Small

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ACCELERANT SPECIALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY and

TEXAS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-425-KKM-AAS

ERIC SMALL,

Defendant.

___________________________________

ORDER

Accelerant Specialty Insurance Company and Texas Insurance Company

move to sanction Defendant Eric Small under Rule 11 based on his

unsuccessful motion to dismiss their complaint. Mot. (Doc. 23). Small’s counsel

objects to the motion. Resp. (Doc. 30). Because Small’s counsel made frivolous

and misleading representations, I grant the motion and order sanctions jointly

against Small’s counsel and his law firm, Neblett Law Group.

I. BACKGROUND

This Court’s December 29, 2025 order details the facts of the case. See

Order (Doc. 48), Accelerant Spec. Ins. Co. et al. v. Small, No. 8:24-CV-425-

KKM-AAS, 2025 WL 3750707 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2025). For ease of reference

here, Small purchased an insurance policy for his boat from the Insurers.

Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 10, 12, 14. When Hurricane Milton made landfall in 2024,

Small’s boat was damaged, and he submitted a claim to the Insurers. Id. ¶¶ 10,

23, 20–26. In response, the Insurers brought this declaratory judgment action

under federal admiralty jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 2.

Small, represented by David Avellar Neblett and James M. Mahaffey, III

of Neblett Law Group, moved to dismiss all counts. Small argued that there

was lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue.

He also contended that the Insurers failed to serve process, to plead with

specificity, to state a claim, and that abstention and equity cut against this

Court exercising jurisdiction. See MTD (Doc. 18). I denied the motion to

dismiss on all grounds. See Order.

The Insurers move to sanction Small under Rule 11 on the basis that his

motion to dismiss made frivolous factual and legal claims. See Mot. Small,

through the same counsel, opposes the motion. Resp. at 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Every lawyer is an officer of the court. And, in addition to his duty of

diligently researching his client’s case, he always has a duty of candor to the

tribunal.” Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). “Rule

11 authorizes the district court to sanction a party who files a pleading

containing a false factual representation if that party knew of, or did not

reasonably inquire into, the falsehood.” Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 875

(11th Cir. 2017) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b), (c)(1)). Sanctions apply not only

to affirmative falsehoods, but also to the denial of factual contentions without

a reasonable basis. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4), (c). Likewise, a district court may

grant sanctions when a party files a pleading “based on a legal theory that has

no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable

argument to change existing law.” Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th

Cir. 1998).

“The standard for testing conduct under amended Rule 11 is

reasonableness under the circumstances.” In re Off. of Ala. Att’y Gen., No. 21-

13514, 2023 WL 129438, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2023) (per curiam) (quoting

United States v. Milam, 855 F.2d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1988)). Courts conduct a

“two-step inquiry” that asks whether a claim is objectively frivolous and

without basis and whether the person who signed the pleadings should have

known. Id. The fact that a motion makes some nonfrivolous arguments does

not bar sanctions “for putting [an] opponent to the expense of opposing a

frivolous claim (or defense).” Reliable Salvage & Towing, Inc. v. Bivona, 476 F.

App’x 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Reed v. The Great Lakes

Companies, Inc., 330 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2003)).

“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law

firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 11(c)(1). Monetary sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2) for frivolous legal

claims must be imposed on an attorney, not the represented party, and

ordinarily a law firm is “held jointly responsible for a violation committed by

its partner.” Id. 11(c)(4), (5). When a sanction is “imposed on motion and

warranted for effective deterrence,” a court may order “payment to the movant

of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly

resulting from the violation.” Id. 11(c)(4). The sanction “must be limited to

what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Neblett’s representations in the motion to dismiss and response to the

motion for sanctions, taken collectively, warrant a sanction.1 In the motion to

dismiss, Neblett made patently frivolous legal arguments and contested

service of process without confirmation from his client that he had not been

served. Faced with the Rule 11 motion, Neblett does not admit fault. Instead,

he continues to misrepresent the law and attempt to mislead the Court. Given

that Neblett describes himself as maritime expert and has made the same

frivolous arguments before, Neblett should have known his assertions were

baseless and sanctions are appropriate. Accordingly, I grant the motion.

1 While both Neblett and Mahaffey signed the filings and in turn violated Rule 11,

the analysis refers to Neblett who, as lead counsel, is “responsible to the court and

the other parties for the conduct of the action.” Local Rule 1.01(d)(9).

A. Service of Process Objection

In the motion to dismiss, Neblett “disputes that process was sufficiently

served” on Small but does not say why, reference the proof of service, or provide

any affidavit or evidence as required. MTD at 17. The Insurers argue that this

objection is frivolous and sanctionable. Mot. at 8. Although frivolous in itself,

Neblett’s later behavior escalates to the level of warranting sanctions.

Specifically, in his response, Neblett effectively admits that he did not

consult with his client before alleging improper service in the motion to dismiss

and thus had no reasonable basis to do so; continues to challenge service with

no reasonable basis; and provides borderline misleading information to the

Court.

Some background clarifies. The Insurers filed this complaint on

February 20, 2025. Compl. In March, Neblett spoke with the Insurers’ counsel,

who confirmed that they had not yet served Small. Resp. at 9. On April 1, the

Insurers served Small and filed proof on the docket. (Doc. 9). According to

Neblett, he contacted his client Small at some point (it is not clear when) about

the issue, “but has not yet received a response.” Resp. at 9. Despite this, Neblett

entered an appearance objecting to service of the complaint and objected to

service again in the motion to dismiss. Notice (Doc. 11) at 1; MTD at 17. After

the Insurers moved for sanctions, Neblett—still without speaking to his client

on the issue—continued to object to service, all without mentioning that proof

of service was filed on the docket.2 Resp. at 9.

This behavior is ground for sanctions under the prongs that ban

affirmative falsehoods and unwarranted denials of facts. See FED. R. CIV. P.

11(b)(3), (b)(4), (c). Given that proof of service was filed and Neblett has never

represented to the Court that his client told him a reason to suspect that

service was invalid, Neblett cannot reasonably believe that he had, or has, a

basis for contesting service. And his failure to mention the proof of service filed

on the docket is borderline misleading. See Wharton v. Superintendent

Graterford SCI, 95 F.4th 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Candor means more than

just not lying. . . . it means steering clear of half-truths, inconsistencies,

mischaracterizations, exaggerations, omissions, evasions, and failures to

correct known misimpressions created by the lawyers’ own conduct.” (citation

modified)). Neblett failed to heed the duty of candor and his actions warrant

sanctions.

2 Below is the entirety of Neblett’s response to the question of service:

This case has a protracted history of service issues and requests to accept

service and the undersigned believes genuine disputes exist over whether Mr.

Small was personally served. In March 2025, the undersigned contacted

counsel for Plaintiffs to request an extension to respond to the Complaint and

as of late March, 2025, counsel for Plaintiffs had advised that Mr. Small had

not yet been served with process. The undersigned has reached out to the

Defendant as to this issue but has not yet received a response.

Resp. at 9.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Objection

Neblett’s objection to subject matter jurisdiction in the motion to dismiss

was frivolous and misleading. See Mot. at 4–6. The law is well-settled not only

on jurisdiction over maritime contracts but specifically marine insurance

contracts like the one at issue here. See GEICO Marine Ins. Co. v. Shackleford,

945 F.3d 1135, 1139 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Marine insurance contracts qualify as

maritime contracts, which fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal

courts and are governed by maritime law.”). Yet Neblett challenged subject

matter jurisdiction on the basis that the complaint failed to meet the standards

of a test that is patently inapplicable to this case. Specifically, Neblett asserted

that the applicable test was for admiralty jurisdiction over torts with no

mention of the test for contracts, the standard clearly governing here. See

MTD at 5–6; Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004) (explaining that

when a court assesses whether a case falls under admiralty or maritime

jurisdiction, the court applies a different test based on whether the dispute

sounds in contract or tort).

When confronted with this issue, Neblett argues that “Small is permitted

to attempt to persuade this Court to apply a different test based on the facts of

this case.” Resp. at 8. This is true, and Rule 11 does not require attorneys to

specifically indicate when they are arguing to change the law. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (hereinafter “1993

Committee Notes”). But the objection in the motion to dismiss was akin to an

assertion that the standard for torts is the law and thus violated the duty of

candor. See Pierce v. Com. Warehouse, 142 F.R.D. 687, 690 (M.D. Fla. 1992). In

any event, even if Neblett was arguing to change the law, the change plainly

had no basis and was frivolous. This behavior warrants sanctions. See Hatteras

of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 853 F.2d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 1988)

(affirming sanctions and describing a plaintiff’s assertion of frivolous

admiralty jurisdiction arguments as “exemplif[ying] the type of situation Rule

11 was designed to prevent”).

C. Misstatement of Law on Attorney’s Fees

To make matters worse, Neblett misstates the law and misrepresents

case holdings in his response to the sanctions motion. As one example, Neblett

asserts that “attorney’s fees are not recoverable in an admiralty action.” Resp.

at 2. While true that attorney’s fees are generally not allowed in admiralty as

part of an award to the prevailing party post-judgment (although there are

exceptions, including when a party “act[s] in bad faith in the course of the

litigation,” Misener Marine Const., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832,

838 (11th Cir. 2010)), attorney’s fees are allowed for violations of Rule 11. See

Cigainero v. Carnival Corp., 426 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1306–07 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

(imposing sanctions under Rule 11 for making a frivolous legal argument and

making false statements of fact). Neblett cites no case in which attorney’s fees

were denied under Rule 11 because the case was in admiralty. This behavior

contributes to “a pattern of” misstating well-settled law and is further ground

for sanction. See 1993 Committee Notes (advising that “whether [the improper

conduct] was part of a pattern of activity” is relevant in considering sanctions).

D. Counsel Should Have Known the Objections Were Frivolous

A reasonable lawyer would have known that the above factual

representations and legal claims were baseless. Indeed, Neblett represents

himself as a “Board-Certified Expert in Admiralty & Maritime Law” who

earned a “Certificate in Reasonable Attorney Fees.” David Avellar Neblett,

Neblett Law Group (last visited Jan. 5. 2026), https://perma.cc/4M39-7QVF;

see also Maritime/Admiralty, Neblett Law Group (last visited Jan. 5, 2026),

https://perma.cc/Q3W4-6K4H (describing the practice as “a full-service

maritime law firm”). Given that Neblett “has engaged in similar conduct in

other litigation,” the mere denial of the motion to dismiss is insufficient to deter

the misconduct. 1993 Committee Notes; see Accelerant Specialty Ins. Co. v.

Ballard, No. 23-61652-CIV, 2024 WL 6822676, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2024).

And though the motion was filed against Small, Neblett is “responsible for the

violation[s],” even the one premised on improper service. 1993 Committee

Notes (“The person signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a document has a

nondelegable responsibility to the court, and in most situations is the person

to be sanctioned for a violation.”). As a result, sanctions against Neblett and

Neblett Law Group jointly are appropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“Absent

exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a

violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

I grant the motion for sanctions based on Neblett’s frivolous and

misleading objections to service of process, subject matter jurisdiction, and

attorney’s fees.3 Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. The motion for sanctions (Doc. 23) is GRANTED IN PART.

2. By January 20, 2026, the Insurers must file a paper detailing the

amount of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred for preparing the

motion for sanctions, replying to Neblett’s response to the motion for

sanctions, and responding to the frivolous objections in the motion to

dismiss. The Insurers shall limit the computation to fees and costs

incurred while litigating the issues of subject matter jurisdiction, service

of process, and attorney’s fees. The memorandum shall include affidavits

3 I grant the motion without a hearing given that Small has had the opportunity to

be heard and there are no factual questions that would change the outcome of the

motion. See Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 525 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The accused

(under Rule 11) must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing as may

be appropriate . . . . Rule 11 does not require that a hearing separate from the trial

or other pretrial hearings be held on Rule 11 charges before sanctions can be

imposed.”); Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993) (abuse of discretion

for not holding a hearing because of “contradictory factual issues”).

and billing records in support of the amount and reasonableness of the

fees.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 6, 2026.

ate a Mizelle

United States District Judge

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