In re Clark

No. 58 December 30, 2025 683

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of

ANNE-MARIE W. CLARK

OSB No. 110900,

Respondent.

(OSB 23322) (SC S071725)

En Banc

On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary

Board.*

Argued and submitted September 19, 2025.

Amber Bevacqua-Lynott, Buchalter, P.C., Portland,

argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent.

Susan Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,

Tigard, argued the cause and filed the brief on behalf of the

Oregon State Bar.

PER CURIAM

The complaint is dismissed.

­_ _____________

* Trial panel opinion dated January 10, 2025.

684 In re Clark

PER CURIAM

The Oregon State Bar charged respondent with

knowingly disobeying a court order, in violation of Rule of

Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.4(c). That rule provides that a

lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the

rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an

assertion that no valid obligation exists.” The dispute cen-

ters around a verbal order that a trial court judge gave to

respondent at a hearing in July 2016. At the time, respondent

was serving as trustee of a special needs trust intended to

benefit her cousin, Allen, who has an intellectual disability.

The Bar contends that, at the conclusion of the hearing, the

judge verbally ordered respondent to electronically deposit

$20 per month into Allen’s bank account. Respondent failed

to do so. That failure is the basis for the Bar’s charge that

respondent knowingly disobeyed a court order in violation of

RPC 3.4(c).

Respondent contends that a knowing violation of

a verbal court order falls outside the scope of RPC 3.4(c).

Alternatively, as a factual matter, although she agrees that

she did not provide Allen with $20 per month, she denies

that the judge ordered her to do so. Instead, she contends

that the order addressed only the method that she should

use to make cash distributions to Allen—namely, that,

when she distributes funds to Allen, she should use elec-

tronic deposit rather than written checks. Respondent fur-

ther maintains that, even if the judge ordered her to provide

Allen with $20 per month, any violation of that order was

not done knowingly, because she did not understand the

judge to have ordered her to do so.

A divided trial panel of the Disciplinary Board

agreed with the Bar, with one member dissenting. Reviewing

the matter de novo, we conclude that the Bar failed to estab-

lish the violation by clear and convincing evidence.

A. Interpretation of RPC 3.4(c)

Although the dispute in this case is primarily fac-

tual, we address respondent’s legal argument first. As noted

above, respondent contends that a knowing violation of

a verbal court order falls outside the scope of RPC 3.4(c),

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 685

which provides that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey

an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an

open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation

exists.” The phrase “obligation under the rules of a tribu-

nal” refers to court rules as well as court rulings, including

orders.1 Respondent agrees that the rule applies to court

orders, but she argues that it applies only to written court

orders, because a verbal order is usually not appealable and

may be modified by the trial court before being reduced to a

written order.

We reject respondent’s interpretation and hold that

RPC 3.4(c) prohibits knowingly disobeying both written and

verbal court orders. The text of the rule does not distinguish

between written and verbal orders. And applying the rule

to both better carries out the intent behind the rule. The

title of RPC 3.4, as adopted by this court, is “Fairness to

Opposing Party and Counsel.” See Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro.

Counselors and Therapists, 353 Or 85, 96-97, 293 P3d 1023

(2012) (explaining that the title of an act “may offer inter-

pretive assistance” when it is part of the bill that the legis-

lature adopts). The rule, including paragraph (c), is intended

to provide broad protection to opposing parties, and their

lawyers, against abusive litigation tactics. See American

Bar Association, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4

comment 1 (“Fair competition in the adversary system is

secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment

of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive

tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.”). When a judge

orders a lawyer to do something or not do something, the

opposing party and their lawyer should expect the lawyer to

1

The text of RPC 3.4(c) tracks the American Bar Association’s Model Rule

of Professional Conduct (Model RPC) 3.4(c). Our interpretation of that rule may

be informed by decisions from other jurisdictions applying the same model rule

prior to our adoption. Cf. State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340, 354, 537 P3d 503 (2023)

(“When the legislature adopts a uniform act, the context of the statute includes

the uniform act, its official commentary, and interpretations from other juris-

dictions that existed at the time of enactment of the Oregon law.”). By the time

Oregon adopted RPC 3.4(c) at the end of 2004, numerous jurisdictions had already

applied similar rules, also drawn from Model RPC 3.4(c), to lawyers who know-

ingly violated court orders. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Braswell, 975

P2d 401, 408 (Okla 1998) (applying rule to court order); Disciplinary Proceedings

Against Ratzel, 218 Wis 2d 423, 432, 578 NW2d 194, 198 (1998) (same); Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Mininsohn, 380 Md 536, 569-70, 846 A2d 353, 373 (Md Ct

App 2004) (same).

686 In re Clark

comply with the order and should not be required to return

to court to enforce it. That is true whether the judge’s order

is written or verbal. See, e.g., Ligon v. Stilley, 2010 Ark 418,

26-27, 104, 371 SW3d 615, 645, 673 (2010) (finding a vio-

lation of Rule 3.4(c) where a lawyer issued subpoenas and

deposition notices after the trial court judge orally directed

the lawyer not to do so).

Although knowingly disobeying a verbal order may

support a violation of RPC 3.4(c), the order must be suffi-

ciently clear in its direction to the lawyer to be knowingly

disobeyed. A lawyer does not knowingly disobey a court order

by merely misunderstanding what the court has ordered.

The scope of a court’s order, and a lawyer’s understanding

of that scope, are questions of fact. We now turn to those

questions of fact in this case.

B. Factual Disputes

A divided trial panel of the Disciplinary Board

found that the Bar established that respondent violated

RPC 3.4(c) by knowingly violating a court order. We review

the trial panel’s decision de novo and may adopt, modify, or

reject the decision of the trial panel. ORS 9.536(2); Bar Rule

of Procedure (BR) 10.6. “On de novo review, this court sits as

factfinder based on the record developed by the trial panel”

to determine whether the Bar has proved each violation by

clear and convincing evidence. In re Munn, 372 Or 589, 591

n 1, 553 P3d 1039 (2024); see also BR 5.2 (establishing clear

and convincing evidence standard). Evidence is clear and

convincing when “the truth of the facts asserted is highly

probable.” In re Gregory Mark Abel, 374 Or 350, 357, 577 P3d

777 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of the facts

that the Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence,

the parties dispute whether the trial judge ordered respon-

dent to provide her cousin with $20 per month and, if so,

whether respondent understood the trial judge to have done

so.

1. The record

The disputed court order was issued verbally at

the conclusion of a July 2016 hearing on Allen’s petition to

remove respondent as trustee of a special needs trust. The

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 687

trust had been established by respondent’s aunt, Allen’s

mother, upon her death. When her mother died in 2010,

Allen was in her mid-40s. She had an intellectual disability

but was living independently and managed her own limited

finances. Her income consisted only of government bene-

fits, which included about $730 per month in Supplemental

Security Income (SSI). The trust documents instruct the

trustee to consider, and generally attempt to minimize, the

extent to which trust distributions to Allen would reduce

her government benefits.

Respondent became the trustee in 2011 upon the

resignation of the first co-trustees, respondent’s parents.

Respondent made no distributions from the trust to Allen

in the first three years that she served as trustee because of

what she described as communication challenges with Allen,

who did not trust respondent and generally avoided direct

communication with her. In 2014, Allen retained counsel,

Mayor, to facilitate trust distributions. Mayor requested that

respondent provide Allen with $20 checks per month, plus

an additional $60 per quarter. Mayor explained that any

cash distributions above that amount would reduce Allen’s

SSI benefits. Respondent complied and began sending those

checks to Mayor.

In April 2015, Mayor filed a petition to remove

respondent as trustee.2 The petition argued that respon-

dent should be removed as trustee because she had limited

experience in trust administration and Allen lacked confi-

dence in her. While that petition was pending, respondent

used trust funds to purchase dining room chairs for Allen

at Mayor’s request and suggested to Mayor that she also

use trust funds to pay for Allen’s rent. Although respondent

estimated that paying for Allen’s rent would reduce her SSI

benefits by about $250 per month, that loss would be more

than offset by the fact that Allen would no longer have to use

her SSI benefits to pay the rent, which was about $625 per

month. Mayor agreed. In September 2015, respondent began

sending checks from the trust to Mayor to cover Allen’s rent.

2

The petition also sought to compel both respondent and her parents to pro-

vide an accounting of trust assets from the time each served as trustees. The

questions related to the accounting are not relevant to the issues presented in

this case, and we do not discuss them further.

688 In re Clark

The trial court scheduled a hearing on Allen’s

petition to remove respondent as trustee. Prior to the

hearing, Mayor withdrew his representation of Allen. As

a result, respondent began sending the regular trust dis-

tributions—$20 per month and $60 per quarter—by check

directly to Allen and began sending the $625 per month

rent checks directly to Allen’s landlord. Allen did not cash

or deposit the checks that respondent sent directly to her.

The trial court held a hearing on the petition in July

2016. That is the hearing at which the trial court issued the

verbal order in dispute in this case. At the hearing, respon-

dent was represented by counsel, Mishkin, and Allen repre-

sented herself. The trial court judge took evidence and tes-

timony and declined to remove respondent as trustee.

After making that ruling, the judge used most of

the remainder of the hearing to address some of Allen’s spe-

cific objections to respondent’s performance as trustee. Allen

primarily objected to respondent paying her rent. Allen saw

that, once respondent had started paying her rent, her SSI

checks were smaller. Allen preferred the larger SSI checks

and complained that the $20 per month checks from respon-

dent did not make up the difference. She stated repeatedly

that she did not want the trust to pay her rent or send her

$20. The judge tried to explain to Allen that she was better

off financially when respondent paid the rent because then

Allen did not need to use her SSI checks to pay the rent.

As they were nearing the end of the hearing,

respondent’s counsel, Mishkin, asked the judge if they could

address a couple of other issues, while Allen was present,

because they had struggled to communicate effectively with

her outside the context of a judicial proceeding. One of the

issues was that Allen had failed to deposit the checks that

respondent had previously sent directly to Allen, after her

counsel withdrew. Respondent asked whether she could use

direct deposit to make the cash distributions and wanted to

get Allen’s bank account information. Allen confirmed that

she had been using the same bank account for years but

objected to respondent sending her $20. The judge explained

to Allen that, if respondent used direct deposit to send her

$20 per month, then the $20 would be there in her account,

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 689

and she could use it however she wanted. Allen replied, “$20

is not going to get me anywhere a month in my house.” When

respondent asked whether she could direct deposit the dis-

tributions to her account, Allen said, “I’ll think about it.”

Following that discussion, the judge said, “[W]e

might want to order that’s how it’s happening.” The follow-

ing exchange occurred with the judge while Allen, respon-

dent, and Mishkin were all present in the courtroom:

“THE COURT: I’m going to instruct you to—

“[RESPONDENT]: And can I make one more

suggestion?

“THE COURT: Yeah. But I’m going to first instruct

you to—

“[RESPONDENT]: If you—

“THE COURT: —direct-deposit into that account,

unless or until it shows that it’s not going there because

there’s no longer the account. So that is how you’re to do it,

okay.

“[RESPONDENT]: Oh, okay. Okay.

“THE COURT: Go ahead. Ask your question.

“[RESPONDENT]: Direct—I will deposit it into her

account myself.

“MR. MISHKIN: Uh-huh (affirmative).

“[RESPONDENT]: Yeah, okay.

“MR. MISHKIN: Yeah. They wire it in.

“[RESPONDENT]: And I could buy her items—not

just pay utility bills or monthly bills, but if she says a—I

want a vacuum cleaner, or I need a table to go with the

chairs, or I need a new mattress.”

After the hearing, respondent stopped making any

monthly cash distributions to Allen, either through checks

or direct deposit, although respondent still paid for Allen’s

rent from the trust. According to respondent, she stopped

making the monthly distributions because Allen had said

that she did not want them and because respondent did not

understand the judge to have ordered her to provide them.

690 In re Clark

Instead, respondent maintains that the judge’s verbal order

addressed only the method for distributing cash; specifically,

authorizing and directing respondent to make any cash dis-

tributions through direct deposit.

The trial court’s resolution of the 2016 hearing was

never memorialized in a written order. Two months after the

hearing, Mishkin prepared a proposed written order based

on his own notes from the hearing. Mishkin’s draft order

reflected respondent’s understanding that the judge’s order

addressed the method of distribution and not the amount

or frequency of distribution. The relevant part of the draft

proposed order stated:

“If and when the current Trustee, Anne-Marie Clark,

receives bank account routing and account number infor-

mation from [Allen], the current Trustee, Anne-Marie

Clark, shall electronically deposit all cash disbursements

due to [Allen] to such bank account.”

Mishkin served a notice of proposed order on Allen, as

required under UTCR 5.100. Mishkin asked Allen to either

contact him if she objected to the draft proposed order or to

contact the trial court directly.

Soon after receiving the notice, Allen retained new

counsel, Seeger. Seeger contacted Mishkin and objected to

the proposed order, though she did not object that the order

failed to compel respondent to provide $20 per month or that

the order otherwise failed to reflect the judge’s rulings at

the July 2016 hearing. Instead, Seeger objected to respon-

dent continuing to serve as trustee.

Mishkin did not submit the proposed order to the

court until almost two years after the hearing. During those

two years, neither Allen nor Seeger suggested that respon-

dent should be providing $20 per month distributions.

Seeger requested one-time cash distributions for Allen on

three different occasions. Each time, respondent provided

cash distributions through direct deposit. After the third

time, respondent told Seeger that she could not continue to

provide cash distributions without additional information

about Allen’s finances and benefits. Seeger did not make

further requests for cash distributions.

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 691

Mishkin finally submitted the proposed order

in May 2018. Seeger filed objections and a motion to hold

respondent in contempt, raising for the first time the allega-

tion that respondent had been disobeying a court order by

failing to provide Allen with $20 per month. After another

hearing, Seeger submitted her own proposed order that

would have required respondent to provide $20 per month.

Respondent objected through Mishkin, noting that such a

requirement had never been requested by Allen, argued by

the parties, or ordered by the court at the July 2016 hearing.

Following other filings and more hearings, respon-

dent stipulated to the appointment of an interim trustee.

The trial court appointed an interim trustee and ordered

the trustee to provide Allen with $20 per month from the

trust. Respondent ultimately agreed to the appointment of

a new permanent trustee as part of a settlement to resolve

claims that Allen had brought against her.

At around the same time that the trial court

appointed an interim trustee, Seeger filed a Bar complaint

raising numerous allegations against respondent. Based on

those allegations, the Bar brought the charge at issue in this

case—that respondent had violated RPC 3.4(c) by knowingly

disobeying a court order when she stopped providing Allen

with monthly $20 distributions.3

Before a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board, the

trial court judge who had issued the verbal order testi-

fied that she had intended her order to compel respondent

to deposit $20 per month into Allen’s account, though she

acknowledged both that her order did “not say that in one

fell swoop” and that Allen had not requested $20 per month.

Respondent and Mishkin both testified that they

did not understand the judge to have ordered respondent

to make specific distributions. Instead, respondent testi-

fied that the judge’s verbal order authorized and directed

her to make any cash distributions through direct deposit.

Respondent said that she did not understand the order to

3

The Bar brought two other charges against respondent based on Seeger’s

allegations. The trial panel found that the Bar did not prove those other charges

by clear and convincing evidence, and the Bar has not sought review of those

decisions.

692 In re Clark

limit her discretion as trustee to determine how best to

provide for Allen, while both maintaining Allen’s access

to government benefits and preserving the trust assets.

Respondent testified that she did not think that the $20 per

month distributions were a good use of trust assets, because

respondent was already using trust funds to pay for Allen’s

rent and because Allen repeatedly stated she did not want

$20 per month distributions.

Mishkin testified consistently with respondent.

He said that he had understood the judge’s order to have

resolved whether distributions would be made through elec-

tronic transfer or paper checks. But, according to him, the

order did not address the frequency or amount of the distri-

butions, which Mishkin understood to be within the discre-

tion of the trustee, respondent.

A majority of the trial panel concluded that respon-

dent had violated RPC 3.4(c), finding both that the trial

court judge had ordered respondent to distribute $20 per

month to Allen and that respondent had knowingly dis-

obeyed that order. The majority interpreted the order as

resolving a hearing at which Allen sought additional cash

distributions, and the majority determined that respondent

had acknowledged that order at the hearing. Based on that

violation RPC 3.4(c), the trial panel imposed a sanction of

public reprimand.

One member of the trial panel dissented from the

conclusion that respondent had knowingly disobeyed the

judge’s order. The dissenting member noted that the tran-

script from the hearing was “confusing” and that Allen’s

“interactions with the judge broke up any continuous expo-

sition of any potential oral order.” Even if the judge had

ordered respondent to make $20 per month distributions,

the dissenting member would have found that the Bar failed

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent

had knowingly disobeyed the order. The dissenting member

explained that, because of “the disorganized nature of the

hearing,” it was not surprising that people might leave the

hearing with different views on the scope of the order. The

dissenting member also noted that Mishkin shared respon-

dent’s interpretation of the order and that their conduct

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 693

following the hearing was consistent with that interpreta-

tion. Respondent petitioned this court to review the trial

panel’s decision.

2. Whether respondent knowingly disobeyed a court

order

As noted above, the Bar bears the burden of prov-

ing a violation by clear and convincing evidence. BR 5.2.

Reviewing the matter de novo, we agree with respondent

and the dissenting member of the trial panel and conclude

that the Bar failed to prove a violation of RPC 3.4(c) by clear

and convincing evidence.

The Bar’s claim depends on establishing that the

trial court judge ordered respondent to deposit $20 per

month into Allen’s bank account and that respondent under-

stood the trial court to have ordered her to do so. As to the

scope of the trial court order, the Bar points to the testi-

mony from the trial court judge, who said that she intended

her order to require respondent to deposit $20 per month in

Allen’s bank account.

For our purposes, however, the scope of the order is

not determined by the judge’s intent, but by the order itself.

Based on the transcripts, the trial court ordered,

“I’m going to first instruct you [respondent] to * * * direct-de-

posit into that account, unless or until it shows that it’s not

going there because there’s no longer the account. So that

is how you’re to do it, okay.”

That order is ambiguous as to whether the judge was direct-

ing respondent to continue her current distributions of $20

per month but do so using direct deposit or directing respon-

dent to use direct deposit, rather than checks, for any future

distributions that she might make.

The Bar contends that the larger context of the

hearing provides clear and convincing support for its inter-

pretation that the trial court ordered respondent to continue

her current distributions of $20 per month but to do so using

direct deposit. The Bar points out that the order came at

the end of a hearing to resolve Allen’s claim that respon-

dent should be removed for failing to properly manage

694 In re Clark

the trust, including failing to provide her with adequate

disbursements.

Although that context lends support for the Bar’s

interpretation, it is not a complete picture of the hearing.

To be sure, Allen’s petition to remove respondent as trustee,

originally filed by Mayor, alleged that respondent had failed

to provide Allen with adequate disbursements. But that

was not the position that Allen advanced at the hearing.

Instead, she said repeatedly that she wanted respondent to

stop the disbursements that she was making—both the rent

payments and the cash distributions.

Regardless, by the time the court issued its verbal

order, the court had already resolved Allen’s petition and

declined to remove respondent. At that point, the trial court

was addressing an issue raised by respondent rather than an

issue raised by Allen. The issue that respondent had raised

was Allen’s failure to deposit written checks and respon-

dent’s request to use direct deposit. That is the immediate

context in which the judge ordered respondent “to direct-de-

posit into that account.” That more immediate context lends

support for respondent’s interpretation. At the very least,

the overall context of the hearing prevents a finding that

the Bar established by clear and convincing evidence that

the trial court ordered respondent to continue her current

distributions of $20 per month.

Even if the Bar were correct and the trial court

judge orally directed respondent to deposit $20 per month

in Allen’s account, the Bar’s claim would still fail because

the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that

respondent understood the judge to have so ordered. And

without that showing, the Bar cannot prove by clear and con-

vincing evidence that she knowingly disobeyed the order. See

RPC 3.4(c) (generally prohibiting “knowingly disobey[ing]

an obligation under the rules of a tribunal”). “Knowingly”

is generally defined to mean “actual knowledge of the fact

in question.” RPC 1.0(h); see id. (constructive knowledge

applies only to knowledge of a conflict of interest).

Respondent testified that she did not understand

the trial court to have ordered her to make $20 per month

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 695

distributions to Allen. “Our case law provides a frame-

work for assessing whether the Bar sufficiently proved that

respondent had acted with actual knowledge, when respon-

dent testified to contrary.” Abel, 374 Or at 359. First, we

consider “subjective factors that are observable from the

record,” such as whether the respondent testified in a man-

ner that was evasive, hyper-technical, or argumentative. Id.

As part of that determination, we also consider and assess

any findings by the trial panel that reflect respondent’s

manner while testifying. Id. Second, we consider “ ‘objective

factors, such as the inherent probability or improbability

of testimony, whether testimony is internally consistent or

inconsistent, whether the testimony is corroborated or con-

tradicted, and so on.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Fitzhenry, 343 Or

86, 104, 162 P3d 260 (2007)); see, e.g., In re Long, 368 Or 452,

472, 491 P3d 783 (2021) (finding that respondent’s testimony

was not credible where client’s competing version of events

better aligned with contemporaneous communications).

In this case, the trial panel did not make any find-

ings about the manner of respondent’s testimony that would

reflect on her credibility. And our own review of the record

does not reveal that respondent testified in an evasive,

hyper-technical, or argumentative manner. Further, her

testimony—that she did not understand the trial court to

have ordered her to provide Allen with $20 per month—is

plausible. As noted above, the trial court’s verbal order was

ambiguous as to whether it was requiring respondent to dis-

tribute $20 per month or directing respondent to use direct

deposit when distributing cash. Respondent could have

plausibly understood the order as addressing only the man-

ner of distributing cash to Allen because that is the issue

that respondent raised with the court and was what respon-

dent reasonably would have thought the court was resolving

through the order. The plausibility of that interpretation is

supported by the fact that Mishkin left the hearing with the

same understanding of the trial court’s order.

The Bar contends that respondent’s statement at

the hearing is inconsistent with her testimony that she

understood the trial court to be addressing only the manner

of distributing cash. In particular, the Bar points out that,

696 In re Clark

after the trial court’s order, respondent stated to the trial

court, “I will deposit it into her account myself.” The Bar

argues that, in the context of the hearing, the “it” in that

statement refers to $20 per month distributions. And, as a

result, the Bar contends that that statement is an acknowl-

edgment by respondent that the trial court had ordered her

to make monthly deposits.

We disagree. Again, the transcript is ambiguous.

The “it” in respondent’s statement might refer to $20 per

month distributions, as the Bar contends, but it could also

refer to any future cash distributions that respondent might

make to Allen. Even if “it” refers to $20 per month distribu-

tions, that statement does not tell us how respondent under-

stood the trial court order. Instead, the meaning of that

statement depends on first establishing respondent’s under-

standing of the order. To be sure, if respondent had under-

stood the trial court to order her to provide Allen with $20

per month, then her statement might reflect an acknowl-

edgement of that order. But if respondent had understood

the trial court to order her to use direct deposit when dis-

tributing cash, then her statement would merely express

her intent, in light of that order, to deposit $20 per month

or other permissible distribution to Allen by direct deposit.

Even if respondent planned to continue the monthly pay-

ments at the time of the hearing, that fact would not neces-

sarily mean that she understood the court to have ordered

her to do so or to have prevented her from changing her

plans after the hearing as permitted by the trust.

Respondent’s conduct was otherwise consistent

with her stated understanding that the trial court did not

order her to provide Allen with $20 per month. The draft

order resolving the July 2016 hearing, prepared by respon-

dent’s counsel, would have required direct deposit but did

not address the amount or frequency of cash distributions.

When, nearly two years after the hearing, Seeger first sug-

gested that respondent should be making $20 per month dis-

tributions, respondent replied, through counsel, that a $20

per month requirement had never been requested, argued,

or ordered.

Cite as 374 Or 683 (2025) 697

As noted at the outset, the Bar bears the burden

of proving its allegation under RPC 3.4(c) by clear and con-

vincing evidence, BR 5.2, which means that the “truth of

the asserted facts must be highly probable.” Abel, 374 Or

at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). That standard

“demands more than merely a suspicion that a particular

fact is true.” In re Peterson, 348 Or 325, 339, 232 P3d 940

(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that

the Bar failed to meet that standard. In this case, the Bar

failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that

either the trial court ordered respondent to prove $20 per

month to Allen or that respondent understood the trial

court to have done so. Accordingly, we dismiss the Bar’s

complaint.

The complaint is dismissed.