B. Torrence v. PPB

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bradley Torrence, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1139 C.D. 2024

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, : Submitted: November 6, 2025

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: December 26, 2025

Bradley Torrence (Petitioner), by counsel, petitions for review of the

Pennsylvania Parole Board’s (Board) September 30, 2010 (mailed October 12, 2010)

determination recommitting Petitioner as a convicted parole violator (CPV).1

1

Petitioner’s brief and his Petition for Review are unclear regarding which of the Board’s

decisions he seeks to appeal. His Petition for Review states:

This petition respectfully seeks a declaratory judgment with regard to the legality

of the decision in 2010 to rescind the previous grant of credit for time spent at

liberty on parole. This petition also respectfully seeks an order compelling the

Board of Probation and Parole to comply with Young [v. Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole, 225 A.2d 810 (Pa. 2020)] and reinstate its previous order

granting credit for time spent at liberty on parole.

(Petition for Review (PFR), ¶¶ 25, 26.) However, Petitioner’s Brief is entitled “Petitioner Bradley

Torrence’s Brief and Reproduced Record in Support of his Appeal from the September 21, 2023

(Footnote continued on next page…)

1

Petitioner argues that the Board’s September 30, 2010 decision unlawfully rescinded

previously awarded credit for time he spent at liberty on parole. After careful

review, we dismiss the Petition for Review and affirm the Board’s September 30,

2010 decision.

Procedural History

This case comes to us by way of transfer of a Petition for Review filed

in our original jurisdiction on October 20, 2023. In response, the Board filed

preliminary objections, which included an objection to this Court’s jurisdiction over

the Petition. We sustained the Board’s preliminary objection, directed that the

matter be transferred to our appellate jurisdiction, and further directed that

Petitioner’s filing date be preserved. See Torrence v. Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 481 M.D. 2023, filed Sept. 3, 2024).

On December 10, 1991, Petitioner was sentenced to a maximum of 20

years of incarceration after previously being found guilty of third-degree murder and

possession of an instrument of a crime. Petitioner was subsequently paroled on

January 25, 1996, with a maximum sentence date of June 28, 2009. (Certified

Record (C.R.) at 7.)

On January 22, 2004, the Department of Corrections issued a warrant

to commit and detain Petitioner after he was arrested by Philadelphia police for

criminal charges that were later dismissed. (C.R. at 92-94.) He was also charged

with violating his parole by leaving the district without prior written permission.

Decision of the [Board] Denying His Request for Administrative Relief.” (Petitioner’s Brief (Br.)

at 1.) In the portion of his brief addressing the merits of his appeal, Petitioner fails to mention the

Board’s September 21, 2023 decision and does not argue that it was incorrectly decided.

Moreover, his statement of the Questions Involved in this appeal mentions only one issue, the

legality of the Board’s 2010 decision. (Petitioner’s Br. at 6.) However, because of the

aforementioned confusion, we address the correctness of the Board’s September 21, 2023 decision,

as well as the correctness of the Board’s 2010 decision.

2

(C.R. at 10-11.) By decision dated February 20, 2004 (mailed on February 26,

2004), the Board ordered Petitioner to be detained pending disposition of the

criminal charges and that he be recommitted to a state correctional institution as a

technical parole violator (TPV), when available, to serve nine months for the parole

violation. (C.R. at 11.) In a Board decision dated April 28, 2004 (mailed on May 7,

2004), Petitioner’s parole violation maximum date was listed as June 28, 2009.

(C.R. at 13- 14.) On January 9, 2005, the Board reparoled Petitioner. (C.R. at 15-

20.) At the time of his reparole, Petitioner was advised that if he were convicted of

a crime while on parole/reparole, the Board could recommit him to serve the balance

of the time he was serving when paroled with no credit for time at liberty on parole.

(C.R. at 19-20.)

On April 6, 2006, the Board ordered Petitioner to again be detained

pending criminal charges after he was arrested for drug offenses and money

laundering. (C.R. at 23, 31.) After waiving his right to counsel and to a revocation

hearing, he pled guilty to federal drug and money laundering charges in the United

States District Court for the District of Delaware on December 1, 2010, and was

ultimately sentenced to 72 months of imprisonment. (C.R. at 24, 64, 69.) Petitioner

remained in federal custody from May 23, 2006, until July 7, 2010. (C.R. at 44.)

After Petitioner was returned to state custody, the Board, in a decision

dated September 30, 2010 (mailed on October 12, 2010), recommitted Petitioner to

a state correctional institution as a TPV (to serve six months) and as a CPV (to serve

12 months) concurrently for a total of 12 months’ backtime. (C.R. at 72.) The

Board’s decision listed his “parole violation maximum date” as December 8, 2022.

(C.R. at 72-73.) It also stated that the time from May 2, 2006 to July 7, 2010 was

factored as time being served in the federal system. (C.R. at 75.)

On June 15, 2011, the Board paroled Petitioner to his federal detainer

sentence. (C.R. at 79.) On September 27, 2022, Petitioner was sentenced to 120

3

months of incarceration for additional federal drug and other offenses he committed

while at liberty on parole. (C.R. at 84-91.) On June 16, 2022, the Board issued a

warrant to commit and detain Petitioner for a parole violation. (C.R. at 92, 94.) The

Board has not conducted parole revocations for the new federal matters. The

Board’s warrant states that “although offender’s original maximum sentence was

12/08/2022, the maximum sentence is being extended due to a new conviction. The

new maximum sentence will be computed upon recording of the Board’s final

action.” (C.R. at 94.)

On July 28, 2023, the Board received an Administrative Remedies

Form challenging the Board’s September 30, 2010 decision, in which Petitioner

claimed the Board illegally rescinded a previous grant of credit he received for time

spent at liberty on parole. (C.R. at 96-98.) On August 29, 2023, the Board dismissed

the request for administrative relief as untimely under the Board’s regulation at 37

Pa. Code Section 73.1. (C.R. at 99.) On September 13, 2023, the Board received a

second Administrative Remedies Form, identical to the previous Administrative

Remedies Form. (C.R. at 100-01.) On September 21, 2023, the Board responded to

Petitioner’s second request for administrative relief and dismissed it as an

unauthorized second or subsequent request under the Board’s regulation. 2 (C.R. at

102.)

On October 20, 2023, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in this Court

asserting that the Board, in its September 30, 2010 decision, incorrectly calculated

his parole violation maximum date as December 8, 2022, by revoking credit it had

previously granted, which unlawfully extended his sentence. In the Petition, he

asserts that the Board had no authority under Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons and

2

On October 11, 2023, the Board received a third Administrative Remedies Form. (C.R.

at 106). On October 17, 2023, the Board dismissed the third request for administrative relief as a

premature challenge to potential future parole violation proceedings. (C.R. at 106.)

4

Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1) (Code), to revisit an earlier Board decision

granting him credit for time served at liberty on parole. However, Petitioner does

not cite to any Board decision or other evidence of record granting him such credit.

He merely recites in his statement of the facts that he was recommitted as a TPV in

2004 and reparoled in February of 2005. He then states that “[n]otably the Board . .

. awarded [Petitioner] credit for time served while at liberty on parole.” (Petitioner’s

Br. at 7.) He does not provide the date of the Board’s decision granting this credit,

the amount of time with which he was credited, or any other relevant facts about the

alleged grant of credit. Petitioner cites Young v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation

and Parole, 225 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2020), for the proposition that under Section

6138(a)(2.1) of the Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1), the Board may not rescind a

previous grant of credit for time spent at liberty on parole and asserts that, therefore,

the Board acted illegally in purporting to do so in its 2010 decision. Id.

To his Petition, Petitioner attached the two 2023 Board decisions

dismissing the two Administrative Remedies Forms that he filed with the Board on

July 22, 2023, and August 15, 2023, challenging the Board’s decision dated

September 30, 2010, and mailed on October 12, 2010.

Issues

In his brief, Petitioner identifies the single issue involved in this case as

“[w]hether the Board of Probation and Parole unlawfully extended his maximum

sentence date?” (Petitioner’s Br. at 6.) Respondent, however, would add three

additional issues, which are: (1) should the Petition for Review be quashed because

it was not filed within 30 days of the Board’s decision denying administrative relief;

(2) whether the Board’s August 2023 Decision denying Petitioner’s July 2023

request for administrative relief as untimely was properly decided and should be

affirmed; and (3) whether the Board’s September 2023 Decision dismissing

5

Petitioner’s second request for administrative relief as unauthorized, was properly

decided and should be affirmed. (Respondent’s Br. at 2.)

Discussion3

A. Timeliness of the Instant Petition for Review

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.)

1512(a)(1), “[a] petition for review of a quasijudicial order . . . shall be filed with the

prothonotary of the appellate court within 30 days after the entry of the order.” In

addition, the appellate rules provide that “[a]n appellate court . . . may not enlarge

the time for filing . . . a petition for review[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 105(b); see also Hill v.

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 683, A.2d 699, 701 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1996). As this Court has explained, “[t]he timeliness of an appeal and compliance

with the statutory provisions which grant the right of appeal go to the jurisdiction of

the court to hear and decide the appeal[.]” Altieri v. Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole, 495 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).

Based on the Petition for Review and Petitioner’s brief, it is clear that

Petitioner seeks to challenge the Board’s September 30, 2010 decision, which

Petitioner alleges illegally rescinded a previous grant of credit for time spent at

liberty on parole. (Petitioner’s Br. at p. 6, 10.) Petitioner filed his Petition for

Review with this Court on October 20, 2023, seeking review of a Board decision

issued in 2010, 13 years prior to the filing of the instant Petition for Review. This

3

Our review in this instance is limited to determining whether the Board erred as a matter

of law, made findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, or violated Petitioner’s

constitutional rights. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Fisher v.

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

6

conflicts with the rules outlined above. Therefore, the Petition for Review is clearly

untimely filed.4

Petitioner does not dispute that his challenge to the Board’s 2010

decision is untimely, because he states: “[a]dmittedly, the decision of the Board to

recalculate [Petitioner’s] time credit [presumably by forfeiting credit previously

awarded] was made in 2010.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 10.) Rather, he argues that, as a

matter of fundamental fairness, his appeal should be allowed because in 2010, the

legal theory underlying the instant appeal was not apparent. That theory did not

become known to Petitioner until our Supreme Court decided Young in 2020.

Petitioner’s argument, simply put, is that in 2010 the Board took away from

Petitioner street time5 that it had awarded to Petitioner in 2005. He then states that

“[a]s would be explained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in [Young], there was

no authority for the Board to do so and its actions were therefore illegal.”

(Petitioner’s Br. at 11.)

This argument is without merit because there is no evidence of record,

and Petitioner cites to none, that the Board ever granted Petitioner credit for time

spent at liberty on parole, which the Board subsequently revoked. Therefore,

4

We also note that Petitioner has failed to preserve his challenge to the Board’s September

30, 2010 decision for appellate review. It is well settled that a litigant may not assert an issue on

appeal unless he first timely raised it at the administrative level. 2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a); Pa.R.A.P.

1551; McCaskill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 631 A.2d 1092, 1094-95 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1993). Parolees desiring to appeal from a parole revocation decision must file an

administrative appeal with the Board within 30 days. The failure to file an appeal within the time

required by law precludes a parolee’s right to challenge the Board’s decision. Larkin v.

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 555 A.2d 954, 957 (Pa. Cmwlth 1989.) Therefore,

Petitioner was required to file an administrative remedies form challenging the Board’s 2010

decision within 30 days of its mailing, which he failed to do.

5

The time a parolee spends at liberty on parole is also referred to as “street time.” Plummer

v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 216 A.3d 1207, 1209 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

7

Petitioner has failed to establish his claim that the Board granted him credit for time

spent at liberty on parole in 2005, which the Board then revoked in its September

30, 2010 decision. Notably, the Board’s 2010 decision does not indicate that it was

revoking any time credit previously awarded to Petitioner. (C.R. at 72-73.)

Moreover, at the time the Board’s allegedly erroneous 2010 decision

was made, the version of Section 6138 of the Code that the Supreme Court

interpreted in its Young decision, was not yet in force. The version of the Code in

effect at the time of the Board’s 2010 decision was an earlier version of the Code

passed by the General Assembly in 2009.6 That version of the Code was in effect

6

Act of August 11, 2009, P.L. 147, No. 33, as amended, 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-6309. That

statute provided in pertinent part:

(a) Convicted violators.—

(1) A parolee under the jurisdiction of the board released from a

correctional facility who, during the period of parole or

while delinquent on parole, commits a crime punishable by

imprisonment, for which the parolee is convicted or found

guilty . . ., may at the discretion of the board be

recommitted as a parole violator.

(2) If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the parolee shall

be re-entered to serve the remainder of the term which the

parolee would have been compelled to serve had the parole

not been granted and shall be given no credit for the time

at liberty on parole.

...

(4) The period of time for which the parole violator is required

to serve shall be computed from and begin on the date that

the parole violator is taken into custody to be returned to the

institution as a parole violator.

