Blevins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-23481-BLOOM/Elfenbein

LATANYA BLEVINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant’s (“Equifax”) Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (“Motion”), ECF No. [13]. The Plaintiff (“Blevins”) filed a Response in Opposition

(“Response”), ECF No. [14]. Equifax filed a Reply in Support (“Reply”), ECF No. [17]. The Court

has reviewed the Motions, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is otherwise

fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Equifax’s Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On or about April 17, 2025, Blevins requested a copy of her credit report from Equifax. ECF

No. [1-1] ¶ 8. Equifax provided an electronic copy of Blevins’ Consumer Credit Disclosure (“the

Disclosure”). Id. ¶ 10. The Disclosure “reported two accounts in [Blevins’] consumer file

categorized as ‘other’”. Id. ¶ 12. Accounts labeled as “other” are accounts not categorized as

“Revolving, Mortgage, or Installment accounts.” Id. ¶ 13. The “other” accounts were reported by

LVNV Funding, LLC xx2930 (“LVNV”). Id. ¶ 14. LVNV is a debt buyer and does not originate

credit lines or loans. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. Despite this, “Equifax disclosed to [Blevins] that LVNV were

the original creditor of the account.” Id. ¶ 17. Moreover, “Equifax omitted full account numbers

for the LVNV tradeline” and an additional nineteen Revolving and Installment accounts. Id. ¶¶ 20,

26.

In her Complaint, Blevins alleges Equifax violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) of the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (“FCRA”) for “failing to clearly and accurately disclose to [Blevins]. . . all of the

information in her file at the time of the request.” Id. ¶ 48. Equifax moves for judgment on the

pleadings and to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing Blevins failed to plead

any facts that show the accounts were inaccurate. ECF No. [13] at 2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

“After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for

judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A party may move for judgment on the pleadings

if there are no material facts in dispute. See Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404

F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir.

2002). In rendering judgment, a court may consider the substance of the pleadings and any

judicially noticed facts. Termilus v. Marksman Sec. Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20356 (S.D.

Fla. Feb. 19, 2016) (citing Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir.

1998)).

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss.” Guarino v. Wyeth LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2011). As such,

a complaint must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a

complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “To survive a motion to dismiss

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I – Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

Under the FCRA, “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, upon request. . . clearly and

accurately disclose to the consumer. . . [a]ll information in the consumer's file at the time of the

request.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). “The term ‘file’, when used in connection with information on

any consumer, means all the information on that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer

reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored.” Id. § 1681a(g).

First, Equifax argues that Blevins fails to show an inaccuracy in reporting as is required to

proceed under §§ 1681e(b) or 1681i of the FCRA. ECF No. [13] at 3-4. Blevins responds that she

is not required to plead an inaccuracy under §§ 1681e(b) or 1681i to state a claim for relief under

§ 1681g(a)(1). ECF No. [14] at 4. The Court agrees with Blevins. § 1681g(a)(1) of the FCRA does

not require a plaintiff to show an inaccuracy in reporting to establish a violation of the disclosure

provision itself. Rather, § 1681g(a)(1) imposes a duty on consumer reporting agencies to disclose

information in a consumer's file upon request, and this obligation is distinct from claims alleging

inaccurate reporting under other FCRA provisions.

Second, Equifax argues Blevins’ claims do not involve information bearing on her credit

worthiness and are therefore unactionable under § 1681g. ECF No. [13] at 5. Equifax avers that

“file” for purposes of § 1681g refers to information in a consumer report. Id. Moreover, that the

FRCA defines a consumer report to mean “any written, oral, or other communication of any

information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness…which is

used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor

in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for credit.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(A)).

Equifax contends that Blevins’ assertions of missing account numbers and missing original

creditor information have no bearing on her credit worthiness and thus, even if Blevins’ factual

allegations are true, Blevins does not state a claim for which relief can be granted under §

1681g(a)(1). Id. at 7.

Blevins responds that Equifax misconstrues the purpose of the FRCA and the scope of “file”

under § 1681g. ECF No. [14] at 6. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “to conflate the

meaning of ‘consumer report’ with ‘file’ would make the terms redundant.” Nunnally v. Equifax

Info. Servs., LLC, 451 F.3d 768, 773 (11th Cir. 2006). The definition of “consumer report” under

§ 1681a(d)(1)(A) and the definition of “file” under § 1681a(g) are different.

Nonetheless, Equifax points to Gillespie v. Trans Union Corp., which held that “file” meant

“information included in a consumer report”. 482 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007). The court

reasoned that a broader reading of “file” would render subsequent paragraphs in the statute listing

other types of information that had to be revealed superfluous. Id. Moreover, that Federal Trade

Commission commentary limited the scope of the term to material included in a consumer report,

and legislative history indicated an intent to ensure that consumers received a copy of their

consumer report, but not a copy of their entire file. Id. Ultimately, the Gillespie court upheld

summary judgment in favor of the credit reporting agency determining that internal dates under

which information will be removed from a credit report are not included in a consumer report. Id.

Under the same analytical structure, the Third Circuit held that an OFAC alert was far more than

a “mere internal record-keeping mechanism” and denied the credit reporting agency’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law. Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 712 (3d Cir. 2010)

(holding that an OFAC alert is part of a consumer’s file as defined in the FCRA).

Here, unlike in Gillespie, the omitted information reaches beyond internal record keeping. The

alleged omissions include full account numbers and original creditor names. “One primary purpose

of the disclosure requirements in [§] 1681g is ‘to allow consumers to identify inaccurate

information in their credit files and correct this information via the grievance procedure established

under [§] 1681i.’” Brown v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-0168-CAM-LTW, 2010 WL

11647403, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2010) (quoting Gillespie, 484 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2007)).

The alleged omissions hinder Blevins’ ability to verify the accounts and dispute potential

inaccuracies. Moreover, as Blevins points out, “knowing the original creditor is essential to

understanding the origin of a debt” and “full account numbers enable consumers to cross reference

their records.” ECF No. [14] at 8. The Court finds full account numbers and original creditor names

to be within the scope of the term “file” under § 1681g of the FCRA.

Though Equifax argues such omissions have no bearing on Blevins’ credit worthiness, the

plain language of § 1681g establishes an obligation to disclose all information in the consumer’s

file without any exception based on credit worthiness. No doubt because the disclosure

requirements, “are designed to protect consumers’ interests in learning of any inaccuracies in their

credit files so that they can promptly correct the files before they are disseminated to third parties.”

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 440, (2021). Equifax cites no case law to support a

requirement under § 1681g that omitted information must have bearing on credit worthiness.

Finally, Equifax argues there is no federal cause of action for non-compliance with Metro-II

guidelines or the Credit Reporting Resource Guide Standards, and as such, Blevins’ claim should

be dismissed. ECF No. [13] at 9. Blevins responds that the Complaint only cites the Metro II and

Credit Reporting Resource Guide Standards “to support the factual allegation that LVNV likely

reported the original creditor’s name, consistent with industry standards.” ECF No. [14] at 9.

Case No. 25-cv-23481-BLOOM/Elfenbein

Beyond the context and factual support, Blevins maintains the source of her claim is grounded in

Equifax’s obligation under § 1681g. Jd. The Court agrees with Blevins. Here, Blevins sufficiently

alleges under § 1681g that she (1) requested a copy of her credit report from Equifax, ECF No. [1-

1] § 8, and (2) Equifax failed to provide a clear and accurate disclosure of all the information in

her file. /d. § 48.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings, ECF No. [13], is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 29, 2025.

BETHBLOOM =——<“i—i‘“CSO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record