Acuna v. SAIF

No. 1105 December 24, 2025 29

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Compensation of Mark Acuna,

Claimant.

Mark ACUNA,

Petitioner,

v.

SAIF CORPORATION

and First City Painting,

Respondents.

Workers’ Compensation Board

2104691, 2200006BF;

A182146

Argued and submitted November 10, 2025.

Julene M. Quinn argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Daniel Walker argued the cause and filed the brief for

respondents.

Charles Robinowitz filed the brief amicus curiae for

Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

30 Acuna v. SAIF

KAMINS, J.

Claimant seeks judicial review of an order of the

Workers’ Compensation Board awarding $7,000.00 in

attorney fees for SAIF Corporation’s (SAIF’s) failure to

comply with a discovery request. Claimant had requested

$27,454.80 in fees and now challenges the reduction in fees

in two assignments of error. First, claimant contends the

board erred in reducing the attorney’s billed hours based

upon an incorrect legal standard and a lack of substantial

evidence and reason. Second, claimant contends that the

board erred in reducing the attorney’s hourly rate based

upon an incorrect legal standard and without substantial

reason. We reject claimant’s second assignment of error but

reverse and remand for reconsideration on the first assign-

ment of error.

We review the board’s legal conclusions, including

the construction of a statute, for legal error, and its fac-

tual findings for substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(a),

(c); Hopkins v. SAIF, 349 Or 348, 355, 245 P3d 90 (2010).

We review the board’s determination for substantial rea-

son, meaning that the “order articulates the reasoning that

leads from the facts found to the conclusion drawn.” Long v.

SAIF, 278 Or App 88, 93, 372 P3d 610 (2016) (internal cita-

tion omitted).

By statute, the board must “award reasonable addi-

tional attorney fees to the attorney for the claimant for

efforts in defending the fee, penalty or costs.” ORS 656.382(3)

(emphasis added). The board must consider twelve factors

under OAR 438-015-0010(4) when determining the reason-

ableness of an attorney fee award. We review the board’s

discretionary decision in setting a reasonable attorney fee

for an abuse of discretion. Schoch v. Leupold & Stevens, 325

Or 112, 118, 934 P2d 410 (1997) (“The court * * * is responsi-

ble for reviewing the agency’s decision to see that it is within

the range of discretion granted to the agency.”).

First Assignment of Error: Reduced Hours

Claimant contends that the board applied an incor-

rect legal standard and that the reduction in hours was not

supported by substantial evidence or reason. We agree that

Cite as 346 Or App 29 (2025) 31

the board’s explanation of how the reasonableness factors

led to the fee award did not amount to substantial reason to

support its decision.

For some reductions, the board listed OAR 438-015-

0010(4) factors, applicable to determining the reasonableness

of an attorney fee award, such as complexity involved and

time devoted. However, the board failed to provide any con-

nection between the factors and its determined reasonable

hours. The board also identified several factors that weighed

in claimant’s favor, including the complexity of the issue,

skill of counsel, interests involved, and benefits secured for

claimant. Again, however, the board did not articulate how

those factors weighed in its conclusion. See Taylor v. SAIF,

295 Or App 199, 203, 433 P3d 419 (2018), rev den, 365 Or

194 (2019) (the board stating it has considered the factors

but not “articulat[ing] a connection between those factors in

its conclusion” does not amount to substantial reason).

In other reductions, the board failed to identify rule-

based factors at all. Without identifying and explaining the

factors that were weighed in each reduction, the decision

lacks substantial reason. See id. at 204 (The court is “not

permitted to supply reasoning on behalf of the board.”);

Schoch, 325 Or at 119 (board’s order did not contain suffi-

cient explanation where the board “did not explain how any

of the rule-based factors * * * weighed in its decision-making

process and led to the fee that it awarded.”).

In addition, the board relied on considerations—

including the helpfulness of briefing and proportionality of

time spent—that are not reasonableness factors under OAR

438-015-0010(4).1 We cannot see how “helpful” a decision-

maker finds an attorney’s work product to be relevant to the

attorney fee calculation, and the board did not provide an

explanation. Taylor, 295 Or App at 200 (“Because the board’s

order lacks substantial reason, we lack a sufficient basis to

meaningfully review the board’s exercise of discretion.”).

Thus, we reverse and remand for reconsideration on

the first assignment of error.

1

The Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) filed an amicus brief argu-

ing that those considerations were unreasonable.

32 Acuna v. SAIF

Second Assignment of Error: Reduced Contingent Hourly

Rate

Claimant contends that the board applied an incor-

rect legal standard in reducing the attorney’s hourly rate by

failing to consider the contingent nature of workers’ com-

pensation practice, and that the board’s order lacked sub-

stantial reason in support of the reduction.

The board is required to consider the contingent

nature of workers’ compensation, including “[t]he risk in a

particular case that an attorney’s efforts may go uncompen-

sated;” “[t]he contingent nature of the practice of workers’

compensation law;” and “[c]laimant’s counsel’s contingent

hourly rate, if asserted, together with any information used

to establish the basis upon which the rate was calculated.”

OAR 438-015-0010(4)(i), (j), (l).

Claimant first contends that, in reducing the hourly

rate, the board failed to consider “the contingent nature of

the practice of workers’ compensation law.” OTLA reiterated

this concern in its amicus brief, arguing consideration of

that factor requires that the fee be increased. In evaluat-

ing that and related factors, the board reasoned that contin-

gency did not weigh heavily in this case:

“Further, because of the contingent nature of workers’

compensation law, there was a risk that claimant’s attorney

might go uncompensated. However, that risk was not par-

ticularly high in this case because claimant was successful

at the hearing level and was the respondent on review.”

Thus, the board’s order shows that it both evaluated “the

contingent nature of the practice of workers’ compensation

law” and explained why that consideration did not weigh

heavily in this case. The board provided a reasonable basis

for its decision. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Fillmore, 98 Or App

567, 571, 779 P2d 1102, rev den, 308 Or 608 (1989) (“The

Board’s explanation of its award is detailed enough to inform

us that it considered all of the factors and had a reasonable

basis for its decision.”).

Claimant also contends that the board failed to

explain why it rejected claimant’s requested contingent

hourly rate, given the lack of contradictory information.

Cite as 346 Or App 29 (2025) 33

The board is required—as it did here—to consider claim-

ant’s counsel’s contingent hourly rate within its discretion.

See Cascade In Home Care, LLC v. Hooks, 296 Or App 695,

698, 437 P3d 1158, rev den, 365 Or 195 (2019) (“The board

is required to consider [fee awards requested by claimant’s

attorney].” (Emphasis in original; internal citation omit-

ted.)). After it did so, the board also considered other fac-

tors, the record, and its experience to conclude that a lower

hourly fee was appropriate.

Claimant contends that the board’s reliance on its

“extensive experience” does not amount to substantial rea-

son. Although reliance on the board’s expertise alone may

not provide substantial reason for the board’s decision, the

board also explained its decision using the rule-based fac-

tors. See Taylor, 295 Or App at 203 (to satisfy the substan-

tial reason requirement, “[the board] must articulate how

the application of those factors supports the amount of fees

awarded” (emphasis in original)).

Reversed and remanded for reconsideration of attor-

ney fees; otherwise affirmed.