(5) If a new sentence is imposed on the parolee, the service of

the balance of the term originally imposed shall precede the

commencement of the new term imposed in the following

cases:

(i) If a person is paroled from a State correctional

institution and the new sentence imposed upon

(Footnote continued on next page…)

8

until 2012, when the legislature again amended the Code.7 It was this 2012 version

of the Code which was at issue in Young, and with respect to which our Supreme

Court held that “the [Code] does not authorize the Board to withdraw an award of

previously granted pursuant to Section 6138(a)(2.1).” 225 A.2d at 814. Indeed, the

2009 version of the Code does not contain a Section 6138(a)(2.1). Rather than

revoking time credit previously awarded to Petitioner, it appears that the Board

simply exercised its discretion to recommit Petitioner and that such recommitment

extended the date of his maximum term on the original sentence. Because the

version of the statute cited by Petitioner was not in effect at the time of the Board’s

September 30, 2010 decision, Petitioner’s arguments with respect to that later statute

or to cases decided under its provisions, such as Young, are inapposite, unless there

is reason to apply the Young decision retroactively.

B. Retroactive Application of Young

In his July 17, 2023 Administrative Remedies Form, Petitioner argued

that in 2010, the Board had no authority to rescind credit previously awarded by the

Board. That is, at the time of the Board’s 2010 decision allegedly revoking credit

previously granted to Petitioner, Section 6138 did not allow the Board to revoke such

credit. Petitioner argued that this was not authorized until 2021, when the General

Assembly, in response to Young, added Section 6138.(a)(2.2) (providing that credit

him is to be served in the State correctional

institution.

(ii) If a person is paroled from a county prison and

the new sentence imposed upon him is to be

served in the same county prison.

(iii) In all other cases, the service of the new term

for the later crime shall precede

commencement of the balance of the term

originally imposed.

7

See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138, which added Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) to the Code.

9

awarded to an offender in a prior board action is subject to forfeiture under this

section if an offender is subsequently recommitted as a CPV). (C.R. at 96).

On appeal to this Court, Petitioner acknowledges that his July 17, 2023

Administrative Remedies Form was filed 13 years late. However, he argues that he

could not have raised this issue in 2010 – because Young, which held that the Board

had no authority to rescind a previous grant of credit for time spent at liberty on

parole, had not yet been decided.8 He argues “[a]s such, the ordinary 30-day time

limitation of 37 Pa. Code § 73.1 has no import here, nor is there any provision

specifying an applicable time limit.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 11.) He claims the Young

decision constitutes a change in the law that should qualify as an exception to the

time period for filing an administrative appeal. We disagree.

Under Section 6138 of the version of the Code in effect in 2010, a

parolee who was recommitted as a CPV automatically and unconditionally forfeited

credit for days spent during the parole period in which the crime was committed. 61

Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2); formerly 61 P.S. § 331.21a(a) (if a parolee was recommitted

as a CPV, the Code provided, without exception, that the parolee “shall be reentered

to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to

serve had the parole not been granted and shall be given no credit for the time at

liberty on parole.”). The question here is whether the change in the law in 2020, via

8

In Young our Supreme Court concluded that once the Board exercises its discretion to

award street time credit, it cannot “reach back” and rescind that credit in a subsequent revocation

proceeding. Young, 225 A.3d at 813-14. Stated differently, the Board may not grant street time

credit to a parolee in a recommitment order, reparole the parolee, and then rescind that credit upon

yet another parole revocation, because the Code “does not authorize the Board to withdraw an

award previously granted pursuant to Section 6138(a)(2.1).” Id. at 814.

10

Young, allows Petitioner to go back and file an administrative remedies form 13

years after the Board entered its September 30, 2010 decision.9

In Threats v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 518 A.2d

327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 553 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1989), this Court

generally held that the Board may consider an untimely application for

reconsideration when the petitioner demonstrates that there has been a subsequent

change in the law that should be applied retroactively to produce a different result

from the Board’s disposition of the original appeal. See 518 A.2d at 328; see also

Flowers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 565 A.2d 185, 186 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1989); Passarella v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 217

A.3d 919, 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

The general rule when an appellate court recognizes a new rule of law

is that the decision is applied retroactively so that a party whose case is pending on

direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of the change in the law. In the Interest of L.J.,

79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013); Walnut Street Associates, Inc. v. Brokerage

Concepts, Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 479 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d

146, 148 (Pa. 1983).

