Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSEPH PALUMBO,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 25-15208 (RK) (TJB)

V.

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MEMORANDUM ORDER

Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the transfer order of the Honorable Monica

Ramirez Almadani, U.S.D.J. of the United States District Court for the Central District of

California, after a finding that venue was improper in the Central District of California but proper

in this District. No. 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).) Prior to the transfer, Plaintiff Joseph

Palumbo (‘Plaintiff’) filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP,’ ECF No. 3),

together with a Complaint against the State of New Jersey (““Compl.,”” ECF No. 1). Those filings

are presently before the Court. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's application to proceed

in forma pauperis is DENIED, and his Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from Plaintiff's Complaint and accepted as true only for

purposes of screening the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See, e.g., Allah v.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

As best the Court can discern from his meandering, handwritten Complaint, Plaintiff

alleges that in May of 1991 he witnessed a Brick Township police officer shoot and kill a five-

year-old boy for no apparent reason, (Compl. at 7)'—and that “the entire State of New Jersey” has

engaged in “a massive cover-up” in the decades since, (id. at 8-9). Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that

he initially saw a man in a yellow car drive over a five-year-old boy on the highway, (id. at 4—5),

and that the man said he was a police officer, then placed the boy’s body in Plaintiff's trunk, (see

id. at 5). He says the driver of the yellow car “told [Plaintiff] to go to the police station... a few

blocks down the highway,” where “a man who was dressed in what appeared to [be]... a dark

blue uniform” took the body from Plaintiff's trunk and told Plaintiff he could leave. (/d.) Later the

same day, Plaintiff alleges that he was pulled over by Brick police officers and instructed to open

his trunk, and the still-alive boy jumped out. Ud. at 6.) One of the Brick officers, who happened to

be Plaintiff's cousin, then allegedly shot and killed the boy. Ud. at 6~7.) Two days later, Plaintiff

says he found the boy’s body in a trash bag outside his home. (/d. at 7-8.) Brick police officers

and the county coroner responded to the scene, took the boy’s body, and left without a word. (/d.

at 8.)

Plaintiff says that “for 30 years after this event [he] inquired to Law Enforcement and the

Press about the event[,] essentially [asking] “who was the child and what happened,’” but “all of

the authorities ... denied that such a thing ever happened.” (/d.) Plaintiff further alleges that he

“ha[s] been accused of every crime in the book by Bricktown Police but not arrested or convicted

of anything,” (id. at 8-9), and that “[t]he Ocean County Prosecutor sent [him] to a Psychiatric

facility where [he] was falsely accused of being Paranoid Schizophrenic,” (id. at 9). Plaintiff

asserts one claim of “obstruction of justice” against the State of New Jersey and seeks $10 million

in damages. (/d.)

' Because Plaintiff’s recitation of the facts in his Complaint—seven pages of “testimony” handwritten on

sheets of notebook paper—appears to contain a duplicate page, (Compl. at 3, 4), the Court cites the page

numbers in the CM/ECF header.

Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a short-form application to proceed in forma

pauperis. (See IFP.) Plaintiff states he is not currently employed, has no source of income and no

savings, lives in a homeless shelter in Los Angeles, California, and has no monthly expenses. (/d.

at 1-2.) He further declares that he currently has no assets—that he once “owned a house,” but “it

was illegally confiscated.” (Id. at 2.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a district court may authorize a plaintiff to proceed in

forma pauperis and order a complaint to be filed without requiring the prepayment of filing fees.

Section 1915 “is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal

courts.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). However, to guard against potential “abuse” of

“cost-free access to the federal courts,” id. (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992)),

Section 1915(e) empowers district courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that “‘is

frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e).

The Court thus engages in “a two-step analysis” when considering a complaint filed with

an in forma pauperis application: (1) under Section 1915(a), the Court determines whether the

plaintiff is eligible to proceed without prepaying the civil filing fee, and (2) under Section 1915(e),

the Court determines “whether the Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).” Archie v.

Mercer Cnty. Courthouse, No. 23-3553, 2023 WL 5207833, at *1—2 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2023) (citing

Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990)). Courts may address these two questions

“in either order or even simultaneously.” Karupaiyan v. Wipro Ltd., No. 23-2424, 2025 WL 89076,

at *3 n.9 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (quoting Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019) (en

banc)).

I. DISCUSSION

A. In Forma Pauperis Application

In order to proceed in forma pauperis, Section 1915(a) requires plaintiffs to submit “an

affidavit stating all income and assets, the plaintiff’s inability to pay the filing fee, the ‘nature of

the action,’ and the “belief that the [plaintiff] is entitled to redress.’” Martinez v. Harrison, No. 23-

3513, 2023 WL 5237130, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)). A plaintiff’s IFP application must “include sufficient information for the Court to

properly evaluate it or to confirm whether Plaintiff is able to pay the court fees.” Hedgepeth v.

Helen Fuld Hosp., No. 22-6029, 2023 WL 4108510, at *1 (D.N.J. June 21, 2023). To facilitate pro

se plaintiffs in satisfying this statutory obligation, the federal judiciary provides a “Long Form”

IFP application, which is available at https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/forms/AO-

239 pdf.

Plaintiff did not utilize the Long Form IFP application. Instead, he provided the Court with

only a “Short Form” IFP application. (IFP at 1.) This renders his IFP application deficient. See

DiPietro v. New Jersey, No. 19-17014, 2019 WL 4926865, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2019); accord

Swiggett v. SPO Brandon Esbenshade, No. 19-2318, 2020 WL 5909373, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 6,

2020). Equally problematic are Plaintiff’s perfunctory responses to each question in the Short Form

application.” (See IFP.) True, Plaintiff’s homelessness sheds light on some of his answers, such as

his representation that he has no expenses whatsoever, (id. at 1—2), but Plaintiff still “must state

For example, after representing that he is not currently employed, Plaintiff did not answer the requisite

follow-up question 1(b) instructing, “If the answer is no, state the date of last employment and the amount

of the salary and wages per month which you received.” (IFP at 1.)

the facts concerning his .. . poverty with some degree of particularity, definiteness or certainty.”

Gross v. Cormack, No. 13-4152, 2013 WL 5435463, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting Simon

v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10-5505, 2011 WL 551196, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb 9, 2011)), aff'd on

other grounds, 586 F. App’x 899 (3d Cir. 2014). Because Plaintiff did not submit the proper form

and otherwise did not make a good faith effort to fill out the IFP application, Plaintiffs application

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Review of Complaint

Although a court is not required to conduct a screening of a complaint after denying an in

pauperis application, the Third Circuit has endorsed a “flexible approach” that allows a

court to dismiss a case “at any time . . . regardless of the status of a filing fee.” Brown, 941 F.3d at

660. The Court proceeds to screen Plaintiff's Complaint here in an effort to “conserve judicial

resources” later. See id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court has a statutory obligation to dismiss any claims that

are “(i) frivolous or malicious; (1i) fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ai) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). That

is, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Further,

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although courts

hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “must still comply with

the pleading requirements of Rule 8,” Prelle v. United States, No. 22-1453, 2022 WL 16958896,

at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2022) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.

2013)); see also Untracht v. Fikri, 368 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (“[B]asic pleading

requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to self-represented and counseled

plaintiffs alike.’’).

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8. Plaintiff purports to set forth “testimony” about alleged events “from May 1991 to

May 2019.” (Compl. at 1.) He narrates criminal conduct allegedly committed by New Jersey police

officers in 1991 and state officials’ alleged inaction in the time since. But “a complaint that

‘meander[s] back and forth across overlapping, yet distinct sets of named defendants’ and [is]

drafted in a hyper-detailed manner that makes ‘it arduous to sift through [the] complaint and stitch

together the relevant allegations in relation’ to each count runs afoul Rule 8.” Blount v. TD Bank,

N.A., No. 20-18805, 2022 WL 4354640, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2022) (alterations in original)

(quoting Williams v. Willingboro Township, No. 20-1114, 2020 WL 3481773, at *2 (D.N.J. June

26, 2020)). Indeed, “it is not clear from the Complaint . . . how [Plaintiff] was harmed in a manner

that gives rise to an actionable claim.” Shaw v. Fernandes, No. 18-228, 2018 WL 547234, at *2

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2018). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d

Cir. 2019) (“[T]he ‘plain’ statement requirement [under Rule 8]... prompts us to ask whether,

liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by these

defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff's claims.”). Plaintiff's Complaint falls far short of Rule 8’s

requirements.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s sole claim of “obstruction of justice” must be dismissed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although Plaintiff does not cite any authority for the claim, state and

federal criminal law prohibit obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (obstruction of

justice); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1 (obstruction of administration of law or other governmental

function). However, Plaintiff does not have authority to enforce these laws. Criminal statutes are

generally enforced solely by the government and thus provide no private cause of action, see Cent.

Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994), and the

criminal statutes prohibiting obstruction of justice create no exception to that general rule, see, e.g.,

Lee v. Emps. of Union Twp. Mun. Ct., No. 17-4229, 2018 WL 1535266, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 28,

2018) (“A private party may not maintain suit under most provisions of Title 18.”); Gurvey v.

Township of Montclair, No. 19-17525, 2022 WL 970303, at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2022) (dismissing

“purported cause[] of action for ‘Obstruction of Justice’” because N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1 “do[es]

not provide a private right of action”); see also Coleman y. N.J. Transit Headquarters, 846 F. App’x

167, 168 (3d Cir. 2021) (affirming screening dismissal of claims brought under related New Jersey

criminal statutes because such criminal statutes “do not create a private right of action’). Plaintiff’s

“obstruction of justice” claim is therefore dismissed.

THEREFORE, it is on this 23rd day of December, 2025, ORDERED that:

lL Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

I. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

3 Given the Complaint’s significant deficiencies, the Court need not wade into the myriad other seeming

issues, such as sovereign immunity and the datedness of the events alleged.

Il. The Clerk’s Office is directed to OPEN this case for purposes of ruling on Plaintiff's

IFP application, then CLOSE the case;

IV. _ Plaintiff may have this case reopened within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this

Memorandum Order by filing an amended complaint and either pre-paying the $402

filing fee ($350 filing fee plus $52 administrative fee) or submitting a renewed

application to proceed in forma pauperis;

V. Upon receipt of an amended complaint and a proper and completed in forma pauperis

application or filing fee within the time allotted by this Court, the Clerk will be directed

to reopen this case; and the Court will screen the amended complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e);

VI. The Summons shall not issue prior to the Court conducting a screening of the amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e);

VII. The Clerk shall serve on Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail: (1) this Memorandum Order;

and (2) a blank long-form application to proceed in forma pauperis.

TF

Ros KIRSCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE