JOHN HEBERT v. SPRING-FORD AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN HEBERT, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-7140

:

SPRING-FORD AREA :

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

PEREZ, J. JANUARY 5, 2026

Plaintiff John Hebert initiated this pro se civil action alleging claims of employment

discrimination against Spring-Ford Area School District (“Spring-Ford”), Robert Catalano, and

Sandra Bernat. Hebert also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. As set forth more fully below,

the Court will grant Hebert leave to proceed in forma pauperis and will permit Hebert to proceed

on certain of his “failure to hire” claims. All other claims will be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Hebert will be granted the option of

proceeding only on the claims that pass statutory screening, or filing an amended complaint to

attempt to correct the deficiencies noted by the Court in the claims that are dismissed.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Hebert used the Court’s form complaint for alleging employment discrimination, along

with a supplement, to plead his claims. (See Compl. at 4-9.)2 By checking the appropriate

1 The factual allegations are taken from Hebert’s Complaint (“Compl.”). (ECF No. 2.)

The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 Hebert attached to his Complaint a copy of a September 18, 2025 Notice of Right to Sue

Letter that he received from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (ECF No. 2-1 at

locations on the form Complaint, Hebert indicates that he brings claims of age discrimination

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as well as the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). (Id. at 4.) He lists the following as the

discriminatory conduct of which he complains – “Failure to hire me,” “Termination of my

employment,” “Failure to promote me,” “Unequal terms and conditions of my employment,”

“Retaliation,” and “Other (False, derogatory, and defamatory statements about me”). (Id. at 5-6.)

Hebert, who was fifty-seven years old when he filed the Complaint, alleges that he began

working at Spring-Ford in December 2022 as a “technical support specialist, (IT help desk

position).” (Id. at 7.) Hebert was employed by Eastern Business Software, Inc., a temporary

staffing agency (“EBS”). (Id.) EBS notified Hebert by email on May 30, 2023, that Spring-

Ford’s School Board had “not authorized staffing assignment and that their preference was to

hire directly.” (Id.) On June 14, 2023, Hebert applied for a Support Technician position via

Spring-Ford’s online portal. (Id.) On June 26, 2023, Hebert submitted an application for a

“Technology Support” position (Job ID # 953). (Id.) Hebert alleges that these positions are the

same, and that as a contractor, he had been performing the job of Support Technician and

Technology Support. (Id.) On August 14,3 Hebert was notified by Spring-Ford that the

Technology Support position had been filled. (Id.) On August 25, 2023, Hebert applied for two

positions, Technology Support (Job ID # 1012), as well as Systems Administrator (Job ID #

1002). At some point, he was notified by Spring-Ford that the positions were filled. (Id.)

4-7.) He also attached a copy of the Charge of Discrimination that he submitted to the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. (Id. at 1-3.)

3 In the Complaint, Hebert lists this date as August 14, 2024, rather than August 15, 2023.

(See Compl. at 7.) This appears to be a typographical error.

Hebert contacted HR Director Sydney Wiesner via LinkedIn to follow-up on his

applications. (Id.) Wiesner responded on October 11, 2023, that the two Technology Support

positions had been filled. (Id.) Hebert states that he saw the names of the two new employees

on Spring-Ford’s website in July, and that one individual was “approximately in” his thirties

while the other individual was in his thirties. (Id.) On October 18, 2024,4 Hebert received a

notification from Spring-Ford that the Systems Administrator position was being closed and

would be reposted. (Id.)

Hebert contends that he was not given a reason why he was not interviewed or hired for

the positions for which he applied. (Id.) He concludes that he suffered discrimination on the

basis of his age. (Id.) In support of this assertion, Hebert alleges that the Technology Support

positions were entry-level, and that he met the job requirements for both the Technology Support

positions and the Systems Administrator position. (Id.) He states that he has been working in

various roles in the IT field and IT support field for twenty years and was previously employed

by another school system as a Technology Coordinator, which is a higher-level position than

both Technology Support and Systems Administrator. (Id.) He also had experience as a QA

tester and experience in evaluating software. (Id.) According to Hebert, he was not counseled or

disciplined for any aspect of his performance or conduct while he worked for Spring-Ford as a

contractor and the two individuals who were hired for the Technology Support positions were

significantly younger than him. (Id.) Hebert further asserts that “Respondents made several

false, derogatory, and/or disparaging remarks to me, both during the term of my employment,

4 It is unclear whether this reference to 2024 is also a typographical error, or whether

Hebert did not receive written notice from Spring-Ford until one year later, in October 2024, that

the Systems Administrator position was filled. In any event, the year is not relevant for purposes

of this screening Memorandum.

and in an exit interview with Catalano and Bernat” that “were intended to malign and

characterize” Hebert as “being too slow, inept, uncooperative, difficult to work with, and

generally not up to the demands of the position.” (Id.) He claims that on “at least one occasion”

he “verbally objected and complained about the comments to Bernat and Catalano.” (Id.) Based

on these allegations, Hebert seeks monetary relief. (Id. at 9.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Hebert appears to be unable to pay the filing fee in this matter, the Court will

grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, his Complaint is subject to

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires the Court to screen and dismiss

the Complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an immune

defendant. “[T]he plausibility paradigm announced in [Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly[, 550 U.S.

544 (2007),] applies with equal force to analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment

discrimination.” Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations

omitted). To state an employment discrimination claim, as with any other claim, a plaintiff must

“put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of

the necessary element.” Id. at 213 (quotations omitted).

The Court construes the allegations of a pro se litigant liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th

182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.

2013)). This requires the Court to remain flexible, especially considering a litigant’s pro se

status. Id. The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed

to name it.” Id. However, ‘“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints

to support a claim.’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant also

‘“cannot flout procedural rules -they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other

litigants.’” Id.; see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at

*3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the

applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v.

Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to

identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).

III. DISCUSSION

Federal law “proscribe[s] discrimination in employment based on several personal

characteristics” including age. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir.

2015) (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623); see also Fowler v. AT&T,

Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 298 (3d Cir. 2021) (claims under the ADEA align with claims under Title

VII). Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with their federal counterparts.

Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ.,

94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)). The ADEA prohibits discrimination against individuals who

are over forty years of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of

Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015).5

5 A plaintiff in an employment discrimination action may establish a prima facie case of

discrimination either through direct evidence of discrimination, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.

Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985), or based on circumstantial evidence through the burden-

shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its

progeny. The McDonnell Douglas framework provides that a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a

member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position in question; (3) he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise

to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. While a

plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a

plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213; see also Martinez v. UPMC

Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (distinguishing “proof” of a claim from the

pleading standard); Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

A. Failure to Hire

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court understands Hebert to allege age-

discrimination claims based on a failure to hire. To state a plausible failure to hire claim, a

plaintiff must allege enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence that: (1) he is at least forty; (2) he is qualified for the job; (3) he suffered an adverse

employment action; and (4) he was passed over in favor of someone else who was sufficiently

younger so as to support an inference of a discriminatory motive, or that the employer continued

to seek out individuals with qualifications similar to his to fill the position. Id. at 266 (citations

omitted); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).

Hebert alleges that he was over forty, that he was qualified for the positions for which he

applied, was not hired, and two individuals in their thirties were hired for the Technology

Support positions. (Compl. at 7.) Thus, taking the allegations as true as the Court must at this

stage of the litigation, Hebert has alleged a sufficient basis for a discriminatory failure to hire

claim based on either of the two Technology Support positions. However, Hebert fails to

sufficiently allege a discrimination claim based on his application for the Systems Administrator

position because he does not allege that a significantly younger individual was hired for that

position, or that Spring-Ford continued to seek out individuals with qualifications similar to his

to fill the position. (See id.) Accordingly, Hebert will be allowed to proceed at this time on the

failure to hire claims relating to the Technology Support positions but not the Systems

Administrator position.

B. Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation

Hebert also alleges that age-based derogatory remarks were made to him and that he

objected to and complained about the comments. (See Compl. at 7.) It is possible that Hebert

seeks to present hostile work environment and retaliation claims based on these allegations.6

To state a plausible claim, a plaintiff claiming a hostile work environment must allege

intentional discrimination due to membership in a protected class, that was severe or pervasive,

that detrimentally affected the plaintiff and would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like

circumstances, and that there was respondeat superior liability. See Nitkin v. Main Line Health,

67 F.4th 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167

(3d Cir. 2013)). The respondeat superior element determines whether the employer may be

liable for acts of its employees. Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167 (citing Huston v. Procter & Gamble

Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009)). Generally, to allege this element

plausibly, “the basis of an employer’s liability for a hostile work environment claim depends on

whether the harasser is the victim’s supervisor or coworker.” Id. at 169 (citing Huston, 568 F.3d

at 104). “The Supreme Court has emphasized that conduct must be extreme to satisfy this

standard, so simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)

are inadequate.” Nitkin, 67 F.4th at 570 (internal quotations omitted). “Title VII is not intended

6 Claims of retaliation and hostile work environment under the ADEA and the PHRA are

analyzed using the same standards as Title VII claims alleging these violations. See Daniels v.

Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); see also Adams v.

City of Newark, 747 F. Supp. 3d 721, 731 (D.N.J. 2024) (“The Third Circuit has not yet

determined whether . . . a [hostile work environment] claim can be made under the ADEA . . .

[but] has on a number of occasions assumed arguendo that a hostile work environment claim can

go forward under the ADEA.” (citing Howell v. Millersville Univ. of Pa., 749 F. App’x 130, 135

(3d Cir. 2018)); Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting the

plaintiff had adequately alleged an ADEA hostile work environment claim); Mulcahy v. Skipper,

No. 21-2788, 2022 WL 3081873, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (affirming entry of

summary judgment in favor of defendant on age-based hostile work environment claim).

as a ‘general civility code,’ and requires that ‘conduct must be extreme’ to constitute the kind of

‘change in the terms and conditions of employment’ the statute was intended to target.” Burgess

v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 642 F. App’x 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).

To state a plausible retaliation claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) [that

he engaged in] protected employee activity; (2) [an] adverse action by the employer either after

or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between

the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action.” See Daniels, 776 F.3d at

193 (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII, ADEA, and PHRA retaliation

claims). A general complaint about unfair treatment does not constitute protected activity; a

plaintiff must show that he complained specifically about unlawful discrimination. Barber v.

CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995). Further, not every complaint to

management is protected activity, and “anti-discrimination employment statutes are not intended

to establish general standards for conduct of employers in dealing with employees.” Daniels,

776 F.3d at 195 (citations omitted). A plaintiff’s “subjective belief that a [co-worker]’s

statement violated the ADEA does not suffice for her complaint [about that statement] to qualify

as protected conduct.” Id. at 194.

Hebert alleges that “false, derogatory, and/or disparaging remarks” were made to him

during his employment and in an exit interview with Catalano and Bernat. (Compl. at 7.) He

avers that these remarks characterized Hebert as being “too slow, inept, uncooperative, difficult

to work with, and generally not up to the demands of the position.” (Id.) Hebert also alleges that

on “at least one occasion” he “verbally objected and complained about the comments to Bernat

and Catalano.” (Id.)

To the extent Hebert seeks to bring a hostile work environment claim, this claim is

undeveloped. It is unclear from the Complaint who allegedly made the comments and Hebert

has failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to determine that the alleged conduct was so

severe or pervasive that a reasonable person in his position would find the Spring-Ford work

environment to be hostile or abusive. Similarly, Hebert’s allegation that he “verbally objected

and complained about the comments to Bernat and Catalano” without any context or factual

development fails to support any of the elements of a retaliation claim. “Although the

plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to

show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at

786 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above

the speculative level”); see also Martinez, 986 F.3d 261 at 266 (“A plaintiff cannot survive

dismissal just by alleging the conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”). The Court will dismiss

Hebert’s hostile work environment claim and retaliation claim as pled but will give him leave to

file an amended complaint in the event he can provide a clearer, more detailed account of the

relevant events surrounding his allegations.

C. Individual Liability

Hebert names Robert Catalano and Sandra Bernat as Defendants, listing the same

addresses for them as he provided for Spring-Ford. (See Compl. at 5.) However, Hebert does

not otherwise identify these individuals in his pleading including what role, if any, they fill for

Spring-Ford. (See id.)

The ADEA does not provide for individual liability and thus any ADEA claim against

Catalano and Bernat are dismissed with prejudice. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d

225, 246 n.29 (3d Cir. 2006); Walker v. Wolf, No. 21-2427, 2022 WL 2703607, at *2 (3d Cir.

July 12, 2022) (per curiam). Unlike its federal counterparts, however, the PHRA provides for

liability against individual defendants but only when those individuals “aid, abet, incite, compel

or coerce” any act declared by the PHRA to be an “unlawful discriminatory practice.” 43 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 955(e).7 Nonetheless, individual liability under the PHRA is narrow. It only

applies to “supervisory employees.” Dici v. Commonwealth, 91 F.3d 542, 553 (3d Cir. 1996);

Jeannot v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 356 F. Supp. 3d 440, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2018). Supervisors can

be held liable under the PHRA in two circumstances: (1) when the supervisor knew or should

have known that the plaintiff was being subjected to discrimination but repeatedly failed to take

prompt action to end the discrimination, or (2) when the supervisor engages in his or her own

acts of discrimination against the employee. See Dici, 91 F.3d at 553; Ahern v. Eresearch Tech.,

Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 663, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

Hebert alleges that “Respondents” made “several false, derogatory, and/or disparaging

remarks” to him during his employment and in an exit interview with Catalano and Bernat.

(Compl. at 7.) He also alleges that he verbally objected and complained about the comments to

Bernat and Catalano. (See id.) Hebert provides no details about either of these Defendants and

does not allege what position either held at Spring-Ford, including whether either was his direct

supervisor. He also does not sufficiently allege what, if any, involvement either had in the

alleged discriminatory conduct. Without any facts about either of these Defendants, and without

greater context for the alleged discriminatory conduct, Hebert has not alleged any plausible

7 The PHRA states “[i]t shall be an unlawful discrimination practice . . . [f]or any person,

. . . to aid [or] abet . . . an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . .” 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(e)

(emphasis added). In comparison, Title VII sets forth unlawful employment practices for

employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations but makes no reference to employees

or individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c).

PHRA claim against either individual. However, Hebert will be permitted the opportunity to

amend the Complaint if he is able to allege facts to state a plausible PHRA claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court will grant Hebert leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As set forth more fully

above, the Court is prepared to serve Hebert’s ADEA failure to hire claims with respect to the

Technology Support positions against Spring-Ford. However, the ADEA claims against

Catalano and Bernat are dismissed with prejudice and all other claims will be dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Considering

Hebert’s pro se status, he will be granted the option of filing an amended complaint to attempt to

cure the defects identified by the Court.8 In the alternative, Hebert may advise the Court that he

seeks to proceed only on the ADEA failure to hire claims with respect to the Technology Support

positions which pass statutory screening.

Hebert’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) will be denied as premature.

See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (in determining whether appointment of

counsel is appropriate, the Court should first determine whether plaintiff’s lawsuit has a legal

basis). This denial is without prejudice to Hebert’s right to renew his motion for counsel should

8 If Hebert chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint must be a

complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to

state a claim. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 contemplates amended pleadings,

“an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a

nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most recently

filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Id. While the Court must liberally

construe pro se pleadings, “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean

accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.” Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173,

175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019). This means that the submission of an amended complaint “effectively

constitutes an abandonment of any prior complaints filed by a plaintiff.”  Smith v. Price, No. 11-

1581, 2012 WL 1068159, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2012), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 11-1581, 2012 WL 1072282 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012).

the case proceed to the discovery stage, or to the Court’s right to seek an appointment of counsel

sua sponte if circumstances warrant it at a future date.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

HON. MIA R. PEREZ

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