Powell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CFLILEERDK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

12/30/2025

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CHARLES POWELL, “Light Rising Water” of the Guale U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Yamassee tribe, and VALERIE POWELL, EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

25-CV-02178 (GRB) (JMW)

-against-

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, HAROLD DAMM,

Referee, Individual Capacity, NEWREZ SHELLPOINT LLC,

MATTHEW JAMES, IRS Agent, Individual Capacity,

NYS DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION & FINANCE,

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, and TIAA-CREF,

Defendants.

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A P P E A R A N C E S:

Charles Powell

Valerie Powell

3386 Bertha Dr.

Baldwin, NY 11510

Pro Se Plaintiffs

Rudolph M. Baptiste

NYS Office of The Attorney General

Suffolk Regional Office

300 Motor Parkway, Ste 230

Hauppauge, NY 11788

Attorney for Defendant, NYS Department of Taxation & Finance

Michael E. Rosen

Houser LLP

60 E. 42nd Street, Suite 2200

New York, NY 10165

Attorney for Bank of New York Mellon & Newrez Shellpoint LLC

No further appearances made for the instant motion

WICKS, Magistrate Judge:

Following prior foreclosure and current eviction proceedings in New York state court,

Pro se Plaintiffs Charles Powell and Valerie Powell (“Plaintiffs”), brought claims against

Defendants1 alleging among other things, that such proceedings were a result of fraud. (See

generally, ECF Nos. 1, 49.) Recently, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R) to the Hon. Gary R. Brown2 recommending that the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss be

granted. (See ECF No. 121.) While that R&R is pending before Judge Brown, Plaintiffs’ latest

motion seeks “emergency” relief to toll the time for Plaintiffs to retrieve their personal property

post-eviction, currently held in a storage unit in connection with the State issued Eviction

Warrant (the “Warrant”). (ECF No. 123; see also ECF No. 125-2 at 2.) The Court provided

Defendants opportunity to oppose, to which only the Bank of New York Mellon and Newrez

Shellpoint LLC (collectively, the “Bank Defendants”), filed opposition.3 (ECF No. 125.) For the

reasons that follow, Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Compel for Temporary Protective Relief is

DENIED.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK & DISCUSSION

On December 11, 2025, and December 12, 2025, Plaintiffs were evicted from their home,

which is the subject of the underlying state proceedings. (ECF Nos. 123 at 1; 125 at 1.) The

personal property of Plaintiffs was removed from the property and placed into a storage facility,

1 The Defendants in this action are (i) Bank of New York Mellon (“Bank of NY”), (ii) Newrez Shellpoint

LLC (“Newrez” and collectively with Bank of NY , the “Bank Defendants”), (iii) Harold Damm

(“Damm”), (iv) Matthew James, IRS Agent, (v) NYS Department of Taxation & Finance (“NYS Dep’t of

Tax”), (vi) Ford Motor Credit Company, and (vii) TIAA-CREF (collectively the “Defendants”).

2 Judge Brown referred all pre-trial matters to the undersigned, including any dispositive motions, for a

Report and Recommendation. (See Electronic Order dated 6/10/2025.)

3 The NYS Department of Taxation & Finance takes no position in the instant motion. (See ECF No.

124.)

with a period of thirty (30) days to retrieve such belongings or the items may be deposed or sold

pursuant to the Warrant. (ECF No. 123 at 2.) Now, Plaintiffs seek emergency temporary relief to

prevent the loss of their personal property as a result of the foregoing. Bank Defendants oppose

arguing that “Plaintiffs have no basis for the request relief” and the Court “lacks authority to

enjoin” the actions that stem from the eviction, which includes the possible disposal of personal

property after the 30-day timeframe is up. (ECF No. 125 at 1-2.)

“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State

court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its

jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. “Courts in this Circuit

have long held that the Anti-Injunction Act [28 U.S.C. § 2283] applies to state-court evictions

proceedings.” Gomez v. Yisroel, No. 21-CV-2172 (PAC), 2021 WL 2138462, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

May 26, 2021) (quoting Ochei v. Lapes, No. 19-CV-3700 (CM), 2020 WL 528705, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2020) (citing Watkins v. Cesar, 88 F. App'x 458, 459 (2d Cir. 2004)

(affirming district court’s decision to deny enjoining eviction proceedings)). “The Anti–

Injunction Act, subject to some exceptions, prohibits injunctive relief that would interfere,

directly or indirectly, with pending state proceedings … or that would ‘prohibit utilization of the

results of a completed state proceeding.’” Pathways, Inc. v. Dunne, 329 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir.

2003) (citing County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54, 58–59, 101 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed.2d 258

(1980) (quoting Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398

U.S. 281, 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970)) (cleaned up); Peters v. Caton Towers

Owners Corp., No. 25-CV-4176 (RPK)(JRC), 2025 WL 2822614, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025)

(same) (collecting cases where the Anti-Injunction Act prevents federal courts from enjoining

eviction procedures and the procedures thereto).

The Anti-Injunction Act is “an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state-

court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of the three specifically defined

exceptions in the Act, which courts must construe ‘narrowly.’” Bosch v. Lamattina, No. 08-CV-

238 (JS)(AKT), 2008 WL 4820247, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2008) (quoting Chick Kam Choo

v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 140-50 (1988).; Armstrong v. Real Est. Int'l, Ltd., No. 05-CV-

5383(SJ), 2006 WL 354983, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2006) (stating the three statutory

exceptions and describing them as “narrow”). Importantly, the Anti-Injunction Act “reflects our

dual system of federal and state courts, and its core message is one of respect for state courts.”

Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Innovation Anesthesia & Pain Servs., P.C., No. 24-CV-2220 (MKB),

2025 WL 917509, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

State proceedings “‘should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention

of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and

ultimately’ the United States Supreme Court.” Manning v. City of New York, No. 24-CV-4747

(LGS), 2024 WL 3377997, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2024) (quoting Szymonik v. Connecticut,

807 F. App'x 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2020)). So, any “doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction

against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to

proceed.” Charisma Mosley v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, No. 25-CV-02919 (NCM) (CLP), 2025

WL 2614972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025) (citing Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306

(2011). The Hon. Judge Natasha C. Merle explained the limited exceptions as follows:

The first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act allows a federal court to stay a state

court proceeding where expressly authorized by Congress and applies where an Act

of Congress clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court

of equity could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court

proceeding. …The second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which allows a

federal court to stay a state court proceeding where necessary in aid of its

jurisdiction, is generally reserved for state court actions in rem4, because the state

court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily impairs, and may defeat, the federal

court's jurisdiction over the res. … Lastly, the third exception to the Anti-Injunction

Act, which is called the relitigation exception, permits a federal court to enjoin a

state court proceeding to protect or effectuate [the federal court's] judgments. This

exception allows a federal court to enjoin state litigation of a claim or issue that was

previously presented to and decided by the federal court.

Id. at *2-3 (citations and quotations omitted) (cleaned up).

Here, none of the exceptions apply. First, no statute exists that Plaintiff could rely upon to

grant the relief sought. See Allen v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 10-CV-168 (CM) (DCF),

2010 WL 1644956, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2010) (“No such statute exists that Plaintiff could

rely on here to stay eviction proceedings against him in state court; the first exception is

therefore inapplicable.”) Second, the state action is against Plaintiffs and the eviction

proceedings as well as the effectuation of it does not aid in this Court’s jurisdiction. In other

words, the relief sought is not necessary to aid with the pending Report and Recommendation or

any other tasks that the Court must perform when deciding the issues raised by Plaintiffs. See id.

at *4; Kristopher v. Stone St. Props., LLC, No. 13 CIV. 566 RJS, 2013 WL 499752, at *3–5

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2013) (citing id.) (“Moreover, a state proceeding ‘would in no way impair this

Court's flexibility and authority to resolve Plaintiff's other claims against [Defendants] and, if

warranted, to award [her] damages.’”) Third, there are no claims or issues that were previously

decided by this Court in connection with the state court action, that would be harmed if the state

eviction procedures or execution of the Warrant continue. See Baumgarten v. Cnty. of Suffolk,

No. 07-CV-539 (JS)(AKT), 2007 WL 1490482, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2007) (“Since

4 Judge Merle also clarified that in rem “is an action ‘[i]nvolving or determining the status of a thing’” …

whereas “‘in personam’ [refers to] an action ‘brought against a person rather than property.’” Id.

Plaintiff is not seeking to protect or enforce a prior federal court judgment, this exception is also

inapplicable.”)

Plaintiffs only recourse at this juncture is to seek this relief in state court. See Milhaven v.

Country Vill. Apartment, No. 19-CV-2384 (KMK), 2020 WL 5663380, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

23, 2020) (denying plaintiff’s request to enjoin defendant with matters concerning the eviction

proceedings as “with state proceedings ongoing, would be ‘tantamount to interfering with, and

thus enjoining, the state-court eviction proceeding’ were the state court ultimately to issue an

order allowing for Plaintiff's eviction.”); see also Aniades v. New York State Div. of Parole, No.

21-CV-5975 (CM), 2023 WL 4421877, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2023) (internal citations

omitted) (“Courts in this circuit have repeatedly found that the availability of an action in the

Court of Claims and state law actions for negligence, replevin, or conversion are adequate post-

deprivation remedies for a deprivation of personal property claim. Since Plaintiff fails to allege

that his available state remedies are in any way inadequate or inappropriate, he cannot assert a

claim for damages against Lis-Johnson in federal court for deprivation of his personal

belongings.”) Denial of requests for an injunction or temporary relief in connection with state

eviction proceedings are routinely the result. See e.g., Keir v. Schoeberl, No. 25-CV-056 (ECC)

(MJK), 2025 WL 437953, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2025), reconsideration denied-, No. 25-CV-

056 (ECC) (MJK), 2025 WL 520764 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (discussing the prohibition

against granting injunctions to stay state eviction proceedings and denying plaintiff's request for

such relief); Quinn v. Ross, No. 25-CV-0645-MAV, 2025 WL 2020142, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July

19, 2025) (denying Plaintiff’s temporary restraining order request as it was barred by the Anti-

Injunction Act); Manning, 2024 WL 3377997, at *2 (same).

Therefore, extending or tolling the time to effectuate the state court proceeding, issuance

of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2283.5 See St. Vincent's Multispecialty Grp., Inc. v. CPI/AHP Cross St. Mob Owner, L.L.C., No.

21-CV-01705 (VAB), 2021 WL 6124521, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Dec. 28, 2021) (explaining that the

three exceptions do not apply to an eviction proceeding or the “summary process”); Baumgarten,

2007 WL 1490482, at *4 (finding that the Court was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act after “ a

Warrant of Eviction was issued by the Sixth District Court of Suffolk County”); Charisma

Mosley, 2025 WL 2614972, at *2 (“plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction does not

identify any exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that would permit this Court to issue an

injunction interfering in the state court debt collection proceeding”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Compel for Temporary

Protective Relief filed at ECF No. 123 is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully

directed to send Plaintiffs a copy of this Order to their last known address as well as any e-mail

addresses previously provided to the Court and make such notation on the docket.

Dated: Central Islip, New York.

December 30, 2025

S O O R D E R E D:

James M. Wicks

/S/

JAMES M. WICKS

United States Magistrate Judge

5 It is unnecessary for the Court to address whether Plaintiff has met the burden for a preliminary

injunction since the Anti-Injunction Act precludes such relief under the circumstances presented here. See

Tupper v. New York, No. 24-CV-2582 (GRB)(SIL), 2024 WL 5399241, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2024)

(discussing the Anti-Injunction Act preclusion and not entertaining the merits of the relief sought); Peters,

2025 WL 2822614, at *3 (focusing on the Anti-Injunction Act rather than the test for a preliminary

injunction or similar relief).