Jordan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JOSHUA JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-1800-MSS-CPT

BOB HENRIQUEZ, in his official

capacity as Hillsborough County Property

Appraiser,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration of Defendant

Hillsborough County Property Appraiser’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss Verified

Second Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 47), and Plaintiff’s response thereto. (Dkt. 51)

Upon consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being otherwise fully advised,

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a dispute over whether certain real property located at

3306 S. Omar Ave. Tampa, FL 33629 (the “Property”) is entitled to an exemption

from ad valorem taxation because it is used for a religious purpose. See Fla. Stat. §

196.196. Plaintiff Joshua Jordan is the Executive Director and Senior Pastor of Faith

Action Church, Inc. (the “Church”). (Dkt. 44 at ¶ 33) Plaintiff incorporated the

Church as a Florida not-for-profit corporation on April 17, 2024. (Dkt. 44-13 at 12–

13) On April 18, 2024, Royce Ann Joyce Jordan, Plaintiff’s spouse, created the Faith

Action Church Parsonage Trust (the “Trust”) and granted the Property to the Trust.

(Dkts. 44-2; 44-13 at 25) Ms. Jordan is the Trustee of the Trust, while Plaintiff and his

progeny are the beneficiaries of the Trust. The Church is not a beneficiary of the Trust.

The Property is designated as a parsonage in the Trust documents. (Dkt. 44-2)

On October 6, 2024, the state of Florida issued a Consumer’s Certificate of

Exemption, which provides that the Church is “exempt from the payment of Florida

sales and use tax on real property rented, transient rental property rented, tangible

personal property purchased or rented, or services purchased.” (Dkt. 44-3) The

Certificate categorized the Church’s exemption category as “Religious-Physical

Place.” (Id.)

The Church also submitted an application for the Property to be exempt from

ad valorem taxes because it is used for a religious purpose.1 (Id. at ¶ 66) On April 11,

2025, Henry McCloud, Manager of the Exemption Compliance Department in the

Hillsborough County Property Appraiser’s Office, informed Plaintiff that his

application was being denied because (1) he did not currently reside at the Property,

and (2) the Property was generating rental income. (Id. at ¶ 67) Plaintiff then advised

Mr. McCloud that all rental income was going back to the Church and being used for

exempt purposes and therefore it should not be considered profit making. (Id. at ¶¶ 67–

1 The Church was listed as the “applicant name” on the application, and the application was

signed by Plaintiff as “Senior Pastor” and Royce Jordan as “trustee/director.” (Dkt. 44-13 at

7–9)

72; Dkt. 44-4) See Fla. Stat. § 196.196(4) (stating that property claimed as exempt for

religious purposes which is used for profitmaking purposes shall be subject to ad

valorem taxation, but “[u]se of property for functions not requiring a business or

occupational license conducted by the organization at its primary residence, the

revenue of which is used for wholly exempt purposes, shall not be considered profit

making.”).

On June 27, 2025, Defendant Bob Henriquez, in his official capacity as

Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, denied Plaintiff’s request for the exemption.

(Dkt. 44-5) The letter and notice of denial (“Denial Letter”) stated that the application

was denied because (1) applicant was not the owner of record on January 1 or had a

proportional interest to the real estate, (2) lacked evidence of religious activity or

services, and (3) the applicant did not meet the statutory criteria for a charitable or

nonprofit entity. (Id.) Plaintiff challenges these reasons. First, Plaintiff asserts that the

Trust owned the Property on January 1.2 Plaintiff then notes that Defendant’s office

never requested any documentation of religious activity or services. Among others,

Plaintiff points to online services, physical services in the Church’s Tokyo, Japan

location, and charitable support as examples of the Church’s religious activity. (Dkt.

44 at ¶ 97) The Denial Letter advised Plaintiff that appeals could be made to the Value

2 From Defendant’s perspective, the issue is that the Church is listed as the applicant on the

exemption application, and the Church did not own the Property (the Trust did). (Dkt. 44-13

at 2–3) Plaintiff alleges that the Trust is an “integrated auxiliary” of the Church and thus

shares in the Church’s “exempt religious status.” (Dkt. 44 at ¶ 44)

Adjustment Board within 30 days. (Dkt. 44-5) Because the constitutional issues

involved, however, Plaintiff opted to seek a resolution in federal court.

After receiving the Denial Letter, Plaintiff submitted a public records request to

Defendant’s office seeking data on its denials of religious exemption applications since

Defendant took office in 2013. (Dkt. 44 at ¶ 132) Plaintiff alleges that these records

demonstrate a “clear pattern of unconstitutional religious determinations by

Defendant’s office,” because they often indicate more denials than applications. (Id.

at ¶ 134) For example, in 2024, Defendant issued 31 denial letters despite receiving

only 10 applications. (Id.) Plaintiff also discovered that Defendant did not retain

records from 2013–2018, despite the requirement for property appraisers to maintain

such records for 10 years.3 (Id. at ¶¶136–37)

From here, Plaintiff also alleges that, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendant

has engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional misconduct and discriminatory

application of religious exemption standards, applying lenient review standards and

favorable presumptions to Catholic religious organizations while subjecting Protestant

religious groups to heightened scrutiny, fabricated denial reasons, and discriminatory

treatment.” (Dkt. 44 at ¶ 116) After further attempts to resolve the exemption denial,

Plaintiff initiated this action. Plaintiff asserts that he is not seeking any tax-related

relief. Instead, Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s “unlawful practice of imposing

unlawful religious sufficiency tests on churches seeking tax exemption.” (Id. at ¶ 10)

3 Plaintiff raises various related challenges to Defendant’s internal operations, including the

delegation of religious exemption denials to others in his office.

The Second Amended Complaint brings eighteen claims against Defendant: (1)

Violation of Florida Statutes Chapter 196; (2) Procedural Due Process Violations; (3)

Violation of Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution; (4) Violation of the Florida

Religious Freedom Restoration Act; (5) Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the

First Amendment; (6) Violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment;

(7) Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (8)

Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”);

(9) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (10) Gross Negligence; (11) Fraudulent

Misrepresentation; (12) Gross Negligence; (13) Procedural Due Process Violations;

(14) Due Process Violations; (15) Fraud and Misrepresentation; (16) Conspiracy to

Violate Civil Rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (17) Unjust Enrichment; and (18)

Municipal Liability – Monell Claim. (Dkt. 44)

Defendant moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, arguing that the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because of the Tax Injunction

Act, the comity doctrine, and because Plaintiff lacks standing. For the reasons

explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.4

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. “[B]ecause a federal court is

powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must

zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a case[.]” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d

4 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the Tax Injunction Act and

that abstention is warranted under the comity doctrine, it does not address Plaintiff’s standing.

1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) may attack jurisdiction facially or factually.

Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). If the challenge is

facial, the court merely evaluates whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis

for subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in the complaint are taken as true

for the purposes of the motion. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov. of Augusta-Richmond

Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Tax Injunction Act

Defendant argues that the Second Amended Complaint is due to be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act. The Tax

Injunction Act states: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the

assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and

efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. “The Tax

Injunction Act is a ‘jurisdictional rule’ and constitutes a ‘broad jurisdictional barrier.’”

I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moe v. Confederated

Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Rsrv., 425 U.S. 463, 470 (1976)). The Act

“restricts the power of federal district courts to prevent collection or enforcement of

state taxes.” Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 823 (1997).

Even when “important constitutional rights are at issue,” district courts lack

jurisdiction to review disputes which concern taxes under state law if an adequate state

remedy exists. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 672–73

(11th Cir. 1984) (citing California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1983))

(“Nor is the jurisdictional bar to challenging state tax laws in federal courts avoided

when suit is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). “The burden is on the plaintiff to allege

facts sufficient to overcome the TIA’s jurisdictional bar.” Capel v. Pasco Cnty., No.

24-12793, 2025 WL 1409399, at *1 (11th Cir. May 15, 2025).5

The Tax Injunction Act bars federal jurisdiction if: “(1) the relief requested by

the plaintiff will ‘enjoin, suspend, or restrain’ a state tax assessment and (2) the state

affords the plaintiff a ‘plain, speedy and efficient remedy[.]’” Williams v. City of

Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1984). The Eleventh Circuit has held that

Florida law provides plaintiffs a “plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.” Osceola v. Fla.

Dep’t of Revenue, 893 F.2d 1231, 1233 (11th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff states that “no state tax remedy can adequately address” Defendant’s

“ultra vires religious determinations that violate the First Amendment” because “such

determinations exceed all statutory authority and involve First Amendment rights the

Constitution forbids government from evaluating.” (Dkt. 51 at 17) Plaintiff cites no

authority for the proposition that he cannot raise constitutional claims in Florida state

courts. This is because there is no limitation on his ability to bring his claims in state

court. See, e.g., Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 982 n.6 (Fla. 2001) (“A claim

under section 1983 may be brough in state court.”) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 488

5 The Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding on this court, it is

persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289

(11th Cir. 2000).

U.S. 1, 10–11 (1980)); see also Barfield v. Cnty. of Palm Beach, Off. of Prop.

Appraiser, No. 10-cv-80980, 2011 WL 1458003, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2011) (“The

Florida state courts will protect Plaintiff’s constitutional rights since Florida ‘[s]tate

courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal

liberties and uphold federal law.’”) (quoting California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457

U.S. 393, 417 n.37 (1982)); Carson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 293 F.2d 337, 339 (5th

Cir. 1961) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States is as applicable to and controlling

upon state courts as it is federal courts. So in this case plaintiffs do not lose any

constitutional rights by being forced to first try their issues in a state court instead of a

federal court.”).6 Thus, the Court holds that Florida provides a plain, speedy, and

efficient remedy.

Plaintiff argues that the Act is nonetheless inapplicable because the

determination of whether real property is entitled to a religious exemption does not

qualify as an “assessment.” In support of this argument, Plaintiff relies on the

distinction between “assessment” and “information gathering” discussed in Direct

Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2015). In Brohl, a trade association of direct-

to-consumer retailers sued the Director of Colorado’s Department of Revenue, seeking

to enjoin the state’s imposition of sales and use tax-related “notice and reporting

requirements” on out of state retailers. Id. at 5–6. Colorado required retailers that did

6 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit

adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

the close of business on September 30, 1981.

not collect Colorado sales and use tax to notify their Colorado customers of the

customer’s duty to file a sales tax return and provide those customers with annual

reports detailing their purchases. The retailers were also required to send an annual

report to the state “listing the names of their Colorado customers, their known

addresses, and the total amount each Colorado customer paid for Colorado purchases

in the prior calendar year.” Id. The purpose of this reporting was to facilitate

Colorado’s collection of sales taxes from the retailers’ customers.

In determining whether the Tax Injunction Act barred the plaintiff’s claims, the

Brohl Court looked to the Federal Tax Code, which treated “information gathering as

a phase of tax administration procedure that occurs before assessment, levy, or

collection.” Id. at 8. “This step includes private reporting of information used to

determine tax liability.” Id. The Court further explained that “assessment,” the next

step in the process, “refers to the official recording of a taxpayer’s liability, which

occurs after information relevant to the calculation of that liability is reported to the

taxing authority.” Id. at 9. The Court then stated that it “might also be understood

more broadly to encompass the process by which that amount is calculated.” Id. The

Court then held that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar the plaintiff’s suit because the

“TIA is keyed to the acts of assessment, levy, and collection themselves, and

enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements is none of these.” Id. at 12.7

7 The Court took no position on whether the suit might nevertheless be barred under the

comity doctrine. Id. at 15.

Relying on this precedent, Plaintiff characterizes his suit as a challenge to

Defendant’s “pre-assessment screening process,” and not a challenge to the

“assessment, levy, or collection” of taxes. The Court disagrees. First, the Court notes

that the Brohl Court was discussing information gathering and assessment in the

context of sales and use tax, which is procedurally distinct from property taxes. In

Hibbs v. Winn, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he term ‘assessment’ is used in

a variety of ways in tax law. In the property-tax setting, the word usually refers to the

process by which the taxing authority assigns a taxable value to real or personal

property.” 524 U.S. 88, 100 n.3 (2004).8 The determination of whether an exemption

applies is a part of the assessment process. See Turner v. Jordan, 117 F.4th 1289, 1296

(11th Cir. 2024) (“A property appraiser assesses property value, adjusts those values

by approving or rejecting exemptions, and certifies this information on the tax roll.”)

(citing Fla. Stat. §§ 193 et seq.); see also Nikolitis v. Ballinger, 736 So. 2d 1253, 1255

(Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (stating it is “clear” that the application of a homestead

exemption is an “integral part” of a “tax assessment”).

Indeed, Florida state courts have consistently held that challenges to the

determination of whether real property is entitled to an exemption are subject to the

requirements of Fla. Stat. § 194.171, which requires actions “contest[ing] a tax

assessment” to be brought within 60 days after the contested assessment is certified.

8 The Brohl Court cited the Hibbs Court’s footnote in support of the idea that “assessment”

may be “understood more broadly to encompass the process by which [the tax] amount is

calculated.” 575 U.S. at 9.

See, e.g., Ward v. Brown, 894 So. 2d 811, 815 (Fla. 2004) (“We conclude that the

petitioners’ argument that ‘classification’ challenges resulting in the denial of a tax

exemption are entitled to a four-year statute of limitations period while other claims

are not, would be contrary to the spirit of the tax assessment statutes[.]”); Nikolitis v.

Hanna, 92 So. 3d 299, 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“[I]t is well established that a

challenge concerning entitlement to a tax exemption is a challenge to an assessment

of taxes, for purposes of section 194.171.”) (emphasis in original).

Finally, even if “assessment” in these circumstances were limited to the “official

recording of taxpayer liability” as Plaintiff argues, Plaintiff’s requested relief would

nevertheless enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment of taxes. Plaintiff asks the

Court to prevent Defendant from denying any applications for religious exemptions.

Considering that, as a property appraiser, Defendant “assesses property value, adjusts

those values by approving or rejecting exemptions, and certifies this information on

the tax roll,” Plaintiff’s request for relief would prevent Defendant from both adjusting

the assessed property value and certifying the information on the tax roll. Turner, 117

F.4th at 1296.

Indeed, while not binding authority, federal courts across the country have

consistently held—after the Brohl decision—that challenges to exemption

determinations in property tax matters are barred by the Tax Injunction Act. See, e.g.,

Marvin v. Allen, No. 23-cv-5947, 2024 WL 4290722, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2024)

(“[S]uits seeking property-tax exemptions . . . are requests to restrain the ‘assessment,

levy[,] or collection’ of a ‘tax.’ By asking the Court to grant a STAR exemption,

Plaintiff effectively asks the Court ‘to determine that [Plaintiff] does not owe property

taxes the [County] has determined are due and owing.”); Baker ex rel. S.B. v. Burghart,

No. 5:25-cv-4110, 2024 WL 2783791, at *3 (D. Kan. May 30, 2024) (suit in which

plaintiffs sought “court order that would have the practical effect of allowing [them],

along with an immeasurable score of others, to claim this tax exemption” would lower

the amount of revenue the state could collect and thus fell “in the traditional heartland

of TIA cases”); Stark v. Town of Rumford, No. 2:20-cv-66, 2020 WL 6785935, at *4

(D. Me. Nov. 18, 2020) (“I lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on the Town’s

imposition or assessment of property tax, including the Town’s alleged failure to grant

the Plaintiffs an exemption based on their religious status.”); Islamic Cmty. Ctr. for

Mid Westchester v. City of Yonkers Landmark Pres. Bd., 258 F. Supp. 3d 405, 414

(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[T]o the extent plaintiffs argue their claim is not ‘related to the

collection of state taxes,’ but rather is based on the revocation of tax exempt status, the

Court fails to see how this distinction matters. In either situation, the claim is that

defendants administered the state tax system in a discriminatory way and therefore

violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Comity and the Tax Injunction Act plainly bar

the Court from adjudicating such a claim.”); see also Barfield, 2011 WL 1458003, at

*2–3 (stating that Plaintiffs’ claims challenging denial of exemption from ad valorem

taxes and “seeking an order compelling the Palm Beach Appraiser’s Office to institute

comprehensive changes to its tax assessment procedure,” were barred by the Tax

Injunction Act because “although stated as a Section 1983 action, [the case was] a

challenge to Defendants’ exercise of their statutory duties in assessing the Plaintiffs’

property”).

b. Comity

Even if the Tax Injunction Act did not preclude jurisdiction in this case,

Plaintiff’s claims are due to be dismissed on comity grounds. The comity doctrine is a

doctrine of abstention that reflects the “belief that the National Government will fare

best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their functions in separate

ways.” Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112

(1981). The doctrine applies in state taxation cases, preventing “federal courts from

entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration.” Levin v.

Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010). The doctrine is to be construed

broadly in state taxation cases. Turner, 117 F.4th at 1301. Taxpayers alleging their

federal rights have been violated by state or local tax practices must seek relief through

state remedies, so long as those remedies are “plain, adequate, and complete.” Fair

Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116.

To survive dismissal under the comity doctrine, it is the plaintiff’s burden to

establish that state court remedies are not “plain, adequate, and complete.” Turner,

117 F.4th at 1305. “A state court remedy meets these minimal procedural criteria only

when it provides the taxpayer with a full hearing and judicial determination at which

she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax.” Id. (quotations omitted)

(emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit has held that Florida law provides “plain,

adequate, and complete state remedies.” See, e.g., Capel, 2025 WL 1409399, at *2.

Because “there is ‘no significant difference’ between the Tax Injunction Act’s ‘plain,

speedy and efficient’ state remedy and the comity doctrine’s ‘plain, adequate, and

complete’ state remedy,” Plaintiff’s challenges to the adequacy of Florida’s procedures

fail for the same reasons already discussed. Turner, 117 F.4th at 1304 n.19 (citing Fair

Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116 n.8).

Plaintiff primarily argues that the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the

comity doctrine, which is now no broader than the Tax Injunction Act and is

inapplicable because he does not seek to prevent tax collection. In support of this

argument, Plaintiff relies on Hibbs, in which the Supreme Court noted in a footnote

that it has “relied upon ‘principles of comity’ . . . to preclude original federal-court

jurisdiction only when plaintiffs have sought district-court aid in order to arrest or

countermand state tax collection.” 542 U.S. at 107 n.9. In Levin, however, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed that the “comity doctrine is more embracive than the TIA.”

560 U.S. at 424. The Court then expressly clarified that the Hibbs footnote did not

restrict the doctrine’s applicability. Id. at 430 (stating that it “did not deploy the

footnote to recast the comity doctrine”). Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect. See also

Turner,117 F.4th at 1301 (noting that “both the Supreme Court and our Court have

confirmed that the comity doctrine is to be construed broadly in state taxation cases”).

Based on principles of comity, abstention is warranted. To award Plaintiff relief,

the Court would have to decide that Defendant’s procedures for determining whether

property is entitled to a religious exemption violate the Constitution. This would

conflict with the principle that “the federal courts should generally avoid interfering

with the sensitive and peculiarly local concerns surrounding state taxation schemes.”

Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation

omitted); see Turner v. Baldwin, No. 3:18-cv-1275, 2019 WL 5423389, at *5 (M.D.

Fla. Oct. 23, 2019) (finding abstention appropriate where “the Court would have to

decide that [the defendants’] administration of procedures for applying and removing

the homestead tax exemption and for effectuating the tax sale violated [the plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights”); Legion of Christ, Inc. v. Town of Mount Pleasant, No. 18-cv-

11246, 2020 WL 4288072, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2020) (stating that “a ruling

passing judgment on the constitutionality” of the Town’s “repeated denials of

Plaintiff’s tax exemption applications” is “precisely the kind of determination that

would ‘disrupt’ New York State’s tax administration, rendering it barred by the

principle of comity”); Islamic Cmty. Ctr., 258 F. Supp. 3d at 414 (holding that comity

plainly bars the court from adjudicating claim that defendants administered the state

tax system in a discriminatory way and therefore violated plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights).

c. RLUIPA

In his response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that RLUIPA provides

an independent federal cause of action (and resulting basis for this Court’s

jurisdiction). But the RLUIPA claim faces the same issues as the other claims in the

Second Amended Complaint – it is barred by the Tax Injunction Act and the comity

doctrine. Even if it were not, however, Plaintiff’s claim would fail. RLUIPA provides,

in relevant part, that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation

in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person[.]”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). The denial of a property tax exemption is not a land use

regulation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (defining “land use regulation” as “a zoning

or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s

use or development of land”); Sandstrom v. Wendell, No. 1:23-cv-405, 2024 WL

1242415, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024) (plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed to

plausibly state a claim upon which relief may be granted where the complaint failed to

“identify any restriction that actually limits his ability to practice his religion at the

properties unrelated to the properties’ tax status”).

d. Shotgun Pleading

Finally, the Court notes that the Second Amended Complaint is independently

due to be dismissed because it is an impermissible shotgun pleading. “Shotgun

pleadings violate Rule 8, which requires ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ by fail[ing] to one degree or another . . .

to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds

upon which each claim rests.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294–95

(11th Cir. 2018). The Eleventh Circuit has “identified four rough types or categories

of shotgun pleadings”: (i) “a complaint containing multiple counts where each count

adopts the allegations of all preceding counts”; (ii) a complaint that is “replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular

cause of action”; (iii) a complaint that fails to “separat[e] into a different count each

cause of action or claim for relief”; and (iv) a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible

for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.”

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015).

Even though Plaintiff is proceeding pro se (that is, without a lawyer) he must still

comply with these minimum pleading standards. See, e.g., Archer v. City of Winter

Haven, No. 8:16-CV-3067-T-36AAS, 2017 WL 11319170, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8,

2017) (dismissing pro se complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading).

The Second Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading because it falls into the

first two categories described above. First, the Second Amended Complaint contains

multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts. In

addition, the Second Amended Complaint is replete with conclusory, vague,

immaterial facts not connected to any particular cause of action. Plaintiff’s manner of

pleading is improper because he includes a litany of legal conclusions and argument

unrelated to any particular claim for relief. This has resulted in an 82-page complaint

containing 397 paragraphs. See Trump v. NY Times Co., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 8:25-

cv-2487-SDM-NHA, 2025 WL 2680597, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2025) (stating that

“a complaint remains an improper and impermissible place” for the “protracted

recitation and explanation of legal authority putatively supporting the pleader’s claim

for relief”); Whitley v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 3:25-cv-441-MMH-MCR, 2025

WL 1294993, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2025) (“Cluttering a complaint with pages of

citations to legal authority is more confusing than clarifying, as both the Court and the

defendant are left to sort through the complaint to identify the factual allegations.”);

Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797-98 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a district

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint containing “scattered legal

arguments, legal standards, legal conclusions, and even (incomplete) citations to legal

authorities”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendant Hillsborough County Property Appraiser’s Opposed Motion

to Dismiss Verified Second Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 47), is

GRANTED.

2. The Second Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 44), is DISMISSED.

3. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE any pending motions and

CLOSE the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 5th day of January 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Any Unrepresented Party

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