A.J.R

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

A-J-R,

Petitioner

Civil No. 25-17279 (RMB)

v.

ERIC ROKOSKY, et al., OPINION

Respondents

BUMB, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner A-J-R’s petition for writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition” Dkt. No. 1), Respondents’

answer to the petition (“Answer” Dkt. No. 3), and Petitioner’s reply brief (“Reply”

Dkt. No. 5.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is an asylum seeker from Iran who is in the custody of the United

States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”), and is currently detained at the Elizabeth Contract Detention

Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey pending removal proceedings. (Petition ¶¶ 1, 7.) On

November 5, 2023, Petitioner arrived at J.F.K. International Airport in New York and

declared his intention to apply for asylum. (Petition ¶ 24; Ex. A, Dkt. No. 1-3.)

Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) detained Petitioner and placed him in expedited

removal proceedings. (Petition ¶ 25; Ex. B, Dkt. No. 1-4.) Upon his credible fear

interview, on November 13, 2023, the asylum officer found Petitioner’s fear credible and

transferred his case to immigration court for further proceedings to determine if he

qualified for asylum. (Petition ¶ 25; Ex. C, Dkt. No. 1-5.)

On January 25, 2024, Petitioner filed his initial Form I-589 requesting asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. (Petition ¶

26.) On February 20, 2024, Petitioner was released from immigration custody on parole

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Petition ¶ 27; Ex. D, Dkt. No. 1-6.) ICE found Petitioner

was not a flight risk nor a danger to the community and did not enroll him in ISAP1 or a

monitoring program. (Id.) Petitioner appeared for all subsequent immigration court

hearings, complied with his parole requirements, and was not arrested or cited for any

crime or violation. (Petition ¶ 27.)

Petitioner was re-detained by ICE on June 27, 2025. (Petition ¶ 28; Ex. A.) He

was not provided written notice or any reason for his arrest. (Id.) At the request of

Petitioner’s counsel, the Elizabeth Immigration Court placed Petitioner on its calendar

for a removal hearing on July 29, 2025, which the Court adjourned sua sponte to August

6, 2025. (Id. ¶ 28.) Petitioner continued pursuing asylum, but on October 7, 2025, an

Immigration Judge denied his application. (Id. ¶ 29; Ex. F, Dkt. No. 1-8.) On

1 ICE’s Alternatives to Detention Program (“ATD”) consists of the Intensive

Supervision Appearance Program “ISAP.” Available at

https://www.ice.gov/features/atd.

November 4, 2025, Petitioner timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”). (Petition ¶ 29; Ex. G, Dkt. No. 1-9.)

On November 3, 2025, Petitioner requested parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) as

implemented by ICE Directive 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a

Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, and provided additional evidence favoring his

release. (Petition ¶ 30; Ex. A, E; Answer; Ex. E, Dkt. No. 3-5.) None of the criteria on

which parole was originally granted has changed. (Petition ¶ 30; Ex. A.)

Petitioner raises the following claims for relief in his Petition. In his first claim

for relief, he asserts Respondents violated the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”), because 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) permits the “return[] to custody” of parolees

only after the Secretary of Homeland Security determines, on a case by case basis, that

the purpose of the parole has been served. (Petition ¶ 58) (citing Y-Z-L-H- v. Bostock, 792

F.Supp.3d 1123, 1144 (D. Or. 2025). Petitioner’s purpose for parole, which had not

been completed, was to apply for asylum and related humanitarian relief. (Id. ¶ 59.)

Neither the Secretary nor her designee made an individualized determination that his

purpose of parole had been served. (Id.)

For his second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts “Newark ICE has failed to

follow ICE’s national policy with respect to Petitioner’s request for release on parole

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), in violation of Accardi.2” (Id. ¶ 62.) The Credible Fear

2 See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954) (addressing

“[t]he crucial question [of] whether the alleged conduct of the Attorney General” by

dictating the result of the Board of Immigration Appeals discretionary determination,

deprived petitioner of any of the rights guaranteed him by the statute or by the

Policy, Paragraph 8.3, ICE Directive No. 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to

Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009), was created to

implement 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) as applied to non-citizens with a positive credible

fear finding and does not require special factors to warrant release. (Id.) Under the

Credible Fear Policy, an arriving alien with a positive credible fear finding should be

released from detention on parole if he establishes his identity, poses neither a flight risk

nor a danger to the community, and no additional factors weigh against release of the

alien. (Id.) Petitioner was released pursuant to the Credible Fear Policy, but he was

later re-arrested despite no change in circumstances. (Petition ¶ 63, Exs. A, D, E.)

Petitioner contends his re-detention by ICE violates the Credible Fear Policy, his right to

due process, and the Accardi doctrine. (Petition ¶ 64.)

Petitioner’s third claim for relief is that his re-detention without adequate

procedures violates due process. (Petition ¶¶ 67-71.) Petitioner was not provided a

meaningful opportunity to be heard and to respond to the reasons for his re-detention.

(Petition ¶ 69.) Petitioner’s fourth claim for relief is that his detention without a bond

hearing is unreasonably prolonged, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to

procedural due process. (Petition ¶¶ 73-81) (citing German-Santos v. Warden, Pike County

Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2024)).

Respondents filed an answer in opposition to habeas relief. They contend

Petitioner is in mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) because he arrived in

regulations issued pursuant thereto[.]”

the United States by airplane and was interviewed by a CBP officer and requested

asylum. (Answer at 15.) Therefore, Petitioner “shall be detained pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such fear, until

removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (“Pending

the credible fear determination by an asylum officer and any review of that

determination by an immigration judge, the alien shall be detained.”) (Answer at 11.)

Respondents argue that although an asylum officer found Petitioner had a credible fear

of persecution or torture if he returned to Iran, he remains subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) because “the alien shall be detained for further

consideration of the application for asylum.” (Id.)

Respondents further submit Petitioner remains an “applicant for admission”

under Section 1225(b), despite the fact that he was paroled and later re-detained. (Id.)

Petitioner’s parole expired on February 19, 2025, when he failed to take steps to renew

parole. (Id. at 8; Ex. C, Dkt. No. 3-3 at 3.) Thus, he returned to the status of an

applicant for admission upon entry into the United States. (Id.) Further, the Court lacks

jurisdiction to consider claims attacking discretionary parole determinations involving

detention under § 1225(b)(1), and § 1225(b)(1) does not permit an Immigration Judge to

conduct a bond hearing in lieu of parole. (Id. at 12.)

Respondents further oppose relief, asserting that: (1) Petitioner lacks standing to

bring a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act; (2) parole decisions are

committed to the sole discretion of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and

(3) Petitioner’s parole revocation is consistent with DHS policies. (Id. at 17-20.)

Finally, Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s detention does not violate due process.

(Id. at 16-20.)

In his reply brief, Petitioner does not dispute that he is subject to detention

without a bond hearing under § 1225(b)(1), but argues that his detention is unlawful

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and that his prolonged detention without a bond

hearing violates the Due Process Clause. (Reply Brief at 1-2.) Petitioner asserts that §

1182(d)(5) only contemplates re-detention after a finding has been made that the

purpose of his parole has been served, and no such finding has been made. (Id. at 2-3.)

Furthermore, Petitioner contends that his re-detention, in lieu of extending his parole,

violates the Accardi doctrine, which prevents an agency from disregarding its own

regulations, and by extension, its own internal policies. (Id. at 3.) When Petitioner was

granted parole in February 2024, he was never notified of the need to report to ICE or

seek an extension of parole. (Id. at 6-7.) He was re-detained without the mandatory

Parole Advisal and Scheduling Notification under Directive 11002.1, which gives notice

before a parole decision is made. (Id. at 7.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Petitioner is detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. Based on this finding, the Court need

not address Petitioner’s additional arguments.

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), the Court has jurisdiction to determine if

Petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Petitioner is in custody in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) because he was not afforded a bond hearing before an

immigration court.

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) applies to “Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States

and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled.” Under this provision,

noncitizens3 who are arriving in the United States and are inadmissible must be screened

and ordered removed without further hearing or review, unless they indicate an

intention to apply for asylum. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii), (I)

and (II), the Attorney General may apply the expedited removal and screening

provisions of § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), to “certain other aliens” including:

an alien . . . who had not been admitted or paroled into the

United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the

satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been

physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-

year period immediately prior to the date of the determination

of inadmissibility under this subparagraph.

When a noncitizen indicates an intention to seek asylum, the immigration officer

conducts an interview of the alien “at a port of entry or at such other place designated by

the Attorney General.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i). If the asylum officer finds the noncitizen

has a credible fear of persecution, the noncitizen “shall be detained for further

consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

Parole authority over noncitizens seeking admission into the United States is

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides:

3 The Court uses the terms “alien” and “noncitizen” interchangeably.

The Secretary of Homeland Security may ... in his discretion

parole into the United States temporarily under such

conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis

for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit

any alien applying for admission to the United States, but

such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an

admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole

shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security,

have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be

returned to the custody from which he was paroled and

thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same

manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the

United States.

The implementing regulation for parole authority under § 1182(d)(5)(A) is 8

C.F.R. § 212.5. Among the groups of aliens who may be paroled are those with serious

medical conditions, minors, noncitizens who will be witnesses in government

proceedings and “aliens whose continued detention is not in the public interest as

determined by those officials identified in paragraph (a) of this section.” Id. § 212.5(b).

“Parole shall be automatically terminated without written notice (i) upon the departure

from the United States of the alien, or, (ii) if not departed, at the expiration of the time

for which parole was authorized.” Id. § 212.5(e)(1). Otherwise, parole may be

terminated on written notice “upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole

was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the officials listed in paragraph (a) of

this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued

presence of the alien in the United States.” Id. § 212.5(e)(2(i). A charging document

served on the alien “will constitute written notice of termination of parole, unless

otherwise specified.”

Noncitizens who are present in the United States without admission may be

arrested and detained on a warrant issued by the Attorney General pending a decision

on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Pending a removal decision, the Attorney General may detain the arrested alien or

release the alien on bond, with conditions prescribed by the Attorney General. Id. §

1226(a)(1), (2).

B. Analysis

In his third claim for relief, Petitioner alleges his re-detention without adequate

procedures violated the parole statute, ICE policy and due process. Petitioner was

paroled into the United States in February 2024, pursuant to the Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security’s exercise of discretion under 8 U.S.C. §

1182(d)(5)(A). (Petition, Ex. D.) Here, as in similar cases, “because §

1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) applies only to individuals “who have not been ... paroled,” the

plain language of the statute clearly and unambiguously shows that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)

cannot serve as the basis for Petitioner's detention.” Rivas Rodriguez v. Rokosky, No. CV

25-17419 (CPO), 2025 WL 3485628, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025). Furthermore, once

Petitioner was paroled into the United States, his parole automatically terminates

without written notice only upon his departure from the United States or the expiration

of time for which his parole was authorized. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e).

Respondents have failed to show Petitioner was notified that his parole would

expire on February 19, 2025. Petitioner received notice that his request for parole was

granted, but the notice did not contain any reporting requirements or parole expiration

date. (Petition, Ex. D.) The only document Respondents have produced to establish

the date Petitioner’s parole expired is a Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien (“the I-

213 Form”), dated June 27, 2025, created after his arrest as it describes the

circumstances of his arrest. (Answer; Ex. C, Dkt. No. 3-3.) The I-213 Form states,

“[o]n February 20, 2024, Newark ICE approved [Petitioner’s] Credible Fear Parole

Request until February 19, 2025.” (Id.)

“The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of

serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (citation modified). At a minimum, due

process likely requires advance notice of reporting requirements and a parole expiration

date. The Court, however, can avoid this constitutional issue by determining that

Petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(1). See Zadvydas

v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (“We have read significant limitations into other

immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation.”) This

determination of the basis for Petitioner’s custody under § 1226(a) is consistent with

Petitioner’s Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien, which states:

To: Any immigration officer authorized pursuant to sections

236 and 287of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part

287 of Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, to serve warrants

of arrest for immigration violations

I have determined that there is probable cause to believe that

[Petitioner] is removable from the United States. This

determination is based upon . . .

the failure to establish admissibility subsequent to deferred

inspection;

biometric confirmation of the subject’s identity and a records

check of federal databases that affirmatively indicate, by

themselves or in addition to other reliable information, that

the subject either lacks immigration status or

nothwithstanding such status is removable under U.S.

immigration law[.]

(Answer, Ex. D.)

Section 236 of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226, see Johnson v. Guzman

Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021) (citation modified) (“[t]he INA further provides that

DHS may arrest and detain the alien pending a decision on whether the alien is to be

removed from the United States[.]”)) Section 287 of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. §

1357(g) and governs when it is appropriate to arrest a noncitizen during the removal

process. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012) (describing the statutory

scheme to arrest an alien during the removal process and noting “[i]f no federal warrant

has been issued, [federal] officers “who have received training in the enforcement of

immigration law . . . have more limited authority[,] . . . [t]hey may arrest an alien for

being ‘in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,’ for

example, but only where the alien ‘is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.’

§ 1357(a)(2).”) Petitioner’s circumstances fit within this statutory framework.

Respondents do not contest that Petitioner was not provided written notice of a

reason for his re-detention. (Response at 11-12.) Instead, they contend his parole and

later re-detention do not change the fact that he is an “applicant for admission” under

Section 1225(b). (Id.) The text of § 1182(d)(5)(A) does not support Respondents’

contention. There is no language in the text about a parolee returning to the position of

an “applicant for admission” at the threshold of entry, as § 1225(b) describes. Rivas

Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3485628, at *2. See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286–87

(2018) (“To implement its immigration policy, the Government must be able to decide

(1) who may enter the country [discussing § 1225] and (2) who may stay here after

entering [discussing § 1226]).”) Because § 1225(b)(1) is not a lawful basis for Petitioner’s

detention, and Petitioner was not detained under the parole revocation procedures

described under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e), the Court concludes he can only be properly

detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), as an inadmissible alien arrested pending a decision

on whether he is to be removed from the United States. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288

(describing § 1226, “[e]ven once inside the United States, aliens do not have an absolute

right to remain here. That includes aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry . . .

Section 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of

aliens pending their removal.”) Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing

pursuant to § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants the Petition and orders

Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1).

Dated: January 5, 2026

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge