The opinion
J-S40025-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NATANIHEL SANMARTIN :
:
Appellant : No. 374 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0001583-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2025
Natanihel Sanmartin appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
on February 3, 2025, for his convictions of third-degree murder, endangering
the welfare of children, and two counts of recklessly endangering another
person.1 Sanmartin challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history:
In the early morning hours of February 12, 2023, police responded
to 42 Darling Street in Wilkes-Barre City, for a report that a female
had been shot inside a residence. Upon entering the residence,
officers observed a bleeding and unresponsive female, later
identified as Carla Pina, laying on a couch in the living area.
Emergency services were provided but Ms. Pina did not survive
her injuries.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 4304(a)(1), and 2705, respectively.
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Natanihel Sanmartin … was also present at the Darling Street
residence when police arrived. He was quickly identified as a
suspect in the shooting and was placed into custody. Witnesses
inside the 42 Darling Street residence at the time of the homicide
reported to investigators, and later testified at trial, that Ms. Pina
was [Sanmartin’s] girlfriend. Prior to the killing, Ms. Pina was out
at a local casino where it was reported she won money. When she
returned to the Darling Street residence, she and two other friends
were drinking alcohol with [Sanmartin]. [Sanmartin] quickly drank
a quantity of liquor and, apparently believing that he was insulted
by Ms. Pina, his demeanor soured. He slammed a liquor bottle on
the table and retreated to a bedroom inside the residence. Ms.
Pina and the other witnesses heard a gunshot ring out from the
bedroom. Knowing that a three (3) year old child was sleeping in
the bedroom from where the report of the gun emanated, Ms. Pina
went into the bedroom. Soon after, the witnesses reported
hearing the report of a second gunshot.
[Sanmartin] exited the bedroom with gun in hand. He pointed the
firearm at two of the hysterical witnesses before being persuaded
to set it aside. After he set the gun down, Melba Gonzalez
concealed it from him by placing it in a laundry basket.
[Sanmartin] then dragged Ms. Pina’s body out of the bedroom and
placed her on the couch. The pair were in a romantic relationship
which had become increasingly contentious in recent weeks.
[Sanmartin] testified that he was angry with Ms. Pina but that the
killing was not intentional.
On October 7, 2024, [Sanmartin’s] case proceeded to trial.
Following three (3) days of testimony and argument, the jury
found [Sanmartin] guilty of murder in the third degree,
endangering the welfare of children, and two (2) counts of
recklessly endangering another person. Thereafter, [Sanmartin]
appeared before the court for sentencing on February 3, 2025.
Prior to that sentencing hearing the court reviewed the pre-
sentence investigation, letters in support of [Sanmartin] and a
sentencing mitigation report submitted by [Sanmartin’s] counsel.
For his conviction for third-degree murder, [the court] sentenced
[Sanmartin] to a term of incarceration for not less than 240
months nor more than 480 months. He received consecutive
sentences within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines
for his convictions for recklessly endangering another person and
endangering the welfare of a child.[a]
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[a]Deadly weapon used sentencing enhancement
pursuant to 204 Pa. Code § 303.10 applied to each of
[Sanmartin’s] convictions.
[Sanmartin] timely filed a counseled post-sentence motion and
notice of appeal.[b] Thereafter, [the court] directed [Sanmartin’s]
counsel to file a concise statement of matters complained of on
appeal by order dated March 20, 2025. On April 3, 2025,
[Sanmartin] filed his counseled concise statement which alleged
that the court erred or abused its discretion by imposing a
sentence at the high end of the sentencing guidelines by imposing
a standard range sentence of 240 to 480 months for his conviction
for third degree murder.
[b] [Sanmartin’s] counseled post-sentence motion filed
February 5, 2025 was denied by order dated March
13, 2025.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/25, at 1-4 (unnecessary capitalization and record
citations omitted). The trial court authored its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June
26, 2025. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Sanmartin raises one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion or made an error of
law in imposing a high end standard range sentence of 240-480
months for murder of the third degree without considering
mitigating factors[?]
Appellant’s Brief, at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
As Sanmartin’s only claim is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
his sentence, he is not entitled to an appeal as of right and must invoke our
jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Dortch, 343 A.3d 298, 310 (Pa. Super.
2025).
Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, as is the case here, the right to appellate review is not
absolute. On the contrary, an appellant challenging the
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discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s
jurisdiction by satisfying the following four-part test:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether appellant’s
brief includes a concise statement of the reasons
relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether
the concise statement raises a substantial question
that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing
code.
Id. (citations omitted).
Sanmartin filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, preserved his
claim in a post-sentence motion, and included a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to our rules. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We therefore turn to the question of whether the concise
statement raises a substantial question.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question
exists only when appellant advances a colorable argument that
the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with
a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the
fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.
This Court has recognized that excessiveness claims premised on
imposition of consecutive sentences do not raise a substantial
question for our review. Likewise, a claim of inadequate
consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial
question for our review.
Dortch, 343 A.3d at 310 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Further, “we cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented
and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial
questions exists.” Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa.
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Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “A Rule 2119(f) statement that simply
contains incantations of statutory provisions and pronouncements of
conclusions of law is inadequate.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516,
529 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Sanmartin’s entire Rule 2119(f) statement is set forth verbatim:
The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in issuing a sentence in
the upper level of the standard range without considering
mitigating factors which qualifies as a substantial question
regarding discretionary review. See Commonwealth v.
Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763 (Pa. Super. 2015) [(en banc)][;] 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Here, the 240-480 month
sentence is at the high end of the standard range (90 to 240
months) as set forth in the sentencing guidelines. [Sanmartin]
argues that the [t]rial [c]ourt failed to consider the mitigating
factors as testified to at the sentencing hearing.
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
The Commonwealth asserts this statement is insufficient and does not
establish a substantial question. See Appellee’s Brief, at 9-10. We agree.
Sanmartin’s Rule 2119(f) statement contains mere conclusions of law and is
therefore insufficient to establish a substantial question.
Furthermore, Sanmartin’s reliance on Caldwell is misplaced. In
Caldwell, this Court evaluated prior case law and noted that “prior decisions
from this Court involving whether a substantial question has been raised by
claims that the sentencing court failed to consider or failed to adequately
consider sentencing factors has been less than a model of clarity and
consistency.” Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 769-70 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). This Court further noted that “[a] court’s exercise of
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discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively does not
ordinarily raise a substantial question[;]” “ordinarily a claim a sentencing court
failed to consider or accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does
not raise a substantial question[;]” and “this Court has held on numerous
occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does
not raise a substantial question for our review.” Id. at 769. (emphasis,
citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, because the
appellant in Caldwell argued his consecutive sentences were unduly
excessive and the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs, this Court
found those two claims in conjunction created a substantial question for our
review. See id. at 770.
Here, Sanmartin solely asserts the trial court failed to consider
mitigating factors. As such, we find he has not raised a substantial question
for our review.
Even if we were to find a substantial question, Sanmartin’s claim is
meritless. Sanmartin argues the trial court failed to consider his acceptance
of responsibility, training and programing completed while in prison awaiting
trial, and his lack of a prior criminal record. See Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8.
Our standard of review regarding a claim challenging the discretionary
aspects of sentencing is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Appellant must establish,
by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
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misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
unreasonable decision.
Dortch, 343 A.3d at 310 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
We are further guided by the statutory mandate of subsection
9781(c)(2), as Sanmartin was sentenced within the guideline ranges.
Subsection 9781(c)(2) provides this Court “shall vacate the sentence and
remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds … (2) the
sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case
involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be
clearly unreasonable[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2).
In determining whether the sentence is clearly unreasonable, we also
consider: “(1) [t]he nature and circumstance of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant[;] (2)[t]he opportunity of the sentencing
court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation [PSI;]
(3)[t]he findings upon which the sentence was based[; and] (4)[t]he
guidelines promulgated by the commission.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). Finally,
we “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors” because the court here had the benefit of a
PSI. Dortch, 343 A.3d at 311 (citation omitted).
The trial court detailed its reason for the sentence imposed after hearing
from counsel and Sanmartin:
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All right. The [c]ourt, again, having presided over this matter, all
proceedings, including the trial and being familiar with the facts
and circumstances of it, having reviewed, as I indicated earlier,
the presentence report and the sentencing memorandum on
behalf of the [d]efendant, as well as other submissions and
everything that has been offered here today, I do note the serious
nature of the offense. Obviously a life is lost and can never be
brought back due to the [d]efendant’s actions.
I do note he does have a lack of a criminal history or any type of
serious criminal record and a prior record score of zero, however,
the offense [for] which he’s about to be sentenced is very serious.
It displays the senseless use of drugs and alcohol and what all of
that can lead to and the devastating choices that this [d]efendant
has made, the impact of this matter on the community and on the
victims is great. The victim’s family will no longer have Ms. P[i]na
to cherish anymore.
I think the big question, as some of the victim’s family members
have asked is why? There doesn’t seem to be any real good reason
why someone should be killed in a manner in which this victim
was killed. The [c]ourt must consider the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense and its impact on the community and
the victims, as well as the rehabilitative needs of the [d]efendant.
I do note that it appears from the sentencing memorandum and
report provided that the [d]efendant has begun to undertake
rehabilitative steps. The chaplain has written on his behalf. The
records reflect he’s taken numerous courses to try to better
himself, which is good that he is on that path. However, that does
not undo the harm that was perpetrated on this night.
The [c]ourt feels that in order to not diminish the serious nature
of the offense to hold the [d]efendant accountable and give him a
lengthy period of time in a structured setting to try to rehabilitate
himself, sentences within the standard range of the applicable
guidelines [are] appropriate[.]
***
The [c]ourt takes note, again, one of the victim[]s in this matter
was a very young child and there were two other victims involved
and fortunately the outcome wasn’t worse for those other three
victims as it was for Carla P[i]na, but the [d]efendant in this
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matter showed extreme indifference to human life by his actions
and must be held accountable.
Sentencing, 2/3/25, at 15-18.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion to this Court, the trial court further explained
the reasons for its sentence:
[The court] did consider the mitigation report provided by the
defense along with the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). …
[The court] did consider the factors which [Sanmartin] cites as
justification for a shorter sentence, but [the court] did not agree
with [Sanmartin] that this evidence justified a less lengthy
sentence of incarceration.
[The court] imposed a standard range sentence of 240 to 480
months of incarceration only after considering the mitigating
factors presented by [Sanmartin] and his counsel. [The court]
imposed a sentence at the top of the standard range because [the
court was] certain that such a sentence was necessary to protect
the public. Murder is a grave offense, and few, if any, offenses in
the crimes code have as great an impact on the victim and their
family.
Moreover, [the court] determined that [Sanmartin’s] sentence
was necessary to provide adequate time to reform him. [The court
was] not unmoved by the efforts at rehabilitation that [Sanmartin
has] made since his incarceration. The mitigation report prepared
by Dr. Deborah Belknap for the defense and the PSI both made it
clear that [Sanmartin] showed remorse for what he had done but
those same reports also demonstrate[d] that [Sanmartin] is a
deeply troubled person who will have to continue his efforts
towards reform for a lengthy period of time in a structured setting.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/25, at 6-8.
The court thoughtfully detailed its reasons for the sentence it imposed
and we cannot find any abuse of its discretion. Sanmartin’s claim the court
failed to give due weight to the factors is insufficient for this Court to question
the validity of the sentence imposed. It is clear from our review the trial court
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took appropriate consideration of all required factors and imposed a fitting
sentence for the murder of Ms. Pina. As such, we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/2025
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