Collins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

ANGELO COLLINS II CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-0079

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

ANGELA EVANS ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, are motions

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6) filed by

Angela Evans (“Defendant”). [docs. #14, 18]. The motions are opposed. [docs. #16, 20].

For reasons assigned below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss contained in

Defendant’s Answer [doc. #14] be DENIED. It is recommended that the “Motion to Dismiss

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6)” be GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART and that this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2025, Angelo Collins, II (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, filed a

complaint in the Western District of Louisiana against Angela Evans (“Defendant”) and Della

Fountain (“Fountain”). [doc. #1]. The Complaint alleged claims of negligence against Fountain

and the intentional tort of sexual assault against Defendant. Plaintiff alleged that the underlying

claims arose from sexual abuse he suffered while being cared for by Defendant prior to 2005.

Plaintiff initially alleged negligence against Fountain as the owner of the home in which the alleged

abuse took place.

On February 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend, requesting the dismissal of claims

against Fountain as her inclusion destroyed complete diversity. [doc. #8]. The Court construed

the motion to amend as a motion to dismiss and dismissed any claims against Fountain, leaving

only the state law tort claims against Defendant.

On May 15, 2025, Defendant, also proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure

to state a claim. [doc. #14]. On June 20, 2025, Defendant filed a subsequent Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Jurisdiction, a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue, and a Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to State a Claim. [doc. #18]. Defendant first argued that the Court lacked personal

jurisdiction over her as she resides in Arizona and has not been to Louisiana for over twenty years.

Id. Defendant then argued that the Western District of Louisiana is an improper venue as the

instant case does not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Id. Finally, Defendant

argues that the relief sought by Plaintiff cannot be granted as all claims are prescribed under

Louisiana law. Id.

Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 2025 [doc. #16] and

to Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss on June 20, 2025. [doc. #20]. Plaintiff argued that

Defendant had waived any argument against personal jurisdiction by failing to raise that objection

in the first answer she filed. Id. Plaintiff further argued that the Western District of Louisiana was

the proper venue given that he suffered much of his asserted emotional damages in Monroe after

his family relocated. Id. Plaintiff argued in the alternative that the case could be transferred to the

Eastern District of Louisiana, where the alleged abuse took place, rather than the case being

dismissed. Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues that he has properly alleged facts to constitute under

Louisiana Revised Statue 14:42; therefore, a five-year prescriptive period under Louisiana Revised

Statute § 9:2800.9(A) would apply. Id. Applying the doctrine of contra non valentum, Plaintiff

argues that the five-year period would not have begun to run until he was cognitively aware of the

abuse and capable of acting upon that knowledge.

Defendant did not file a reply, and the time to do so has elapsed. Accordingly, the motions

are ripe.

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b(2)

If a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the claims against her must be

dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b(2). While the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that personal jurisdiction exists, he need only present facts to make out a prima facie

case supporting such jurisdiction. Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th

Cir. 2000).

B. Rule 12(b)(3)

A motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(3) generally requires a district court to determine whether venue is supported by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case

laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,

transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a). Once a defendant has raised the improper venue issue by motion, the plaintiff bears the

burden to establish that the district he chose is the proper venue. Perez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co.,

70 F.3d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir. 1995). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, “the court must

accept as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all conflicts in favor of the plaintiff.”

Ginter ex rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte, 536 F.3d 439, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Braspetro Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 F. App’x 612, 615 (5th Cir. 2007)).

However, Rule 12(b)(3) permits the Court to look at all evidence in the record beyond simply those

facts alleged in the complaint and its proper attachments. Lighthouse MGA, LLC v. First Premium

Ins. Grp., Inc., 448 F. App’x 512, 514 (5th Cit. 2011).

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391 states that a civil action may, except as

otherwise provided by law, be brought only in “(1) a judicial district in which any defendant

resides, if all defendants residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district

in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district

in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided [by 28 U.S.C. § 1391], a judicial district

in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction" at the time the action is commenced.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

C. 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for

relief, inter alia, when it contains a “short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief ...” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, however, must

be alleged with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not equate

to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility

simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although

the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption

does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading comprised of “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule

8. Id. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to

make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 153 (5th

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

(citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual

proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Nevertheless, a court is compelled to dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is premised

upon an invalid legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).

II. Discussion

As an initial matter, Defendant’s first motion to dismiss, contained in her Answer, and

made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), did not raise the issue of personal

jurisdiction. [doc. #14]. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1) provides that a party waives the

defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by “omitting it from a motion in the circumstances

described in Rule 12(g)(2).” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(A). Rule 12(g)(2) prohibits a party from a

raising a defense “that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier [Rule 12] motion.”

FED. R. CIV. P.12(g)(2). Thus, lack of personal jurisdiction is waived if a party omits the defense

from a Rule 12 motion and the defense was “available.” See Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515,

523 (5th Cir. 2002); Cactus Pipe & Supply Co. v. Montmartre, 756 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (5th Cir.

1985).

However, pro se litigants, such as Defendant in the instant case, are generally subject to

greater consideration than would be given to an attorney. Other courts have permitted pro se

litigants to raise a personal jurisdiction defense even after filing responsive pleadings. See

Goodwin v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 2014 WL 1691544 at *5 (E.D. La. 2014); United

Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Robb, 391 F. Supp. 626, 631-31 (M.D. N.C. 1975); Bell v. Shah, 2009

WL 860588, at *1 (D. Conn. 2006); Internet Archive v. Shell, 2006 WL 1348559, at *1 (N.D. Cal.

2006); In re Ha, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2345, 2009 WL 2514870, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 11,

2009). In light of Defendant’s pro se status, the Court finds that she did not waive her personal

jurisdiction defense, and the Court must now determine whether the defense has merit.

A. Whether the Court has Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant

When a nonresident defendant, such as in the instant case, seeks dismissal for lack of

personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court’s

jurisdiction over the defendant. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir.

2008). Unless the Court convenes an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the plaintiff need only make

a prima facie showing that the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. Id. As with

Rule 12(b)(1) motions, the Court is not restricted to reviewing the pleadings alone when

considering a Rule 12(b)(2) motion: the Court may consider affidavits, interrogatories,

depositions, or any other appropriate method of discovery. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th

Cir. 1994). “In determining whether a prima facie case exists, this Court must accept as true the

plaintiff’s uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in [his] favor all conflicts between the

jurisdictional facts contained in the parties' affidavits and other documentation.” Pervasive

Software, Inc. v. Lexware GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Freudensprung v. Offshore Technical Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 343 (5th Cir. 2004)

“The Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if two

requirements are satisfied: (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction; and

(2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with Due Process.” Phillips v. ABB Combustion

Engineering, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 693, 2013 WL 3010794, at *2 (E.D. La. 2013)(citations

omitted). “Because the limits of Louisiana’s long-arm statute are coextensive with the limits of

constitutional due process, the two-part inquiry merges into one: whether this Court’s exercise of

jurisdiction over the defendant[] would offend due process.” Id. (citing LA. R.S. § 13:3201(B)).

“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to

the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties or

relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (citing Int’l Shoe Co.

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). A district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction

satisfies the Due Process inquiry if the plaintiff shows: (1) that the defendant has purposefully

availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum

contacts” with that state; and (2) that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id.; see also Choice Healthcare, Inc. v.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado, 615 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

“The ‘minimum contacts’ prong of the two-part test may be further subdivided into contacts that

give rise to ‘general’ personal jurisdiction and ‘specific’ personal jurisdiction.” Choice

Healthcare, Inc., 615 F.3d at 368. Courts may exercise general jurisdiction over any lawsuit

brought against a defendant that has substantial, continuous, and systematic general contacts with

the forum state. Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006). “If a

defendant has relatively few contacts, a court may still exercise specific jurisdiction ‘in a suit

arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” Id. (citing Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the actions which form the basis of his lawsuit occurred in

New Orleans, Louisiana. [doc. #1]. Though Defendant now resides in Arizona, accepting all

allegations regarding jurisdiction as true, then the claims arise from the Defendant’s contacts with

the forum state, and the State of Louisiana can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over

Defendant.

Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) [doc. #18] be DENIED.

B. Whether Venue is Proper Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)

Generally, the court should not consider challenges under Rule 12(b)(6) until after

jurisdiction and venue challenges are resolved. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l., 320 F.2d 219,

221 (2d Cir.1963). Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendant’s argument of improper venue

first.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has also waived her ability to raise an objection to venue

because she failed to do so in her first Motion to Dismiss. However, “[a] district court may consider

sua sponte whether venue is proper and has discretion to dismiss or transfer a case if venue is

improper.” Caldwell v. Palmetto State Savings Bank of South Carolina, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th

Cir. 1987); accord Brown v. McConnell, 2022 WL 256590, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 26, 2022). 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a), authorizes a discretionary transfer when venue is proper but another venue is

more convenient, and § 1406(a), which requires a transfer when venue is improper but justice

weighs in favor of transfer to a proper venue rather than dismissal. See Franco v. Mabe Trucking

Company, Inc., 3 F.4th 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2021). “Whether venue is ‘wrong’ or ‘improper’ depends

exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies the requirements of federal

venue laws . . . .” Atlantic Marine Construction Company, Inc. v. United States District Court for

Western District of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 55 (2013).

The Court will address each of the three options enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to

determine whether venue is proper in the Western District of Louisiana. Under 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b)(1), a suit may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides if all

defendants reside in the state in which the district is located. The sole Defendant alleges she is a

resident of the state of Arizona, and this fact is not contested by Plaintiff. Therefore, because

Defendant does not reside in the state of Louisiana, much less specifically in the Western District

of Louisiana, venue is not proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391(b)(2) allows a civil action to be brought in a

judicial district in which “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C.

§1391(b)(2). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the events or omissions giving rise to these

claims occurred in the Western District of Louisiana. Instead, Plaintiff argues that venue is proper

in the Western District because Plaintiff lives in the Western District, where he “continues to suffer

from emotional and psychological harm,” and he has received and continues to receive medical

treatment in Monroe, Louisiana, and Ruston, Louisiana, both of which are within the Western

District of Louisiana. [doc. #20].

However, courts have routinely rejected this argument because it “flies in the face of the

pertinent, plain language of § 1391(a)(2) that venue is proper in ‘a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.’” Smith v.

Fortenberry, 903 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D. La. 1995); Roberson v. Southwest Freight Lines, 2007

WL 3120045 at *3 (W.D. La. 2007). The event or omission giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim is the

alleged sexual assault which occurred in New Orleans, not the medical treatment he later sought

for the ramifications of that assault. Thus, venue is not proper in the Western District of Louisiana

under § 1391(b)(2).

Finally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3), “if there is no district in which an action may

otherwise be brought” under the venue statute, then a civil action may be brought “in any judicial

district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such

action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). This third option is not applicable in this case because there

exists another district in which this action may otherwise be brought. Id. Plaintiff’s action could

have been brought in the Eastern District of Louisiana, where the actions giving rise to Plaintiff’s

claims allegedly occurred. Id. Therefore, the Court finds that venue is not proper in the Western

District of Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).

C. Whether the Action Should be Dismissed or Transferred

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1406(a), when a plaintiff selects an improper venue, a court “shall

dismiss [the action], or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division

in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C § 1406(a). Defendant argues that the action should

be dismissed as the claims brought by Plaintiff are time barred. [doc. #18]. Defendant specifically

relies on Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2800.9 which she alleges requires childhood sexual abuse

claims to be filed within three years of the date the alleged victim reaches twenty-one years of

age. Id. Defendant alleges that the statute provides a five-year window after the age of majority

to bring any such claims. [doc. #20].

However, both Plaintiff and Defendant have failed to correctly state the prescriptive period.

See LA. R.S. 9:2800.9. The statute in relevant part states that “[a]n action against a person for

sexual abuse of a minor or for physical abuse of a minor resulting in permanent impairment or

permanent physical injury or scarring does not prescribe.” LA. R.S. § 9:2800.9 (A)(1) (emphasis

added). The Louisiana Legislature amended the statute with an effective date of June 2021 to

remove the previous ten-year prescriptive period. LA. R.S. § 9:2800.9; [doc. #1]. Plaintiff filed

his Complaint after the effective date, and, thus, claims under this statute have not prescribed.

However, the amended statute also places more rigorous filing requirements on those who

are twenty-one years of age or older when they file suit. LA. R.S. § 9:2800.9 (B). Specifically,

the statute provides:

B. Every plaintiff twenty-one years of age or older at the time the action is filed

shall file certificates of merit executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a

licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff declaring, respectively,

as follows:

(1) That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the attorney has

consulted with at least one licensed mental health practitioner who is licensed to

practice and practices in this state and whom the attorney reasonably believes is

knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and

that the attorney has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that

there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the petition. The person

consulted may not be a party to the litigation.

(2) That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices

in this state and is not a party to the action, has interviewed the plaintiff and is

knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and

has concluded, on the basis of his knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his

professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff has been

subject to criminal sexual activity or physical abuse during his childhood as defined

in this Section.

(3) That the attorney was unable to obtain the consultation required by Paragraph

(1) because a statute of limitations would impair the action and that the certificates

required by Paragraphs (1) and (2) could not be obtained before the impairment of

the action.

Id. Thus, the statute requires that a plaintiff file these mandatory certificates contemporaneously

with the petition or complaint. LA. R.S. § 9:2800.9 (B); see also Doe v. Jesuit High Sch. of New

Orleans, 2021-0284 (La. App. 4 Cir 11/10/21), 331 So. 3d 426, 432.

Here, Plaintiff failed to file the required certificate despite being over the age of twenty-

one when he filed his Complaint in this Court. Courts have interpreted such failure to provide a

certificate as an issue of maturity. Jesuit High Sch. of New Orleans, 331 So. 3d at 432; see also

Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dardar, [20]13-2351 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So.3d 271; Doe v. Diocese of

Alexandria, CW 20-00629 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/11/21). Further, the statute also prevents plaintiffs

from filing such claims which name the defendant until an in camera review has been conducted

and the Court finds there is “reasonable and meritorious cause for filing of this action.” LA. R.S.

§ 9:2800.9 (D). Without any such finding, and without the requite certificates to make such a

finding, a Plaintiff’s case cannot properly accrue. Jesuit High Sch. of New Orleans, 331 So. 3d at

432. Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are premature, and transferring the case to the

Eastern District of Louisiana would not be in the interest of justice.1 McClintock v. Sch. Bd. of

East Feliciana Parish, 299 F. App’x 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2008).

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant’s motion to

dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice.

1 The undersigned has no facts or information to suggest that Plaintiff could have met the

requirements of this statute to provide adequate certifications. A dismissal without prejudice

allows Plaintiff to refile his claims in a proper venue if he can meet the requirements of the

statute.

D. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)

Finally, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in both the motion to dismiss contained in

her Answer [doc. #14] and her separately filed motion to dismiss [doc. #18]. However, having

found that venue is not proper in the Western District of Louisiana, the undersigned finds that the

Court should not reach the merits of Defendant’s arguments. Therefore, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Defendant’s motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6) [doc. #s 14 & 18].

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss contained in Defendant’s Answer

[doc. #14], be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6)” [doc. #18] be GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. To the extent that Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion be DENIED. To the extent that Defendant moves to

dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion

be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as premature.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of

time is granted under FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish

a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION SET FORTH ABOVE,

WITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY, SHALL BAR THAT

PARTY, EXCEPT UPON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR, FROM ATTACKING ON

APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL

CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. See Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79

F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).

In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, on this 3rd day of December, 2025.

KAYLA DYE MOCL&skKY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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