Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

THE FILTA GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-914-PGB-NWH

LXU, LTD., KENNETH MELICK,

KITCHEN KARE

INNOVATIONS, LLC and

SHANE FARRER,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for

Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 29). The Defendants submitted a Response in

Opposition (Doc. 57)1, and the Court presided over an evidentiary hearing

regarding the Motion on December 18–19, 2025. Upon consideration, the

Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction is granted.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Franchise Agreement

The Filta Group offers franchises, including FILTAFRY®, which involves

microfiltration of used cooking oils using a Mobile Filtration Unit (“MFU”). (Doc.

29-1, ¶ 2). The MFU bears Plaintiff’s trademarks. (Id. ¶¶ 3–4). The Plaintiff’s

1 Rather than attaching the Declarations of Kenneth Melick and Shane Farrer to their response,

the Defendants filed the Declarations as separate documents. (See Docs. 57, 58, 59).

franchisees can also market FILTACLEAN®, which offers cleaning and sanitizing

of commercial kitchen surfaces. (Id. ¶ 6). Filta franchisees operate the MFUs from

vans that are specially equipped and bear the Filta Mark. (Id. ¶ 5). It is undisputed

that Plaintiff has extensively employed and advertised its Marks throughout the

United States.2 (Id. ¶¶ 17–18).

Defendant Ken Melick is the owner of Defendant LXU, Ltd. (“LXU”). (Id. ¶

7). Mr. Melick executed a Franchise Agreement with Plaintiff on January 9, 2014.

(Id. ¶ 7; Plf. Ex. 2). Whenever a franchisee offers another Filta service to a

customer, the franchisee signs a Franchise Agreement Addendum. (Doc. 29-1, ¶ 8).

Defendants Melick and LXU (collectively, the “Franchisees”) operated a

franchised Filta business in Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky (collectively, the

“Territories”) using the MFU system and Marks. (Id. ¶ 10). The Franchisees were

required to operate the franchised business continuously during the term of the

Franchise Agreement. (Id. ¶ 12). Defendant Melick also guaranteed LXU’s

performance to Filta and its adherence to the Franchise Agreement’s non-compete

and non-solicitation provisions. (Plf. Ex. 2, p. 33, §§ 23.1–23.5). The franchisee is

also prohibited from providing financing, other assistance, or facilities to any

business that competes with Filta. (Plf. Ex. 2, § 23.1). Defendant Melick testified

that, as a Filta franchisee, he knew which services were being provided to

2 A comprehensive list of Plaintiff’s Marks is set forth at Docket Entry 29-1 in paragraphs 17–

18. Defendants KKI and Farrer infringed Plaintiff’s Marks in other ways, including Mr.

Farrer’s LinkedIn page identifying him as Director of Operations at The Filta Group, Inc. –

USA. (Plf. Ex. 45). Defendant Farrer’s LinkedIn page was not changed until the second day of

the hearing.

customers, when the services were scheduled, and the amount paid by each

customer. He obtained this information from Filta’s inside sales department.

Filta took steps to protect its confidential and proprietary information. The

Franchise Agreement prohibits the Franchisees from transferring or selling the

MFUs. (Doc. 29-1, ¶¶ 24–25; Plf. Ex. 2, § 8.1). Filta had the right to inspect a

franchisee’s business, including its books and records, vans, and MFUs, and could

direct a franchisee to provide a list of its customers. (Doc. 29-1, ¶¶ 27, 28). To

protect its proprietary information, franchisees were required to obtain signed

confidentiality and/or non-compete agreements from their employees. (Id. ¶ 32;

Plf. Ex. 2, §§ 13.3, 17.2, 23.6). If the Franchise Agreement expires or is terminated,

the franchisee is required to sell its MFUs to Plaintiff and cooperate in

transitioning customers back to the Plaintiff. (Plf. Ex. 2, §§ 22.1–22.10).

B. The Formation of KKI

Defendant Farrer testified at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant Farrer

formed Kitchen Kare Innovations (“KKI”) on October 1, 2024, with the assistance

of Mr. Li, counsel for the Franchisees. Before founding KKI, Defendant Farrer was

employed by LXU, where he began as a technician and eventually rose to the

position of Chief Operating Officer. Defendants Farrer and Melick, as well as Mr.

Li, maintain offices at the same physical address. Defendant Farrer attended

conventions while employed by LXU and gained knowledge of fryer management

during his eight-year tenure. Defendant Farrer also learned which customers LXU

serviced under the Filta franchise and the amounts charged for those services.

Defendant Melick never asked Defendant Farrer to sign a confidentiality

agreement.

Although Defendant Farrer is not a signatory to the Franchise Agreement,

on March 25, 2025, he received a cease-and-desist letter from the Plaintiff’s

counsel. (Plf. Ex. 22). Counsel advised Defendant Farrer that under § 8.6.9 of the

Franchise Agreement, LXU is prohibited from competing with Filta and from using

confidential information obtained during the term of the Franchise Agreement.

Defendant Farrer was also instructed that the Franchise Agreement prevents a

franchisee from circumventing the non-competition clause by acting indirectly

through any other person or entity (Id.). Defendant Farrer testified that he showed

this letter to Mr. Li, who later assisted him in drafting correspondence soliciting

business from LXU customers.

C. The Conspiracy

On September 18, 2024, Defendant Melick applied to become a distributor

for Ceiling Pro International, a company that sells cleaning chemicals. (Plf. Ex. 62).

In the application, Defendant Melick identified his company as “LXU ltd dba Filta

Environmental Kitchen Solutions.” (Id.). Two weeks later, Ceiling Pro invited

Defendant Melick to a training event. (Plf. Ex. 63). Defendant Farrer accompanied

him on this trip. On September 27, 2024, the Plaintiff learned about the upcoming

conference and reminded Defendant Melick that he was required to sign an

addendum to the Franchise Agreement before he could provide these services. (Plf.

Ex. 18). Defendant Melick never signed the addendum. Instead, on October 1,

2024, Defendant Farrer, with the help of Mr. Li, formed KKI, ostensibly to provide

ventilation hood cleaning services. Defendant Melick loaned Defendant Farrer

$17,500 to secure a Ceiling Pro distributorship, knowing that the Plaintiff was

forging a relationship with Ceiling Pro to grow Plaintiff’s kitchen cleaning services.

(Plf. Ex. 18).3

Leading up to May 16, 2025, LXU had received several default notices from

the Plaintiff. (Plf. Exs. 15, 24–27, 29). Defendant Melick testified on the second day

of the evidentiary hearing and admitted that on April 29, 2024, the Franchisor

requested a complete customer list (Plf. Ex. 15), and he did not comply as required

by the Franchise Agreement. Defendant Melick also conceded that he violated the

Franchise Agreement by failing to have employees sign confidentiality agreements,

performing work outside of his designated territory, and denying Filta access to his

books, records, and facilities. (Plf. Exs. 25, 26, 28, 29).

On May 16, 2025, without providing Filta prior notice, the Franchisees

unilaterally terminated the Franchise Agreement and sent a letter, using the Filta

Mark, to every customer. (Plf. Ex. 33). The letter was sent to customers on Friday,

May 16, 2025, and informed them that LXU would no longer provide fryer

management services. (Id.). Defendant Melick told these franchise customers that

he had “already reached out to alternate service vendors to secure their agreement

3 Defendants KKI and Farrer contend that Defendant Melick’s loan does not violate the

Franchise Agreement’s prohibition on financing a competitor because Filta was not yet

offering kitchen cleaning services. This may be true, but evidence that Defendant Melick

financed Defendant Farrer’s newly formed business sets the stage for what comes next.

to provide you with uninterrupted fryer management services under the same

terms as you’ve been getting from LXU.” (Id. (emphasis added)). Defendant Melick

stated that “[a] representative from one of these vendors will reach out

directly to you today to establish service.” (Id.).

In reality, only one vendor was on deck to replace LXU. Minutes after

Defendant Melick cut ties with Filta and left his franchise customers without a

vendor to service their fryers, Defendant Farrer sent a letter drafted by Mr. Li to

the same Filta customers. (Plf. Ex. 34). Using Filta’s proprietary client list,

Defendant Farrer introduced himself and offered to provide the

“same services under the same terms and conditions as you previously received”

from LXU. (Id.). Defendant Farrer sweetened the deal by offering “a special

opportunity to receive a discount in exchange for executing a new service

agreement with [KKI].” (Id.). Defendant Farrer testified that he knew how much

each customer was paying for fryer services, having worked for LXU. Seven

minutes before LXU sent its cessation-of-services letter to Filta customers, Mr. Li

provided LXU’s employees and Defendants Melick and Farrer instructions on how

to back up their Filta Gmail and Filta files stored on Google accounts. (Plf. Ex. 31).

According to Defendant Farrer, KKI provided hood cleaning services before

May 16, 2025. That said, KKI was a fledgling operation with 5 employees: two sales

representatives, two service representatives, and Defendant Farrer. (See Plf. Ex.

78). To service the 450 Filta customers who received Defendant Melick’s cessation

of services letter, KKI needed an infusion of equipment and personnel; Defendant

Melick provided both. The testimony established that Defendant Melick

transitioned all of LXU’s employees, its vans equipped with MFUs, and the

warehouses used by LXU to KKI. (See also Plf. Ex. 91). Following this transition,

KKI grew to 41 employees. (Plf. Ex. 81). Defendant Melick continued to pay

employees formerly employed by LXU from the “transition” through August 2025.

Defendant Farrer lacked sufficient income or assets to secure financing, so

Defendant Melick kept the equipment, including vehicles, in his name, and

Defendant Farrer agreed to repayment terms.4

The net effect of Defendant Melick’s termination of the Franchise

Agreement and the cessation of services letter to Filta’s customers was to provide

KKI and Defendant Farrer with immediate access to 450 customers to whom KKI

hoped to upsell hood cleaning services. Furthermore, the transfer of employees

and equipment from LXU to KKI was not designed to transfer LXU’s debt to KKI,

as Defendant Melick contends in his declaration and testimony. Defendant Melick

testified that he transitioned his employees and equipment to KKI to buy time to

determine how to either dispose of the assets at the end of the lease agreement or

relocate them to places where he would not be in violation of the non-compete

clause. That is, Defendant Farrer and KKI served as a place holder to maintain

customers while LXU and Defendant Melick found a way to circumvent the non-

4 LXU and Defendant Melick breached the Franchise Agreement by failing to comply with § 2.

(Plf. Ex. 2). The Defendants failed to deliver to Filta all MFUs in their possession or control,

failed to provide contact details for all customers, and did not cooperate in the transition of

the servicing of customers to Filta or its designee. (Plf. Ex. 2, §§ 22.3, 22.7, 22.10).

compete clause. Ultimately, KKI retained 150 LXU customer accounts, growing its

business at least threefold.5

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A plaintiff is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief upon establishing: “(1)

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be

suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant

outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing

party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.”

McDonald’s Corp., 147 F.3d at 1306. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

remedy that should only be entered upon the movant establishing each of the four

requisite elements. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Filta argues that it is entitled to an injunction on its breach of restrictive

covenant claim and its trademark infringement-based claims. The Court agrees

and grants a preliminary injunction as to both counts.

5 Defendant Melick testified that he received the first notice of default by Filta on March 25,

2025, for helping Defendant Farrer set up KKI which offers services similar to Filta. (Plf. Ex.

23). Defendant Melick asserts his refusal to cure subsequent notice of default was motivated

by his opinion that Filta was determined to terminate his franchise agreement. However,

Filta’s motive in issuing the notices of default is irrelevant to LXU’s duty under the Franchise

Agreement. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 1998).

A. Trademark Infringement

1. Filta is Substantially Likely to Succeed on the Merits of its

Infringement-Based Claims

Filta brings its first claim for injunctive relief under the Lanham Act. “The

Lanham Act creates a claim for trademark infringement when a trademark holder

can demonstrate that the use of its trademark by another is likely to confuse

consumers as to the source of the product.” Home Box Off., Inc. v. Showtime/The

Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1314 (2d Cir. 1987). “[A] terminated

franchisee’s continued use of its former franchisor’s trademarks, by its very nature,

constitutes trademark infringement.” Burger King Corp. v. Majeed, 508 F. Supp.

994, 1002 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

Section 2.1 of the Franchise Agreement limits the Franchisees right “to use

the [Marks] and System solely in connection with the operation of the Franchise.”

Likewise, Section 8.9.1 states:

You may use the Proprietary Marks only in connection with

the Franchise. You may not, without Filta’s prior written

consent, register any company name or trademark or make

use of any business name incorporating any of the Proprietary

Marks or incorporating any similar sounding name.

The Franchise Agreement also states that upon the termination of the

Franchise Agreement, terminated franchisees must stop using the Marks.

Specifically, Section 22.1 states that:

Immediately upon expiration or termination of this

Agreement by either party for any reason or the Transfer of

the Franchise to a new owner, unless otherwise explicitly

directed by Filta, You must:

22.1 cease to trade under the Proprietary Marks, and cease to

use the Proprietary Marks (or any imitation or approximation

thereof) on the Van, Stationary, signs, uniforms or

otherwise[.]

Filta submitted evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing that there has

been consumer confusion in the oil delivery and oil filtration marketplace as a

result of Defendants continuing to operate an oil delivery and filtration business

using Filta’s Marks. For example, Defendants’ employees have continued to visit

Filta’s customers wearing uniforms bearing Filta’s trademarks, pretending to be

offering products and services under the Filta brand. In reality, however, those

individuals work for Defendants and issue invoices directing that payment be

made to KKI. (See Plf. Ex. 30).

After reviewing all of the evidence and hearing testimony, the Court finds

that Filta carried its burden in demonstrating that there has been a likelihood of

consumer confusion in the marketplace as a result of Defendants’ actions. As such,

this Court finds that Filta is substantially likely to prevail on its trademark

infringement-based claims.6 (See Plf. Exs. 37, 39).

2. Defendants’ Continuing Infringement of Filta’s Marks will

Irreparably Injure Filta

As an initial matter, based on the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020,

Filta is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. See 15 U.S.C. §

1116(a) (stating that “[a] plaintiff seeking any such injunction shall be entitled to a

6 The Court likewise finds that Defendants’ infringement of Filta’s trademark also constitutes a

breach of the Franchise Agreement by the Franchisees.

rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of a violation identified

in this subsection in the case of a motion for a permanent injunction or upon a

finding of likelihood of success on the merits for a violation identified in this

subsection in the case of a motion for a preliminary injunction”); Hammer Brand,

LLC v. Voro, Inc., No. 23-1272, 2024 WL 5430594, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2024)

(stating that “[o]nce infringement is established, a plaintiff is entitled to a

rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm”). Here, given that Filta has

established a likelihood of success on its claims against Defendants, it is entitled to

a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm.

Even without the presumption of irreparable harm, which Defendants have

not rebutted, given the strong likelihood of consumer confusion and Filta’s

substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Filta has met its burden of

demonstrating that it will suffer irreparable injury if Defendants’ actions are

allowed to continue. See Sundor Brands, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 86, 93

(M.D. Fla. 1986) (“The law is settled that the existence of a likelihood of confusion

constitutes irreparable injury, as a matter of law, sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.”).

3. The Threatened Injury to Filta Outweighs Any Threatened

Harm to Defendants

The threatened harm to Filta outweighs any harm Defendants may suffer

from the granting of injunctive relief. Defendants’ self-inflicted harm in choosing

to continue to operate in the cooking oil delivery and filtration industry after the

termination of the Franchise Agreement is outweighed by the damage done to Filta

by the infringement of its marks. Clayton v. Howard Johnson Franchise Sys., Inc.,

730 F. Supp 1553, 1561–62 (M.D. Fla. 1988).

4. The Injunction will not be Adverse to the Public Interest

Lastly, the relief Filta requests is not adverse to the public interest.

Consumers, including restaurants, stadiums, arenas, casinos and caterers, rely

upon the Filta Marks in doing business with Filta franchisees. They are then

deceived into giving Defendants their business under the mistaken belief that they

are a legitimate Filta franchisee. Granting injunctive relief to Filta will in fact serve

the public interest by preventing consumer confusion.

B. The Restrictive Covenants

1. Florida Law Controls

Filta seeks to enforce restrictive covenants that prevent Defendants from

soliciting Filta’s customers or operating in the same industry as Filta, as specified

in Sections 23.2 and 23.3 of the Franchise Agreement. Section 30.1 of the Franchise

Agreement states that “[t]his Agreement is governed in all respects in accordance

with the law of the State of Florida, without regard to the application of Florida

conflict of law rules.” Accordingly, Florida law governs the enforcement of the

restrictive covenants.

2. Filta is Substantially Likely to Succeed on its Claim to Enforce

the Restrictive Covenants

Sections 23.2 and 23.3 of the Franchise Agreement contain post-term

restrictive covenants against competition and solicitation as follows:

23.2 For 2 years following the . . . termination . . . of this

Agreement . . . [LXU] may not, without Filta’s prior written

consent, own, operate, be employed by, provide financing or

other assistance or facilities to, or have any interest in, any

Competing Business7 that is operating within any Territory

formerly assigned to [LXU] or within the geographic area

defined by an outer boundary line that is measured twenty-

five miles outward from the perimeter of any Territory

formerly assigned to [LXU] . . . [LXU] acknowledge[s] that its

purpose is to protect the goodwill of Filta and its other

franchisees.

23.3 For 2 years following the . . . termination . . . of this

Agreement . . . [LXU] may not have any contact with any

customers to which [LXU] provided services within the 1-year

period before . . . termination . . . for the purpose of soliciting

such customers for any Competing Business at any location.

Defendant Melick expressly agreed to abide by the restrictive covenants in

the Guaranty, which is included in the Franchise Agreement. FILTA is

substantially likely to succeed on its claim for breach of the restrictive covenants

because those covenants are in place to support legitimate business interests.

Florida law determines whether a restrictive covenant is appropriate based

on its scope and breadth. Under Florida law, a non-compete agreement is

enforceable if it seeks to protect “one or more legitimate business interests.” FLA.

STAT. § 542.335(1)(b). First, Filta has a legitimate business interest in protecting

7 The Franchise Agreement defines “Competing Business” as “any business that offers services

similar to those provided by the Franchise.”

its marks and the goodwill associated with those marks in the Territories where

Defendants have continued to operate in the oil delivery and filtration industry.

Second, Filta has a legitimate business interest in preventing Defendants’

unauthorized use of confidential information obtained through the franchise

relationship, including valuable information about Filta’s customers, such as their

identities, ordering needs and habits, and pricing. Third, Filta has a legitimate

business interest in protecting customer goodwill associated with Filta. Finally,

without an injunction, Filta will be unable to re-franchise the Territories, as

Defendants’ competing business will make it more difficult or impossible to sell

the Territories to a replacement franchisee. These are all legitimate business

interests sufficient to support the entry of a preliminary injunction to enforce the

Franchise Agreement’s restrictive covenants.

Moreover, the Court finds that the restrictions in the covenants are

reasonable in time, area, and line of business. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1). The

restrictive covenant prevents competitive activity: (1) within the Territory formerly

assigned to the Franchisees; and (2) within the geographic area defined by an outer

boundary line measured twenty-five miles outward from the perimeter of any

Territory formerly assigned to the Franchisees. Further, the two-year duration of

the restrictive covenants is a reasonable period to permit Filta a fair opportunity

to establish a new franchise within Defendants’ prior territories. Thus, the

restrictive covenant is narrowly tailored, not overbroad, and reasonably

formulated to protect Filta’s legitimate business interests. Filta has met its burden

of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its claim for

breach of the restrictive covenants by virtue of Defendants’ continued operation of

a competitive business in the oil delivery and filtration industry within and around

Defendants’ former Territories.

Moreover, “Florida courts have not hesitated to enforce non-compete

agreements against both the [party] who signed the agreement as well as against

the [non-parties to the agreement] through which the corporation conducted

business even where the individual was the only signatory to the non-compete

agreement.” N. Am. Prods. Corp. v. Moore, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1229-30 (M.D.

Fla. 2002). Parties “cannot avoid the reach of the non-solicitation agreement by

using a straw man.” Id. In other words, “individuals and entities may be enjoined

from aiding and abetting a covenantor in violating a covenant not to compete” and

an injunction binds the signatory “but also those identified with them in interest,

in privity with them, represented by them or subject to their control.” Dad’s Props.,

Inc. v. Lucas, 545 So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (enjoining parties that

were not signatories to non-compete agreement where it was clear that the non-

signatories aided and abetted signatories in their intentional violation of the non-

compete).

District courts routinely enter preliminary injunctions against terminated

franchisees that signed non-compete agreements as well as those with whom the

former franchisees have worked in setting up a competing business

notwithstanding that the others did not sign a non-compete agreement. See JTH

Tax, Inc. v. Abikarram, No. 19-60328, 2019 WL 2254816, at *2–*3 (S.D. Fla. Mar.

22, 2019) (enjoining terminated franchisee’s wife from operating competing tax

preparation business where wife used same facilities as terminated franchisee, wife

was servicing customers previously serviced by terminated franchisee, and

evidence indicated that wife was being used to aid and abet terminated franchisee’s

evasion of franchise agreement’s non-compete); Pirtek USA, LLC v. Layer, No. 05-

793, 2005 WL 8159764, at *4–*5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2005) (enjoining competing

business set up by former franchisee’s wife despite the fact that neither competing

business nor wife signed franchise agreement containing non-compete); U.S.

Lawns, Inc. v. Landscape Concepts of CT, LLC, No. 16-929, 2016 WL 9526340, at

*7 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2016) (enjoining competing business set up by franchisee

during term of franchise agreement, which was neither a party to the lawsuit or a

party to a written non-compete, from violating terms of the former franchisee’s

non-compete).

Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) makes clear that every

injunction order binds “the parties,” “the parties’ officers, agents, servants,

employees, and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in active concert or

participation with” those previously described. U.S. Lawns, 2016 WL 9526340, at

*7. For this reason, as well, an injunction against the Franchisees binds Farrer and

KKI, given that Farrer qualifies as LXU’s officer, agent, servant, and employee, and

that KKI and Farrer are in active concert or participation with the Franchisees. As

discussed above, Defendants Melick and LXU acted in concert with Defendants

KKI and Farrer. To allow Defendants to use KKI and Farrer to circumvent the

restrictive covenants would render the non-compete clause and non-solicitation

clauses unenforceable by use of the simple expedient of performing all solicitations

in the name of the corporate non-signatory or through the use of an agent to aid

and assist in the violation of the restrictive covenants. Pirtek, 2005 WL 8159764,

at *5. Based on the foregoing, KKI and Farrer are clearly subject to the Franchisees’

control and conspired with the Franchisees to set up and operate the competing

business. As a result, they can be lawfully enjoined.

3. Filta Demonstrates Irreparable Injury

“The violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates a presumption

of irreparable injury to the person seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant.”

FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(j). Thus, Filta has demonstrated irreparable injury arising

from Defendants’ violations of the restrictive covenant.

4. The Balance of Harm Weighs in Favor of Filta

As stated previously, the threatened injury to Filta outweighs any damage

Defendants may suffer from the granting of injunctive relief because Defendants’

harm in choosing to continue to operate in the subject industry after the

termination of the Franchise Agreements is self-inflicted. Defendants cannot now

disregard their obligations under the restrictive covenant. The harm to Filta would

be substantial if Defendants did not comply with the restrictive covenant because

Filta has invested significant time and money developing and establishing its

presence in and around the Territories in connection with the oil sale, delivery and

filtration industry.

5. The Injunction will not be Adverse to the Public Interest

A preliminary injunction will not be adverse to the public interest because it

will encourage parties to adhere to contractual obligations. Moreover, Florida law

contemplates the entry of an injunction to enforce reasonably restrictive covenants

in franchise agreements. Defendants have not offered any evidence of a public

policy interest that substantially outweighs the need to protect Filta’s legitimate

business interests. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(i). Therefore, the Court finds that

Filta is entitled to a preliminary injunction to enforce its restrictive covenant with

Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 29) is GRANTED.

2. Defendants and all persons acting on their behalf, in concert with, or

under their control are preliminarily enjoined from:

(a) using, manufacturing, packaging, distributing, selling,

advertising, displaying, or promoting any product or service

bearing any of Filta’s trademarks including, without limitation,

FILTAFRY® and any variation thereof;

(b) holding themselves out as an operator of a Filta franchise or

having any connection with Filta or the System; and

(c) making in any manner whatsoever any statement or

representation, or performing any act, likely to lead members

of the public to believe that Defendants and the products and

services provided by Defendants, are in any manner, directly or

indirectly, associated, affiliated, or connected with, or licensed,

sponsored, authorized, or approved by Filta.

3. LXU and Melick, and all persons acting on their behalf, in concert

with, or under their control, are preliminarily enjoined from:

(a) for a period of 2 years commencing on the date of this Order,

owning, operating, being employed by, providing financing or

other assistance or facilities to, or having any interest in, any

business that offers services similar to those previously

provided by LXU (a “Competing Business”) including, without

limitation, fryer cleaning and cooking oil filtration, the sale and

delivery of new cooking oil, the collection and/or recycling of

used cooking oil and kitchen cleaning within the Territories or

within the geographic area defined by an outer boundary line

that is measured twenty-five miles outward from the perimeter

of the Territories; and

(b) for a period of 2 years commencing on the date of this Order,

having any contact with any customers to which LXU provided

services within the 1-year period before May 16, 2025, for the

purpose of soliciting such customers for any Competing

Business at any location.

4. KKI and Farrer, and all persons acting on their behalf, in concert with,

or under their control are preliminarily enjoined from:

(a) for a period of 2 years commencing on the date of this Order,

providing services similar to those previously provided by LXU

to any of Filta’s customers that were serviced by LXU within the

1-year period before May 16, 2025, including, without

limitation, oil cleaning and filtration, the delivery of new

cooking oil and kitchen cleaning; and

(b) for a period of 2 years commencing on the date of this Order,

having any contact with any customers to which LXU provided

services within the 1-year period before May 16, 2025, for the

purpose of soliciting such customers to provide services similar

to those previously provided by LXU to any of Filta’s customers

that were serviced by LXU within the 1-year period before May

16, 2025.

5. Defendants and all persons acting on their behalf, in concert with

them, or under their control shall:

(a) deliver to Filta within 30 days all Mobile Filtration Units in

their possession or control;

(b) deliver to Filta within 10 days all Confidential Information (as

defined on pages 2 and 3 of the Franchise Agreement) and all

versions of the Manual in their possession or control and

Defendants shall not retain any copies of any part of the Manual

or Confidential Information;

(c) deliver to Filta within 10 days all FiltaCool filters not in use at

customer locations;

(d) deliver to Filta within 10 days all customer lists or other data

that they collected from customers in connection with their

Filta business;

(e) within 10 days cancel any fictitious name filing or similar filing

and any domain name registrations that associates them with

Filta, the franchised business or the System;

(f) deliver to Filta within 10 days: (i) full contact details for all

customers LXU serviced; and (ii) the names of all other persons

who have inquired about and/or requested the services of LXU

within the 12 months before May 16, 2025;

(g) within 10 days assign to Filta all telephone numbers used by

LXU and Melick in connection with their franchised Filta

business;

(h) within 10 days deliver to Filta all copies of documents

containing Filta’s Confidential Information including, without

limitation, customer information, along with any of the

documents obtained from Filta’s system after May 16, 2025;

(i) within 10 days delete and permanently destroy all documents

containing Filta’s Confidential Information including, without

limitation, customer information, along with any of the

documents obtained from Filta’s system after May 16, 2025;

(j) within 10 days dismantle the Poly Tanks, oil pump, motor for

pump, berm, hoses, fittings, couplings, PVC, ball valves and

tank hose utilized in connection with their collecting, storing

and selling waste vegetable oil;

(k) immediately refrain from accessing Filta’s systems or using, or

providing to others, Filta’s Confidential Information including,

without limitation, customer information; and

(l) comply with their ongoing obligations that survive termination

of the Franchise Agreement including, but not limited to,

Article 17 (Confidential Information) and Article 24

(Indemnification).

6. Defendants shall file with the Court and serve on Filta’s counsel within

fourteen days of this Order a report, in writing and under oath,

setting forth in detail the manner in which Defendants have complied

with this Order.

7. Given Filta’s size and financial condition, coupled with the fact that it

is extremely likely to prevail on its claims, Filta shall not be required

to post a bond.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on December 23, 2025.

<.

PAUL G.

UNITED STATES*DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties