Teamsters Local 776 v. PLRB

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Teamsters Local 776, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1532 C.D. 2024

:

Pennsylvania Labor Relations : Argued: December 8, 2025

Board, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: January 8, 2026

Teamsters Local 776 (Union) petitions for review of the October 15, 2024

final order of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) affirming the decision

of the hearing examiner that the PLRB did not have jurisdiction over what it deemed

to be a judicial employer’s decision to terminate the employment of a court-appointed

employee rather than an unfair labor practices case. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Aurora Bayles (Bayles) worked for the Adams County Court of Common

Pleas (CCP)1 as a probation officer. She and other court-supervised employees were

1

CCP filed a notice of intervention on December 12, 2024, and filed a brief.

members of the Court-Appointed Professional Unit (bargaining unit) represented by

Union.2 She was also the bargaining unit’s Chief Steward.

Union and the County have had collective bargaining agreements (CBA)

since 2000. The CBA between the parties was most recently renewed in 2020 and

expired on December 31, 2023. The County and Union negotiated over the terms of

the new contract throughout 2023.

In December 2023, the County voted to approve a 4% general wage

increase for its non-Union employees. Union employees were given wage increases,

ranging from zero to 2.5% pursuant to their negotiated CBAs.

On or about August 21, 2023, some employees within the bargaining unit

filed a Decertification Petition, seeking to remove Union as their bargaining

representative. The County stayed further negotiations of the CBA pending the

determination of the Decertification Petition.3

On January 19, 2024, the CCP terminated Bayles’ employment for

violating workplace policies.4 On February 5, 2024, Union filed an unfair labor

practice charge against the County and the CCP, alleging that the CCP’s termination

2

The bargaining unit consists of all full-time and regular part-time support staff employees

who are directly involved with and necessary to the functioning of the courts and who are hired, fired,

and directed by the courts, including but not limited to employees in Court Administration, Domestic

Relations, District Magistrate’s Offices, Department of Probation Services, and Court Reporters.

3

Union also filed a charge of unfair labor practices regarding the County’s alleged refusal to

negotiate and/or arbitrate a new contract pending the Decertification Petition results. The PLRB

declined to issue complaints on the charge, finding that the County had no obligation to bargain or

proceed to interest arbitration pending the Decertification Petition proceedings. Union filed two other

unfair labor practice charges against the County, all of which were dismissed or declined by the

PLRB. Those decisions are not before us.

4

Evidently, Bayles distributed stress balls and stickers to other probation officers with an

acronym FAFO, meaning “F--- around and find out.”

2

of Bayles during the pending Decertification Petition and because of her protected

activities in assisting Union during that campaign, violated Section 1201(a)(1) and (3)

of the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA),5 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a)(1) and (3). On

March 15, 2024, the PLRB issued a complaint against both the County and the CCP

and set a hearing date.

On April 9, 2024, the CCP filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the

PLRB lacked jurisdiction over its decision to terminate Bayles based on the separation

of powers doctrine as the discipline involved a judicial employee.6

On June 6, 2024, the hearing examiner issued a recommended order

dismissing the unfair labor practice charge against the CCP. The hearing examiner,

relying on Cook v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 315 A.3d 885 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2024), concluded that the PLRB does not have jurisdiction over the CCP, under the

separation of powers doctrine, to review its employment disciplinary action against

Bayles, a judicial employee. The hearing examiner rejected Union’s position that this

matter concerns the rights of judicial employees to organize and collectively bargain

and that Teamsters Local 115 v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 619 A.2d 382

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (en banc) (holding that judicial employers may not interfere with

employees’ attempts to form a union for purposes of collectively bargaining with the

county on issues related to their pay and benefits), was controlling on the issue of the

PLRB’s jurisdiction.

Union filed Exceptions to the hearing examiner’s decision granting the

motion to dismiss the complaint. On October 15, 2024, the PLRB issued its final order

5

Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, as amended.

6

The County also filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2024, which was denied by the

hearing examiner on June 18, 2024.

3

denying Union’s Exceptions and granting the motion to dismiss the complaint filed by

the CCP.

II. Issues

On appeal,7 Union acknowledges that the CCP’s inherent right to

discharge its employees is well-settled and protected under the separation of powers

doctrine under article V, section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Relying primarily

on Teamsters Local 115, Union argues, however, that it is not a violation of the

separation of powers doctrine for the PLRB to hear an unfair labor practice charge

alleging that a court has impeded its employees’ ability to organize and collectively

bargain. Union argues that, here, the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over Union’s

claim against the CCP because the unfair practice alleged (i.e., the termination of

Bayles during the pendency of the Decertification Petition) encroaches on the rights of

the CCP’s employees to organize and bargain collectively.8 Specifically, Union

7

Our standard of review of the final order of the PLRB is limited to determining whether the

adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, is not in accordance with law,

is in violation of the practice and procedure of the Commonwealth agency, or whether any finding of

fact made by the agency and necessary to support its adjudication is not supported by substantial

evidence. Jefferson County Court Appointed Employees Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations

Board, 985 A.2d 697 (Pa. 2009).

8

The PLRB is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction by Section 1301 of the PERA, which

provides:

The [PLRB] is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in

any unfair practice listed in Article XII [(Section 1201)] of this act. This

power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means

of adjustment or prevention that have been or may be established by

agreement, law, or otherwise.

43 P.S. § 1101.1301. Section 1201(a) of the PERA makes it an unfair labor practice to, inter alia,

“(1) Interfer[e], restrain[] or coerc[e] employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Article IV

[(Section 401)] [Employee Rights ] of this act. 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a). Section 401 of the PERA, in

turn, provides: “It shall be lawful for public employes to organize, form, join or assist in employe

organizations or to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining

. . . .” 43 P.S. § 1101.401 (emphasis added).

4

contends that its unfair labor practice charge plainly raised an issue surrounding the

rights of the employees of the CCP “to organize and collectively bargain” under

Section 401, and that the CCP interfered with these rights, in violation of Section

1201(a)(1) of the PERA, by terminating Bayles during the pendency of the

Decertification Petition. In support of its position that Bayles’ termination constituted

“interference, restraint or coercion” with the rights of its employees to “organize and

collectively bargain,” Union explains:

[T]he CCP terminated a Union Steward amid contract

negotiations and an attempt to decertify [Union, as the unit’s

bargaining representative] . . . . At the time of her

termination, Bayles was involved in both the negotiations of

the new CBA, and the organization of bargaining unit

employees to thwart the [D]ecertification [P]etition. It is

clear and obvious that a union without a steward is in a

facially worse position than one with a steward, especially at

a time in which their responsibilities are at an all-time high.

(Union’s Br. at 14.) Union further contends that the termination of Bayles “directly

affected the rest of the bargaining units’ same rights in a completely foreseeable

manner” and that her termination was “felt across the entire bargaining unit.” Id. at

15-16. It maintains that Bayles’ termination was “pretextual” and that she was “the

victim of her station as a Union Steward.” Id. at 15.

It is Union’s position that there is no violation of the separation of powers

doctrine because here, as in Teamsters Local 115, the CCP has infringed upon its

employees’ attempts to organize and collectively bargain. It maintains that Cook does

not control because the issue at the heart of this matter is the CCP’s employees’ right

to organize, not the judiciary’s right to hire, fire, or supervise their employees.

III. Analysis

A court’s inherent right to hire, fire, and supervise court employees

without interference from other government branches is well established. County of

5

Butler v. O’Brien, 650 A.2d 1146, 1148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). A court’s right to hire,

fire, and supervise its employees has a solid foundation in the doctrine of separation of

powers set forth in article V, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Beckert v.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District Council 88,

425 A.2d 859, 862 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), aff’d per curiam, 459 A.2d 756 (Pa. 1983); see

also Jefferson, 985 A.2d at 707 (recognizing that Pa. Const. art. V, § 1 “vests with the

judiciary the power to administer justice,” and the judiciary’s authority over court

employees is “essential to the maintenance of an independent judiciary”).

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, the three branches of the

Commonwealth government (the General Assembly, the Executive, and the Judiciary)

are each separate, equal, and independent of the other. L.J.S. v. State Ethics

Commission, 744 A.2d 798, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Article V of the Pennsylvania

Constitution guarantees the independence of the Judiciary. See Com. ex rel. Gallas v.

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 636 A.2d 253, 261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), aff’d,

665 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1995). Thus, neither the Executive Branch nor the General

Assembly, acting through an administrative agency, may constitutionally infringe upon

the powers or duties of the Judiciary. L.J.S., 744 A.2d at 800. As our Pennsylvania

Supreme Court has stated, “[u]nder the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature

may not exercise any power specifically entrusted to the judiciary.” Court of Common

Pleas of Erie County (6th Jud. Dist.), Juvenile Probation Department v. Pennsylvania

Human Relations Commission, 682 A.2d 1246, 1247 (Pa. 1996). The separation of

powers principle extends to employment matters within the Judiciary itself. The law

is clear:

The courts of this Commonwealth under our Constitution

have certain inherent rights and powers to do all such things

as are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice.

The power to select judicial assistants is an inherent corollary

6

of the judicial power itself and the power to supervise or

discharge such personnel flows essentially from the same

source. That power may not, consistent with the

constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, be policed,

encroached upon or diminished by another branch of

government.

L.J.S., 744 A.2d at 800-01 (citations omitted). This rationale extends to all levels of

court personnel. Erie, 682 A.2d at 1248; see also Ellenbogen v. Allegheny County, 388

A.2d 730, 735 (Pa. 1978) (addressing the authority of Pennsylvania judges over court

employees, including those in the probation offices). At the same time, employees of

the judiciary may organize and collectively bargain with their county commissioners

for matters related to their pay. Beckert, (holding that the PLRB’s review of a judicial

clerk’s dismissal pursuant to the CBA encroached upon the judiciary’s power to hire

and fire court employees).

A. Teamsters Local 115

Teamsters Local 115, upon which Union relies here, involved a very

unusual situation, somewhat of an anomaly, the likes of which we have not seen since.

There, Teamsters Local 115 began an organizational drive among the employees of the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas court), which garnered

positive responses from various employee groups, including court criers, court officers,

and judicial aides. After the organizational drive started, however, the common pleas

court was advised that these positions would not appear in the following year’s budget

and would, instead, be replaced by the position of tipstaff. The result of this change

was the elimination of employees occupying these former positions, although some

were rehired as tipstaff. In addition, within a week of the organizing drive, 100

custodial positions were eliminated based on the judicial employer’s decision to

privatize. Because of the judicial employer’s actions, the labor union filed an unfair

labor practice charge with the PLRB, alleging that the reclassification of the judicial

7

employees and privatization of the custodial positions was motivated by anti-union

animus and to prevent unionization in violation of Section 1201(a)(1) and (3) of the

PERA.

The PLRB, however, relying on Beckert, refused to issue a complaint in

response to the charge because it concluded that the constitutional doctrine of

separation of powers prevented it from exercising jurisdiction over the charges where

the judicial branch of government was the respondent. Teamsters Local 115, 619 A.2d

at 400-01. Teamsters Local 115 filed exceptions to the PLRB’s decision, which the

PLRB denied, and an appeal to this Court followed.

On appeal, Teamsters Local 115 argued that Beckert9 was distinguishable

because at issue in the case before us at that time was the judicial employees’ rights to

organize and the vindication of those rights is left, in the first instance, to the PLRB.

9

In Beckert, a court of common pleas entered into a CBA which provided that no employee

could be demoted, suspended, discharged, or disciplined without just cause. Subsequently, a clerk

employed by a district justice, who had been discharged from her employment, appealed her discharge

through the grievance process. The clerk was reinstated at one level of the grievance procedure when

an agreement was reached between the court administrator and the union, but the discharge was

upheld when the district justice appealed the matter to the president judge. The CBA had provided

for an appeal to the president judge only when the grievance had not yet been resolved. The union

subsequently filed unfair labor practice charges with the PLRB against the court, claiming that the

court did not follow the termination procedures outlined in the parties’ CBA. The court, in turn, filed

an equity action in this Court’s original jurisdiction seeking to enjoin the PLRB from exercising

jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice charge on the theory that the discharge of a court employee

was a matter within the exclusive province of the judiciary. This Court agreed, concluding that the

PLRB’s review of the clerk’s dismissal pursuant to the CBA encroached upon the judiciary’s power

to hire and fire court employees. Beckert, 425 A.2d at 863-64. We explained that “PERA grants to

judicial employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively with county commissioners, or

other management representatives of the courts, concerning the financial terms of employment,” but

also acknowledged that “PERA cannot constitutionally be interpreted as immunizing such employees

from the inherent judicial power of discharge.” Id. at 863. Thus, we enjoined the PLRB from

exercising jurisdiction over the clerk’s discharge, noting that “the discharge of a judicial employee is

a judicial power vested by our Constitution in the courts. That power may not, consistent with the

constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, be policed, encroached upon, or diminished by

another branch of government.” Id. at 862.

8

We agreed with Teamsters Local 115 that Beckert was not controlling because in

Beckert, the rights of judicial employees to organize under the PERA was not at issue.

There, the court “had already entered into a voluntary [CBA] with the [union]” and the

CBA itself provided that the final appeal and final decision would rest with the

President Judge.” Id. at 403. We explained that “Beckert stands for the proposition

that the ultimate resolution of a dispute over a collective bargaining agreement which

already exists cannot rest with the executive or legislative branches of government

where the issue concerns the authority to select, discharge, or supervise court

personnel.” Id. (emphasis added). In explaining further why the matter before us was

unlike Beckert, we stated that

in the instant case,. . . we are faced with a situation where,

allegedly, the judiciary refuses to even allow its employees

to organize for the purpose of bargaining and

consequently, there is no [CBA] in dispute. Beckert is thus

clearly distinguishable insofar as it delineates the jurisdiction

of the [PLRB] over unfair labor practice charges levelled

against the judiciary.

Id. (emphasis added).

Given the particular facts in that case, we emphasized “that the judiciary

cannot fire its employees at its pleasure where its motivation is to prevent

organization and bargaining under [the PERA].” Id. at 408 (emphasis added).

Concluding that Beckert was not controlling because the right of judicial employees to

organize under the PERA was at issue, we carved out an exceptionally narrow

exception to the separation of powers rule where it is alleged that the judiciary is

impeding its employees’ ability to organize and collectively bargain. We held that it

is not a violation of the separation of powers principles for the PLRB to hear a charge

filed by judicial employees who claimed all positions in a proposed bargaining unit

that had yet to be established were eliminated in an effort to quash their efforts to

9

form a union and bargain with their judicial employer. Because the PLRB had the

exclusive jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice charge10 alleging that the judicial

employees were fired as a result of the exercise of their right to organize under the

PERA, we reversed the PLRB’s decision to decline the acceptance of jurisdiction and

remanded the case to the PLRB to conduct hearings on the unfair labor practice

charges.

Our holding in Teamsters Local 115 was incredibly narrow and applied

only to those cases in which employees were fired for allegedly exercising their right

to organize in the first instance, which is a violation of the PERA. We made it clear

that in that situation, the PLRB would have jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice

charge. That is, there would be no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

However, where the dispute involves the rights of the judicial employer to discharge

an employee under a CBA that already exists, the separation of powers principles

would be violated if the executive or legislative branches attempted to interfere with

judicial supervision of its employees. Id.

B. Cook

Recently, in Cook, this Court reaffirmed the need for strict adherence to

the separation of powers principles in cases under the PERA. There, the York County

Court of Common Pleas (court) entered into a CBA with the Service Employees

International Union, Local 668, Pennsylvania Social Services Union (SEIU), which is

the bargaining agent for court-appointed employees, including those in the Probation

and Parole and Domestic Relations units. A probation officer (a judicially appointed

10

Again, any interference with or restraint of the employees’ right to organize and bargain

collectively constitutes an unfair labor practice, 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a)(1), and, by virtue of Section

1301 of the PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.1301, exclusive original jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice

charges lies with the PLRB.

10

employee) received a written reprimand for violating the court’s search and seizure

policy. The probation officer, through his labor union, filed a grievance pursuant to

the CBA. Thereafter, the probation officer’s discipline was enhanced from a written

reprimand to a two-day suspension. As a result of this punishment enhancement, the

probation officer, with the assistance of SEIU, filed an unfair labor practice charge with

the PLRB alleging that the court retaliated against him for utilizing the grievance

process.

The PLRB issued a complaint, and the court filed a motion to dismiss

arguing that, under Beckert, the PLRB did not have jurisdiction to review the probation

officer’s discipline based on the separation of powers doctrine. The PLRB denied the

motion to dismiss but determined that no unfair labor practice occurred. The court

appealed the final order of the PLRB and also filed a declaratory judgment action in

this Court’s original jurisdiction raising a number of arguments, including that the

PLRB was without jurisdiction to reach the merits of the unfair labor practice charge,

i.e., that the court did not commit an unfair labor practice. SEIU and the PLRB filed

an application for summary relief arguing that the imposed discipline interfered with,

coerced, or restrained organizing and collective bargaining activity in such a way that

Teamsters Local 115 controlled. Cook, 315 A.3d at 896. In dismissing the application,

we distinguished Teamsters Local 115, noting that the unfair labor practice charge in

that case involved the judiciary’s refusal to allow its employees to organize for

purposes of bargaining, and that the circumstances before us in Cook did not involve

the organizing of employees. Rather, it involved the discipline of a judicial employee.

Subsequently, in a memorandum en banc opinion, we granted the court’s application

for a declaratory judgment and concluded that “the [PLRB] lacked jurisdiction to issue

the complaint” and vacated the PLRB’s final order. In so doing, we emphatically ruled

11

that the PLRB cannot assert jurisdiction over a court to review the court’s supervision

and discipline of court-appointed employees, as a matter of law, under the separation

of powers doctrine. Cook v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No.

161 M.D. 2021, filed April 5, 2024) (en banc).

C. Whether Teamsters Local 115 Controls

Here, Union contends that this is a case involving employees’ right to

organize and collectively bargain and not an issue policing the judiciary’s right to hire,

fire, and supervise. Therefore, Union contends, the factual scenario in this case is

similar to that of the judicial branch’s employees in Teamsters Local 115, not Cook.

We disagree.

The narrow holding of Teamsters Local 115 is clearly inapplicable here.

In this case, as in Beckert and Cook, a single employee, i.e., Bayles, was terminated.

Union, in its charge, alleged that Bayles was treated disparately than other employees

who committed more serious offenses because of her Union activities. Therefore, it is

clear that Union was seeking to have Bayles’ discipline reviewed by the PLRB, a non-

judicial branch of government. Under the separation of powers doctrine this is

forbidden.

Union alleges the CCP committed an unfair labor practice by terminating

Bayles during the pendency of the Decertification Petition and during the time when

Bayles was involved in both the negotiations of the new CBA and efforts to thwart the

Decertification Petition. Union asserts in limited and conclusory fashion, with no

elaboration, that “a union without a steward is in a facially worse position than one

with a steward,” that the termination of Bayles “directly affected the rest of the

bargaining units’ same rights in a completely foreseeable manner” and that her

termination was “felt across the entire bargaining unit.” (Union’s Br. at 15-16.)

12

Despite Union’s attempt to color the matter as an unfair labor practice,

there is no allegation that by terminating Bayles the CCP interfered with, restrained, or

coerced its employees from “organiz[ing], form[ing], join[ing] or assist[ing] in

employe organizations or [] engag[ing] in lawful concerted activities for the purpose

of collective bargaining . . . .” 43 P.S. §§ 1101.401; 1101.1201(a). The CCP’s

employees still have access to PERA’s processes, unlike the court employees in

Teamsters Local 115, who were prevented altogether from reaping the benefits of

collective bargaining because they were fired for attempting to organize under the

PERA. In Teamsters Local 115, this Court made abundantly clear that its ruling

applied only to alleged interference with employees’ initial efforts to organize because

courts, as public employers, are obligated to bargain under the PERA. This narrow

exception does not extend to judicial supervision of employees after a union is certified

and after a CBA is in place. In cases where a CBA exists, the employees have already

organized and engaged in collective bargaining. In that situation, as here and in Cook

and Beckert, the PLRB simply cannot, under the separation of powers doctrine,

interfere with the judiciary’s inherent right to hire, fire and supervise its employees

entirely.

In this matter, it is clear there was no attempt by the CCP to prevent

employees from organizing for purposes of bargaining with the County. A union was

already in place, as it had been for over 20 years, and there is no allegation that the

CCP, by firing Bayles, somehow prevented Union from meeting and bargaining with

the County on behalf of the CCP’s employees. In fact, the crux of this case is not

interference attempts by the judiciary’s employees to organize but rather the opposite.

The unfair labor practice charge here relates to the CCP’s employees’ attempts to

decertify their existing bargaining unit. Because both Union and a CBA were already

13

established, Teamsters Local 115’s narrow exception is inapplicable. Rather, this case

is governed by the overwhelming body of case law holding that the PLRB has

jurisdiction only if the unfair labor practice charge involves a court employee actually

organizing co-workers or bargaining with a county, and where the charge is based on

some other time period, it must be dismissed by the PLRB for want of jurisdiction.

Teamsters Local 115 is, therefore, distinguishable because unlike the situation in

Teamsters Local 115, the judiciary is not refusing to allow its employees to organize

for the purpose of bargaining. Rather, like in Beckert and Cook, the discipline of a

judicial employee is at issue.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the PLRB,

which dismissed Union’s unfair labor practices charge against the CCP for lack of

jurisdiction.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

14

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Teamsters Local 776, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1532 C.D. 2024

:

Pennsylvania Labor Relations :

Board, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8th day of January, 2026, the final order of the

Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board dated October 15, 2024, is hereby AFFIRMED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge