CAMMARANO V. WEAVER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL J. CAMMARANO, JR., :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-2117

:

DETECTIVE THOMAS M. WEAVER, :

et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

HENRY, J. January 5th , 2026

Michael J. Cammarano, Jr., filed a pro se Complaint in April 2025, asserting civil rights

violations based on an arrest. Cammarano named as Defendants Detective Thomas M. Weaver,

District Attorney John T. Adams, and the County of Berks. For the reasons set forth below, this

matter will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

The events that underlie Cammarano’s claims are alleged to have begun on August 29,

2022, when Cammarano was arrested “by officers from the Berks County District Attorney's

Office, including Detective Thomas Weaver.” (Compl. at 6.) Cammarano was, at that time, a

licensed attorney, and he asserts that “[t]he arrest was related to a dispute between a former

client of [Cammarano’s] and [the client’s] prior counsel over a contingency fee.” (Id.)

Cammarano was “charged with theft and conspiracy to commit theft.” (Id.) In brief,

Cammarano alleges that Defendants Weaver and Adams proceeded with Cammarano’s arrest

and prosecution, despite having knowledge that the dispute between his former client and the

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Cammarano’s Complaint

(ECF No. 2). The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing

system.

client’s prior counsel had been settled in civil litigation prior to Cammarano’s arrest.2 (Id.)

Cammarano states that “[o]n April 26, 2023, a judge dismissed all charges against [him] with

prejudice in a habeas corpus proceeding, citing a lack of evidence and no probable cause. The

judge specifically found that the underlying fee dispute was civil in nature and that the [client’s

prior counsel] had refused multiple requests to substantiate their claimed entitlement [to the

contingency fee].” (Id.) Through this action, Cammarano asserts federal constitutional claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state tort claims, and he seeks damages and injunctive

relief for “reputational and emotional” injuries. (Id. at 7.)

In an Order dated June 5, 2025, the Court granted Cammarano in forma pauperis status

and appointed the Clerk of Court to send waivers of service to the Defendants pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). (ECF No. 5.) The waivers of service were returned

executed by all three Defendants on June 30, 2025. (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11.) On August 5, 2025,

the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

(ECF No. 12) (the “Motion”). Defendant Adams argues that he is entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity from the bulk of Cammarano’s claims against him. (See ECF No. 12-1

at 4-5 (citing, inter alia, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420, 431 (1976); Odd v. Malone, 538

F.3d 202, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2008)).) Defendant Berks County argues that Cammarano has not

stated a claim for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978), either against the County itself or against Defendants Weaver and Adams in their official

capacities, because Cammarano “failed to plausibly identify any official policy or custom that

2 Although no record of the criminal proceedings is publicly available, the Court notes that

Cammarano was disbarred by Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dated April 30, 2024.

See Off. of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cammarano, No. 147 DB 2021 (Pa. Apr. 30, 2024).

caused a constitutional violation.” (Id. at 10-12.) And all Defendants argued that Cammarano’s

remaining claims are untimely or fail to state a claim to relief. (Id. at 6-9.)

By Order dated August 5, 2025, Cammarano was directed to file a response to the

Motion by September 4, 2025. (ECF No. 13.) When Cammarano failed to timely file a

response, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on December 1, 2025, directing Cammarano

to explain why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and directing

Cammarano to file a response to the Defendants’ Motion if he intended to prosecute his case.

(See ECF No. 14.) Cammarano has not responded to that Order, either, and his time to do so has

now expired. For the reasons set forth below, Cammarano’s Complaint will be dismissed with

prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Given Cammarano’s failure to respond to the Court’s Orders, the Court will consider

whether it is appropriate to dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an action when a plaintiff fails to prosecute the case,

fails to comply with the rules of procedure, or fails to comply with a court order. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b). “A District Court has the authority to dismiss a suit sua sponte for failure to

prosecute by virtue of its inherent powers and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b).” See Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Philadelphia Police Dep’t, 159 F. App’x 371, 373 (3d Cir.

2005) (per curiam) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). Ordinarily, a

court determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a case because of a plaintiff’s failure to

prosecute must consider several factors as set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,

747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994).

However, an analysis under Poulis usually is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the

case or makes adjudication impossible. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir.

2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to

abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of

the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts

Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an

analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise

makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).

In the context of a pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss a case where the plaintiff has failed to respond thereto

is effectively akin to sanctioning the plaintiff for failing to comply with a local rule or court

order, and a “drastic” sanction like dismissal with prejudice requires a Poulis analysis. See

Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1991). A court cannot grant a Rule 12

motion as “unopposed” or “uncontested” without a Poulis analysis. See, e.g., Washington v.

Wenerowicz, No. 21-2741, 2022 WL 39870, at *2 n.5 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (per curiam); Adkins

v. Reynolds, 788 F. App’x 824, 828 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Wiggins v. MacManiman, 698

F. App’x 42, 43-44 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Jones v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 381

F. App’x 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Shuey v. Schwab, 350 F. App’x 630, 632-33 (3d

Cir. 2009); Hernandez v. Palakovich, 293 F. App’x 890, 895-96 (3d Cir. 2008). That is so even

if, as here, the plaintiff has been ordered to respond and warned that failure to respond could

result in dismissal. Brzozowski v. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm’n, 738 F. App’x 731, 734 (3d Cir.

2018) (per curiam) (remanding where “[t]he District Court did not acknowledge the Poulis

factors. Instead, in dismissing Brzozowski’s amended complaint, the District Court merely

noted that: (1) it directed Brzozowski to respond to the Commission defendants’ motion; (2) it

warned him that failure to respond might result in dismissal; and (3) Brzozowski nevertheless

failed to respond.”). Thus, the Court will consider the Poulis factors to determine whether it is

appropriate to dismiss Cammarano’s case for failure to prosecute.

III. DISCUSSION

In Poulis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated six factors

to consider when determining whether to dismiss an action due to a plaintiff’s failure to

prosecute:

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the

adversary . . . ; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or

the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other

than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the

meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis omitted). When balancing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic

formula,” “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and all six factors need not be satisfied for a

court to dismiss a complaint. See Briscoe v. Klause, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). In this

case, an assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing this action.

As to the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, it is

Cammarano’s sole responsibility to prosecute his case and comply with Court orders. See id. at

258-59 (explaining that “a pro se plaintiff is personally responsible for complying with the

court’s orders” and “it is logical to hold a pro se plaintiff personally responsible for delays in his

case because a pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for the progress of his case”); Emerson v.

Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002) (where litigant was proceeding pro se, any failure

to comply with orders was attributable to him). Cammarano was given two opportunities to file

a response the Defendants’ Motion: the first when the Motion initially was filed and he was

directed to respond, and the second when the Order to Show cause was issued. (See ECF Nos.

13, 14.) Cammarano was expressly informed that if he failed to respond to the Court’s Order to

Show Cause and file a response, this case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (See ECF

No. 14.) Nonetheless, Cammarano failed to file a response to the Motion and did not

communicate with the Court in any other respect. Cammarano, as a self-represented litigant, is

solely responsible for complying with the Court’s orders. Further, as a former attorney,

Cammarano should be familiar with the requirement that he respond to motions and comply with

Court orders. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of dismissal.

The second factor, prejudice to the defendants, is neutral here. “Examples of prejudice

include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the

excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.’” Adams v.

Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)

(quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984). Since this case is in its early

stage of litigation, there appears to be no prejudice to the Defendants at this point. However, as a

practical matter, it is unclear how the Defendants could be expected to defend against a case with

an unresponsive plaintiff if the case were to move forward.

The third factor, a history of dilatoriness, must be assessed over the lifetime of the case,

keeping in mind that “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at

261. However, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of

dilatoriness, such as . . . consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at

874. On the one hand, this case is in the early stages of litigation. On the other hand, the

litigation cannot proceed beyond its initial stage due to Cammarano’s failure to comply with the

Court’s Orders to file his response. The delay is solely attributable to Cammarano and nothing

in the record provides a reasonable explanation as to why he is unable to comply with the

Court’s directives. For example, there is no indication on the docket that Cammarano failed to

receive the Court’s Orders directing him to file his response. Because the record shows

unexplained delays in Cammarano’s prosecution of the case, this factor weighs in favor of

dismissal.

The fourth factor, whether plaintiff’s conduct was willful or in bad faith, weighs in favor

of dismissal. As noted above, Cammarano has been expressly and repeatedly instructed on what

he was required to do to prosecute this case, namely respond to the pending Motion, and also has

been expressly informed of the consequences of the failure to comply with the Court’s Orders.

The Court’s most recent Order (ECF No. 14) made clear that if Cammarano failed to comply

with the Order, his case could be dismissed. On this record, Cammarano’s failure to file a

response may fairly be understood as willful. That conclusion is further supported by the

inference that Cammarano, a former attorney, would understand the consequence of failing to

oppose a motion to dismiss his complaint.

An examination of the fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal,

reveals that no other sanction would be effective. Cammarano is proceeding pro se and his

apparent refusal to respond to the pending Motion, if left unaddressed, would be a complete

barrier to this case proceeding beyond the pleadings stage. Given the procedural posture of this

case, Cammarano’s pro se and in forma pauperis status, and Cammarano’s apparent

unwillingness to prosecute his claims by responding to the pending Motion, it is difficult to

determine what lesser sanction might be available or appropriate in this context. See Adonai-

Adoni v. King, 506 F. App’x 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Because Adonai-Adoni

proceeded pro se and in forma pauperis, monetary sanctions were not a viable form of

alternative sanction.”); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal

of case where dilatory conduct “made adjudication of the case impossible. Therefore, any lesser

sanction would not have furthered the interests of justice.”); King v. Galano, No. 14-1691, 2015

WL 6523459, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s history of nonparticipation and

noncompliance in this matter suggests that alternative sanctions would be futile.”). As such, no

other sanction would be effective. The fifth factor thus weighs in favor of dismissal.

Under the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider if the claims or defenses are

meritorious. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70 (“A claim or defense, will be deemed meritorious

when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff

or would constitute a complete defense.”). Here, the Defendants have advanced compelling

arguments as to prosecutorial immunity, lapse of the relevant statutes of limitations, and other

fatal deficiencies in Cammarano’s Complaint. (See generally ECF No. 12 at 4-12.) The Court

specifically notes that the Defendants appear to be correct that the majority of Cammarano’s

claims appear to be untimely. The timeliness of Cammarano’s § 1983 claims are governed by

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524; Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). A claim accrues

“when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when [he] can file suit and

obtain relief.” Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted).

In general, this means that the statute of limitations will start running at the time the plaintiff

“knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of

Del. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).

Cammarano’s claims for false arrest, unreasonable seizure, and first amendment

retaliation all accrued on the date of his arrest, August 29, 2022, so the Court agrees that they

appear untimely.3 See Lloyd v. Ocean Twp. Counsel, 857 F. App’ x 61,64 (3d Cir. 2021) (per

curiam) (noting that false arrest and imprisonment claims begin to run at the time the plaintiff

was “ detained pursuant to legal process”); LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’ x 140, 142 (3d Cir.

2011) (per curiam); Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018) (illegal search

claims accrue at “the moment of the search”); Ojo v. Luong, 709 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir.

2017) (per curiam) (“Most of [plaintiff's claims] accrued when defendants conducted their

searches and seizures on July 11, 2011, because [plaintiff] knew or should have known the basis

for these claims at that time.”); Sevast v. Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1153 (Pa. 2007) (explaining

that in Pennsylvania, “the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the right to institute and

maintain the suit arises”). The Defendants have also made compelling arguments that

Cammarano’s allegations fail to state a Monell claim, a substantive due process claim, or a claim

for abuse of process under state law. (See ECF No 12-1 at 6-7, 9-12.)

As in Poulis, the Court can discern no allegations in Cammarano’s Complaint that would

avoid these compelling defenses, and Cammarano filed no answer to the motion to dismiss that

specifies which of his allegations would overcome the identified defenses. See Poulis, 747 F.2d

at 870 (explaining that the proffered defense was “on its face, compelling,” where plaintiffs

3 Cammarano asserts claims under state law for defamation and false light based on the

allegation that Defendant Adams made an “untrue” public statement after the arrest that

Cammarano’s license to practice law had been “suspended in connection with the matter.”

(Compl. at 6.) However, as noted above, it appears that Cammarano’s law license was

suspended in December 2021, and he was disbarred in April 2024. See Cammarano, No. 147

DB 2021. And in any event, as the Defendants argue, it appears that these claims would be

barred by Pennsylvania’s a one-year statute of limitations for such claims. See Oldham v. Pa.

State Univ., 138 F.4th 731, 750 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Graham v. Today’ s Spirit, 468 A.2d 454,

457 (Pa. 1983)); see also McClenaghan v. Turi, 567 F. App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2014) (per

curiam) (“The relevant triggering event for the statute of limitations in a defamation action under

Pennsylvania law, however, is the publication of the defamatory communication by the

defendant, not the point in time when the plaintiff first learns of the communication.”).

made no allegation in the complaint that would avoid the defense and did not respond to the

motion to dismiss, and concluding that “[w]hile we express no opinion on whether summary

judgment or dismissal would have been warranted on this ground, the existence of a prima facie

defense is a factor to be weighed along with the foregoing factors.”) (internal citations omitted).

Thus, even if Cammarano could maintain a meritorious claim under federal or state law based on

his arrest and prosecution, each Defendant has articulated a compelling defense to Cammarano’s

claims, which weighs in favor of dismissal. Even if the Court were to find the sixth Poulis factor

to be neutral at this stage of the litigation, the first, third, fourth, and fifth Poulis factors weigh in

favor of dismissal.

A plaintiff may have a meritorious claim, but he must prosecute that claim in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s orders to prove that claim and entitle

him to judgment, if warranted. Absent a plaintiff who is participating in the legal process, this

case cannot move forward.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Poulis factors weigh in favor of

dismissing this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for Cammarano’s failure

to prosecute. Simply put, there is no way for this litigation to proceed without Cammarano’s

participation. An appropriate order will be filed separately.