Whether a new rule is applied retroactively, however, is a matter of

judicial discretion that may be exercised on a case-by-case basis. L.J., 79 A.3d at

1087; Walnut Street Associates, 20 A.3d at 479. In considering whether to deviate

from the general rule and only apply a new rule of law prospectively, a court must

consider: (i) the purpose of the new rule, (ii) the extent of reliance by courts and

litigants upon the old rule, and (iii) the effect the new rule of law will have on the

9

Petitioner does not explain why, if Young was decided in 2020, he waited three years to

file his Administrative Remedies Form, or how it is possible, in those circumstances, that we can

deem the Administrative Remedies Form timely. He merely argues that he “recently” became

aware of the Young decision. Id.

11

fair administration of justice. L.J., 79 A.3d at 1087; Kendrick v. District Attorney of

Philadelphia County, 916 A.2d 529, 536 (Pa. 2007). These factors are weighed to

determine whether retroactive application is appropriate.

Here, Petitioner has not established that Young was meant to be applied

retroactively to his situation. Petitioner does not mention, let alone discuss, the

three-prong test for retroactivity. He merely states that the Board should have

“fix[ed] its illegal action and award[ed] [Petitioner] the time to which he is entitled.”

(Petitioner’s Br. at 12.) The failure to develop an argument on appeal results in

waiver. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585 n.5 (Pa. 1998) (holding that

failure to develop an issue in an appellate brief results in waiver). Nevertheless, had

Petitioner not waived the issue, we would find the issue to be meritless.

First, Petitioner filed his first Administrative Remedies Form three

years after Young was decided. Therefore, there is no question that Petitioner’s first

Administrative Remedies Form was not pending at the time Young was decided.

Moreover, shortly after Young was decided on February 19, 2020, the General

Assembly passed the Act of June 30, 2021, P.L. 260, No. 59 (Act 59), which

abrogated Young.10

Second, Petitioner’s request for the retroactive application of Young

was first made on October 20, 2023, in his Petition for Review. However, at that

time, Young had already been abrogated by a new version of Section 6138 of the

Code which went into effect on June 30, 2021. Therefore, Young is not “new” law.

It was overruled by the legislature. Thus, had the issue been preserved, we would

decline to apply Young retroactively.

C. Petitioner’s Two Administrative Remedies Forms

10

Section 6138(a)(2.2) now provides that credit awarded to an offender in prior board

action is subject to forfeiture under this section if an offender is subsequently recommitted as a

CPV.

12

On July 17, 2023, Petitioner submitted an Administrative Remedies

Form to the Board, which received it on July 28, 2023, challenging the Board’s

September 30, 2010 decision extending Petitioner’s maximum date to December 8,

2022. (C.R. at 96-97.) In his request for administrative relief, Petitioner argued that

by extending his maximum date, the Board violated Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the

Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1), by illegally rescinding credit it previously granted

to Petitioner. (C.R. at 96-97.) On August 29, 2023, the Board mailed its decision

stating that it had dismissed Petitioner’s request as untimely under the Board’s

regulation at 37 Pa. Code Section 73.1. The Board informed Petitioner that if he

wished to appeal the dismissal of his request for relief, he had thirty days from the

mailing date of the Board’s decision to file an appellate petition for review with this

Court, or by September 29, 2023. (C.R. at 99.) To the extent that Petitioner now

appeals this Board decision in our appellate jurisdiction, his preserved filing date is

October 20, 2023. We therefore find that any appeal of this Board decision is

untimely.

On September 13, 2023, Petitioner filed a second Administrative

Remedies Form with the Board making exactly the same argument he made in his

July 17, 2023 request for administrative relief from the Board’s 2010 decision (C.R.

at 100-01.) The Board mailed its decision in response to this request for

administrative relief on September 21, 2023, stating,

The record reveals that the Board has already disposed of

this matter in its response mailed to you on August 29,

2023. As such, [Petitioner’s] request for relief received on

September 13, 2023 is deemed an unauthorized second or

subsequent request for relief and it cannot be accepted. 37

Pa. Code § 73.1.

Accordingly, [Petitioner’s] request for relief received

September 13, 2023 is hereby DISMISSED as

unauthorized.

13

(C.R. at 102.)

We find that the Board’s September 21, 2023 decision was correctly

decided because the Board properly applied its regulation when it dismissed

Petitioner’s second 2023 administrative challenge to its 2010 decision. See 37 Pa.

Code §§ 73.1(a)(4), 73.1(b)(3).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Petition for Review is dismissed

as untimely, especially in light of our finding that Petitioner has not demonstrated

that the Young decision should be applied retroactively to the challenged 2010 Board

decision.

__________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

14

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Bradley Torrence, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1139 C.D. 2024

:

Pennsylvania Parole Board, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 26th day of December, 2025, the Petition for Review

is DISMISSED.

__________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge