Nature's Touch Med Nj, LLC v. City of Hoboken

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0722-24

NATURE'S TOUCH MED NJ,

LLC d/b/a NATURE'S TOUCH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CITY OF HOBOKEN,

RAVINDER SINGH BHALLA,

Individually and as Mayor of

Hoboken,

Defendants-Appellants.

___________________________

Argued October 28, 2025 – Decided December 30, 2025

Before Judges Gilson, Perez Friscia, and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2720-24.

Daniel Antonelli argued the cause for appellants

(Antonelli Kantor Rivera, PC, attorneys; Daniel

Antonelli and Lori D. Reynolds, of counsel and on the

briefs; Kathleen P. Ramalho, on the briefs).

Vincent August Sicari (Vincent A. Sicari, LLC) argued

the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendants, the City of Hoboken and its former Mayor Ravinder Singh

Bhalla, appeal from a September 27, 2024 order granting the motion of plaintiff

Nature's Touch Med NJ, LLC (plaintiff or Nature's Touch) to deem, as timely,

its notice of claim under the Torts Claims Act (the TC Act), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to

-12-3. The controlling issue on this appeal is when did plaintiff's tort cause of

action accrue.

The underlying dispute concerns the City of Hoboken's (the City) denial

of plaintiff's application to operate a medical marijuana dispensary. Plaintiff

initially received a favorable recommendation from the City's Cannabis Review

Board (the Board) in January 2022. That same month, however, Mayor Bhalla

refused to sign the required letter of support, effectively blocking plaintiff's

application. Plaintiff asserts that it was unaware of any actionable basis to

contest Mayor Bhalla's decision until May 2024, when allegations surfaced in a

lawsuit brought by a former City employee, Pantaleo Pellegrini, that Mayor

Bhalla had accepted a bribe not to recommend plaintiff's application to operate

a medical marijuana dispensary.

We affirm the September 27, 2024 order on the grounds that plaintiff's

tortious interference claim did not accrue until it learned of the Mayor's alleged

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malicious interference, which on the current record, we accept did not occur

until May 2024. On remand, however, plaintiff is limited to pursuing one tort

claim against the City and Mayor: a claim of tortious interference. If plaintiff

seeks to pursue any other tort cause of action, it must move to amend its

complaint, and the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine if any other

tort cause of action can be timely filed under the TC Act.

I.

We discern the facts from the record on plaintiff's motion. We note that

the record is limited because the parties have not engaged in discovery and there

was no evidentiary hearing. Therefore, we accept the facts as alleged by plaintiff

but recognize that those facts are vigorously disputed by defendants.

Nature's Touch is a limited liability company, which has a medical

marijuana dispensary license to operate in New Jersey. In 2022, plaintiff applied

for permission to operate a medical marijuana dispensary in the City at 1014

Washington Street.

On January 7, 2022, the Board reviewed plaintiff's application and issued

a favorable recommendation to the City's Mayor for a letter of support. On

January 10, 2022, plaintiff learned that Mayor Bhalla had refused to sign the

required letter of support, effectively blocking its application. Mayor Bhalla did

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not issue a letter explaining his reasons for not issuing a letter of support, and

plaintiff claims that at that time it did not know the reason for Mayor Bhalla's

decision.

Instead, plaintiff contends it learned of the grounds for a tort claim against

the City and the Mayor in May 2024. Plaintiff asserts that in early May 2024, it

became aware of a lawsuit filed by Pellegrini, the former Director of the

Department of Health and Human Services for the City, against the City and

Mayor. On May 3, 2024, Pellegrini, who had resigned from his position with

the City, filed a complaint against defendants alleging wrongful termination and

other claims.1 Pellegrini's complaint was amended on May 7, 2024.

According to Pellegrini's complaint, at a January 14, 2022 meeting, Mayor

Bhalla stated that he had received a phone call from Mayor Fulop of Jersey City

and Mayor Fulop was "extremely upset and very angry" about the Board's

decision to support Nature's Touch's application because his wife planned to

open a medical cannabis dispensary in the City. At the same meeting, Mayor

Bhalla allegedly stated he would be "quashing" Nature's Touch's application and

1

Defendants assert that Pellegrini is "an aggrieved former employee who

voluntarily resigned from his position with the City . . . after it was discovered

he engaged in serious acts of misconduct . . . embezzling from the City [.]"

Defendants also ask this court to take judicial notice that Pellegrini pled guilty

to embezzling money from the City and filing a false tax return.

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that, in exchange, Mayor Fulop promised to provide legal work for Mayor

Bhalla's private law firm. Plaintiff also asserts that Mayor Fulop's wife is a co-

owner of Story Dispensary of Hoboken, LLC (Story Dispensary), and on

February 24, 2022, the City's Board approved Story Dispensary's application to

operate a medical cannabis retail business in the City.

On May 17, 2024, plaintiff served defendants with a notice of tort claim.

The notice alleged the Mayor quashed plaintiff's Board-approved license with

the intent to deprive them of business for his own personal enrichment and quid

pro quo.

Thereafter, on July 23, 2024, plaintiff moved before the trial court to deem

its tort claim notice as timely. In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted

certifications from two of its three owners, who claimed they first learned of the

Mayor's alleged bribe in the Spring 2024, from the Pellegrini complaint.

Plaintiff also submitted a proposed verified complaint, which contained five

"counts" but did not identify specific tort causes of action. 2

2

Plaintiff's verified complaint also named Mayor Fulop and his wife, Jaclyn

Thompson, as defendants. The record is not clear if those defendants have been

served and have entered appearances. Neither of those defendants is involved

in this appeal.

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Defendants opposed the motion. They argued the notice was untimely and

the complaint should be barred or dismissed under the TC Act.

On September 27, 2024, the trial court issued an order and short letter

opinion granting plaintiff's motion and deeming plaintiff's tort claim notice as

timely. In doing so, the trial court relied on Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J.

111, 118-19 (2000), and reasoned: "[T]he discovery rule applies and justifies

the filing of a late claim. Although [p]laintiff was aware its application was

denied [in January 2022], it was unaware until the Spring of 2024 that there may

have been unlawful reasons for the denial." The trial court did not conduct any

hearing to determine when plaintiff learned of its alleged tort claim against the

City and Mayor. Instead, the court accepted plaintiff's representations as set

forth in the certifications from plaintiff's owners.

Defendants now appeal from the trial court's September 27, 2024 order.

This issue is before us under Rule 2:2-3(b)(7). See R. 2:2-3(b)(7) (explaining

"orders granting or denying motions to extend the time to file a notice of tort

claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9" are appealable as of right). 3

3

We note that plaintiff did not file a motion to file a later tort claim notice;

rather it moved to have the notice deemed timely. Nevertheless, we accept this

appeal and if necessary, would grant leave to appeal as if the motion was timely

filed.

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II.

On appeal, defendants make one argument. They allege that the trial court

erred by applying the discovery rule and granting plaintiff's motion to deem its

notice of tort claim as timely. In support of this argument, defendants contend

that the TC Act requires a notice of claim to be filed within ninety days, but no

later than one year, from the accrual of the cause of action. They assert that

plaintiff's cause of action accrued in January 2022, when it was allegedly injured

by the denial of a medical retail cannabis license, and therefore, plaintiff's tort

claims are time-barred. So, they ask us to reverse the trial court's order and

dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

Plaintiff, in response, contends that its cause of action did not accrue until

May 2024, when it learned through Pellegrini's complaint of Mayor Bhalla's

alleged improper motives for denying its application. Accordingly, plaintiff

asserts that its notice was "not only filed within the one-year period for late

notice[,] but [was] filed well within the [statutory] ninety[-]day period."

This court reviews the trial court's application of the discovery rule and a

decision to deem plaintiff's notice timely de novo. Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447

N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016); Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm.,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). The central issue on this appeal is determining when

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plaintiff's claim of tortious interference accrued. To answer that question, we

must evaluate the TC Act's requirements, including the requirement to provide

a tort claim notice to the public entity.

A. The TC Act.

The TC Act waives the State's sovereign immunity subject to certain

requirements and limitations. See N.J.S.A. 59:1-2 (explaining that "public

entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of [the TC

Act] and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established" in the

TC Act). "[G]enerally, immunity for public entities is the rule and liability is

the exception." McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 474 (2011) (quoting Fluehr v.

City of Cape May, 159 N.J. 532, 539 (1999)).

To proceed with a tort claim against a public entity, a plaintiff must file a

notice of claim within ninety days of the accrual of the cause of action. Ben

Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 133 (2017) (citing N.J.S.A.

59:8-8). A plaintiff may file a late notice of claim within one year of the accrual,

provided the plaintiff demonstrates extraordinary circumstances and that the

public entity has not been substantially prejudiced. Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 59:8-

9). The failure to file within ninety days or within one year under extraordinary

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circumstances bars a claimant from bringing the tort claim against the public

entity or its employees. Ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 59:8-8(a)).

To determine if a claimant has provided timely notice, a court must

determine the date on which the tort claim accrued. McDade, 208 N.J. at 475

(quoting Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 118) (explaining that "[t]he first task is always

to determine when the claim accrued"). The TC Act "does not define the date

of accrual in any significant way, [but] the comment to [N.J.S.A. 59:8-1] states

'[i]t is intended that the term accrual of a cause of action shall be defined in

accordance with existing law in the private sector.'" Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at

116 (third alteration in original) (quoting Margolis & Novak, Claims Against

Public Entities, 1972 Task Force cmt. to N.J.S.A. 59:8-1 (2000)).

In general, a claim accrues on the date when the underlying tortious act

occurred. Ben Elazar, 230 N.J. at 134 (citing Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 117). The

date of accrual, however, can be delayed under the discovery rule. Ibid. The

discovery rule "may affect the timeliness of a notice of claim . . . by tolling the

date of accrual for purposes of computing the ninety-day period set forth in

N.J.S.A. 59:8-8(a)." McDade, 208 N.J. at 474. "The discovery rule is an

equitable doctrine created by the courts to protect unsuspecting persons from

statutory limitations periods during which a claim must be brought or forever

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lost." Dunn v. Borough of Mountainside, 301 N.J. Super. 262, 273 (App. Div.

1997). Under the discovery rule, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff

"discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should

have discovered that he [or she] may have a basis for an actionable claim."

Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973).

The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained the connection between the

notice requirement under the TC Act and the discovery rule. Beauchamp, 164

N.J. at 118-19. In that regard, the court has stated:

In determining whether a notice of claim under N.J.S.A.

59:8-8 has been timely filed, a sequential analysis must

be undertaken. The first task is always to determine

when the claim accrued. The discovery rule is part and

parcel of such an inquiry because it can toll the date of

accrual. Once the date of accrual is ascertained, the

next task is to determine whether a notice of claim was

filed within ninety days. If not, the third task is to

decide whether extraordinary circumstances exist

justifying a late notice.

[Ibid.]

Under the discovery rule, the accrual date is tolled from the date of the

tortious act until the injured party knows of her injury and knows that a third

party is responsible for the injury. McDade, 208 N.J. at 475. "When a plaintiff

knows he [or she] has 'suffered an injury but [does] not know that it is

attributable to the fault of another,' the discovery rule tolls the date of accrual as

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to that unknown responsible party." Ben Elazar, 230 N.J. at 134-35 (second

alteration in original) (quoting Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 246

(2001)).

B. The Application of the Discovery Rule to Plaintiff's Tort Claim.

Plaintiff's complaint does not clearly identify a tort cause of action. At

oral argument before us, plaintiff's counsel stated plaintiff was asserting a claim

for tortious interference with a prospective economic gain. We hold plaintiff to

that representation because the TC Act requires a claimant to clearly identify the

specific tort it will pursue. N.J.S.A. 59:8-3(a) ("[N]o action shall be brought

against a public entity or public employee under this act[] unless the claim upon

which it is based shall have been presented in accordance" with the TC Act).4

To state a claim for tortious interference, a plaintiff must prove four facts:

(1) plaintiff had a protectable prospective economic relationship; (2) the

relationship was maliciously interfered with; (3) the interference caused the loss

of that prospective economic gain; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages. See

4

Read generously, plaintiff's complaint could also support claims of fraud and

conspiracy. Nevertheless, on the current record, plaintiff has not demonstrated

that a claim for fraud or conspiracy should be tolled under the discovery rule.

Consequently, if plaintiff seeks to pursue those claims, it will need to make a

motion and the trial court will need to conduct a hearing to determine whether

those claims, or any other asserted tort cause of action, were timely under the

TC Act.

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Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989);

Vosough v. Kierce, 437 N.J. Super. 218, 234 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting DiMaria

Const., Inc. v. Interarch, 351 N.J. Super. 558, 567 (App. Div. 2001), aff'd o.b.,

172 N.J. 182 (2002)).

Plaintiff contends that it had a protectable prospective economic gain

because it reasonably expected to be able to operate a medical marijuana

dispensary in the City. Plaintiff then contends that its prospective economic

gain was lost when the Mayor maliciously interfered with that right by not

advancing its application. Thus, plaintiff asserts that it suffered damages.

Concerning the discovery rule, plaintiff asserts that it only learned of the

Mayor's malicious action when, in May 2024, it heard of Pellegrini's allegations

that the Mayor had accepted a bribe to block plaintiff's application.

Given plaintiff's allegations, its injury occurred in January 2022.

Nevertheless, on the current record, plaintiff did not know until May 2024, that

the Mayor acted with the requisite malicious interference, which is a necessary

element to prove tortious interference. In other words, without knowledge of

the Mayor's malicious intent, plaintiff was not aware that it had a claim for

tortious interference. See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 122 (noting a cause of action

will not accrue "if a person does not know that he or she has been injured at

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all"); Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272 (explaining that even if plaintiff knows they have

been injured, there may be "no basis for an actionable claim," if they do not

know their injury is "attributable to the fault [] of another"). Consequently, on

the current record, we hold that plaintiff's tortious interference claim did not

accrue until May 2024. Thus, plaintiff filed a timely tort claim notice on May

17, 2024.

Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim is time-barred because, in January

2022, plaintiff knew of its injury and that the Mayor had blocked its application.

Defendants point out that there was no unknown third party. Defendants are

correct in pointing out that many of the existing cases discussing the discovery

rule involved discovery of an unknown third party. See Ben Elazar, 230 N.J. at

139-40 (tolling accrual when plaintiffs had no reason to believe that the

township owned the property where chemical storage tanks that caused their

injury were located); Gallagher v. Burdette-Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., 163 N.J. 38,

43-44 (2000) (tolling accrual until plaintiff learned her after-care physicians

were at fault during a deposition for a malpractice suit against her surgeon).

Nevertheless, the application of the discovery rule to the facts in this case is still

warranted. Although plaintiff knew in January 2022 that the Mayor did not issue

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a letter advancing its application, plaintiff did not know until May 2024 that the

Mayor allegedly took that action maliciously.

To accept defendants' position would encourage potential claimants to file

tort claim notices even if they had no basis to believe the governmental action

was illegal. See Martinez v. Cooper Hosp.-Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 58

(2000) (holding that plaintiff was not required, for the purpose of tolling, to

investigate for medical malpractice when there was no evidence of wrongdoing);

Big Smoke, LLC v. Township of W. Milford, 478 N.J. Super. 203, 217 (App.

Div. 2024) (explaining that municipal actions, including cannabis licensing

"enjoy a presumption of validity"). In other words, potential claimants would

file notices and then go on a fishing expedition to see if there had been wrongful

governmental action or inaction. It would not be consistent with the TC Act nor

good public policy to encourage notice of claims that do not have a good faith

basis. See Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 121-22 (quoting Fuller v. Rutgers, the State

Univ., 154 N.J. Super. 420, 426 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 610

(1978)) (noting that the purpose of the tort claim notice requirement is to allow

the public entity to settle "meritorious" claims prior to the beginning of a suit).

It is, however, consistent with the well-established discovery rule, to toll the

accrual of a cause of action until a plaintiff has a basis for an actionable claim.

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In summary, on the current record, we affirm the order deeming plaintiff's

notice under the TC Act timely. We point out, however, that defendants will

have the right to conduct discovery. If they learn of facts showing that plaintiff

knew, or should have known, before May 2024 that the Mayor acted improperly,

then defendants would have the right to move for a dismissal or for summary

judgment. We also point out that plaintiff's claim is limited to a tort action.

Plaintiff did not file a timely complaint in lieu of prerogative writs. So, plaintiff

cannot argue that the City or Mayor acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or

unreasonably in not granting their license.

Affirmed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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