BAILEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JESSICA B.,1

Plaintiff, No. 24cv10463 (EP)

v. OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

PADIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, who suffers from various physical impairments, appeals from the Social Security

Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to the Social

Security Act (the “Act”).2 D.E. 1. For the reasons below, the Court will GRANT the appeal,

VACATE the denial, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.3

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s DIB Application

Plaintiff filed a protective DIB application on August 3, 2021, alleging disability beginning

October 7, 2020 due to, among other things, post-COVID syndrome and morbid obesity. See R.

17.4 The SSA initially denied the application on December 1, 2021, and again upon

1 To protect the privacy interests of plaintiffs in social security cases, the Court adopts the

recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States to refer to plaintiffs in social

security cases by their first name and last initial. Veronica D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-1326,

2025 WL 2665313, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2025).

2 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.

3 The Court decides the appeal without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).

4 “R.” denotes the administrative record. D.E. 4.

reconsideration on June 7, 2022. Id. After Plaintiff requested a hearing, Administrative Law Judge

Ricardy Damille (herein, the “ALJ”) conducted a hearing on May 23, 2023 (herein, the “Hearing”).

Id. On December 21, 2023, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application. Id. 14.

B. The ALJ’s Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

To qualify for DIB, a claimant must show that she is disabled within the meaning of the

Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). Disability is the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than [twelve] months.” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A); see Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,

38-39 (3d Cir. 2001). The individual’s physical or mental impairment, furthermore, must be “of

such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). “‘[W]ork which exists in the national economy’

means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives

or in several regions of the country.” Id.

The Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a

plaintiff is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps

one through four, and the Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88,

92 (3d Cir. 2007)).

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not

disabled. This is not at issue here; the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful

activity during the period from her alleged onset date of October 7, 2020, through her date last

insured of September 30, 2023. R. 20.

At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or

combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability to

do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the plaintiff does not have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not

disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three. Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the

following severe impairments: post-COVID syndrome, asthma, obesity, anxiety, and autism. R.

20. Plaintiff’s post-COVID syndromes include headaches, shortness of breath, fatigue and

difficulty with concentration/slower processing. Id. 24. The ALJ noted that although Plaintiff was

using an albuterol inhaler as needed to treat her pulmonary symptoms, Plaintiff reported that she

continued to struggle with shortness of breath with exertion, energy, and fatigue. Id. A disability

determination service (“DDS”) found that Plaintiff had severe impairments involving the

respiratory system as well as chronic fatigue syndrome. Id. 26.

At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairments meet or equal the

severity of an impairment in the Listing of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so, the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the

impairment(s) has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.

Id. § 404.1509. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did

not, for any of the conditions identified in step two, have a physical impairment or combination of

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. R. 20-

22.

At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

and whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f),

416.920(e), (f). If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because the

plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step five. Here, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work, R. 29, and had the RFC to conduct:

[S]edentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a)

except she must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust,

gases and poor ventilation. She is restricted to a work setting with

a moderate noise level which is commensurate with an office type

setting. She cannot tolerate light brighter than that found in a work

environment such as an office or retail store. She is able to

understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. She is

restricted to work involving few workplace changes, occasional

decision making and free of fast-paced production. Fast pace is

defined as assembly line work. With respect to the essential

functions of the job, she can have occasional interaction with

supervisors, coworkers and the public.

Id. 22.

At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff—considering the plaintiff’s RFC,

age, education, and work experience—can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The step five determination is often accomplished

through vocational expert (“VE”) testimony. Maria B. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-20090, 2022 WL

17733680, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2022). VE testimony “typically includes, and often centers upon,

one or more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218

(3d Cir. 1984). The ALJ will ask the VE whether, given the claimant’s physical capability, the

claimant can perform certain types of jobs listed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

(“DOT”).5 Maria B., 2022 WL 17733680, at *2. If the ALJ determines that the plaintiff can

5 “The DOT is a ‘publication of the United States Department of Labor that contains descriptions

of the requirements for thousands of jobs that exist in the national economy;’ ALJs generally

perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy,6 then the plaintiff is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the

impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period

of at least twelve months. N.M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-1093, 2024 WL 1006288, at *2

(D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2024).

At the Hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to:

assume a person of the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff, who

could perform sedentary work, except she must avoid concentrated exposure to

fumes, odors, dust, gases and poor ventilation; is restricted to a work setting with a

moderate noise level which is commensurate with an office type setting; cannot

tolerate light brighter than that found in a work environment such as an office or

retail store; can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; is

restricted to work involving few work place changes, occasional decision making

and free of fast-paced production (defined as assembly line work); and can have

occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers and the public with respect to

the essential functions of the job.

D.E. 9 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”) at 3 (citing R. 57-60). Assuming the above limitations, the VE

testified that there were three jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy: (1)

semiconductor bonder7 (22,675 jobs); (2) table worker8 (8,766 jobs); and (3)

consult the DOT to determine whether any jobs exist that a claimant can perform.” Socha v. Saul,

No. 18-10307, 2021 WL 1422887, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2021) (quoting Burns v. Barnhart,

312 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2002)).

6 Both parties agree that SSR 24-3p, the new social security ruling that replaces SSR 00-4p, and

which, among other things, addresses how VEs should estimate job numbers, does not apply to

this action given the ALJ’s decision predates SSR 24-3p’s effective date. Br. at 6 n.1; Opp’n at 7

n.2.

7 DOT 726.685-066, 1991 WL 679631.

8 DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217.

telephone/switchboard operator (58,117 jobs).9 R. 59-60; see also id. 30. Accordingly, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. 30-31.

C. Plaintiff’s Appeal

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the SSA Appeals Council, which denied review on

September 26, 2024. Id. 1-6. On November 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed this appeal. D.E. 1. Plaintiff’s

brief followed. D.E. 7 (“Brief” or “Br.”). The Brief presents one issue for the Court: whether

there are unresolved conflicts between the VE testimony and the DOT regarding the two unskilled

sedentary jobs (table worker and semiconductor bonder) that the ALJ found that Plaintiff could

perform. Id. at 1. Defendant, the SSA Commissioner, opposes. Opp’n. Plaintiff replies. D.E. 10

(“Reply”).

9 DOT 235.662-022, 1991 WL 672175. The ALJ did not mention this job in his Opinion. See R.

30-31. Although the ALJ does not state it explicitly, based on the VE’s testimony, the Court infers

that the ALJ likely concluded that the job of telephone switchboard operator no longer exists in

significant numbers in the national economy. Either way, the Commissioner meets its step five

burden when the ALJ identifies at least one occupation with a significant number of jobs in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. See Wilkinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 558 F.

App’x. 254, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b)). Accordingly, the

Court limits its inquiry to the jobs the ALJ—and not the VE—identified, and will not consider this

job, as Defendant implicitly asks the Court to do. See Opp’n at 4 n.1 & 15 n.5

Because SSR 24-3p does not apply to this matter, the DOT’s outdated database was the likely

source for the occupational data provided by the VE (the VE did not explicitly state the source of

his data, nor did he testify as to his methodology of estimating the number of jobs that exist in the

national economy for these jobs). And although the SSA now recognizes the DOT is not the only

reliable source of occupational data for claims brought after SSR 24-3p’s effective date, the Court

must still note that in actions like this one, the DOT can be a problematic source of occupational

data, especially for many of the jobs that have been rendered obsolete since 1977. See Fernando

P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-5578, 2023 WL 6121332, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2023); Lisa

Rein, Social Security denies disability benefits based on list with jobs from 1977, Washington Post,

Dec. 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/27/social-security-job-titles-

disabled-applicants-obsolete/ (“But after spending at least $250 million since 2012 to build a

directory of 21st century jobs, an internal fact sheet shows, Social Security is not using it, leaving

antiquated vocational rules in place to determine whether disabled claimants win or lose.”); see

also Cunningham v. Astrue, 360 F. App’x 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the Commissioner

where the two DOT job categories relied on appeared to be obsolete).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Judicial review of an SSA determination is based upon the pleadings and the transcript of

the record. The scope of that review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s findings of fact. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings . . . as to any fact, if

supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181

F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (district court has plenary review of all legal issues and reviews the

ALJ’s findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence).

“Substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427

(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)). However, a “single

piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the [Commissioner] ignores, or fails to

resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d

Cir. 2000) (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)).

If faced with conflicting evidence in the Record, the Commissioner “must adequately

explain . . . his reason for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.” Kirby v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 16-5159, 2017 WL 4330361, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017) (citations omitted). The Court

must determine “whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to enable

judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for his decision.” Dunster v. Dudek,

No. 24-469, 2025 WL 622333, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2025) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000)). An ALJ’s findings must “be accompanied by a clear and

satisfactory explication of the basis on which [they] rest[].” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704

(3d Cir. 1981). Decisions with conclusory findings or which indicate the ALJ failed to consider

all the evidence are not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 705-06. And the Court must

also ensure the ALJ did not “reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Id. at 706

(citing King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980)).

III. REVIEW OF ALJ’S OPINION

Although the Commissioner bears the burden at step five of demonstrating that the claimant

can perform jobs existing in the national economy, see Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d

Cir. 2014), this burden is satisfied if the ALJ identifies at least one occupation with a significant

number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Wilkinson, 558 F.

App’x. at 256 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(b), 416.966(b)).

Here, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination that she could work as either a

semiconductor bonder and/or table worker given inconsistencies and internal conflicts between the

VE’s testimony, the DOT, and the ALJ’s findings. Br. at 4-12.

As noted above, “ALJs rely primarily on the DOT and VEs for information about

requirements of work in the national economy.” Beers v. Colvin, No. 12-2129, 2014 WL 241514,

at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2014) (citing SSR 00-4p). Nevertheless, an ALJ may not allow

inconsistencies between a plaintiff’s actual skills, VE testimony, and the criteria set forth in the

DOT to go unaddressed and unresolved. Sanchez v. Dudek, No. 24-240, 2025 WL 924046, at *7

(M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2025) (citing Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 617 (3d Cir. 2014)). SSR 00-

4p provides that a “VE’s testimony and evidence regarding occupational information should be

consistent with the occupational information contained in the DOT.” Knight v. Colvin, No. 16-

1816, 2018 WL 1400077, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2018). When there is an apparent unresolved

conflict between the DOT and VE testimony, “the ALJ is required to elicit a reasonable explanation

for the conflict before relying on the VE’s evidence. If the ALJ finds the VE’s explanation for the

conflict to be reasonable and provides a basis for doing so, the ALJ can rely on the VE’s

testimony.” Id. (citing SSR 00-4p at *2-4).

As explained in more depth below, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to identify or explain

conflicts between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, and therefore, will GRANT Plaintiff’s appeal.

A. Table Worker

The VE testified—and the ALJ subsequently concluded—that Plaintiff could work as a

table worker. R. 30-31, 60. As defined in the DOT, the table worker job involves “[e]xamin[ing]

squares (tiles) of felt-based linoleum material passing along on conveyor and replac[ing] missing

and substandard tiles.” 1991 WL 680217. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that she could

work as a table worker “presents an inconsistency between the ALJ’s fashioned RFC and the DOT

that neither the VE nor ALJ resolved” given she is restricted from performing fast-paced

production work, including assembly line work. Br. at 7. The Court agrees.

As many courts in this Circuit have found, jobs like table worker—which require an

individual to perform tasks along a conveyor belt—are clearly assembly line work. See, e.g.,

Abigail L. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-2275, 2022 WL 16362468, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2022)

(“[C]onveyor belt work conflicts with Plaintiff’s restriction from tandem work on an assembly

line.”) (citing Laura K. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2215, 2021 WL 4391123, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2021)

(“Th[e] task of looking at items on a conveyor belt and removing specific items conflicts with an

RFC precluding fast paced, assembly line work.”) (citation modified)); see also Reed v. Saul, No.

19-1826, 2021 WL 3121484, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,

2021 WL 3115190 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2021) (where both the Court and the ALJ referred to

production rate pace as assembly-line work); Maxwell v. Kijakazi, No. 22-4465, 2023 WL

3674335, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2023) (same).10

At the Hearing, the ALJ explicitly told the VE that assembly line work was not permitted.

R. 56-57.11 Therefore, “the testimony of the VE that an individual who could not perform

production rate pace positions could perform . . . assembly line positions was inconsistent with the

DOT.” Sanchez, 2025 WL 924046, at *10. “If there is an apparent conflict between VE testimony

and DOT information, the ALJ must receive a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy.” Beers,

2014 WL 241514, at *8 (citations omitted). Here, despite being required to do so, the ALJ failed

to identify this inconsistency, address the inconsistency with the VE, or resolve it in his decision.

Sanchez, 2025 WL 924046, at *10. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there is not substantial

evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could work as a table worker. See Cotter, 642

F.2d at 705-06.

10 In a footnote, Defendant cites to several cases that support its contention that there is no apparent

conflict between the RFC and the table worker position based on the presence of a conveyor belt

in the job description. Opp’n at 8 (citations omitted).

The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments for two reasons. First, because Defendant

exclusively relies on out-of-circuit district court cases, which, as Defendant notes later in the

Opposition in a different context, have no binding effect on this Court. See Opp’n 9-10. Instead

of relying on these out-of-circuit cases, this Court will follow the several in-circuit district court

cases that have consistently found a conflict where a plaintiff is restricted from assembly line work

yet is determined to be able to work in a job that includes a conveyor belt. Second, unlike in other

cases where the Court has been required to make the logical jump between fast-paced production

work and work on a conveyor belt, see e.g., Sanchez, 2025 WL 924046, at *10, here, the ALJ

explicitly excluded assembly line work, see R. 56-57. Thus, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that

“Defendant’s argument regarding the table worker job fails because the ALJ specifically precluded

work involving assembly lines.” Reply at 2.

11 Specifically, the ALJ stated in his hypothetical to the VE that the work environment must be

“free of fast-paced production. Fast pace here is defined as assembly line work, so no assembly

line work.” R. 57.

B. Semiconductor Bonder

As Defendant notes, even if the Court finds an inconsistency with respect to the table

worker position, Plaintiff cannot prevail so long as the ALJ identifies at least one occupation with

a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. Opp’n at 7-9; see

also Sayers v. Kijakazi, No. 22-117, 2023 WL 5672742, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2023).

Plaintiff raises several challenges to the ALJ’s finding that she can work as a

semiconductor bonder. One involves the apparent failure of the ALJ to identify or address a

discrepancy in the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could work as a semiconductor bonder despite the

fact Plaintiff “cannot tolerate light brighter than that found in a work environment such as in an

office or a retail store.” R. 58; Br. at 9-11.

The semiconductor bonder job involves the following:

Tends automatic bonding machine that bonds gold or aluminum wire to integrated

circuit dies to connect circuitry to package leads: Reviews schematic diagram or

work order to determine bonding specifications. Turns dials to set bonding machine

temperature controls and to regulate wire feeding mechanism. Mounts spool of wire

onto holder and inserts wire end through guides, using tweezers. Positions

semiconductor package into magazine of automatic feed mechanism, and observes

package, using microscope or equipment display screen, to ensure connections to

be bonded are aligned with bonding wire. Adjusts alignment as necessary. Activates

machine that automatically bonds wire to specified connections on semiconductor

package leads. Removes packages from bonding machine and places packages in

work tray. May test tensile strength of bonded connections, using testing

equipment. May locate connections and bond wire to connect circuitry of hybrid

circuits, using precision-bonding machine.

DOT 726.685-066, 1991 WL 679631.

The DOT is silent as to the lighting conditions for the semiconductor bonder job. See id.

At the Hearing, the VE testified that the form perception in this job is limited. R. 60.

The DOT’s silence on an issue does not automatically create a conflict. See Feeley v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-1311, 2021 WL 4473152, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2021). Nevertheless,

Plaintiff maintains that the VE’s response regarding form perception was “unresponsive/off-topic”

to the question asked by the ALJ regarding her lighting limitation because form perception is

distinct from whether the job involves bright lights, the latter of which is at issue due to Plaintiff’s

migraines. Br. 10-11. Thus, she argues, there exists a conflict between the hypothetical posed by

the ALJ and the VE’s testimony.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. As Plaintiff explains, form perception “relates to the ability

to perceive pertinent detail in objects or in pictorial or graphic material.” Reply at 7; see also

Podedworny, 745 F.2d at 219 (describing form perception as a skill/aptitude); Tackett v. Heckler,

No. 82-366, 1983 WL 44231, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 1983) (grouping form perception in a list

of transferable vocational skills including eye-hand coordination, manual and finger dexterity, and

spatial ability). The VE’s testimony that the semiconductor bonder job has low form perception

speaks to whether the job requires a certain skill, not whether the role would expose Plaintiff to

bright lights, nor, in turn, whether an individual with a lighting limitation like Plaintiff’s can

perform the role. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff can

perform the semiconductor bonding job was incomplete, and the ALJ’s reliance on this testimony

was improper. Moreover, the ALJ failed to identify this error or correct it in his decision.

In response to Plaintiff’s argument, Defendant avers that Plaintiff is impermissibly

attempting to supplant her lay testimony for the VE’s testimony at the Hearing. Opp’n at 14-15

n.4 (citations omitted). The Court disagrees with Defendant’s characterization of Plaintiff’s

argument. Plaintiff is not, for instance, claiming that the VE’s testimony that the semiconductor

bonder job requires low form perception is incorrect, or that Plaintiff has a different aptitude for

form perception than was otherwise determined by the ALJ; instead, Plaintiff is asserting that the

VE’s testimony that someone who has limited form perception can perform the semiconductor

bonding job does not address the pertinent questions of whether someone working in the role

would be exposed to bright lights and whether this job runs afoul of the lighting limitation posed

by the ALJ in his hypothetical questions at the Hearing.12 As noted above, the Court agrees with

Plaintiff that the VE’s testimony does not squarely address the hypothetical lighting limitation

posed by the ALJ. The VE also failed to explain why the fact the role requires low form perception

means that Plaintiff would not be subjected to bright lights on the job.

Given the Court’s findings that (1) the VE’s testimony regarding form perception fails to

address whether the semiconductor bonder position can be performed by someone with Plaintiff’s

lighting limitation and (2) the ALJ failed to identify or explain this discrepancy, the Court has no

choice but to conclude that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff can work as a semiconductor

bonder is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s

appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s appeal will be GRANTED, the ALJ’s denial of benefits

will be VACATED, and the matter will be REMANDED to the SSA for further proceedings

consistent with this Opinion. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: December 28, 2025

/s/ Evelyn Padin

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

12 Although Plaintiff has not improperly speculated with respect to her form perception argument,

the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has improperly cited to YouTube videos to

demonstrate that the semiconductor bonder position requires exposure to bright lights. Opp’n at

14 (noting that the SSA can take administrative notice of job data from certain government

publications and can use vocational experts or specialists) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(d), (e),

416.966(d), (e)).