). While the Court takes some issue with narrowing a grievance

search to just grievances involving EKGs around certain dates when this action is

proceeding upon a broader claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s chest pain in

November 2023 or February 2024, the Court finds it even more concerning that Defendant

represented to the Court that no such grievance regarding EKGs performed on or around

4 Typically, when considering a motion for summary judgment based upon a prisoner’s alleged failure to

exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an

evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust. Wagoner

v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008)). Accord

Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). However, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary when

there are no material factual disputes. See Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (no hearing

required where there are “no disputed facts regarding exhaustion, only a legal question”). Here, however,

such a hearing would not be beneficial because the grievance’s filing date, response date, and contents are

found in the record, such that the only issue remaining is the legal question of whether the prison’s eight-

month delay in responding to Plaintiff’s grievance rendered the administrative process unavailable.

November 24, 2023, existed when: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint included some records of

Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 (see, e.g., Doc. 2 at pp. 34, 41-42); (2) Defendant’s own records

also documented the facilities’ receipt of Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 (see Doc. 51-3 at p.

2, Doc. 51-4 at p. 8); and (3) Plaintiff’s Response indisputably attached and cited to

Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 (Doc. 53 at pp. 19-23).5

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Grievance No. K4-1123-1772 identified

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant and exhausted all available administrative remedies

as to that claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue

of Exhaustion is DENIED (Doc. 51).

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I. Preliminary Injunction Legal Standards

A preliminary injunction represents an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that is

available only when “the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

Goodman v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Reg., 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in

original) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). Additionally,

mandatory preliminary injunctions like the one sought here, which would require an

affirmative act by the defendant, are “ordinarily cautiously viewed and sparingly

5 To make matters worse, rather than providing the Court with Grievance No. K4-1123-1772, Defendant

summarily stated in a footnote that “[i]n order to avoid filing voluminous exhibits, the Grievances have

not been attached to this Motion since none are relevant to the Complaint. A full copy of the Grievances

will be provided should the Court wish to review.” (Doc. 51 at p. 2, fn. 3). Suffice it to say, Defendant’s

own, self-serving (and here, erroneous) representation as to what constitutes a relevant grievance is not

appropriate evidence for the Court to rely upon when determining whether summary judgment should be

granted. In the future, Defense Counsel should take great care to ensure its representations to the Court are

accurate and to file all potentially relevant grievances alongside Defendant’s motion in order to meet

Defendant’s burden of proof.

issued.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham v. Med. Mut. of

Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997)).

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that he is likely to

succeed on the merits of his claim, he has no adequate remedy at law, and that he would

suffer irreparable harm if he were not provided the relief sought in his preliminary

injunction. See Finch v. Treto, 82 F.4th 572, 578 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Speech First, Inc. v.

Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020)). If the plaintiff makes this showing, then the court

proceeds to a balancing analysis, weighing the harm of denying an injunction to the

plaintiff against the harm to the defendant of granting one. Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine,

Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2021). Ultimately, the plaintiff must show “that the balance

of equities tips in his favor.” Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir.

2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1754 (2021) (quoting Winter v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Furthermore, “[u]nder the PLRA injunctive relief to remedy

unconstitutional prison conditions must be ‘narrowly drawn,’ extend ‘no further than

necessary’ to remedy the constitutional violation, and use the ‘least intrusive means’ to

correct the violation of the federal right.” Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)).

II. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction “in the form of a transfer out of Menard to

a facility that will accommodate Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by way of adequate

medical attention[.]” (Doc. 52 at p. 12). In support of his request, Plaintiff raises numerous

allegations of inadequate medical care and/or deliberate indifference, as well as

retaliation (see generally Id.). Defendant has filed a response in opposition which argues

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief: (1) is improper because it relates to

allegations unrelated to the conduct in this lawsuit; (2) impermissibly seeks to bind the

conduct of individuals who are not parties to this lawsuit; and (3) fails to meet the high

bar meriting the imposition of such an extraordinary and drastic remedy (Doc. 54 at pp.

2-3).

Ultimately, the Court need not reach the parties’ substantive arguments because,

after Plaintiff’s Motion and Defendant’s Response were filed, Plaintiff was transferred

from Menard to Pontiac Correctional Center (see Doc. 55). Significantly, most, if not all,

of Plaintiff’s allegations of harm center upon the allegedly inadequate care and retaliatory

conduct he was experiencing at Menard (see generally Doc. 52). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

transfer to a different facility provides the relief his motion sought and renders his

specific concerns inapplicable. See Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004)

(“[W]hen a prisoner who seeks injunctive relief for a condition specific to a particular

prison is transferred out of that prison, the need for relief, and hence the prisoner’s claim,

become moot.”); Jones v. Butler, 663 Fed. Appx. 468, 470 (7th Cir. 2016) (Finding the

plaintiff’s “demand for injunctive relief became moot, since Jones demanded and got a

transfer” and only his conjecture suggested the possibility of a return to his prior facility).

For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED as MOOT

(Doc. 52).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on

the Issue of Exhaustion is DENIED (Doc. 51) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction is DENIED as MOOT (Doc. 52).

This action is now moving beyond the exhaustion of administrative remedies

phase. Accordingly, the stay on merits-based discovery is LIFTED and the parties can

proceed with discovery on the merits. A new scheduling order will be entered by separate

order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 8, 2026

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge