Hunt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY HUNT, CASE NO. 4:24-CV-01820-JPC

Petitioner, JUDGE J. PHILIP CALABRESE

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DARRELL A. CLAY

WARDEN ANTHONY DAVIS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

With the aid of counsel, Petitioner Anthony Hunt, a prisoner in state custody, seeks a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF #1). The District Court has jurisdiction under

§ 2254(a) and the matter is referred to me to prepare a Report and Recommendation.1

(Non-document entry of Jan. 10, 2025). Respondent Warden Anthony Davis, as Warden of the

Trumbull Correctional Institution (hereinafter, the State), filed the Return of Writ with the state

court record. (ECF #6). Mr. Hunt filed a Traverse and the State responded with a surreply.

(ECF #13, 14).

Challenging his convictions for felonious assault and having a weapon while under a

disability, Mr. Hunt asserts two grounds for relief. As outlined below, I recommend the District

Court DENY Grounds One and Two, DISMISS the petition, and DENY a certificate of

appealability (COA) on all grounds.

1 This matter was originally referred to Magistrate Judge Reuben Sheperd who

recused himself on January 10, 2025. (ECF #7).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State court factual findings

The Ohio Court of Appeals, Eighth Appellate District, set forth the operative facts here,

which are presumed correct unless Mr. Hunt rebuts them by clear and convincing evidence. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). On reconsideration, the Eighth District determined:

{¶3} Hunt was charged with one count of aggravated murder (Count 1), two counts

of murder (Counts 2 and 3), two counts of felonious assault (Counts 4 and 5), one

count of tampering with evidence (Count 6), one count of having a weapon while

under disability (Count 7), one count of illegally possessing a firearm in a liquor-

permit premises (Count 8), and two counts of aggravated riot (Counts 9 and 10). The

charges were brought against Hunt in connection with the shooting death of

Ge’Ongela Rivers (“Rivers”) that occurred at My Friends Restaurant in Cleveland,

Ohio, on March 22, 2021. Hunt exercised his right to a jury trial on all counts except

Count 7, which was tried to the court.

{¶4} Skyla Johnson (“Johnson”), Hunt’s girlfriend, testified at trial that she was living

with Hunt and his brother, Keondre Austin (“Austin”), at the time of the shooting.

In the early morning hours of March 22, 2021, Johnson, Hunt, and Austin took an

Uber to My Friends Restaurant in Cleveland. At the restaurant, they sat in a booth

and ate some food.

{¶5} Meanwhile, Rivers and her friend, Antonio Ortiz (“Ortiz”), entered the

restaurant to order food to go. They were sitting on stools at a counter near the front

of the restaurant looking at a menu when they began to interact with Austin, who

passed them as he was going outside to see if the Uber Johnson had called was outside

the restaurant.

{¶6} While Austin was speaking with Ortiz, Johnson went outside to smoke a

cigarette, and Hunt, who remained at the booth, began putting leftover food into

carry-out boxes. Hunt testified that as he was packing up the food, he noticed that

Austin and Ortiz were engaged in conversation that was not “positive.” Cetewayo

Fuller (“Fuller”), a patron from a nearby booth, also stated that the tone of the

conversation was “aggressive.” Nicole Hanna (“Hanna”), a server who was standing

at the counter ringing up a to-go order at the time of the shooting, testified there was

“tension” between Ortiz and Austin. Neither Johnson nor Hunt knew Rivers or Ortiz

prior to the shooting incident. Nevertheless, Hunt became concerned for Austin’s

safety due to the tone of the conversation.

{¶7} Hunt testified that he called Austin back to the booth, in an apparent effort to

stop him from engaging with Ortiz. Surveillance video, admitted into evidence as

state’s exhibit No. 602 shows that Austin responded to Hunt and began walking back

to the booth but then turned back toward Ortiz and Rivers. State’s exhibit No. 602

shows that when Austin walked back toward Ortiz, Ortiz stood up and began walking

toward the front door to the restaurant. Austin followed Ortiz, and Hunt followed

Austin.

{¶8} The video shows that Ortiz walked toward the front of the restaurant and turned

toward Austin while drawing a firearm from inside his jacket. Hunt, who was

standing behind Austin, almost simultaneously drew a firearm from his inside

pocket. Austin was unarmed and Hunt knew he was unarmed. According to Tom

Ciula (“Ciula”), the video forensic analyst with the Cleveland Police Department

who authenticated state’s exhibit No. 602, the video evidence establishes that Ortiz

began shooting three twenty-fifths of a second before Hunt began shooting. Both

Ortiz and Hunt fired numerous shots at each other. Ortiz shot from behind a wall

in the vestibule area of the restaurant, and Hunt fired several shots toward the door,

where Ortiz was taking cover. At some point during the shooting, Hunt was shot in

the ankle and fell to the floor. In that moment, Ortiz ran out the front door of the

restaurant to a car parked in the parking lot and fled the scene, leaving Rivers alone

in the restaurant.

{¶9} Meanwhile, Hunt realized he had been shot but continued shooting. He

explained at trial that he had heard numerous gunshots, he did not know where all

the bullets were coming from, and decided to shoot Rivers, who was behind him

because he thought the bullets may have also come from her. He explained:

Well, I couldn’t understand where the gunshots were coming from.

And when I finally realized that I was shot, I heard movement behind

me, and I really didn’t have enough time to see who that was behind

me or if they had a firearm or not before I had to make a split[-]second

decision on whether or not to possibly end the threat that was behind

me.

The video evidence confirms that Hunt quickly decided to shoot Rivers, who was

unarmed and running away.

{¶10} Upon being shot, Rivers initially fell to the floor but subsequently stood up

and walked outside the restaurant where she collapsed. An autopsy revealed that

Rivers sustained two gunshot wounds. One wound was composed of injuries to her

liver, left kidney, pancreas, abdominal arteries, and portal vein. The other wound

was composed of injuries to Rivers’s skeletal muscle and cecum. According to Dr.

David Dolinak, a deputy medical examiner with the Cuyahoga County Medical

Examiner’s Office, Rivers died as a result of these injuries. Austin sustained six

gunshot wounds and also died from his injuries.

{¶11} Hunt argued at trial that he was acting in self-defense when he shot Rivers.

Detective Robby Prock (“Det. Prock”) of the Cleveland Police Department testified

that he collected 21 casings from Ortiz’s FN five-seven firearm, most of which were

recovered from the vestibule area of the restaurant. Det. Prock also recovered 14

cartridge casings from Hunt’s Glock. The video evidence demonstrates that all of the

shooting occurred during a six-second timeframe.

{¶12} The trial court granted a defense motion for acquittal on Counts 8, 9, and 10,

which alleged one count of illegal possession of a firearm in a liquor-permit premises

charge and two counts of aggravated riot. Defense counsel requested jury instructions

on self-defense, transferred intent, and on lesser-included offenses. The court denied

counsel’s request for a lesser-included-offense instruction but provided instructions

on self-defense and transferred intent.

{¶13} The jury found Hunt guilty on Counts 4 and 5, which alleged felonious assault

and identified Rivers as the victim, but it acquitted him of the other charges. The

court found Hunt guilty of having a weapon while under disability as alleged in

Count 7. The court merged Counts 4 and 5 and sentenced Hunt to a minimum of

eight years on Count 5, plus three years on an attendant firearm specification for an

aggregate minimum prison term of 11 years. The court sentenced Hunt to 36 months

on the having weapons-while-under-disability charge and ordered the 36-month

sentence to be served consecutive to the sentence on Count 5, for an aggregate

minimum 14-year prison term. And, pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, the court

sentenced Hunt to an indefinite prison term of 14–18 years in prison.

(ECF #6-1 at PageID 212-16 (citations omitted); see also State v. Hunt, No. 111892, 2023 WL

4010521, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 2023), appeal not allowed, 220 N.E.3d 814 (Ohio 2023)

(table)).

B. Direct appeal

Through counsel, Mr. Hunt timely appealed his convictions to the Eighth District where

he raised five assignments of error:

1. [Mr. Hunt] was denied the due process of law under the United States and

Ohio Constitutions [due to] errors in jury instructions on transferred intent

and mistake of fact, and missing instructions on reckless assault.

2. Hunt was denied due process by way of inconsistent verdicts.

3. Prosecutorial misconduct and/or ineffective assistance of counsel in closing

arguments.

4. The State of Ohio presented insufficient evidence that [Mr. Hunt] did not

act in self-defense.

5. The manifest weight of the evidence did not support a conviction of felonious

assault.

(See ECF #6-1 at PageID 99) (cleaned up). On May 11, 2023, the Eighth District affirmed. (See id.

at PageID 165).

Mr. Hunt timely sought reconsideration under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(A), arguing the

Eighth District applied the wrong standard of review to the first assignment of error and, as to the

other assignments of error, made factual mistakes and did not address arguments made. (Id. at

PageID 191-99). On June 15, 2023, the Eighth District granted reconsideration on the first

assignment of error only, vacated its prior decision, and issued a new decision again affirming Mr.

Hunt’s convictions. (Id. at PageID 209, 211).

On July 31, 2023, through counsel, Mr. Hunt timely appealed to the Supreme Court of

Ohio, advancing five propositions of law:

1. A defendant acts in self-defense when a defendant honestly believes they are

in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, even when that belief,

while grounded in the factual circumstances of the case, is mistaken. When

the defendant negligently harms another as a result of such a mistaken

believe, self-defense will still apply.

2. SB 201 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.

3. Defense counsel is ineffective when counsel fails to object to prosecutorial

arguments that incorrectly limit the application of the doctrine of self-

defense.

4. When the jury’s verdict in one count reveals that the jury believed the

defendant acted in self-defense, a guilty verdict for a lesser-included offense

contained in a separate count of the indictment denies the defendant due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 2 of the

Ohio Constitution.

5. When a material question of fact is raised regarding the mental state of a

defendant using proportionate force in self-defense, a trial court’s failure to

give an instruction on reckless assault denise the defendant due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio

Constitution.

(ECF #6-1 at 236-37, 240). On April 2, 2024, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to hear his

appeal. (Id. at PageID 268; see also Hunt, 220 N.E.3d 814).

FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION

In his petition before this Court, Mr. Hunt raises two grounds for habeas relief:

GROUND ONE: Petitioner was denied due process of law by the trial court’s failure

to properly instruct the jury on self-defense.

Supporting Facts: Petitioner, who had just been shot, mistakenly believed that the

assailant’s companion was working in concert to harm him, and shot and killed the

companion. Instead of instructing the jury that self-defense required both an

objective and subjective standard, the trial court instructed the jury that Petitioner,

to be entitled to a claim or self-defense, must “reasonably and honestly believe” that

he was about to be killed or receive great bodily harm.

GROUND TWO: Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of trial counsel by counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct

in closing argument.

Supporting Facts: In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that Petitioner’s self-

defense argument could be rejected if he acted negligently or recklessly, in

contradiction to the statutory requirements of the offense. Defense counsel offered

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the argument.

(ECF #1 at PageID 3-4).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs Mr. Hunt’s

habeas petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). AEDPA recognizes that “[s]tate courts

are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights” so AEDPA acts as a “formidable barrier

to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v.

Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). AEDPA “dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-

court rulings which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell v.

Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (citation and quotation omitted). Habeas courts review the last-

explained state-court judgment on the federal claim at issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805

(1991).

Under AEDPA, habeas relief cannot be granted for a person in custody pursuant to a state

conviction unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

For the purposes of § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” means “the governing

legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its

decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). It includes “the holdings, as opposed to

dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).

A state court’s decision is “contrary” to Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives

at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has decided on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Id. at 405. The word “contrary” means “diametrically different, opposite in

character or nature, or mutually opposed.” Id. A state court does not act contrary to Supreme

Court precedent when the precedent of the Supreme Court is ambiguous or nonexistent. See

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (per curiam).

A state court’s decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court

precedent if (1) the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the state prisoner’s case or (2) the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court’s precedent to a new context

where it should not be applied or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle in a new context

where it should apply. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A state-court decision must be “objectively

unreasonable” to have unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent which requires more than

the decision being “erroneous” or “incorrect.” See id. at 409-11. “It bears repeating that even a

strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court’s factual determinations stand unless they too are

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court. See Harrington, 562 U.S.

at 100. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized “a state court factual determination is not

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion.”

Burt, 571 U.S. at 18. Under AEDPA, “a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall

be presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner offers clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2554(e)(1).

Comity principles also require federal courts to defer to a state court’s judgment on issues

of state substantive and procedural law. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986); Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982). Federal courts must accept a state court’s interpretation of its statutes

and rules of practice. Duffel v. Dutton, 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1986).

The standard is intended to be difficult to meet and reflects the view that habeas corpus is

a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” not a substitute for

ordinary error correction through appeal. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-03; see also Brown v.

Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 133 (2022) (describing habeas as an “extraordinary remedy, reserved for

only extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system and different in kind from providing

relief on direct appeal”) (cleaned up). To obtain “habeas corpus from a federal court, a state

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing

law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

ANALYSIS

1. Ground One lacks merit because even if the jury instruction on self-defense were faulty,

Mr. Hunt has not demonstrated the instruction violated clearly established federal law.

In Ground One, Mr. Hunt argues the trial court violated his due-process rights by

erroneously instructing the jury that self-defense required a defendant reasonably and honestly

believe that death or great bodily harm would occur when the proper instruction was that a

defendant must subjectively believe he is in danger and that belief must be objectively reasonable.

(ECF #1 at PageID 3; ECF #13 at PageID 1618-20). The State responds that the state courts

determined the instruction was correct under state law and Mr. Hunt has not shown the

instruction rendered the trial fundamentally unfair or violated the United States Constitution. (See

ECF #6 at PageID 50-51).

The correctness of a jury instruction typically is a matter of state law. Keahey v. Marquis,

978 F.3d 474, 478 (6th Cir. 2020). To warrant habeas relief, a petitioner must show his

“conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Claims that allegedly erroneous jury instructions violate federal

constitutional guarantees of due process are subjected to heightened scrutiny because the Supreme

Court has cautioned that the category of jury instructions rising to a due process violation is drawn

“very narrowly.” Id. at 72-73. The relevant inquiry is “whether the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Cupp v. Naughten,

414U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see also Keahey, 978 F.3d at 478 (holding that petitioner “must show that

the trial judge not only misread state law but also misread it so badly that it violated the

[Constitution]”).

Mr. Hunt challenges this instruction:

Tests for reasonable grounds and honest belief: In deciding whether the Defendant

had reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief that he was in imminent or

immediate danger of death, you must put yourself in the position of the Defendant,

with his characteristics, his knowledge or lack of knowledge, and under the

circumstances and conditions that surrounded him at the time. You must consider

the conduct of Ge’Ongela Rivers and/or Antonio Ortiz and decide his or her . . . acts

and words caused the Defendant to reasonably and honestly believe that the

Defendant was about to be killed or receive great bodily harm.

(ECF #6-7 at PageID 1481).

Mr. Hunt argues the state court “conflated the subjective and objective components of self-

defense; essentially, it required the ‘honest belief’ to be objectively reasonable.” (ECF #13 at

PageID 1622). He advances several cases to argue the instruction was incorrect under Ohio law.

(Id. at PageID 1618-19). But the state courts already rejected this argument and held the

instruction was “an accurate statement of the law relative to the second element of a self-defense

claim” and was “virtually identical” to another instruction the Supreme Court of Ohio previously

upheld. (See ECF #6-1 at PageID 221-23) (citing State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 330-31 (Ohio

1997)). Federal habeas courts do not function as another state appellate court reviewing state

courts’ decisions on state law. See Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 1988). Mindful of

this role, this Court need not decide whether the instruction was correct as a matter of state law

because even if erroneous, the instruction did not violate clearly established federal law.

As discussed above, clearly established federal law means “the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade,

538 U.S. at 71-72. It includes “the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Thus, Mr. Hunt must show the erroneous instruction “violated concrete

Supreme Court holdings,” “not generalized principles.” Keahey, 978 F.3d at 478 (citing Marshall v.

Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 61 (2013) and Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 318 (2015)).

Mr. Hunt cites Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147, to assert the instruction “so infected the entire trial

that the resulting conviction violates due process.” (See ECF #13 at PageID 1621, 1623). Beyond

citing Cupp’s generalized principle, Mr. Hunt offers just one case, Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867,

876 (6th Cir. 1999), as an example of where an erroneous self-defense instruction warranted

habeas relief. (ECF #14 at PageID 1621-22). But Barker is a Sixth Circuit decision and the

Supreme Court has held “[Sixth Circuit] precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal

law,’ as determined by the Supreme Court” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Parker v. Matthews,

567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012). Therefore, Sixth Circuit precedent “cannot form the basis for habeas

relief under AEDPA” either on its own or “on the ground that they merely reflect what has been

‘clearly established’ by [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Id.

Even if Barker alone could provide the basis for habeas relief, Barker does not apply to Mr.

Hunt’s situation. In Barker, the Sixth Circuit held that a trial court’s failure to give a self-defense

instruction specifically stating the defendant was justified in using deadly force to repel a rape

under Michigan law violated the petitioner’s due-process rights and rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court held the jury instruction was erroneous

under Michigan law, but the error was harmless because no reasonable juror would have believed

the defendant’s claim of self-defense. Id. at 870. The issue in Barker was thus “whether, under

[AEDPA], the Michigan Supreme Court’s finding of harmless error was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, federal law.” 199 F.3d at 871-72. In contrast, as noted above, Ohio

courts found the jury instruction given at Mr. Hunt’s trial was correct under Ohio law and did not

make a harmless-error finding. Thus, Barker’s holding that the Michigan court violated federal law

in its harmless-error analysis is inapplicable here. See Gimotty v. Elo, 40 F.App’x 29, 36 (6th Cir.

2002) (distinguishing Barker on this basis).

I thus recommend the District Court DENY Ground One as without merit.

2. Ground Two lacks merit because the state court reasonably rejected Mr. Hunt’s

ineffective-assistance claim.

In his second ground, Mr. Hunt argues his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient

assistance by not objecting to the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument conflating the

subjective and objective components to self-defense to suggest the jury could reject Mr. Hunt’s self-

defense theory if he acted negligently or recklessly. (See ECF #1 at PageID 3; ECF #13 at

PageID 1622-23). The State responds that the state court’s decision receives AEDPA deference and

it applied the controlling federal law and reasonably rejected Mr. Hunt’s ineffective-assistance

claim. (ECF #6 at PageID 52-53).

As noted earlier, AEDPA “dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell, 543 U.S.

at 455 (citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, Mr. Hunt must demonstrate the Eighth

District’s adjudication of his ineffective-assistance claim either “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceedings.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The two-part test in Strickland v. Washington, 486 U.S. 668 (1984), is the clearly established

federal law governing ineffective-assistance claims. This standard requires the habeas petitioner

establish (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on

all the circumstances in the case, such that the attorney did not function as “counsel” guaranteed

by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. To satisfy the deficiency prong, the habeas petitioner “must show

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 668. To

satisfy the prejudice prong, the habeas petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d)

is all the more difficult. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. First, the standards of Strickland and

§ 2254(d) are both highly deferential. See Strickland, 486 U.S. at 689; Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n.7.

When both apply, the ordinary deference in habeas review is “doubly so.” Knowles v. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). Second, unreasonableness under Strickland is different from

unreasonableness under § 2254(d). Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. When § 2254(d) applies, the

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. Id. Instead, the question is whether a

reasonable argument exists that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Id. Because the

Strickland standard is a general one, the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. at 123.

Mr. Hunt argues his counsel was ineffective for not objecting when the prosecutor asserted

during closing argument that the jury could reject his self-defense argument if it found he acted

negligently or recklessly. (See ECF #1 at PageID 4; ECF #13 at PageID 1622-23). The Eighth

District addressed this claim alongside Mr. Hunt’s standalone claim for prosecutorial misconduct

for that statement:

{¶45} In the third assignment of error, Hunt argues the state engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct by impermissibly asserting during closing argument that Hunt should be

subject to a negligence or recklessness standard when evaluating his claim of self-

defense.

* * *

{¶47} Hunt argues, in the alternative, that because defense counsel failed to object to

the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, he was deprived of his constitutional right

to the effective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,

the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that

deficient performance. In the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice

is established when the defendant demonstrates “a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.”

{¶48} Hunt objects to the following closing remarks by the prosecutor:

I am not saying that Anthony Hunt needs to get up off the floor and

dust himself off and have a cup of coffee and properly assess the

situation. That’s not what I am saying. If you take one half second

more, you’re already turned, already looking at Ms. Rivers as she's

running away. Her back is turned. Just take that extra half second. It’s

your responsibility. You’re the one claiming to be acting in self-

defense. The situation is unfolding too quickly because he chose for

it to unfold too quickly. The harm that Mr. Ortiz causes is

reprehensible and distinct from any harm that you could possibly

fathom Ms. Rivers had caused to him. You need to slow it down, not

the situation. You control the situation. That’s a test of

reasonableness, my friends. Just one more second, and she’s alive

today, and we might not be here. It’s not reasonable to make

assumptions in situations like this.

Hunt contends these statements lowered the state’s burden of proof for conviction.

As previously stated, defense counsel failed to object to these remarks and thus

forfeited all but plain error.

{¶49} Hunt argues the prosecutor’s statements subjected him to a negligence standard

of reasonableness, which was lower than the standard that should have applied to

him. However, Hunt fails to identify and explain the standard he claims should have

been applied to him instead. Moreover, as previously stated, the reasonableness of a

defendant’s actions when acting in self-defense involves both a subjective and

objective component. With respect to the objective component, Thomas holds that

the jury must consider “all of the defendant’s particular characteristics, knowledge,

or lack of knowledge, circumstances, history, and conditions at the time of the

attack” to determine whether he reasonably believed that he was imminent danger

when he acted in self-defense.

{¶50} The prosecutor argued that Hunt had a duty to act reasonably. The prosecutor

acknowledged that a defendant may defend himself, but he argued that the

defendant cannot unreasonably kill the people around him even though he is under

attack. To hold otherwise would negate the objective reasonableness element of a

self-defense claim. The prosecutor noted that Rivers had her back turned to Hunt

because she was running away when he shot her. Thus, the prosecutor was asking the

jury to consider whether Hunt’s decision to shoot her was objectively reasonable

under these circumstances. There is nothing unfairly prejudicial about this argument

because it comports with the objective standard articulated in Thomas and is,

therefore, consistent with the law on self-defense.

(ECF #6-1 at PageID 229-31; see also Hunt, 2023 WL 4010521, at *9-10) (citations omitted).

As discussed above, under the doubly deferential standard of review, Mr. Hunt must show

the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable—in other words, he must show no

reasonable argument exists that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. See Harrington,

562 U.S. at 105. Mr. Hunt argues that counsel’s failure to object was deficient and prejudicial

because:

Again, self-defense was the only issue in this case. There is no reasonable trial strategy

that would have allowed the prosecutor to conflate, as the judge did, the objective

and subjective components of self-defense and allow the jury to conclude that he was

guilty of felonious assault if [he] was merely mistaken as to the threat that Rivers

presented.

(ECF # 13 at PageID 1623). But the Eighth District concluded the prosecutor was not conflating

the objective and subjective components of self-defense, rather “the prosecutor was asking the jury

to consider whether Hunt’s decision to shoot [Ms. Rivers] was objectively reasonable.” (ECF #6-1

at PageID 231). This factual finding is presumed correct unless Mr. Hunt proves otherwise by clear

and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Mr. Hunt offers no argument or evidence to

suggest the state court incorrectly read the transcript of closing argument. Thus, there remains a

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard because an objection

that the prosecutor conflated the elements of self-defense would be meritless. See Piontek v. Palmer,

546 F.App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Defense counsel does not perform deficiently under

Strickland by failing to undertake futile tasks or raise meritless claims.”).

Mr. Hunt also argues “the court’s erroneous instruction, combined with defense counsel’s

ineffective assistance in failing to object to the prosecution’s misconduct in closing argument, so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” (ECF #13 at PageID

1623) (quotation omitted). A petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on the cumulative

weight of errors that individually do not support habeas relief. See Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d

789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he law of this Circuit is that cumulative error claims are not

cognizable on habeas because the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue.”). Thus, to the

extent Mr. Hunt seeks to cumulate Grounds One and Two, such an argument does not entitle

him to habeas relief.

I thus recommend the District Court DENY Ground Two as without merit.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus

unless a judge issues a COA and specifies the issues that can be raised on appeal. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c). “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). When a district court has determined a petitioner’s

constitutional claim to lack merit, the petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong” before receiving

a COA. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the district court denies a habeas

petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim,

a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling. Id. A showing that the appeal would succeed on the claim is not needed to grant a COA.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003).

Mr. Hunt has not made a substantial showing that he was denied any federal constitutional

right. Jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the grounds for relief are meritorious

federal constitutional claims. I thus recommend the District Court DENY Mr. Hunt a COA.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For these reasons, I recommend the District Court DENY Grounds One and Two as

without merit and DISMISS the petition. I further recommend the District Court DENY Mr.

Hunt a COA on all grounds.

Dated: January 6, 2026

/

DARRELL A. CLAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Objections, Review, and Appeal

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Civ. R. 72.3(b). Properly asserted

objections shall be reviewed de novo by the assigned district judge.

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or

waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, either to the district judge or ina

subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or

whether the party responds to the Report and Recommendation. Berkshire v.

Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be specific and not

merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the Report and

Recommendation; “a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to

object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.

1991). Objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the

arguments in briefs submitted to the Magistrate Judge. “A reexamination of the

exact same argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific

objections ‘wastes judicial resources rather than saving them and runs contrary to

the purpose of the Magistrates Act.’”” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018

WL 3018175, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) (quoting Howard, 932 F.2d at 509).

The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the interest

of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).

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