Flanks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYMOND FLANKS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-6897

THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al. SECTION: “G”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS

This litigation arises from Plaintiff Raymond Flanks’s (“Plaintiff”) wrongful conviction

for first-degree murder in 1985. Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant Jason Williams, in his

official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney.1 Plaintiff alleges the Orleans Parish District

Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) secured his wrongful conviction in violation of his constitutional

rights by withholding material exculpatory evidence in violation of OPDA’s obligations under

Brady v. Maryland.2

Before the Court is Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Brandy

Bradley (“Bradley”).3 Bradley is a vocational evaluator retained by Plaintiff to estimate the

earnings he lost while incarcerated. On December 1, 2025, the Court issued an Order denying

Defendants’ original motion to exclude Bradley’s testimony.4 However, the Court ordered that on

or before December 5, 2025, Bradley shall amend the report to reduce the lost wages/benefits

1 See Rec. Doc. 27. All of the claims against the City of New Orleans, Anne Kirkpatrick, John Dillmann and

John/Jane Does #1-20 have been dismissed by the Court on summary judgment or in Plaintiff’s stipulation of

dismissal. See Rec. Docs. 161, 175, 202.

2 Rec. Doc. 27 at 4–5. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3 Rec. Doc. 159.

4 Rec. Doc. 143.

numbers to account for expenses that Plaintiff would have sustained had he been out of prison.5

Defendants now argue that Bradley’s testimony should be excluded because she has failed to

comply with that Order.6 Plaintiff opposes the motion.7 Having considered the motion, the

memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the

motion.

I. Background

On November 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants in this Court for

alleged violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of state

law.8 On June 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.9 This matter is set for trial on

January 12, 2026. This case is related to Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful conviction in May 1985 for

the first-degree murder of Martin Carnesi.

In May 1985, a jury found Plaintiff guilty of first-degree murder in the death of Martin

Carnesi, and Plaintiff was sentenced to life in prison.10 Nearly 37 years later, on November 17,

2022, Plaintiff’s first-degree murder conviction was vacated.11 At the November 17, 2022

exoneration hearing, the “OPDA stated that ‘the State agrees that Mr. Flank’s [sic] conviction was

5 Id. at 15.

6 Rec. Doc. 159.

7 Rec. Doc. 162.

8 Rec. Doc. 1.

9 Rec. Doc. 27.

10 Rec. Doc. 27 at 12–13.

11 Id. at 14.

obtained in violation of Brady v. Maryland’ because ‘the State failed to disclose … materials [that]

are favorable, and under circumstances of the State’s case against Mr. Flank[s], material.’”12

Plaintiff retained Brandy Bradley, a licensed rehabilitation counselor and certified

vocational evaluator, to testify regarding Plaintiff’s lost wages while he was incarcerated. On

December 1, 2025, the Court issued an Order denying Defendants’ original motion to exclude

Bradley’s testimony.13 However, the Court ordered that on or before December 5, 2025, Bradley

shall amend the report to reduce the lost wages/benefits numbers to account for expenses that

Plaintiff would have sustained had he been out of prison.14

On December 5, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel provided correspondence and an amended expert

report to Defendants. Bradley’s amended report stated that she was making no deductions for

business expenses because the employment opportunities considered in her report “do not involve

incurring business expenses, such as expenses one would incur by running their own business as

opposed to working for another business as an employee or contractor.”15

On December 11, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Renewed Motion to Exclude Expert

Testimony of Brandy Bradley.16 On December 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the

motion.17 On December 18, 2025, Defendants filed a reply brief in further support of the motion.18

12 Id.

13 Rec. Doc. 143.

14 Id. at 15.

15 Rec. Doc. 159-2 at 1.

16 Rec. Doc. 159.

17 Rec. Doc. 162.

18 Rec. Doc. 169.

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion

In the instant motion, Defendants argue that Bradley’s testimony should be excluded in its

entirety because Plaintiff has refused to comply with the Court’s order requiring calculation and

deduction of expenses.19 Defendants point out that nothing in this Court’s order suggested that

Plaintiff was required to account for only “business expenses” that he would have incurred if he

had not been in prison.20 Defendants assert that Plaintiff should have requested reconsideration if

he disagreed with the Court’s ruling.21 Nevertheless, Defendants contend there is not a compelling

reason to reconsider the issue.22 Defendants argue that wrongful conviction cases are

distinguishable from physical injury cases where normal living expenses are not deducted.23

Unlike a plaintiff who is unable to work due to a physical injury but will still incur normal living

expenses, Defendants assert a plaintiff who is wrongfully convicted is relieved from paying most

normal living expenses.24

B. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to the Motion

Plaintiff contends that the Court’s order did not require Bradley to deduct living expenses

from the estimate of lost wages.25 Plaintiff asserts that Bradley has no basis or specialized

knowledge to estimate Plaintiff’s living expenses, as it is not something she has done in her

19 Rec. Doc. 159-1 at 5.

20 Id. at 2.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 3.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 3–4.

25 Rec. Doc. 162 at 1.

capacity as a vocational expert.26 Because Bradley is not an accountant or economist, Plaintiff

submits that opining about what living expenses Plaintiff might have incurred is beyond the scope

of her expertise.27 Plaintiff asserts that Bradley has the experience to opine on job-related expenses,

which she did and found none.28 Plaintiff cites numerous wrongful conviction cases from

throughout the country in which there was no suggestion that it would be appropriate to deduct

“living expenses” from lost earning capacity.29

C. Defendants’ Arguments in Further Support of the Motion

In reply, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s opposition suggests he did not retain the

correct experts.30 If Bradley is unable to perform all of the required steps to calculate lost income,

Defendants submit that does not mean she is excused from complying with the law—it means that

her opinions are unreliable and should be excluded.31 Defendants point out that Plaintiff has not

cited a single decision of any court analyzing the question and deciding that avoided “living

expenses” should not be deducted in a lost income calculation arising from wrongful conviction.32

At best, Defendants contend Plaintiff cites two cases in which the question was not analyzed

because it was not raised by the parties.33 Therefore, Defendants assert Plaintiff has not offered

26 Id. at 2.

27 Id. at 4.

28 Id.

29 Id. at 3 (collecting cases).

30 Rec. Doc. 169 at 2.

31 Id.

32 Id.

33 Id.

any compelling reason for the Court to reconsider or modify the prior ruling and Bradley’s

testimony should be excluded in its entirety for her failure to comply with that ruling.34

III. Law and Analysis

On December 1, 2025, the Court issued an Order denying Defendants’ original motion to

exclude Bradley’s testimony.35 However, the Court ordered that on or before December 5, 2025,

Bradley shall amend the report to reduce the lost wages/benefits numbers to account for expenses

that Plaintiff would have sustained had he been out of prison.36 On December 5, 2025, Plaintiff’s

counsel provided correspondence and an amended expert report to Defendants. Bradley’s amended

report stated that she was making no deductions for business expenses because the employment

opportunities considered in her report “do not involve incurring business expenses, such as

expenses one would incur by running their own business as opposed to working for another

business as an employee or contractor.”37

Defendants now argue that Bradley’s testimony should be excluded because she has failed

to comply with that Order.38 At issue in this motion is whether Bradley must deduct from her lost

earnings calculation living expenses Plaintiff would have incurred had he not been incarcerated.

The Court’s December 1, 2025 Order was not clear on the type of expenses that Bradley should

deduct. Upon further review of the available law, the Court finds that living expenses do not need

to be deducted from the lost earnings calculation.

34 Id. at 3.

35 Rec. Doc. 143.

36 Id. at 15.

37 Rec. Doc. 159-2 at 1.

38 Rec. Doc. 159.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates “‘a species of tort liability’ in favor of persons who are deprived

of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the [United States] Constitution.”39 When

a plaintiff seeks damages for violations of his constitutional rights, the level of damages is

ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts, as a matter

of federal common law.40 Damages in cases governed by common law tort principles are designed

to provide, “compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.”41

Black’s Law Dictionary defines compensatory damages as “[d]amages sufficient in amount to

indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered.”42 Compensatory damages may include not

only out-of-pocket losses and other monetary harms, but also such common law tort injuries as

“impairment of reputation . . ., personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.”43

While common law principles unequivocally provide that compensatory damages are

available in Section 1983 cases, it does not delineate the scope of the damages available. This is

because Section 1983 and the common law “do not contain every rule of decision required to

adjudicate claims asserted under them.”44 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, courts should engage in

a “three-step process to borrow an appropriate rule” when the applicable rule is not available.45

First, courts look to the law of the United States “so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same

39 Memphis Cmty. School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

40 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983).

41 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).

42 DAMAGES, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

43 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).

44 Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47 (1984).

45 Id.

into effect.”46 If such law is unavailable, courts then must move to the second step which requires

considering the application of state “common law, as modified and changed by the constitution

and statutes” of the forum state.47 Finally, the third step requires the Court, should it find state law

to be applicable, to consider whether applying state law would be “inconsistent with the

Constitution and laws of the United States.”48

Under common law, in personal injury cases, “[t]he general rule is that an injured plaintiff

is entitled to the full amount of any lost earning capacity unreduced by personal living expenses.”49

This is because “the injured plaintiff will continue to incur such expenses during his work life

expectancy and will be required to pay them from the proceeds of any award for lost earning

capacity.”50 “Consequently, the policy of not deducting living expenses puts the plaintiff in the

same economic position he would have occupied had he not been injured.”51 On the other hand, in

wrongful death cases, living expenses are generally excluded because “any award for lost earning

capacity relates to a period during which the decedent will not be alive and cannot possibly incur

any living expenses.”52

Neither party has identified, and the Court has been unable to locate, any caselaw directly

addressing whether living expenses should be deducted from lost wages in wrongful conviction

cases. Plaintiff has cited some authority where living expenses were not deducted from lost

46 Id. at 48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Doe v. United States. 737 F.Supp. 155, 164 (D.R.I. 1990).

50 Id.

51 Id.

52 Id.

earnings of a wrongfully incarcerated plaintiff, although the issue of such a deduction does not

appear to have been raised in those cases.53 In the prior Order, the Court primarily relied on Reeder

v. Williams, a decision by another judge in this District, holding that an accountant should have

deducted “expenses that Reeder would have sustained had he been out of prison and working as

an electrician.”54 Plaintiff suggests that Reeder should be read to mean business expenses, as

Reeder was alleging he would have been self-employed as an electrician had he not been

incarcerated. Defendants suggest that the district court was instructing the expert to deduct all

living expenses. The language in Reeder is unclear on this point.

Since common law does not provide any direct guidance on this issue, the Court next looks

to Louisiana law. There is a Louisiana statute providing for compensation in wrongful conviction

and imprisonment cases. The statute provides that an award of compensation for wrongful

conviction should not be reduced based on “expenses incurred by the state or any of its political

subdivisions in connection with the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of the

petitioner.”55 Although the statute does not apply to the Section 1983 claims in this lawsuit, it

provides some guidance on this issue.

If Plaintiff had not been incarcerated, he would have unquestionably incurred living

expenses. However, calculation of these living expenses appears to be outside the scope of

Bradley’s expertise. Calculating the living expenses Plaintiff would have incurred is also a highly

speculative proposition as living expenses vary widely based on person and circumstance.

53 See, e.g., White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 534–35 (8th Cir. 2010); Burton v. City of New York, 630 F.

Supp. 3d 586, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Wellner v. City of New York, 393 F. Supp. 3d 388, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting

cases).

54 Reeder v. Williams, No. CV 22-4614, 2025 WL 1142179, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2025).

55 See La. Rev. Stat. § 15:572.8(H)(4).

Defendants have not cited any authority to support their argument that Bradley’s testimony should

be excluded because she fails to deduct these expenses. Therefore, the Court will not require

Bradley to deduct living expenses from the lost earnings. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Exclude Expert

Testimony of Brandy Bradley** is DENIED.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 8th_ day of January, 2026.

NANNETTEJOLIVETTE BROWN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6 Rec. Doc. 159.

10