Martinez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

—————————————————————X

ADELAIDA MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 19-cv-2672 (NRM) (MMH)

STATEN ISLAND UNIVERSITY

HOSPITAL; KARYN TREVAL, In Her

Individual and Official Capacities; and

ANTOINETTE HENDERSON, In Her

Individual and Official Capacities,

Defendants.

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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Adelaida Martinez brings claims against her former employer, Staten

Island University Hospital (“SIUH”), and two former supervisors, Karyn Treval and

Antoinette Henderson, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”), the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

(the “FMLA”), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296 (the

“NYSHRL”), the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 (the

“NYCHRL”), and the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq. (the

“LMRA”).

Martinez was terminated from her position as a technician in the SIUH

emergency department following an incident in November 2018. Martinez contends

that she suffered a panic attack at work, after which she was discriminated and

retaliated against, wrongfully denied protected FMLA leave, and fired in violation of

the collective bargaining agreement between her employer and her union. In

contrast, the hospital characterizes Martinez’s conduct as workplace violence that

justified her immediate termination.

The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment, each arguing that the

record before the Court contains undisputed facts that entitle them to judgment as a

matter of law. The Court has reviewed the extensive summary judgment record as

well as the parties’ submissions and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that there

are significant disputed facts going to the heart of Martinez’s disability

discrimination claims. These genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary

judgment as to Martinez’s disability discrimination claims. Her retaliation, FMLA

interference, and LMRA hybrid claims, however, fail as a matter of law. Accordingly,

Martinez’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety, and

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following undisputed factual background is drawn from Plaintiff’s Rule

56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Pl. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF No. 89, Defendants’ Rule

56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“Def. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF No. 97-1, Plaintiff’s

Counterstatement to Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF

No. 94, and Defendants’ Counterstatement to Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def.

Resp. 56.1 Stmt.”), ECF No. 95-1.

Staten Island University Hospital (“SIUH”) is a member hospital of Northwell

Health and a two-campus specialized teaching hospital that provides care to residents

of Staten Island and the New York metropolitan region. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1. At

all relevant times, Antoinette Henderson was employed as SIUH’s Labor and

Employee Relations Manager, responsible for ensuring that staff and managers

adhered to the applicable collective bargaining agreements and contracts. Id. ¶¶ 2–

3. At all relevant times, Karyn Treval was employed as Senior Director of Emergency

Services and was Martinez’s supervisor. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.

Martinez first began working at SIUH as a Senior Patient Care Assistant on

March 20, 1995 and, on February 22, 2011, became an Emergency Department

Technician (“EDT”) in trauma critical care, pediatric emergency, and urgent care, the

position she held until her termination. Id. ¶ 20; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1. In

December 2005, while assigned to monitor a suicidal patient in a locked unit,

Martinez experienced an anxiety attack, left the unit without permission, and

received a two-day suspension. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21–23. She filed a grievance

contesting the suspension, and, in September 2006, SIUH agreed to remove it from

her record. Id. ¶¶ 24–25; Settlement Agreement executed Sep. 21, 2006, Pl. Ex. GG,

ECF No. 91-33.

Martinez has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),1

claustrophobia, and anxiety disorder since at least 2006. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.

1 The record, at various points, contains references to Martinez being

diagnosed with “post-traumatic stress disorder” and “post-traumatic stress

syndrome.” The Court understands these to be different diagnoses. Because the

She has been treated by psychiatrists and prescribed medications, including

diazepam and other anxiety and sleep medications, since 2005. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 10, 12–

14, 19. Her treating physicians described these as ongoing “serious medical

conditions” in 2005 and 2008. Id. ¶ 6. Martinez often wakes up with anxiety daily.

Id. ¶ 10. Martinez’s medical history includes panic attacks, intense palpitations,

sweating, and shortness of breath. Id. ¶ 19. From 2006 through 2011, SIUH

approved multiple FMLA leave requests by Martinez, including intermittent leave

for anxiety, PTSD, and other conditions. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 26–32; Def. Resp.

56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 20, 28–34. In 2011 and 2012, SIUH began denying Martinez’s FMLA

requests. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 20, 38.

On November 7, 2018, Martinez reported for duty as an EDT, responsible for

cleaning and stocking emergency department units. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 41–42;

Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 49–51. Martinez discovered a pediatric critical care room

lacked vital supplies, began restocking, and became concerned about incoming critical

patients. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 43–44; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–53. When a

triage nurse brought in a pediatric patient but found the room unprepared, she used

another room. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 45–46. Martinez then began experiencing

palpitations and left for the pediatric emergency department (“PED”) nurses’ lounge

to control her anxiety. Id. ¶ 47; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 56–58.

What happened in the PED lounge is intensely disputed by the parties, as will

be addressed infra. It is undisputed that Martinez cried out and could not continue

parties more consistently refer to Martinez’s “post-traumatic stress disorder” or

“PTSD,” the Court uses this term for purposes of this motion.

to work. See Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–58; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62–67. Following

the incident in the PED lounge, Marilyn Hayes, Martinez’s union representative,

assisted her in breathing exercises and escorted her out of the hospital through the

ambulance bay. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62–63; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 72–75.

Treval instructed that Martinez was to be suspended and told Martinez to

bring a union delegate to a meeting the next day, November 8, 2018. Pl. Resp. 56.1

Stmt. ¶¶ 59, 65–66; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 76–83. On November 8, 2018, Martinez

met with Treval, Assistant Nursing Manager Nicholas Gennusa, and Hayes, her

union delegate. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 66; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 77. At the meeting,

Martinez stated that, upon arriving for her shift on November 7, she noticed that

items on the room preparation checklist had not been completed, including an open

code cart/intubation box and supplies that had been left out and not discarded. Pl.

Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 67; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 78. At the meeting, Treval also told

Martinez that lack of cleanliness in a room was not an excuse for her “behavior” and

informed her of her suspension pending investigation. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 72; Def.

Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 116. As discussed infra, what otherwise transpired at this meeting

is in dispute. See Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 67, 69, 71, 74; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 77–

81. After the meeting, Martinez was offered the contact number for SIUH’s

“Employee Assistance Program.” Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 73; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.

¶ 118.

Martinez’s employment was terminated on November 14, 2018. Pl. Resp. 56.1

Stmt. ¶ 83. When asked in deposition if she reviewed Martinez’s medical history,

prior accommodations, or FMLA records during the investigation from November 7

to November 14, 2018, Henderson responded “No” and stated she did not think it was

relevant. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 109–11. Henderson testified it would not have

mattered if Martinez’s conduct was caused by her disability; Martinez would have

been terminated regardless. Id. ¶¶ 112–13, 210.

Martinez’s union, 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (the “Union”),

did not file a written grievance challenging her termination. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.

¶ 93; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 168. Nonetheless, pursuant to the collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”) between SIUH and the Union, a Step 3 grievance meeting was

held on November 27, 2018. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 94–95; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.

¶¶ 87–93. At the meeting, Martinez apologized for her conduct, including any

“threatening feelings” she may have caused, and explained life stressors. Pl. Resp.

56.1 Stmt. ¶ 96; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 88. Meeting notes reflect that Martinez

disclosed she had “FMLA,” had “tried twice” to obtain it but was “denied,” and that

she had “anxiety and panic.” Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 87–88. Martinez stated she

was “not physically or mentally fit to work” on November 7, 2018, that her “anxiety

was triggered” that day, and that she was “seeking and receiving professional help”

for anxiety. Id. ¶¶ 90–92. She asked that SIUH view her case as an anxiety attack

rather than intentional workplace violence. Id. ¶ 93. Martinez reminded SIUH of

her prior history of anxiety and PTSD and her prior FMLA approvals for the same

conditions. Id. ¶ 91. Hayes and contract administrator Kerry Johnston also asked

SIUH to allow Martinez to go out on disability, receive medical treatment, and then

return to work in lieu of termination. Id. ¶ 208. Defendants state that, by the time

of the Step 3 meeting, Martinez had already been terminated and was no longer

eligible for workplace accommodations. Id. ¶ 207. Martinez’s grievance was denied

and the decision to terminate her upheld. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 97.

Under the Union’s constitution and the collective bargaining agreement, the

contract administrators initially decide whether to take a grievance to arbitration.

Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 173–176. If they decline, the employee may appeal to the

Chapter Hearings and Appeals Board (“Chapter Board”). Id. ¶ 175. Martinez

appealed to the Chapter Board to take her grievance to arbitration, but the Chapter

Board declined. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 99–100. By letter dated January 7, 2019, the

Union informed Martinez of the Chapter Board’s decision and advised her of her right

to appeal to the Division Hearings and Appeals Board (“Division Board”) within 72

hours of receipt of the letter. Id. ¶ 101. Martinez received this letter but did not take

a further appeal to the Division Board. Id. ¶¶ 100, 102.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Martinez filed the instant suit on May 6, 2019. Compl., ECF No. 1. The Hon.

Carol Bagley Amon initially presided over this case. Shortly thereafter, on June 5,

2019, Martinez received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), ECF No. 13-1, and Martinez filed an Amended

Complaint reflecting the administrative exhaustion of her claims before the EEOC.

First Amended Compl. (“First Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 13 (June 13, 2019). Martinez

further amended her Complaint on October 14, 2019. Second Amended Compl.

(“Second Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 24.

Martinez pleads 10 causes of action. However, one of the causes of action is

actually two separate claims, so Martinez is asserting 11 causes of action. They are:

(1) Discrimination under the ADA against SIUH; (2) Retaliation under the ADA

against SIUH; (3) Interference with FMLA rights against SIUH; (4) Discrimination

and retaliation under the NYSHRL against SIUH;2 (5) Aiding and abetting

discrimination under the NYSHRL against individual defendants Treval and

Henderson; (6) Discrimination under the NYCHRL against all defendants; (7)

Retaliation under the NYCHRL against all defendants; (8) Aiding and abetting

discrimination under the NYCHRL against individual defendants; (9) Vicarious

liability under the NYCHRL against SIUH; and (10) a hybrid claim for breach of the

CBA under § 301 of the LMRA against SIUH. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 195–307.

This suit originally included the Union as an additional defendant. See

generally Compl; First Am. Compl.; Second Am. Compl. The Union moved to dismiss

the Second Amended Complaint in December 2019, Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32 (Dec.

5, 2019), and Judge Amon granted in part and denied in part the motion on June 19,

2020. Mem. & Order, ECF No. 44. The Union then answered the Second Amended

Complaint on July 16, 2020, ECF No. 45, and the remaining Defendants answered on

2 The Court notes that, under the NYSHRL, discrimination and retaliation are

separate causes of action. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1) (prohibiting discrimination); id.

§ 296(7) (prohibiting retaliation). Thus, while Martinez lists 10 causes of action in

her Amended Complaint, she actually advances 11.

July 20, 2020, ECF No. 46. On December 8, 2020, this case was reassigned to the

Hon. Diane Gujarati.

While discovery was ongoing, Martinez and the Union filed a stipulation of

dismissal with prejudice as to the Union. ECF No. 60 (June 30, 2022). This case was

then reassigned to the undersigned on November 8, 2022.

The parties informed the Court on April 3, 2024 that they had completed fact

discovery, Min. Entry dated Apr. 3, 2024, and Defendants requested a pre-motion

conference on their anticipated motion for summary judgment, Ltr., ECF No. 74 (July

31, 2024). In her response to Defendants’ pre-motion conference letter, Martinez

indicated that she intended to cross-move for partial summary judgment. Ltr., ECF

No. 75 (Aug. 14, 2024). The Court denied Defendant’s pre-motion conference request

as unnecessary and directed the parties to serve and file their cross-motions for

summary judgment. Dkt. Order dated October 7, 2024.

The parties’ cross-motions were fully submitted on January 24, 2025. Def. Mot.

for Summ. J. (“Def. Mot.”), ECF No. 97; Def. Mem. in Supp. (“Def. Mem.”), ECF No.

97-9; Pl. Mem. in Opp’n (“Pl. Opp’n”), ECF No. 93; Def. Reply Mem. in Supp. (“Def.

Reply”), ECF No. 97-13; Pl. Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Pl. Mot.”), ECF No. 88; Pl.

Mem. in Supp. (“Pl. Mem.”), ECF No. 90; Def. Mem. in Opp’n (“Def. Opp’n”), ECF No.

95; Pl. Reply in Supp. (“Pl. Reply”), ECF No. 92. Defendants cross-move for summary

judgment as to all of Martinez’s claims. Def. Mem. at 7.3 Martinez cross-moves for

summary judgment only as to (1) her discrimination claims under the ADA,

3 All page references are to ECF pagination unless otherwise noted.

NYSHRL, and NYCHRL against SIUH;4 (2) her hybrid claim pursuant to § 301 of the

LMRA against SIUH; and (3) her interference claim under the FMLA against SIUH.

Pl. Mem. at 6. Martinez also cross-moves for summary judgment as to (4) her

NYSHRL and NYCHRL aiding and abetting claims and her NYCHRL discrimination

claims against individual Defendants Treval and Henderson. Id. at 25–26.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute about a ‘genuine issue’ exists for

summary judgment purposes where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

decide in the non-movant’s favor.” Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d

Cir. 2008) (quoting Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007)). A fact is

material “when its resolution ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.’” SCW W. LLC v. Westport Ins. Corp., 856 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521

(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court “is required to view the record

in the light most favorable to the party against which summary judgment is

contemplated and to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor

4 Martinez’s papers are not a model of clarity. Throughout her briefing, she

makes reference to her “claims for disability discrimination under Title VII.” Pl.

Mem. at 6; see also id. at 19, 25. Elsewhere, however, Martinez accurately references

her claims arising under the ADA. See, e.g., id. at 19–24. Accordingly, the Court

construes references to Title VII as references to the ADA, because Martinez has at

no point in this proceeding advanced a claim pursuant to Title VII.

of that party.” NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 178 (2d

Cir. 2008).

“The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a

disputed issue of material fact.” Thorpe v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-5995 (CM),

2021 WL 3811238, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2021) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party

must present ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The party opposing summary judgment ‘may not rely

on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.’” Id. (quoting Scotto v.

Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998)). “Finally, the nonmoving party ‘must do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986)). “To withstand a summary judgment motion, sufficient evidence must

exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.” Id.

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

at 323.

DISCUSSION

I. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact

Before evaluating the legal sufficiency of Martinez’s claims, the Court notes

the existence of several genuine disputes of material fact that go to the heart of this

case. Specifically, the Court finds that the record contains key factual disputes as to

(1) what precisely transpired in the PED lounge on November 7, 2018, and whether

Martinez’s conduct constituted misconduct within SIUH’s policies; and (2) the extent

of Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disability and whether her disability played

any role in the November 7, 2018 incident.

As discussed infra, these disputes go to the heart of this case. As then-Judge

Sotomayor explained, “the ADA does not immunize disabled employees from

discipline or discharge for incidents of misconduct in the workplace,” even when their

misconduct is a “manifestation of [their] disabilit[ies].” Valentine v. Standard &

Poor’s, 50 F. Supp. 2d 262, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000).

However, when an employee’s conduct does not constitute misconduct, but it is relied

upon by an employer which knows that the conduct is caused by a disability, the

employee may state a claim under the ADA. See McMillan v. City of New York, 711

F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Here, it is undisputed that [plaintiff] was tardy because

of his disability and that he was disciplined because of his tardiness. In other words,

[plaintiff] was disciplined because of his disability.”). Martinez’s disability

discrimination claims may survive only if she has adduced evidence that a reasonable

jury could find proves (1) she did not commit misconduct warranting termination

under SIUH’s policies on November 7, 2018 and (2) her employer terminated her

despite knowing that her conduct was cause by her disability. These facts are

disputed on the record before the Court, and accordingly summary judgment is

inappropriate.

a. Genuine Disputes Exist as to the Nature of Martinez’s Conduct

on November 7, 2018 and Whether this Conduct Amounted to

Misconduct Within the Meaning of SIUH’s Policies Against

Workplace Violence

Some aspects of Martinez’s conduct in the PED lounge are not in dispute. For

example, it is undisputed that Martinez did not physically attack anyone in the PED

lounge. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 66. Likewise, it is undisputed that Martinez did not

destroy or damage SIUH property. Id. ¶ 67; see also Dep. of Marilyn Hayes dated

July 15, 2021, Pl. Ex. B (“Hayes Dep.”) at 129:5–6, ECF No. 91-2 (“I took pictures of

the pediatric lounge showing there was no damage.”).5

Other aspects of Martinez’s conduct are heavily disputed. Defendants claim

that multiple witnesses reported Martinez screaming, crying, slamming doors,

punching walls, and making statements such as “I can’t do this anymore in this

fucking place,” as well as physically striking objects. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–55;

Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 62–64. Martinez denies that she cursed or engaged in any

violent conduct, claims that any yelling occurred in the PED lounge away from

patients, and asserts she only kicked a garbage can because it was in her way as she

fled the room while in the midst of her panic attack. Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 51–58;

Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 63–67. There is conflicting evidence on what transpired with

the garbage can. Some witnesses indicated that Martinez threw a large garbage can

against a wall, while Martinez asserts otherwise. Compare Pl. Ex. HH (“Witness

Statements”) at 3, ECF No. 91-34 (“After [Martinez] walked to [the PED lounge]

5 Pincites to deposition transcripts are to the original pages and lines, not to

the ECF pagination.

bathroom and threw broom and garbage pail (environmental’s) against wall.”, and id.

at 4 (“I found [Martinez] in the lounge screaming, cursing, and throwing the large

environmental garbage can.”), with Dep. of Adelaida Martinez dated July 21, 2021,

Pl. Ex. A (“Pl. Dep.”) at 119:17–19, ECF No. 91-1 (“[T]here was a garbage can next to

me, so I kicked it with my foot to get it out of my way so I could go to my coat.”).

Defendants claim one witness reported one pediatric patient’s mother made a remark

implying distress; Martinez disputes that the incident occurred in front of patients.

Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 52. As Hayes, Martinez’s union representative, was escorting

Martinez out through the ambulance bay, Defendants claim Martinez ran, screamed,

struck walls, and hit a glass door in the bay; Martinez disputes this, citing Hayes’s

review of surveillance video showing “distress” but no violence.6 Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt.

¶ 64; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 73–75.

This record would permit a jury to draw different conclusions from the various,

conflicting descriptions of the incident. Though Henderson initially contended at her

deposition that Martinez’s “behavior was threatening,” she then conceded that

Martinez did not threaten anyone in the PED lounge. Dep. of Antoinette Henderson

dated July 29, 2021, Pl. Ex. C (“Henderson Dep.”) at 167:6–12, ECF No. 91-3. One

witness statement, written by an employee who was apparently present in the PED

lounge when Martinez entered, indicated that the employee was “startled” when

6 Video footage of Martinez’s conduct after exiting the PED lounge existed but

was not preserved by Defendants; the parties dispute the content and relevance of

the footage. Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 141–43. The parties do not dispute that Hayes

reviewed this footage before it was deleted, however, and Hayes testified as to her

recollection of the footage at her deposition. Hayes Dep. at 119:4–11, 133:16-137:19.

Martinez entered but that the employee “remained in the corner doing iLearns [an

online training program]” during the incident, permitting but not requiring a jury

inference that this employee was not fearful of remaining in Martinez’s vicinity and

continuing to complete her assigned trainings. See Witness Statements at 3. This

particular witness statement was characterized by Henderson at her deposition as

indicating the employee “was hiding behind the computer.” Henderson Dep. at

170:20–22. Henderson subsequently conceded, however, that none of the witness

statements contained claims that witnesses were afraid. Id. at 190:19–22.

Other record evidence would permit a jury to conclude that Martinez’s conduct

was contemporaneously perceived as non-threatening. Hayes, who overheard

Martinez’s conduct, described it as “frantic, despair, just loud.” Hayes Dep. at 63:11–

12. When Hayes arrived at the PED lounge bathroom, she saw Martinez “banging on

the mirror with her flat palms, fingers out. [Martinez] was saying, ‘Why? Why? I

can’t do this anymore. Why?’ And she was banging on the glass, on the mirror, like,

in despair it looked like. It was pretty sad to see that, actually.” Id. at 65:12–18.

One witness statement indicates that an employee overhead a patient’s parent

comment, after hearing the incident, that “Oh, something bad must have happened

to someone’s family,” Witness Statements at 10, which does not necessarily suggest

that the parent perceived the incident as threatening or violent. Further, after

Martinez exited the building, an SIUH Manager, Nicholas Genussa, sent Hayes alone

to inform Martinez that she was on administrative leave and to retrieve Martinez’s

badge if possible, Hayes Dep. at 77:6–13, which could lead a jury to conclude that

Genussa did not perceive Martinez as a threat to Hayes following the incident.

Moreover, the record does not establish conclusively that Martinez engaged in

misconduct within the meaning of the policies Defendants cite to justify Martinez’s

termination. SIUH’s policy addressing Aggression, Bullying, Hostility and Violence

in the Workplace permits the termination of any employee that “engages in

aggression, bullying, hostility and/or violence.” Decl. of Antoinette Henderson dated

Nov. 13, 2024 (“Henderson Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 97-6. SIUH’s Rules and Regulations

“prohibit harassment and work place [sic] violence of any form . . . as well as fighting

or engaging in heated arguments with co-workers, visitors, or others. Any form of

harassment, intimidating or threatening behavior towards another employee, patient

or visitor will not be tolerated.” Id. ¶ 7 (citation modified). SIUH’s progressive

discipline policy allows that “employees can be terminated without prior warning for

serious misconduct such as . . . fighting, harassing and/or intimidating

behavior . . . and actions endangering patient/employee welfare or disrupting

Hospital operations.” Id. ¶ 8 (citation modified). Finally, SIUH’s Employee

Handbook notes that SIUH “does not tolerate bullying, workplace violence,

intimidation, verbal threats, non-verbal threats or physical acts of violence against

any individual on [SIUH] property.” Id. ¶ 9 (citation modified). An alleged violation

of the prohibition against workplace violence was the sole grounds cited for

Martinez’s dismissal. Pl. Ex. L (“Termination Letter”) at 3, ECF No. 96-12. These

policies plainly prohibit fighting, bullying, and other forms of targeted violence and

harassment in the workplace. But it is not clear that they apply to the kind of conduct

Martinez exhibited on November 7, 2018. While Defendants assert that Martinez’s

conduct fell within SIUH’s prohibitions against workplace violence, a reasonable jury

could, but would not be required to, conclude otherwise.

The parties’ submissions underscore that genuine disputes exist as to

Martinez’s precise conduct and whether it constituted grounds for her termination.

See Pl. Mem at 10–12 (describing the November 7, 2018 incident); Pl. Opp’n at 18

(asserting that “[t]he facts support that Plaintiff was the very opposite of violent”);

Def. Mem. at 10–12 (describing the November 7, 2018 incident); id. at 19 (“Plaintiff’s

employment ended at the Hospital because of her violent misconduct on November 7,

2018.”). Resolving these questions is a task properly left to the jury. Accordingly, as

discussed further infra, these disputes preclude summary judgment on Martinez’s

disability discrimination claims.

b. Genuine Disputes Exist as to Defendants’ General Knowledge of

Martinez’s Disability, the Connection Between Martinez’s

Disability and Her Conduct on November 7, 2018, and

Defendants’ Specific Knowledge as to a Connection Between

Martinez’s Disability and Her Conduct

The record also precludes summary judgment because of genuine factual

disputes as to whether (1) Defendants were aware of Martinez’s disability at the time

they decided to terminate her; (2) Martinez’s conduct on November 7, 2018 was a

manifestation of her disabilities; and, if so, (3) Defendants were aware of the

relationship between Martinez’s disability and the November 7, 2018 incident.

First, as to Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disabilities, Defendants assert

that SIUH decisionmakers were not aware of Martinez’s disability prior to her

termination. Henderson Decl. ¶ 12 (asserting that Henderson had no knowledge of

Martinez’s anxiety, depression, or PTSD prior to her termination); Dep. of Karyn

Treval dated June 30, 2021, Decl. of Daniel Gomez-Sanchez Ex. B (“Treval Dep.”) at

40:25–41:6, ECF No. 95-2 (same); Decl. of Terry Pando dated Nov. 13, 2024 ¶ 3, ECF

No. 95-8 (same). Martinez disputes this. Specifically, Martinez points to the multiple

occasions between 2006 and 2011 when she took FMLA leave for anxiety and PTSD,

and argues that this history reasonably imputes knowledge of her disability to

Defendants. Pl. Mem. at 21 (“SIUH granted Plaintiff FMLA benefits for multiple

years for her disabilities.”). Defendants concede that Martinez was granted FMLA

leave for these conditions between 2006 and 2010. Decl. of Mary Beth Springstead

dated Nov. 13, 2024 (“Springstead Decl.”) ¶¶ 4–7, ECF No. 95-5; Def. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 20.

Springstead, SIUH’s Associate Executive Director of Human Resources at all relevant

times, asserts that “Plaintiff’s supervisors were never notified of the nature of

Plaintiff’s medical or health condition[s] that caused Plaintiff to make the request[s]

for leave,” see Springstead Decl. ¶ 15, implying that no decisionmakers were aware

of Martinez’s disabilities. However, Springstead was personally briefed on the

investigation into Martinez’s conduct, and Henderson testified at her deposition that

Springstead was involved in making the determination that Martinez’s conduct

amounted to workplace violence. Henderson Dep. at 65:15–66:24. Additionally,

SIUH requires its employees to submit annual health assessments, and Martinez

disclosed in those assessments in 2016 and 2017 that she took medication for PTSD.

Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 40.7

Moreover, Martinez asserts that Henderson was personally aware of

Martinez’s anxiety diagnosis. After she stopped receiving FMLA leave in 2011,

Martinez alleges that she received an “accommodation by going to [Henderson’s]

office to seek refuge whenever I felt . . . an anxiety [attack] coming on.” Pl. Dep. at

185:8–11, 185:22–186:15. During these instances, Martinez asserts Henderson would

“console” her, give her water, help calm her down, and “express to [Martinez] that she

understood . . . how [Martinez] felt [and] that she, too, also suffered anxiety.” Id. at

185:12–18. Martinez testified at her deposition that she went to Henderson’s office

five or six times between 2011 and 2017. Id. at 185:23–186:3. Martinez further

testified that sometimes she “would end up going home” after going to Henderson’s

office. Id. at 188:24–25. Martinez alleges that having leave to remove to Henderson’s

office was an accommodation because “[t]hey don’t do that for everyone.” Id. at 219:6–

7. Henderson contests this, asserting that Martinez came to her office on one occasion

when she was “stressed out” but that, on the other occasions, Martinez came to her

office in Martinez’s capacity as a union delegate to “represent a member for [a]

contract violation or if [a member] had a concern.” Henderson Dep. at 94:5–96:14.

7 Defendants assert that these health assessments are not disclosed to

employees’ managers and are not used in making employment decisions. Henderson

Decl. ¶ 10. Martinez contends, however, that this disclosure “ke[pt] Defendant SIUH

on actual notice of her ongoing disabilities.” Pl. Mem. at 9. The extent to which

individual decisionmakers were aware of Martinez’s health assessments at the time

of the decision to terminate Martinez’s employment, notwithstanding SIUH

confidentiality policies, is a question properly left to a jury.

Accordingly, there are genuine disputes of material fact as to the extent of

Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disabilities. Based on (1) Martinez’s

documented history of taking FMLA for her anxiety disorder and PTSD; (2) the

annual medical disclosures SIUH required Martinez to make; and (3) Martinez’s

testimony about her interactions with Henderson, a reasonable jury could find that

Defendants were aware of Martinez’s disabilities prior to terminating her.8

Second, as to whether Martinez’s conduct was caused by her disabilities,

Defendants neither concede nor meaningfully dispute this fact. However, the record

contains evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to find Martinez’s conduct was

caused by her disabilities. Martinez went to urgent care on November 8, 2018, the

day after the incident at work, and was prescribed a new medication for her anxiety.

Pl. Dep. at 157:14–159:4. Martinez was also directed to follow up with her primary

care physician. Id. at 158:14–16. Martinez saw a nurse practitioner in her primary

care physician’s office on November 12, 2018. Dep. of Dr. Noreen Tan-Chu dated Mar.

22, 2023, Pl. Ex. H (“Tan-Chu Dep.”) at 145:24–146:3, ECF No. 91-8. At this

appointment, Martinez reported objective symptoms of “palpitations” and “shortness

of breath.” Id. at 131:23–24. The nurse practitioner’s notes indicated that Martinez

8 The parties agree that Martinez was referred to SIUH’s “Employee

Assistance Program” following the November 8, 2018 meeting. Pl. Opp’n at 13; Def.

Mem. at 11. However, the record does not reveal what this Program entails, when

referrals to the program might be made, or whether the Program is related to

employees with disabilities. The only references to the program that the Court has

found in the record are in the table of contents of the Basic Human Resources Policies,

but the relevant section on the Program has not been submitted. See Henderson

Decl., Exs. E & F, at 44, 50. Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, the Court

does not consider the fact that Martinez was referred to this Program to be probative

of Defendants’ knowledge of Martinez’s disabilities.

“had a panic attack at work.” Id. at 118:21–22. On November 20, 2018, Martinez

had a follow up appointment with her primary care physician. Id. at 145:15–23. At

this November 20 appointment, after discussing the November 7 incident, Martinez’s

physician assessed Martinez with “panic disorder without agoraphobia” and

“posttraumatic stress disorder.” Id. at 124:23–125:3, 145:24–146:3. Martinez’s

physician further noted that Martinez could not work in November 2018 because of

her panic disorder, specifically noting that Martinez was “unable to work in [the]

E.R., too much stress.” Id. at 143:10–14, 146:6–7, 148:17–21. Martinez’s physician

also extended the anxiety medication prescription Martinez was initially given at

urgent care. Pl. Dep. at 162:2–11. Finally, Martinez was referred to see a

psychiatrist. Tan-Chu Dep. at 120:14–19, 123:9–13. Based on this evidence, a

reasonable jury could, but would not be required to, conclude that Martinez’s conduct

was caused by her disability.

Third, as to Defendants’ awareness of a causal relationship between Martinez’s

November 7, 2018 conduct and her disabilities, by arguing that Treval and Henderson

were not aware of Martinez’s disabilities, Defendants implicitly assert that

decisionmakers were not aware that the November 7 incident was caused by

Martinez’s disability. However, a genuine dispute exists as to whether Martinez

informed her employer during the November 8, 2018 investigatory meeting that her

conduct the previous day was caused by her disability. Treval testified at her

deposition that Martinez did not tell her that she suffered from “[a]nxiety attacks,

depression, and/or post-traumatic stress disorder.” Treval Dep. 42:12–24. This

appears to be contradicted by the deposition testimony of Henderson, who stated that

“I am aware of the fact that Marilyn [Hayes] said [at the November 8, 2018 meeting]

she thought it was an anxiety attack.” Henderson Dep. 195:14–16. Martinez’s

deposition testimony indicates that her union representative informed SIUH

supervisors at the November 8 meeting that Martinez’s conduct was caused by her

anxiety disorder. Pl. Dep. at 173:10–17, 174:9–175:5. Contemporaneous notes from

the meeting indicate that Hayes stated that she “went to [Martinez] because I heard

her have an anxiety attack.” Pl. Ex. K (“11/8/18 Meeting Notes”) at 3, ECF No. 91-

11. Henderson discounted this statement by Martinez’s union representative Hayes

because “Marilyn[] [Hayes’s] interpretation doesn’t qualify her as a clinical person,”

meaning “the hospital does not have to act upon Marilyn’s thought that it was an

anxiety attack.” Henderson Dep. at 198:7–10, 18–21. Henderson further stated, in

relation to Hayes’s assertion that Martinez’s conduct was a manifestation of her

anxiety disorder, that “[w]e still don’t know what that means.” Id. at 198:22–23.

Based on this record evidence, a reasonable jury could, but would not be

required to, conclude that Defendants were both generally aware of Martinez’s

disability and specifically aware that her November 7, 2018 conduct may have been

caused by her disability (or, at least, that Martinez was contending as much when

she tried to explain the reasons for her actions). As discussed infra, these genuine

disputes all concern material facts that preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

disability discrimination claims.

II. Disability Discrimination Claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and

NYCHRL

The Court now turns to Martinez’s disability discrimination claims under the

ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. The ADA provides that:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on

the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job

training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Disability discrimination claims may be brought under a

theory of failure to provide reasonable accommodation or of adverse employment

action.” Berger v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 22-CV-10257 (GHW) (SDA), 2025 WL

1095419, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025) (citing Balchan v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No.

21-CV-10326 (JGK), 2025 WL 588021, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2025)), report and

recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1094495 (Apr. 11, 2025).9 “Claims alleging

disability discrimination in violation of the ADA are subject to the burden-shifting

analysis originally established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, [411 U.S. 792] (1973).” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (quoting McBride v. BIC

Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009)). This framework, developed

in the Title VII context, is also applied to claims brought under the ADA. See Trane

v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 94 F. Supp. 3d 367, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 639 F.

9 Berger concerned a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). See 2025 WL 1095419, at *7. However, Section 504 and the ADA

have “identical requirements.” Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d

Cir. 1999); see also Hodges v. Holder, 547 F. App’x 6, 7–8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Because the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are very similar, we may look to caselaw interpreting

one statute to assist us in interpreting the other.” (citation modified)). Accordingly,

the Court refers to Berger and other Rehabilitation Act cases in evaluating Martinez’s

claims under the ADA here.

App’x 50 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[Courts] review[] ADA claims under the same burden-

shifting framework established for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. . . . .”).

Martinez also raises claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Unlike federal

law, which contains separate statutes protecting different groups of individuals from

discrimination, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are general anti-discrimination statutes

applying to different protected classes. See N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(a) (NYSHRL

prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “age, race, creed, color,

national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity

or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics,

familial status, marital status, or status as a victim of domestic violence”); N.Y.C.

Admin. Code §§ 8–107(1)(a)(2), (3) (NYCHRL prohibiting employment discrimination

on the basis of “actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender,

disability, marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, sexual and

reproductive health decisions, sexual orientation, uniformed service, height, weight,

or immigration or citizenship status”).

The general McDonnell Douglas framework applies under the ADA, the

NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL, see Nieblas-Love v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 165 F. Supp. 3d

51, 72–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), but the state and municipal laws are not necessarily

coextensive with the federal law, see Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 232

N.Y.S.3d 594, 595–97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2025) (discussing the standard for

evaluating NYSHRL claims at summary judgment and explaining that the NYSHRL

prohibits a wider array of discriminatory conduct than Title VII); McCarthy v.

Motorola Solutions Inc., No. 21-CV-4020 (RER), 2025 WL 2482247, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 28, 2025) (same for NYCHRL claims). “Given the close overlap [between the

three statutes], if a plaintiff can satisfy his or her burden under the ADA, a plaintiff

will also satisfy his or her burden under the [NYSHRL and NYCHRL].” I.M. by L.M.

v. City of New York, 111 N.Y.S.3d 273, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2019) (citing

Williams v. City of New York, 121 F. Supp. 3d 354, 364 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).

Here, genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on

Martinez’s ADA disability discrimination claim under both an adverse employment

action and a failure-to-accommodate theory. These genuine disputes include (1) what

the precise nature of Martinez’s conduct was and whether that conduct rendered her

inherently unqualified for her position; (2) whether Martinez’s conduct on November

7, 2018 was caused by her disability; (3) whether Defendants were aware that the

conduct was caused by the disability; and, as to a failure-to-accommodate theory, (4)

whether Martinez’s disability was sufficiently “obvious” to trigger an obligation on

the part of Defendants to initiate an informal interactive process.

a. Adverse Action Theory of Disability Discrimination

Under the “familiar standard” of McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie

case ADA disability discrimination claim under an adverse action theory,

a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) [her]

employer is subject to the ADA; (2) [she] was disabled within the

meaning of the ADA; (3) [she] was otherwise qualified to perform the

essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable

accommodation; and (4) [she] suffered adverse employment action

because of [her] disability.

McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125 (quoting Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169

(2d Cir. 2006)). If a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, “a rebuttable

presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to set

forth some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”

Stapleton v. Prince Carpentry, Inc., No. 22-CV-4044 (NCM), 2025 WL 2591519, at *13

(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2025) (citing Anderson v. Nat’l Grid, PLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 120, 140

(E.D.N.Y. 2015)). “Where the employer has articulated such a reason, the burden

shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext for

discrimination.” Id. (citing Geer v. Gates Chili Cent. Sch. Dist., 577 F. Supp. 3d 147,

166 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)). If the reason offered by the employer was caused by the

employee’s disability, there is no need for a pretext inquiry. See McMillan, 711 F.3d

at 129 (finding that, where plaintiff is disciplined for a reason that his employ knows

is caused by his disability, “[p]retext is not an issue”).

As to the NYSHRL, the New York State Legislature amended the statute in

2019. Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 595–96. Prior to this amendment, “[t]he standards for

establishing unlawful discrimination under the NYSHRL [] were the same as those

governing [T]itle VII cases.” Id. at 595 (citing Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C.

v. N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts., 794 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 2003) and Ferrante v. Am. Lung

Ass’n, 687 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1997)). “As a result of the amendment, the NYSHRL

now aligns with the standards of the [NYCHRL].” Id. at 596 (collecting cases);

Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 45 n.9 (2d Cir. 2025) (noting

that the New York Court of Appeals “constru[es] NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims

together” following the 2019 amendment (citing Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 235 N.E.3d

351, 354 (N.Y. 2024))).

However, “[t]hat amendment was effective August 12, 2019, and applies to

causes of action . . . that are filed on or after the effective date.” Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d

at 596 (citations omitted); see also Ricciardo v. NYU Hosps. Ctr., No. 22-CV-4952

(MKB), 2025 WL 2208371, at *25 n.23 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2025) (“The amendments

apply to claims accruing after August 12, 2019.” (citing Edelman, 141 F.4th at 45

n.9)).10 Martinez’s Second Amended Complaint was filed on October 8, 2019, see ECF

No. 24, and relates back to May 6, 2019, the date of Martinez’s original Complaint,

see ECF No. 1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A.,

560 U.S. 538, 553 (2010) (“[Rule 15(c)(1)] mandates relation back once the Rule’s

requirements are satisfied; it does not leave the decision whether to grant relation

10 There appears to have been some earlier confusion as to the effective date of

the 2019 amendment to Executive Law § 300, the Construction provision of the

NYSHRL. See Arazi v. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp., No. 20-CV-8837 (GHW), 2022 WL

912940, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (“After that amendment, the standard for

NYSHRL aligns with the NYCHRL standard for claims that accrued on or after

October 11, 2019.”); Wellner v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 17-CV-3479 (KPF), 2019 WL

4081898, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019) (“[T]hese amendments only apply to

claims that accrue on or after the effective date of October 11, 2019.”). Other

provisions of 2019 amendments were effective 60 days after their enactment. See A.

8421/S. 6577, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., ch. 160, § 16(b) (N.Y. 2019) (“This act shall take

effect immediately, provided, however . . . Sections one-a, two, three, four, five, seven,

eight and nine of this act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after it shall have

become a law.”). However, the section amending Executive Law § 300 was not

included in this 60-day effective date exception. Id. at § 6 (amending the NYSHRL

Construction provision); id. at § 16(d) (Section 6 effective immediately). In Edelman,

the Second Circuit resolved this issue by clarifying that August 12, 2019 was the

effective date for the amendments to Section 300. 141 F.4th at 45 n.9.

back to the district court’s equitable discretion.”). Accordingly, Martinez’s NYCHRL

claims are governed by the standards that applied before the 2019 amendment.

For pre-2019 amendment causes of action, “[t]raditionally, discrimination

claims under the ADA and the NYSHRL were analyzed similarly, using the burden-

shifting scheme set forth in [McDonnell Douglas].” Wright v. City of New York, No.

23-CV-3149 (KPF), 2024 WL 3952722, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024). The “key

difference” between the ADA and the NYSHRL is that “the NYSHRL has a broader

definition of disability than does the ADA because it does not require any showing

that the disability substantially limits a major life activity.” Scarville v. Living Res.

Corp., No. 21-CV-0807 (GTS), 2022 WL 4365863, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2022)

(citing Ugcatz v. U.P.S., Inc., No. 10-CV-0124 (MKB), 2013 WL 1232355, at *14

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013)).

As to the NYCHRL, the City law is recognized as providing more expansive

protections for the rights of a person with disabilities than its federal and pre-2019

amendment state counterparts. See McCarthy, 2025 WL 2482247, at *2 (“After the

2005 Restoration Act amendments, however, courts now interpret the federal and

state counterparts ‘as a floor below which the NYCHRL cannot fall.’” (quoting Ya-

Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2015))); Makinen v. City of

New York, 86 N.E.3d 514, 519 & n.1 (N.Y. 2017) (noting that the specific language of

the Restoration Act provided that “interpretations of New York state or federal

statutes with similar wording may be used to aid in interpretation of the NYCHRL,

viewing similarly worded provisions of federal and state civil rights laws as a floor

below which the NYCHRL cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which the local law

cannot rise” (citation modified) (quoting Local L. No. 85 (2005) of City of N.Y. § 1)).

“Under the NYCHRL, unlawful discrimination must play ‘no role’ in an employment

decision.” Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (quoting Singh v. Covenant Aviation Sec.,

LLC, 16 N.Y.S.3d 611, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015)). “To effectuate the purpose

of the NYCHRL, courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework with a mixed motive

standard to discrimination claims.” McCarthy, 2025 WL 2482247, at *3 (collecting

cases); see also Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (“[A] defendant’s motion for summary

judgment must be analyzed under both the familiar framework of [McDonnell

Douglas] and under the newer mixed-motive framework, which imposes a lesser

burden on a plaintiff opposing such a motion.” (citations omitted)).11 “A defendant

must make a prima facie showing that there is no evidentiary route that could allow

a jury to believe that discrimination played a role in their challenged actions.”

Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (citation modified). “A plaintiff may defeat summary

judgment by coming forward either with evidence that the defendant’s stated reasons

11 The Second Circuit previously questioned the continuing viability of the

McDonnell Douglas framework as applied to NYCHRL claims. See Mihalik v. Credit

Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is unclear

whether McDonnell Douglas continues to apply to NYCHRL claims and, if so, to what

extent it applies . . . .”). More recent caselaw, however, demonstrates that the

McDonnell Douglas framework, modified by a mixed-motive analysis, is the

appropriate vehicle for evaluating NYCHRL claims. See Uttarwar v. Lazard Asset

Mgmt. LLC, No. 24-1085-CV, 2025 WL 704278, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (summary

order) (“NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are both analyzed using the three-step

burden shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in [McDonnell

Douglas].” (citing Furfero v. St. John’s Univ., 941 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. App. Div.

2d Dep’t 2012) and Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30–31 (N.Y.

App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012))).

were a pretext for discrimination or with evidence that discrimination was one of the

motivating factors for the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 596–97 (quoting Ellison v.

Chartis Claims, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.3d 53, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2019)).

Here, the parties do not appear to dispute that (1) SIUH is an employer covered

by the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL or (2) Martinez is disabled within the meaning

of those statutes — specifically, because she has been diagnosed with PTSD and an

anxiety disorder. Accordingly, the Court turns to whether she “was otherwise

qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable

accommodation.” McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125.

i. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Preclude a Determination

at Summary Judgment as to Whether Martinez was

“Otherwise Qualified” for Her Position Despite Her

Disability.

An analysis of whether Martinez is qualified to perform the essential functions

of her positions requires the Court to determine (1) what functions were essential to

her position and (2) whether she was qualified to perform these functions. See

McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127–28 (performing this analysis in this order). Courts

generally “give considerable deference to an employer’s determination as to what [job]

functions are essential, [though] there are a number of relevant factors that may

influence a court’s ultimate conclusion as to a position’s essential functions.” Id. at

126. Here, Defendants have adduced a few essential functions they assert are

relevant to this suit. Martinez’s “essential duties included, among other things,

cleaning the emergency department units and preparing the units for incoming

patients by stocking them with supplies.” Decl. of Karyn Treval dated Nov. 13, 2024

(“Treval Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 97-7; see also Pl. Dep. at 60:17–62:9 (stating that

Martinez’s job included, inter alia, maintaining essential items in trauma cases,

assisting patients, taking vital signs, setting up trays, and assisting with crutches

and splinting).

As to whether she was qualified for the position she held, Martinez has

introduced performance reviews that indicate, in calendar year 2016, she

demonstrated an overall “Exceptional Performance” and specifically achieved a

“Consistent Demonstration” in the evaluation area of “Behavioral Expectations.” Pl.

Ex. I (“Performance Evaluations”) at 2, 6, ECF 91-9. In calendar year 2017, Martinez

demonstrated an overall “Consistent Performance” and specifically achieved a

“Consistent Demonstration” in the “Behavioral Expectations” area. Id. at 7, 10.

Moreover, Martinez asserts that she had previously received accommodations from

her employer that enabled her to perform her job despite her disability. As discussed

supra, Martinez was allegedly permitted to manage her anxiety by seeking “refuge”

in Henderson’s office and occasionally leaving work when her symptoms became

unmanageable. Pl. Dep. at 185:8–11, 185:22–186:15, 188:24–25. Additionally,

Martinez was first diagnosed with PTSD and anxiety following a 2005 panic attack

while at work. Id. at 101:9–17. Following this panic attack, Martinez was treated at

the SIUH Emergency Department where she usually works. Id. at 109:14–18. After

Martinez’s diagnosis, she received FMLA leave for these disabilities and her job

functions were adjusted so that she would not “be asked to transport patients [to

building 10, the in-patient psychiatric ward] anymore.” Id. at 104:21–105:8. The fact

that Martinez successfully performed her job for more than a decade after the

previous implementation of reasonable accommodations would be sufficient to meet

Martinez’s burden to show she “could have performed [the essential] functions [of her

position], with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of the termination.”

McMillan, 711 F.3d at 127. Martinez has demonstrated this element of her prima

facie case. See id. (noting that “[t]his burden is not heavy”).

Defendants nonetheless argue that Martinez is inherently unqualified for her

position in light of the November 7, 2018 incident. In particular, they assert that

“Martinez was not able to work at [SIUH] without violating its policies against violent

events in the workplace” — making her “inherently unqualified to work in her

position as an EDT there.” Def. Opp’n at 17; see also id. at 18 (“That [Martinez] was

unable to [clean the emergency department units for incoming patients and stock

them with supplies] without having an extreme overreaction to having an incoming

patient directed to a unit she was preparing also renders her unqualified for her job.”);

Francis v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 195, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“A disabled individual

cannot be otherwise qualified for a position if he commits misconduct which would

disqualify an individual who did not fall under the protection of the statute.” (citation

modified)).

Defendants’ conclusion that Martinez violated SIUH’s prohibition against

workplace violence was the ultimate factor in the decision to terminate Martinez. At

her deposition, Henderson was asked, “[i]f [Martinez] or Ms. Hayes did indicate [at]

that November 8, 2018 meeting that [Martinez] was having a panic attack or an

anxiety attack [on November 7, 2018], how would that, if at all, influence your

decisions related to the investigation?” Henderson Dep. at 164:7–13. Henderson

answered that “the fact that she . . . alleged having panic attacks didn’t excuse the

behavior of workplace violence.” Id. at 164:14–17. Henderson was also asked, “if

[Martinez] was having [an] anxiety attack in the emergency department at the time

that she was exhibiting this behavior [on November 7, 2018], would that influence

your decisions regarding how to deal with her disciplinary matter going forward?”

Henderson Dep. at 165:3–9. Henderson responded, “No.” Id. at 165:11. Henderson

further stated that “[Martinez] alleges she had an anxiety or panic attack, yes, but

I’m saying that her actions were not dismissed by that, not condoned. That doesn’t

condone her behavior.” Id. at 165:24–166:4. Martinez interprets this to mean that

“Defendant Henderson was clear that it would not have made any difference if

Plaintiff has a medical defense, disabilities, or medical documents [because] Plaintiff

would have been suspended and terminated regardless.” Pl. Mem. at 15; see also Pl.

Opp’n at 12. Defendants appear to agree. See Def. Mem. at 17 (“Whether or not

Plaintiff’s violent behavior on November 7, 2018 was caused by her underlying

anxiety and alleged PTSD and other mental disabilities is immaterial.”).

In light of the above, ultimately, Defendants do not disclaim reliance on

Martinez’s disability when making the decision to terminate her. This may, in turn,

render their knowledge of that disability and the relationship between the disability

and Martinez’s conduct on November 7, 2018 irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. See

Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) (“But when

the employer does not disclaim reliance on the handicap, the ‘solely by reason of’

element is by definition satisfied. The question then becomes whether the employee

is qualified despite his or her handicap to perform the essential functions of the job.”

(citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987))).

In other words, Defendants assert that Martinez would have been terminated

regardless of whether her November 7 conduct was caused by (or otherwise a

symptom of) her disability. Thus, her disability discrimination claim succeeds or fails

depending on whether Martinez’s conduct constituted a violation of SIUH’s policies

against workplace violence. Indeed, even Martinez does not dispute that, if she had

violated SIUH’s policies against workplace violence, that would render her inherently

unqualified for her position. But she maintains that there is a factual dispute about

whether her conduct on November 7 in fact constituted “workplace violence,” or

whether her actions otherwise gave Defendants reasonable grounds to conclude that

she would be unable to follow SIUH’s policies going forward if she remained in her

current position.12

Accordingly, this inquiry into whether Martinez’s conduct made her inherently

unqualified is the crux Martinez’s disability discrimination claims. “‘Whether an

employee is otherwise qualified as of the date of termination is a highly fact-sensitive

forward looking’ inquiry [that requires] a prognostication concerning the likelihood

12 The Court notes that Defendants’ concession that Martinez would have been

terminated whether or not her conduct was caused by her disability means the Court

does not need to reach a pretext analysis under the McDonnel Douglas framework.

See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 124, 129 (noting that “[p]retext is not an issue” where an

employee is disciplined for conduct that is a manifestation of their disability, and the

employer is aware that the conduct was “due to” the disability).

that plaintiff’s impairment will result in similar conduct in the future.” Quinlan v.

Hofstra Univ., No. 03-CV-3883 (JS), 2006 WL 8441209, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2006)

(citation modified) (citing Teahan, 951 F.2d at 521). As discussed supra, genuine

disputes exist as to the precise nature of Martinez’s conduct and whether it fell within

SIUH’s prohibitions against workplace violence.

Defendants contend that they are “not claiming that Plaintiff posed a direct

threat to the health or safety of others that could not be eliminated by reasonable

accommodation,” which constitutes the “direct threat” defense against an ADA claim.

Def. Reply at 8; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (“[A]n individual shall not pose a direct

threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”). Instead, they

argue that she was inherently unqualified for her position “because of her

misconduct, whether caused by a disability or not, which violated [SIUH’s] policies.”

Def. Reply at 8. However, the main case Defendants rely on for this “inherently

unqualified” argument, Valentine v. Standard & Poor’s, principally concerned

employee conduct that the employee conceded “was threatening in nature.” 50 F.

Supp. 2d 262, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000); see also id. at

289 (citing “plaintiff's admission that he threatened a fellow employee's professional

reputation and well-being in the workplace”). Yet here, there is no indication in the

record that Martinez directly threatened another employee or anyone else during the

November 7, 2018 incident. Indeed, at her deposition, Henderson conceded Martinez

did not threaten anyone during the November 7, 2018 incident. Henderson Dep. at

167:2–11 (confirming that Martinez did not “speak to someone in that room” or

“threaten anybody that day . . . in the emergency department”). Valentine does stand

for the proposition that the ADA “does not immunize disabled employees from

discipline or discharge for incidents of misconduct in the workplace,” even if the

misconduct at issue is a “manifestation of [a] disability.” 50 F. Supp. 2d at 289

(emphasis added). But, as discussed supra, there is a dispute as to whether

Martinez’s conduct truly constituted misconduct at all.

In the other cases Defendants cite, the employee misconduct at issue was more

severe than even Defendants’ characterization of the conduct Martinez engaged in on

November 7, 2018. See Quinlan, 2006 WL 8441209, at *5 (finding that a university

employee with bipolar disorder was not otherwise qualified where (1) he jumped into

a hotel swimming pool fully clothed, returned to the hotel despite being previously

ejected, and was arrested for trespassing; (2) officials from other universities called

plaintiff’s employer concerning plaintiff’s conduct; and (3) the parties agreed that this

conduct would result in the termination of any employee); Francis, 928 F. Supp. at

200–02, 205 & n.4 (finding a postal worker was not otherwise qualified where she

misrepresented her physical capacity and ability to get to work in order to support

her claims for workers’ compensation and continued the misrepresentation when

confronted); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F. Supp. 226, 234 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)

(finding a hospital repair technician was not otherwise qualified where (1) he was

cited three times in less than three months for incorrectly repairing hospital

equipment used to care for patients and (2) the third instance involved failure to

properly repair a syringe pump used to feed infants, which led supervisors to conclude

he inability to perform his job posed a “direct threat” to the safety of patients);

McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 638–39, 643 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding a

volunteer janitor was not otherwise qualified where he sexually harassed five

colleagues, as well as nursing students and visitors, consistently over the course of

several years).13

Here, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to the nature of Martinez’s

conduct and whether it constituted “workplace violence.” These disputes preclude

the Court from deciding at summary judgment whether Martinez’s conduct violated

SIUH’s policies or otherwise rendered her inherently unqualified for her position. A

jury could reasonably find for either party on this issue. Accordingly, neither party

is entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether Martinez has proven her

disability discrimination claim under an adverse employment action theory under

state, City, or federal law.

13 The principal case Defendants cite that did not involve misconduct concerned

a city bus driver with color-blindness who could not distinguish the colors of traffic

lights. Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2003). In Shannon, the

ability to distinguish between traffic light colors was a function essential to the safe

operation of a bus, and there was no accommodation that would enable plaintiff to

fulfill this role going forward. Id. at 99–103. The Second Circuit concluded there was

no evidence that the plaintiff “has or might regain the ability to distinguish the colors

of traffic lights.” Id. at 101. In other words, the Shannon plaintiff’s disability was a

permanent disability that meant he was and would forever be unable to perform a

core essential function of his position every time he got behind the wheel of a bus.

This circumstance is also distinguishable. Here, Martinez’s physician, Dr. Tan-Chu,

believed that, with psychotherapy, changes to her medication, some time away from

work, and workplace “adjustment,” Martinez would be able to continue her work at

SIUH. Tan-Chu Dep. at 143:13–22, 153:23–154:4; see also McElwee, 700 F.3d at 633–

34 (finding that whether “aberrant behavior” caused by disability was disqualifying

from plaintiff’s job “is perhaps more easily addressed by asking whether a reasonable

accommodation for [the] disability existed”).

b. Failure-to-Accommodate Theory of Disability Discrimination

Turning to Martinez’s second theory of liability, “[a]n employer may also

violate the ADA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.” McMillan, 711

F.3d at 125. To establish a prima facie case under a failure-to-accommodate theory,

a plaintiff must demonstrate,

(1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA;

(2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of [her] disability; (3)

with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential

functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make

such accommodations.

Id. at 125–26. “If a plaintiff suggests plausible accommodations, the burden of proof

shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that such accommodations would present

undue hardships and would therefore be unreasonable.” Id. at 128. “In

discrimination claims based both on adverse employment actions and on failures to

accommodate, the plaintiff ‘bears the burdens of both production and persuasion as

to the existence of some accommodation that would allow [her] to perform the

essential functions of [her] employment.’” Id. at 126 (quoting McBride, 583 F.3d at

97). “[T]he ADA envisions an interactive process by which employers and employees

work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably

accommodated.” Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting McBride,

583 F.3d at 99). “Failure-to-accommodate claims do not require proof of

discriminatory intent.” Brooklyn Ctr. for Psychotherapy, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins.

Co., 955 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2020).

For Martinez’s failure-to-accommodate theory, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL use

the same standard as the ADA. Kleyman v. SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-

3137 (PKC), 2020 WL 5645218, at * 8 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2020) (noting that “[t]he

same standards apply to claims under the NYSHRL [and under the ADA]” (citing

Sivio v. Vill. Care Max, 436 F. Supp. 3d 778, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 2020))); Einsohn v. N.Y.C.

Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-CV-2660 (RPK), 2022 WL 955110, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,

2022) (“The same basic framework governs failure-to-accommodate claims under the

ADA and NYCHRL” (citing Frilando v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 463 F. Supp. 3d 501,

514 (S.D.N.Y. 2020))). However, as with a general disability discrimination claim,

“claims under the NYCHRL must be considered ‘independently from and more

liberally than their federal counterparts.’” Einsohn, 2022 WL 955110, at *6 (citation

modified) (quoting Wells v. Achievement Network, No. 18-CV-6588 (KPF), 2021 WL

810220, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021)).

Martinez has made an initial showing as to each step of her prima facie case,

and genuine disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on Martinez’s failure-to-

accommodate theory. First, the parties do not dispute the first element of Martinez’s

prima facie case, that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Second,

genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Defendants were on notice of

Martinez’s disability. Third, genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether

Martinez was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable

accommodations. The Court must now consider whether the record could permit a

jury to find that Defendants refused to accommodate Martinez.

i. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Exist as to Whether

Martinez’s Disability was Obvious and Whether It Became

Obvious After Alleged Misconduct

Typically, the interactive process envisioned by the ADA is “initiated by the

employee’s request for an accommodation.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 122. “[G]enerally [it

is] ‘the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that

an accommodation is needed.’” McElwee, 700 F.3d at 641 (quoting Brady v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008)). Some courts interpret this as a rule

that, “to make a claim premised on a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show

that she did, in fact, request an accommodation.” Turner v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 658

F. Supp. 3d 123, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2023); see also id. at 138 (“Without Plaintiff's request

for an accommodation, it was not Defendant's responsibility to suggest an

accommodation of its own accord.” (citing McElwee, 700 F.3d at 641)); id. at 139

(“Again, without a request for accommodation, Defendant was not obligated to

provide one.”); Guerrero v. Constellation Health Servs., LLC, No. 22-CV-07736 (OEM),

2025 WL 2549936, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2025) (“As an initial matter, to maintain a

claim premised on a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that she requested

an accommodation.” (citing Turner, 658 F. Supp. 3d at 137)); Hampson v. State Farm

Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 12-CV-00258 (BKS), 2015 WL 12733387, at *12 (N.D.N.Y.

Mar. 26, 2015) (holding that it is sufficient, under the ADA and NYSHRL, for an

employee “to make the employer aware of his or her disability and to ask whether an

accommodation can be made”).

However, the Second Circuit has held that, “under certain circumstances, an

employer is required to act proactively and engage in an interactive process to

accommodate the disability of an employee even if the employee does not request

accommodation.” McElwee, 700 F.3d at 642 (citing Brady, 531 F.3d at 135). The

Second Circuit has held “that an employer has a duty reasonably to accommodate an

employee’s disability if the disability is obvious — which is to say, if the employer

knew or reasonably should have known that the employee was disabled.” Brady, 531

F.3d at 135. Where an employee “does not request specific accommodation,” but the

employee’s disability is obvious, an employer is “obligated to engage in the []

interactive process” in order to “assess whether an employee’s disability can be

reasonably accommodated.” Id. at 135–36 (citing Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor,

205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000)). This rule aligns with the regulations that

implement the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (“It is unlawful for a covered entity

[such as an employer] not to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical

or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a

disability, unless [the accommodation imposes an undue hardship].” (emphasis

added)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable

accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal,

interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the

accommodation.” (emphasis added)).

Here, for substantially the same reasons outlined in supra in relation to

whether Defendants had notice of Martinez’s disabilities, a genuine dispute of

material fact exists as to whether Martinez’s disability was sufficiently obvious to

trigger Defendants’ obligation to accommodate her. A reasonably jury could find that

some combination of (1) Martinez’s November 7, 2018 conduct, (2) Hayes’s statement

on November 8, 2018 that Martinez’s conduct was the result of a panic attack, (3)

Martinez’s alleged interactions with Henderson about her anxiety disorder, and (4)

Martinez’s earlier FMLA leave requests to address her anxiety and PTSD made

Martinez’s disability sufficiently obvious. See Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569,

580 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that “whether [the employer] knew or should have

known [plaintiff] was disabled constitutes a genuine issue of material fact” precluding

summary judgment); cf. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313–14 (3d

Cir. 1999) (holding that, after an employee “became psychotic at work,” the employer

had sufficient information to trigger an “obligation to participate in the interactive

process” and to request additional information, despite the employer’s disclaiming all

knowledge of employee’s disability until after the start of the litigation), abrogated by

statute on other grounds as recognized in Rocco v. Gordon Food Serv., 998 F. Supp.

2d 422, 426 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2014).

Defendants assert that they were “not required to excuse Plaintiff’s

misconduct, regardless of its cause” and cite McElwee, 700 F.3d at 641, for the

proposition that “[a] requested accommodation that simply excuses past misconduct

is unreasonable as a matter of law.” Def. Opp’n at 18. However, as discussed in

supra, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Martinez’s November 7, 2018 conduct

in fact constituted “misconduct” within the policies Defendants assert she violated.

This contrasts sharply with the other case Defendants cite, where it was undisputed

that the plaintiff had in fact committed misconduct. See Fahey v. City of New York,

No. 10-CV-4609 (ILG), 2012 WL 413990, at *2, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012) (finding

that a firefighter’s after-the-fact request for an accommodation was unreasonable as

a matter of law where he (1) was terminated for testing positive for cocaine in light

of the department’s zero-tolerance policy; (2) operated a fire truck with cocaine in his

system the morning after the party at which he ingested cocaine; and (3) refused to

voluntarily seek counseling services for his PTSD, which were available). This

genuine dispute of material fact precludes this Court from finding, at summary

judgment, that Defendants were relieved of any obligation to initiate an interactive

process with Martinez after the November 7 incident and determine if reasonable

accommodations of her disability were possible.14

Martinez is also not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. She has

asserted that Defendants had previously “offered accommodation” for her known

disability by permitting her to “seek refuge” in Henderson’s office when she felt the

14 Defendants do not argue in any of their submissions that accommodating

Martinez through a leave of absence — the accommodation Martinez requested

through her union representative at the November 27, 2018 Step 3 grievance meeting

— would impose an undue hardship on their business. See generally Def. Mem.; Def.

Opp’n; Def. Reply. The record supports that such an accommodation would not

impose an undue hardship, since (1) Martinez herself had taken FMLA leave in the

past and (2) at least one other employee was offered a leave of absence during an

investigation into alleged misconduct. See Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20 (listing the

instances when Martinez took FMLA leave); Pl. Ex. KK, ECF No. 96-37 (anonymized

letter “confirm[ing] that the investigation is being held in abeyance” while the

employee took an approved, post-misconduct leave of absence). Accordingly, the

Court does not see the undue hardship element of a failure-to-accommodate claim as

posing any obstacle to denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

onset of anxiety. Pl. Dep. at 185:8–18. Defendants therefore have grounds to argue

to a jury that they did provide a reasonable accommodation to Martinez, but that she

failed to take advantage of the accommodation on November 7, 2018. See Noll v. Int’l

Bus. Machines Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming a grant of summary

judgment for an employer where “[t]he summary judgment record establishes that

IBM provided Noll with several accommodations” that the court concluded were

reasonable); Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding

that an employer had not failed to accommodate an employee where, inter alia, the

employee rejected as reassignment offer); Jacobson v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., No. 16-

CV-06169 (CM), 2018 WL 6817064, at*29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018) (granting an

employer summary judgment where “[t]he record demonstrates that every

accommodation request that [p]laintiff made with respect to [her disability] was

granted”); Gronne v. Apple Bank for Sav., No. 98-CV-6091 (JS), 2000 WL 298914, at

*7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2000) (finding that, “because [plaintiff] rejected the reasonable

accommodations offered by [her employer], she cannot perform the essential

functions of her job” and therefore “is not a qualified person with a disability under

the ADA” (citation modified) (citations omitted)), aff’d, 1 F. App’x 64 (2d Cir. 2001).

Thus, as with Martinez’s adverse employment action theory, her failure-to-

accommodate theory raises genuine disputes that may only be resolved by a jury.

c. Disability Discrimination Claims Against Individual Defendants

Treval and Henderson under the NYCHRL

Martinez also seeks to hold Treval and Henderson individually liable under

the NYCHRL for disability discrimination. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(1)(a)(3)

(making it unlawful for “an employee or agent” of an employer to discriminate on the

basis of protected characteristics “in compensation or in terms, conditions or

privileges of employment”). The New York Court of Appeals construes this provision

to extend direct liability to employees who have “some supervisory role over the

victim of their discrimination,” including “not just those with formal managerial or

titular authority over a plaintiff, but [also] those who wield any ability to dictate or

administer the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s

employment.” Russell v. NYU, 246 N.E.3d 868, 877 (N.Y. 2024). “Individual liability

under the NYCHRL only exists if the individual actually participated in the conduct

giving rise to the discrimination claim,” and extends to employees who are involved

in discipline decisions. Goffe v. NYU Hosp. Ctr., 201 F. Supp. 3d 337, 358 (E.D.N.Y.

2016) (citation modified); see also Lee v. Riverbay Corp., 751 F. Supp. 3d 259, 291

(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“Under this provision, individuals may incur liability only for their

own discriminatory conduct.” (citation modified)).

Here, the parties do not dispute that Treval was Martinez’s formal supervisor.

Pl. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5. As to Henderson, the parties do not dispute that she “was

responsible for ensuring that staff and managers adhered to the collective bargaining

agreement,” id. ¶ 3, meaning she was responsible for administering Martinez’s terms

and conditions of employment. Both Treval and Henderson fit within the broad

definition of “supervisor” applicable under the NYCHRL.

However, while the parties agree that both Treval and Henderson participated

in the investigation into Martinez’s conduct and the decision to terminate her, they

disagree as to who made the ultimate decision to terminate Martinez. Pl. Resp. 56.1

Stmt. ¶ 81. Defendants claim Treval, Henderson, and Chief Nursing Officer Terry

Pando decided to terminate Martinez for workplace violence on November 14, 2018.

Id. ¶¶ 81–83; Def. Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 100–03, 115. Martinez contends that Associate

Executive Director of Human Resources Mary Beth Springstead, Henderson’s

supervisor, made the decision to suspend and then terminate Martinez. Pl. Resp.

56.1 Stmt. ¶ 81. Henderson testified that she kept Springstead informed of the

disciplinary process and sought her guidance and that Springstead determined, based

on witness statements, that Martinez’s conduct constituted workplace violence. Def.

Resp. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 100–03.

Henderson further testified that she did not disclose any information to

Springstead about Martinez’s medical conditions or disabilities, to the extent she had

knowledge of these conditions at all. Id. ¶ 105. Moreover, Springstead concedes that

she “ha[d] access to all records of the Hospital relative to any employee requests for

a leave of absence, medical or otherwise, including but not limited to leave taken

under the [FMLA], including any leave taken or requested by former employee

Adelaida Martinez, the Plaintiff, during her employment at the Hospital.”

Springstead Decl. ¶ 3. The extent to which Springstead may (or may not) have shared

information about Martinez’s disability with Henderson is a jury question. Thus, a

genuine dispute exists as to whether Treval and Henderson had knowledge of

Martinez’s disability.

A reasonable jury could find that one or both individual Defendants directly

participated in the decision to terminate Martinez’s employment and did so because

of her disability. Of course, that same jury would not be required to make such a

finding. Accordingly, considering these genuine disputes of material fact, both

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to the individual liability claims

against Treval and Henderson under the NYCHRL are DENIED.

* * *

Defendants strenuously argue that Martinez committed workplace violence

that justified her termination. Workplace violence is a serious concern, and

employers have the right to make personnel decisions — including, in some

circumstances, to terminate disabled employees — that are reasonably necessary to

maintain a safe workplace. But the record before the Court does not conclusively

establish that, as a matter of law, Martinez’s conduct on November 7, 2018

constituted misconduct within the meaning of the policies Defendants cited to justify

her termination. That issue is properly left to a jury. There are genuine disputes of

material fact that are relevant to both Martinez’s adverse action and failure-to-

accommodate theories of disability discrimination. Accordingly, the parties’ cross-

motions for summary judgment on Martinez’s ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL

disability discrimination causes of action are DENIED. Moreover, because the

NYCHRL claim against SIUH survives, and because genuine disputes of material

fact exist as to the extent of Treval’s and Henderson’s direct knowledge and

participation in these allegedly discriminatory actions, the parties’ cross-motion for

summary judgment on Martinez’s direct liability claims against the individual

Defendants is also DENIED.

III. Retaliation Claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL

“The burden-shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas also applies to

retaliation claims under both the ADA and the NYSHRL.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125

(citing Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002)). For these two

statutes, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by showing “(i) a

plaintiff was engaged in protected activity; (ii) the alleged retaliator knew that

plaintiff was involved in protected activity; (iii) an adverse decision or course of action

was taken against plaintiff; and (iv) a causal connection exists between the protected

activity and the adverse action.” Id. (quoting Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d

337, 353 (2d Cir. 2019) and Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 234

(2d Cir. 2000)). “‘Protected activity’ is ‘action taken to protest or oppose statutorily

prohibited discrimination.’” Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 354 (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores,

Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 2000), superseded on other grounds by Local L. No. 85

(2005) of City of N.Y.). “While it is unnecessary for an individual to specifically invoke

the word discrimination when complaining in order to alert her employer to her

protected activity, there must be some basis to conclude that the employer was aware

that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity.” Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 575

F. App’x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014).

The standard under the NYCHRL is somewhat different. “The NYCHRL offers

retaliation victims, like discrimination victims, broader protection than its [pre-2019

amendment] NYSHRL counterpart.” Reichman v. City of New York, 117 N.Y.S.3d

280, 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2020) (citing Albunio v. City of New York, 947

N.E.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. 2011) and Brightman v. Prison Health Serv., Inc., 970 N.Y.S.2d

789, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013)). A retaliation claim under the NYCHRL

requires a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case that:

(1) he or she engaged in a protected activity as that term is defined under

the NYCHRL, (2) his or her employer was aware that he or she

participated in such activity, (3) his or her employer engaged in conduct

which was reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in that

protected activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the

protected activity and the alleged retaliatory conduct.

Id. (quoting Sanderson-Burgess v. City of New York, 102 N.Y.S.3d 678, 681 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2d Dep’t 2019)). Put another way, “to prevail on a retaliation claim under

NYCHRL, the plaintiff must show that she took an action opposing her employer’s

discrimination and that, as a result, the employer engaged in conduct that was

reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in such action.” Mihalik, 715 F.3d

at 112 (citing Albunio, 947 N.E.2d at 138 and Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872

N.Y.S.2d 27, 33–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2009).

What constitutes “protected activity” differs under the statutes. Under the

ADA, protected activity includes requesting a reasonable accommodation. See Weixel

v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002) (“First, plaintiffs do allege

that they were seeking reasonable accommodation of [student]’s disability — which

constitutes protected activity under [the ADA].” (citing Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d

298, 311 (2d Cir. 1999))); Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 126 (discussing a request for

accommodation implicitly as protected activity under the ADA and noting that “[t]he

close temporal proximity between [plaintiff’s] requests for the accommodation and

the instruction that she would need to go on medical leave is sufficient to support an

inference of retaliation” (citing Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of

Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001)); Konieczny v. N.Y. State Div. of

Parole, 647 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Requesting reasonable

accommodations for a disability may also constitute protected activity.” (citations

omitted)).

Martinez’s retaliation claims, which were brought on May 6, 2019, predate

both the August 12, 2019 and November 11, 2019 effective dates of amendments to

the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, respectively. Martinez’s state and City law retaliation

claims are thus governed by their pre-2019 amendment standards.15 Before 2019, it

15 In 2019, the NYCHRL was explicitly amended to make it “an unlawful

discriminatory practice for [an employer subject to the NYCHRL] to retaliate . . .

against any person because such person has . . . requested a reasonable

accommodation under this chapter . . . .” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(7)(v); see also

Local L. No. 129 (2019) of City of N.Y. § 1 (amending Section 8–107(7) effective

November 11, 2019); Simmons v. Vill. Plumbing & Heating NY Inc., 200 N.Y.S.3d

293, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023) (noting the “2019 amendment to the [NYCHRL] that

codified a request for a reasonable accommodation as protected activity”). In light of

the 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL that “align[ed]” the NYSHRL to the standards

of the NYCHRL, see Wright, 232 N.Y.S.3d at 596, it is not clear whether requesting a

reasonable accommodation constitutes protected activity under the NYSHRL at

present. See Jordan v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-4962 (DLC), 2024 WL 4872186,

at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2024) (observing that “[i]t is possible that [the] recent

amendment to the NYSHRL might change how New York courts would interpret the

state law” but concluding “the August 2019 amendment to the NYSHRL did not

change the NYSHRL to mean that a request for a reasonable accommodation is

protected activity” because, “[w]hile the New York City Council amended the

NYCHRL . . . the New York State Legislature did not similarly act”). The Court need

not prognosticate how New York courts might further reinterpret protected activity

under the NYSHRL, however, because Martinez’s retaliation claims pre-date these

2019 amendments.

appears that “a request for reasonable accommodation [was] not a protected activity

for purposes of a retaliation claim” under either the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL.

Witchard v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 960 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t

2013); see also Medina v. AAM 15 Mgmt. LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 332, 346 (S.D.N.Y.

2024) (“New York’s intermediate appellate courts have long made clear that under

the NYSHRL, a request for reasonable accommodation is not a protected activity for

purposes of a retaliation claim.” (citation modified)).

Under any of these standards — ADA, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL — Martinez has

failed to establish a prima facie case at the first step of the analysis because the record

evidence does not show that she engaged in protected activity prior to her

termination. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Martinez, the

closest she came to engaging in protected activity prior to her termination was when

her union representative Hayes indicated, at the November 8, 2018 investigatory

meeting, that Martinez’s conduct the previous day was the result of an anxiety attack.

See Henderson Dep. 195:14–16 (“I am aware of the fact that Marilyn [Hayes] said [at

the November 8, 2018 meeting] she thought it was an anxiety attack.”). But merely

alerting an employer that certain conduct was caused by a disability does not

constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation. See Turner, 658 F. Supp. 3d at

138–39 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (holding that a plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case

of retaliation under the ADA where, inter alia, she “explained that the cause [of a

missed deadline] was medical issues brought on by my new chemotherapy

medication” but “ma[de] no reference to any explicit request for an accommodation”).

And even if this statement were generously interpreted to constitute a request for an

accommodation, it still would not amount to protected activity under the pre-2019

amendments NYCHRL or NYSHRL. Nor does the record contain any other indication

that Martinez otherwise opposed, objected to, or protested any form of alleged

disability discrimination prior to her termination on November 14, 2018.

Instead, the earliest date on record at which Martinez clearly requested a

reasonable accommodation was at the November 27, 2018 Step 3 grievance meeting

— after she had been terminated from employment. See Pl. Dep. at 202:20–23 (“I

recall [union representative] Kerry Johnston requesting [at the Step 3 grievance

meeting] a reasonable accommodation in allowing me to seek medical attention and

get some medical treatment.”). Because this request for accommodation post-dates

the decision to terminate, it cannot satisfy the “causal connection” requirement under

the ADA, NYSHRL, or NYCHRL.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims is

GRANTED.

IV. Aider and Abettor Claims Against Individual Defendants Treval

and Henderson under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL

Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL contain identical provisions that state,

“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite,

compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter, or to

attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(6); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107(6). “The

NYSHRL permits an employee to be held liable for aiding and abetting a liable

employer.” Nanakumo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 23-CV-00314 (ALC), 2025

WL 919479, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025). “To be liable under [the NYSHRL], an

individual employee need not have supervisory or hiring and firing power, but must

have ‘actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the claim.’” Malena v.

Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting

Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157 (2d Cir. 2004)). The NYCHRL also extends

aiding and abetting liability to employees. See Nankumo, 2025 WL 919479, at *9

(“[E]mployees may incur liability under the NYCHRL for their own discriminatory

conduct, for aiding and abetting such conduct by others, or for retaliation against

protected conduct.” (citation modified) (quoting Nezaj v. PS450 Bar & Rest., 719 F.

Supp. 3d 318, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2024))). The same general standard applies to both

statutes. Malena, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (“The [NYCHRL] also supports claims for

aiding and abetting, which are susceptible to the same standard as under the

NYSHRL, as [the] language of the two laws is virtually identical.” (citation modified)).

Aider and abettor liability under these two statues “extends to personal liability for

aiding and abetting allegedly unlawful discrimination by an employer even where an

individual defendant’s action serve as the predicate for the employer’s vicarious

liability, so long as the employer’s conduct has also been found to be discriminatory

under the NYSHRL.” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 73

(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citation modified).

Defendants advance two arguments against Martinez’s aider and abettor

claims. First, Defendants argue that Martinez’s “claim against both Treval and

Henderson fails because her underlying claims against [SIUH] fail.” Def. Mem at 25.

However, as detailed supra, Martinez’s disability discrimination claims against SIUH

under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL have survived summary judgment. Summary

judgment as to the derivative claim is thus unwarranted on this ground.

Second, Defendants argue that Martinez “cannot make any showing of ‘direct,

purposeful participation’ by the individual defendants [Treval and Henderson]” and

that this purported failure “requires dismissal of her claim.” Id. However, as

explained supra, there are genuine disputes as to who made the ultimate decision to

terminate Martinez’s employment and the respective roles played by Treval and

Henderson in that final decision. These disputes preclude a finding by this Court at

summary judgment that Martinez’s aider and abettor claims against Treval and

Henderson fail as a matter of law.

However, these genuine disputes of material fact also prevent the Court from

finding, as Martinez asserts, that the record indisputably demonstrates that

“Henderson and Treval were directly involved and responsible for discrimination

against Plaintiff.” Pl. Mem. at 26. Accordingly, both parties’ cross-motions for

summary judgment as to Martinez’s aider and abettor claims against Treval and

Henderson are DENIED.

V. Vicarious Liability Claim Against SIUH under NYCHRL

Because Martinez’s disability discrimination claim against SIUH under the

NYCHRL has survived summary judgment, her derivative claim for vicarious

liability against SIUH under the NYCHRL based on Treval’s and Henderson’s

conduct is duplicative of her non-derivative claim against SIUH for the same conduct.

See Singhal v. Doughnut Plant, Inc., No. 20-CV-3295 (ALC), 2022 WL 976885, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[T]he vicarious liability claim against [the employer is]

dismissed as duplicative because Plaintiff also brings non-derivative, general

NYCHRL claims against [the employer], which the Court has upheld.”). Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this vicarious liability claim is

GRANTED.

VI. Interference with FMLA Rights Claim Against SIUH

Martinez also claims that SIUH unlawfully interfered with her rights under

the Family and Medical Leave Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful

for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to

exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”). The FMLA entitles eligible

employees to take leave for certain qualifying reasons provided they follow certain

notice requirements. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (“Leave requirement”). To make

out a prima facie case of interference with FMLA rights, Martinez must establish:

1) that she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; 2) that the

defendant is an employer as defined by the FMLA; 3) that she was

entitled to take leave under the FMLA; 4) that she gave notice to the

defendant of her intention to take leave; and 5) that she was denied

benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA.

Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2016). An employer’s

intent is not at issue in an FMLA interference claim, because “the question is simply

whether the employer in some manner impeded the employee’s exercise of his or her

right [under the FMLA].” Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir.

2004); see also Hill v. City of New York, 136 F. Supp. 3d 304, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

(“The employer’s intent is irrelevant to a FMLA interference claim.” (citing Potenza,

365 F.3d at 167)), amended and supplemented by No. 13-CV-6147 (PKC), 2019 WL

1900503 (Apr. 29, 2019).

As an initial matter, the record reflects that Martinez was denied FMLA leave

three times between 2011 and 2012. Springstead Decl. ¶ 11. To the extent Martinez

predicates an FMLA interference claim on these denials, it is time-barred by the

FMLA’s statute of limitations. See §§ 2617(c)(1), (2) (providing for a general two-year

statute of limitations and a three-year statute of limitations for willful violations,

with a claim accruing on “the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation

for which the action is brought”). Martinez filed this case on May 6, 2019, more than

six years after the expiration of the limitations period for either an alleged willful or

non-willful violation of the FMLA.

Martinez also appears to assert an FMLA interference claim in relation to the

November 7, 2018 incident and her subsequent termination. See Pl. Opp’n at 29

(discussing a “request for FMLA” in relation to Plaintiff’s termination). Such a claim

would be timely under the FMLA’s statute of limitations. Defendants do not dispute

that, during the term of her employment, Martinez was an eligible employee within

the meaning of the FMLA. Nor do Defendants argue that SIUH was not an employer

within the meaning of the statute. Further, it appears that Martinez may in fact

have been qualified to take leave under the FMLA. Her disabilities — namely, an

anxiety disorder and PTSD requiring medication and ongoing treatment — could

qualify as a “serious health condition” as defined by the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 2611(11)(b) (“The term ‘serious health condition’ means an illness, injury,

impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves . . . continuing treatment

by a health care provider.”). The Department of Labor has recently advised that “[a]

serious health condition can include a mental health condition.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

Fact Sheet #28O: Mental Health Conditions and the FMLA (May 2022),

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/28o-mental-health [https://perma.cc/

AXV7-LAAZ].16 The record supports, but does not conclusively establish, that

Martinez’s disability properly qualifies as a “serious health condition” entitling her

to FMLA leave.

However, Martinez’s prima facie case fails at the fourth element. The record

establishes beyond dispute that Martinez, before her November 14, 2018 termination,

did not either (1) request FMLA leave or (2) provide sufficient notice that any leave

taken was for an FMLA-qualifying reason.17 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1) (“When an

16 This Fact Sheet, which the Court finds persuasive though it is non-binding,

advises:

A serious mental health condition that requires continuing

treatment by a health care provider includes—

• Conditions that incapacitate an individual for more than three

consecutive days and require ongoing medical treatment, either

multiple appointments with a health care provider, including a

psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or clinical social worker, or a

single appointment and follow-up care (e.g., prescription medication,

outpatient rehabilitation counseling, or behavioral therapy); and

• Chronic conditions (e.g., anxiety, depression, or dissociative

disorders) that cause occasional periods when an individual is

incapacitated and require treatment by a health care provider at

least twice a year.

17 The Court notes that the question of whether Martinez provided sufficient

notice under the FMLA is a separate inquiry from whether Martinez’s disability was

employee requests FMLA leave, or when the employer acquires knowledge that an

employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer must notify

the employee of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave within five business

days, absent extenuating circumstances.”). Accordingly, she did not provide notice

“of her intention to take leave,” as required to make out an FMLA interference claim.

Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 424.

The regulations implementing the FMLA provide that “[a]n employee shall

provide sufficient information for an employer to reasonably determine whether the

FMLA may apply to the leave request.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b). The regulation

presumes that there has been a request to take leave, or at least an indication that

leave is necessary. The record establishes that, at the November 8, 2018

investigatory meeting, Martinez’s union representative took the position that

Martinez’s conduct the previous day was a result of a panic attack. Henderson Dep.

195:14–16 (“I am aware of the fact that Marilyn [Hayes] said [at the November 8,

2018 meeting] she thought it was an anxiety attack.”). But nothing in the record

reflects that Martinez ever requested leave or indicated that leave was necessary at

this meeting. “Nothing in the FMLA places a duty on an employer to affirmatively

grant leave without such a request or notice by the employee. Rather, to invoke the

protection of the FMLA, an employee must provide notice and a qualifying reason for

requesting the leave.” Amley v. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp., No. 19-CV-3777

(CM), 2021 WL 4429784, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 27, 2021) (citation modified) (emphasis

sufficiently obvious to trigger her employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process

under the ADA, discussed supra.

added) (quoting Slaughter v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. of N.Y., 64 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326

(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). To the extent Martinez was on leave following the November 8

investigatory meeting, it was an involuntary administrative leave, not a leave that

she affirmatively requested pursuant to an FMLA qualifying reason.

Nor does the record establish that Martinez’s union representatives requested

that Martinez be permitted to take FMLA leave prior to the subsequent Step 3

grievance meeting on November 27, 2018. And by that point, Martinez had already

been terminated. Any post-facto request at the November 27 meeting would not have

put her employer on adequate notice of a need for leave prior to the end of her

employment relationship. See Brown v. The Pension Bds., 488 F. Supp. 2d 395, 409–

10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that a letter “did not constitute adequate notice” in part

because “the letter was received after [the plaintiff’s] termination”); Palmer v. Kaiser

Found. Hosps. Tech. Risk Off., No. 16-CV-2376 (WJM) (KMT), 2017 WL 6547344, at

*6 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2017) (adopting report and recommendation) (holding that,

“[b]ecause it is undisputed in the record that Defendant had already made the

decision to terminate [p]laintiff prior to her request for FMLA leave,” the plaintiff

“could not prevail on a claim of interference with her FMLA rights” (citation

modified)), aff’d, 753 F. App’x 590 (10th Cir. 2018); Staton v. Child.’s Nat’l Med. Ctr.,

No. 20-CV-03328 (DLF), 2022 WL 4446396, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 23, 2022) (holding that

a plaintiff’s FMLA interference claims failed where the plaintiff “did not make her

[FMLA leave] request until after her termination became effective”). Stated another

way, Martinez cannot argue that her termination interfered with her FMLA rights

when she had not sought to exercise those rights prior to her termination. See

Waltman v. United Servs., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 86, 109–10 (D. Conn. 2022) (“The

Second Circuit has held that a terminated employee fails to prove interference where

he or she did not show that the employer ‘considered the protected activity a negative

factor in its decision to terminate him or her.’” (citation modified) (quoting Sista, 445

F.3d at 176)).

Thus, because Martinez has failed to prove an essential element of her FMLA

interference claim, see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, this claim must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Martinez’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment as to the FMLA interference claim

is GRANTED.

VII. Hybrid Claim Against SIUH under LMRA § 301

Martinez also asserts a “hybrid” claim under the LMRA against Defendant

SIUH. “Although formally comprised of two separate causes of action, a suit in which

an employee alleges that an employer has breached a CBA and that a union has

breached its duty of fair representation by failing to enforce the CBA is known as a

hybrid § 301/fair representation claim.”18 Bryant v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 550 F.

Supp. 2d 513, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Acosta v. Potter, 410 F.Supp.2d 298, 308

(S.D.N.Y.2006)). “To establish a hybrid § 301/DFR claim, a plaintiff must prove both

18 “Section 301 of the LMRA governs the employer’s duty to honor the collective

bargaining agreement, and the duty of fair representation is implied from § 9(a) of

the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).” White, 237 F.3d at 179 n.3

(citations omitted).

(1) that the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the

union breached its duty of fair representation vis-a-vis the union members.” White v.

White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164–65 (1983)). “The plaintiff may sue the union or the

employer, or both, but must allege violations on the part of both.” Id. at 179 (citing

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165). A plaintiff is not required to exhaust her grievance and

arbitration remedies before bringing a hybrid claim. See Allen v. United Parcel Serv.,

Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“A hybrid § 301 claim pairs a claim

that the employer breached the CBA with a claim that the union’s breach of its duty

to fairly represent the employee prevented the employee from exhausting the

grievance process.” (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163–64 and Carrion v. Enter.

Ass’n, 227 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir.2000))).

To satisfy the breach of the duty of fair representation element of a hybrid

claim, Martinez must demonstrate (1) “that the union’s actions or inactions are either

arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith” and establish (2) “a causal connection

between the union’s wrongful conduct and [her] injuries.” Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots

Ass’n, Int’l, 604 F.3d 703, 709 (2d Cir. 2010). A union acts arbitrarily “only if, in light

of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s

behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational.” Air Line

Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (citation modified); see also Roy v.

Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra Soc’y, Inc., 682 F. App’x 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2017)

(“[A]rbitrary conduct amounting to a breach is intentional conduct by union officials

or acts of omission which, while not calculated to harm union members, may be so

egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so

unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary.” (quoting NLRB v. Local

282, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 740 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1984))). “A union’s acts are

discriminatory when substantial evidence indicates that it engaged in discrimination

that was intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Vaughn,

604 F.3d at 709–710 (citation omitted). “To demonstrate bad faith, [P]laintiff must

show that the union’s actions constitute fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.”

Velasquez v. Metro Fuel Oil Corp., 12 F. Supp. 3d 387, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting

Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 05–CV–2666 (JBW), 2005 WL

1661093, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2005)); see also Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n-Int’l,

156 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A union acts in bad faith when it acts with an

improper intent, purpose, or motive.” (citation omitted)).

Here, Martinez has failed to present evidence that satisfies any of the claim’s

essential elements. First, Martinez has adduced no evidence that the Union engaged

in intentional and severe discrimination against her because of her disability. See

Vaughn, 604 F.3d at 709–710. Though Martinez claims “[t]he [U]nion’s intentional

refusal to assert Plaintiff’s disability defense, was discriminatory,” Pl. Mem. at 30,

this is conclusory. Martinez has not demonstrated that she produced medical

documentation to substantiate her disability defense to the Union. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes,

386 U.S. 171, 194 (1967) (“In a case such as this, when Owens supplied the Union

with medical evidence supporting his position, the Union might well have breached

its duty had it ignored Owens’ complaint or had it processed the grievance in a

perfunctory manner.” (emphasis added)). Johnston specifically raised Martinez’s

disability to Treval at the Step 3 grievance meeting. Dep. of Kerry Johnston dated

July 7, 2021, Pl. Ex. E at 64:12–65:9, ECF No. 96-5. Martinez concedes that the

Union raised disability defense to the employer. Pl. Mem. at 30 (“[T]he [U]nion spent

a lot of time (informally) begging SIUH to consider [Martinez’s disability defense].”).

No record evidence indicates the Union discriminated against Martinez because of

her disability or otherwise.

Second, there is no evidence that the Union acted deceitfully or dishonestly

towards Martinez in handling her grievance, or that Union officials acted with an

improper motive or purpose. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to

Martinez, it demonstrates that the Union was forthright with her, communicating its

decisions concerning her grievance directly and advising Martinez of her appeal

rights. See, e.g., Ltr. dated Jan. 7, 2019, Pl. Ex. U at 2, ECF No. 91-21

(communicating the Chapter Board’s December 27, 2018 decision not to advance the

grievance). The Union specifically requested and received an extension of the 30-day

contractual time limit to advance a grievance to arbitration to permit Martinez to

avail herself of the Union’s appeal process. Email dated Dec. 18, 2018, Pl. Ex. FF at

2, ECF No. 96-32. The record contains no evidence that the Union’s decisions were

infected by an invidious or otherwise inappropriate intent.

Third, the record contains no evidence that the Union acted arbitrarily. Hayes

conducted an investigation into the November 7 incident. See generally Pl. Ex. X,

ECF No. 96-24 (notes from witness interviews conducted by Hayes). This

investigation produced few, if any, witnesses willing to testify on Martinez’s behalf.

See Hayes Dep. at 112:24–25 (“[P]eople just really didn’t want to get involved.”). To

the extent Martinez asserts the Union should have done more to preserve the video

footage of the incident, the record indicates the Union made a reasoned decision not

to pursue this evidence given SIUH’s position on the grievance. See id. at 138:16–

139:1 (“[The union’s contract administrators] thought that I just . . . didn’t

understand . . . that the videos weren’t going to help her.”). To the extent this

conclusion was incorrect, “tactical errors are insufficient to show a breach of the duty

of fair representation; even negligence on the union’s part does not give rise to a

breach.” Roy, 682 F. App’x at 47 (quoting Barr v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 868 F.2d

36, 43 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Velasquez, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 415 (“[W]here the Union

investigates a member’s claim and reasonably determines that it is either meritless

or simply unwinnable, it has satisfied its duty.” (quoting Mazza v. Dist. Council of

N.Y., No. CV-00-6854 (BMC), 2007 WL 2668116, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 6, 2007))).

There is no dispute that the Union filed a grievance on Martinez’s behalf and

that a Step 3 grievance meeting was held at which Martinez and her Union

representatives made her case. Pl. Dep. at 192–93; see also Collective Bargaining

Agreement art. 31, Grievance Procedure, Pl. Ex. CC at 3, ECF No. 91-29 (“Anything

to the contrary herein notwithstanding, a grievance concerning a discharge or

suspension may be presented initially at Step 3 in the first instance . . . .”). The

Chapter Board made an individualized determination not to advance Martinez’s

grievance to arbitration and documented its conclusion. Greivance Determination

Form, Pl. Ex. T at 5, ECF No. 96-20 (documenting the Chapter Board’s decision). The

Union’s handling of Martinez’s grievance was not “perfunctory.” See Arnold v. 1199

SEIU, No. 09-CV-5576 (DLC), 2009 WL 4823906, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009)

(“‘Although a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it

in perfunctory fashion,’ members ‘do not have an absolute right to have their

grievances taken to arbitration.’” (citation modified) (quoting Spellacy, 156 F.3d at

128)), aff’d, 420 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2011). Martinez’s assertion that the Union should

have specifically raised a defense based on the “No Discrimination” clause of the CBA,

assuming arguendo that this defense would have succeeded, also fails to show a

breach of the duty of fair representation. See Smith v. Drug, Chem., Cosm., Plastics

& Affiliated Indus. Warehouse Emps. Loc. 815, 943 F. Supp. 224, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)

(“At most the union’s failure to raise certain arguments might be said to amount to

negligence, but proof that a union acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not

enough to make out a claim of unfair representation.” (citation modified) (quoting

Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev’d on other

grounds, 625 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981))).

Finally, the Union here cannot be said to have “prevented [Martinez] from

exhausting the grievance process,” Allen, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 298, because Martinez

herself abandoned her grievance by failing to appeal to the Division Board. Martinez

concedes that she received the January 7, 2019 letter informing her of the Chapter

Board’s decision not to advance her grievance and forwarded that letter to her

attorneys. But Martinez failed to timely appeal to the Division Board. Her

grievance’s ultimate failure was not caused by any breach of the Union’s duty of fair

representation, but by her own inaction.

Because no reasonable jury could find that the Union acted egregiously and

thereby breached its duty of fair representation when Martinez herself abandoned

her grievance, her hybrid claim has suffered “a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element.” See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The Court thus need not

consider whether Defendants violated the CBA. See White, 237 F.3d at 183 nn.12 &

13 (declining to continue the hybrid claim analysis after concluding plaintiffs failed

to show a breach of the duty of fair representation). Martinez has failed to raise any

genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on this claim.

Accordingly, as to her LMRA claim, Martinez’s cross-motion for summary judgment

is DENIED and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

/ / /

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Martinez’s cross-motion for summary judgment is

DENIED in its entirety, and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, Defendants’ motion is decided

as to each claim as follows:

ADA disability discrimination Defendants’ motion is DENIED

NYSHRL disability discrimination Defendants’ motion is DENIED

NYCHRL disability discrimination Defendants’ motion is DENIED

NYCHRL individual liability Defendants’ motion is DENIED

ADA retaliation Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

NYSHRL retaliation Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

NYCHRL retaliation Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

NYCHRL aider and abettor liability Defendants’ motion is DENIED

NYCHRL vicarious liability Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

FMLA interference Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

LMRA hybrid claim Defendants’ motion is GRANTED

At trial, Martinez will be permitted to advance both an adverse employment action

theory and a failure-to-accommodate theory of liability as to her disability

discrimination claims under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: January 6, 2026

Brooklyn, New York