Custer

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 CHRIS C.,1 Case No. 25-cv-04134-TSH

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10 SSA COMMISSIONER, Re: Dkt. Nos. 9, 12

11 Defendant.

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13 I. INTRODUCTION

14 Plaintiff Chris C. moves for summary judgment to reverse the Social Security

15 Administration’s denial of his claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42

16 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. ECF No. 9. Defendant cross-moves to affirm. ECF No. 12. Pursuant to

17 Civil Local Rule 16-5, the matter is submitted without oral argument. For the reasons stated

18 below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion.2

19 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

20 On July 15. 2021, Plaintiff filed concurrent claims for disability benefits under Titles II

21 and XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability since July 30, 2019. Administrative

22 Record (AR) 262-77. Following denial at the initial and reconsideration levels, Plaintiff requested

23 a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). AR 133-58, 172-77, 195-97. An ALJ held

24 a hearing on May 12, 2023 and issued an unfavorable decision on April 23, 2024. AR 25-98. The

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1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the

recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial

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Conference of the United States.

1 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 14, 2025. AR 1-6. Plaintiff now

2 seeks review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

3 III. ISSUE FOR REVIEW

4 Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal: Whether the Appeals Council erred by not applying

5 Social Security Ruling 24-2p, which addresses the timeframe for past relevant work.

6 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

7 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides this Court’s authority to review the Commissioner’s decision

8 to deny disability benefits, but “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite

9 limited.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). The Commissioner’s

10 decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on the

11 application of improper legal standards. Id. Substantial means “more than a mere scintilla,” but

12 only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

13 conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (cleaned up). Under this standard,

14 which is “not high,” the Court looks to the existing administrative record and asks “whether it

15 contains ‘sufficient evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Id. at 102 (cleaned

16 up).

17 The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that

18 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm

19 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d

20 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

21 resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Id. at 1010 (citation

22 omitted). If “the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a decision,” the

23 Court must defer to the ALJ’s decision. Id. (citation omitted).

24 Even if the ALJ commits legal error, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld if the error is

25 harmless, meaning “it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or that,

26 despite the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains

27 its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (cleaned up). But “[a]

1 conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless” and is instead “constrained to review the reasons the

2 ALJ asserts.” Id. (cleaned up).

3 V. DISCUSSION

4 A. Framework for Determining Whether a Claimant Is Disabled

5 A claimant is “disabled” under the Social Security Act (1) “if he is unable to engage in any

6 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

7 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

8 for a continuous period of not less than twelve months” and (2) the impairment is “of such severity

9 that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and

10 work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

11 economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012).

12 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to employ a five-step sequential

13 analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1) (disability insurance benefits); id. § 416.920(a)(4) (same

14 standard for supplemental security income). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one

15 through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

16 At step one, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial

17 gainful activity,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), defined as “work done for pay or profit that

18 involves significant mental or physical activities.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148 (cleaned up). Here, the

19 ALJ determined Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity since July 30, 2019, the

20 alleged onset date. AR 30.

21 At step two, the ALJ decides whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of

22 impairments is “severe,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), “meaning that it significantly limits the

23 claimant’s ‘physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.’” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148

24 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a)). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled.

25 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe

26 impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine; right shoulder

27 impingement; degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees (status post acromioclavicular

1 hypothyroidism; and borderline diabetes (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).” AR 31.

2 At step three, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of

3 impairments that meets or equals an impairment in the “Listing of Impairments” (referred to as the

4 “listings”). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1. The listings

5 describe impairments that are considered “to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing

6 any gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1525(a). Each impairment is described in terms of “the objective

7 medical and other findings needed to satisfy the criteria of that listing.” Id. § 404.1525(c)(3).

8 “For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified

9 medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how

10 severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (footnote omitted). If a

11 claimant’s impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent

12 to the criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering

13 age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff

14 did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets the listings. AR 32.

15 If the claimant does not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ proceeds to step four and assesses

16 the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), defined as the most the claimant can still do

17 despite their limitations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)), and determines whether they are able to

18 perform past relevant work.3 If the ALJ determines, based on the RFC, that the claimant can

19 perform past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(f). Here, the ALJ

20 determined Plaintiff has the RFC

21 to perform less than the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20

CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). Specifically, the claimant can sit

22 for 6 hours at a time or cumulatively in an 8-hour workday with

appropriate breaks; can stand and/or walk for 2 hours at a time or

23 cumulatively in an 8-hour workday; has no need for an assistive

device to walk; can push, pull, lift and/or carry 20 pounds

24 occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can occasionally bend, stoop,

balance, kneel, and crouch; can occasionally climb ladders, scaffolds,

25 stairs, and ramps; can occasionally reach in all directions including

overhead above the shoulder with the dominant right upper extremity;

26 and can frequently hold, feel, and finger objects with both hands.

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1 AR 33. As such, the ALJ determined Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a

2 Technical Writer and has therefore not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

3 Act, from July 30, 2019, through the date of the decision.4 AR 38-39.

4 B. Analysis

5 Under the rules in effect at the time of the ALJ’s April 23, 2024 decision, a claimant’s

6 “past relevant work” was substantial gainful activity that was performed within the last 15 years

7 and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565(a),

8 416.965(a). Plaintiff does not dispute he could perform his past relevant work during this time,

9 admitting he “stopped working as a technical writer in July of 2019.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8. Nor does he

10 dispute that his work as a technical writer met the regulatory definition of “past relevant work” at

11 the time of the ALJ’s decision. See generally id. Instead, his challenge relies on a rule that took

12 effect in June 2024, after the ALJ found him not disabled. Id. at 7–8. This rule— Social Security

13 Regulation (SSR) 24-2p—shortened the timeframe for past relevant work from 15 years to 5

14 years. See 89 Fed. Reg. 27653 (Apr. 18, 2024); SSR 24-2p, 89 Fed. Reg. 48,479 (June 6, 2024),

15 available at 2024 WL 2846571. Plaintiff argues that, because he stopped working as a technical

16 writer in July of 2019, “[h]ad the Appeals Council properly applied the five-year lookback period

17 it would have determined that the plaintiff’s past work as a technical writer was too remote to be

18 considered relevant under SSR 24-2p.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8. He argues SSR 24-2p should apply

19 because the Appeals Council denied review of his claim on March 14, 2025, after SSR 24-2p took

20 effect. Id.

21 When issuing SSR 24-2p, the agency explained it expects federal courts to review its “final

22 decisions using the rules that were in effect at the time we issued the decisions.” SSR 24-2p, 2024

23 WL 2846571, at *48479 n.1. As such, the amendment applies to “claims newly filed and pending

24 beginning on June 22, 2024.” 89 Fed. Reg. 48138 (June 5, 2024). Consistent with this guidance,

25 the Ninth Circuit has declined to apply the new regulation to appeals in which the ALJ decision

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4 As such, it was unnecessary for the ALJ to proceed to step five, where the burden shifts to the

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agency to prove that “‘the claimant can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national

1 became final before June 22, 2024. See McClune v. Dudek, 2025 WL 1099701, at *2 (9th Cir.

2 Apr. 14, 2025) (“Because McClune’s application was filed in 2016, and the ALJ’s decision

3 became the final decision of the Commissioner in 2023, and because the Commissioner has issued

4 a Social Security Ruling explaining that the new definition is intended to be applied prospectively

5 in ALJ decisions issued on or after June 22, 2024, SSR 24-2p, 89 Fed. Reg. 48479 n.1 (June 6,

6 2024), we decline to apply the new regulation in this appeal.”); Dodge v. Dudek, 2025 WL

7 1099705, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025) (same).

8 Here, as the Appeals Council explained in its declination of review, the date of

9 adjudication was April 23, 2024, the date of the ALJ’s decision. See AR 1 (“[Because] we have

10 denied your request for review . . . the Administrative Law Judge’s decision is the final decision of

11 the Commissioner of Social Security in your case.”)). Although Plaintiff argues otherwise, the

12 Ninth Circuit recently confirmed this point in Obrien v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 687 (9th Cir. 2025).

13 In Obrien, the Court held that where the Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review,

14 the relevant “adjudication” for ascertaining past relevant work “is the ALJ’s decision.” Id. at 702.

15 Since its decision in Obrien, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly confirmed its holding. See Houlihan

16 v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 1905106, at *2 (9th Cir. July 10, 2025); Beatty v. Bisignano, 2025 WL

17 1639232, at *2 (9th Cir. June 10, 2025); Benson v. Dudek, 2025 WL 1404946 at *2 (9th Cir. May

18 15, 2025); see also Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 656 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the

19 court will “defer to Social Security Rulings unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with

20 the [Social Security] Act or regulations” (alteration in original) (quoting Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d

21 1453, 1457 (9th Circ. 1989))).

22 Under the regulations in place at the time the decision was issued, past relevant work was

23 defined as work an individual did within the past 15 years. As Plaintiff last performed work as a

24 technical writer in July 2019, and the ALJ’s decision was issued on April 23, 2024, the ALJ did

25 not err by concluding this was past relevant work.5

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5 Even if the Court were to find SSR 24-2p applies to Plaintiff’s case (and it makes no such

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finding here), it could not result in a finding of disability because Plaintiff had past relevant work

1 VI. CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff?s motion and GRANTS

3 Defendant’s cross-motion. The Court shall enter a separate judgment, after which the Clerk of

4 Court shall terminate the case.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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7 Dated: December 31, 2025

THOMAS S. HIXSON

9 United States Magistrate Judge

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27 relevant work if it was performed on or after April 23, 2019. And, as Plaintiff concedes in his

28 brief (PI.’s Br. at 8), he worked as a technical writer until July 2019 (AR 33, 59-60, 326), which is

within the five-year lookback period.