ANDERSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EVA ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 24-2095

KENNETH L. BARITZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Pappert, J. December 23, 2025

MEMORANDUM

Eva Anderson sued Kenneth L. Baritz, Esquire and his law firm Baritz Law

Associates LLC, asserting various claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

She recently violated a court order by refusing to attend her deposition. The

defendants moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), and the

Court grants the motion in part and requires Anderson to pay counsel $5,316.00.

I

Anderson sued Kenneth Baritz and Baritz Law Associates over their efforts to

collect rent Anderson withheld from her landlord. Though Anderson is proceeding pro

se, she has a law degree from Poland and is licensed to practice law there, and she

recently received a Master of Laws from Temple University Beasley School of Law. (Tr.

of Oral Arg., Dec. 4, 2025 at 15–17, Dkt. No. 102.)

In November of 2024, Baritz and his firm moved to dismiss Anderson’s claims,

but the Court denied the motion. Anderson v. Baritz, No. 24-2095, 2025 WL 309047, at

*1–9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2025). In October of 2025, the Baritz defendants served

Anderson with a notice to take her deposition on November 6. (Letter from Monica

Littman to the Court at 1, Dkt. No. 69.) Anderson replied that she was not available to

be deposed until after November 14. (Letter from Eva Anderson to Monica Littman at

3, Dkt. No. 69-1.) She also said she would not answer, among other things,

(1) “irrelevant” questions, (2) questions “designed to harass, embarrass, or intimidate,”

(3) questions about the underlying landlord-tenant litigation or (4) questions about her

medical and treatment history. (Id. at 2.) Concerned that Anderson was attempting to

improperly “place limits” on and “pre-determine” the scope of her deposition, counsel for

the Baritz defendants sought the Court’s intervention. (Letter from Monica Littman to

the Court at 1.)

On October 29, the Court held an on-the-record telephone conference with the

parties. The Court told Anderson she needed to sit for a deposition and answer

questions relevant to the case. See (Tr. of Telephone Conference at 1–25, Dkt. No. 89).

Anderson asserted for the first time she could not sit for an in-person deposition

because she has a heart condition. But, as the Court noted, there was no evidence or

documentation to support such a claim. After the conference, the Court ordered

Anderson to (1) attend an in-person deposition at ten o’clock in the morning on

November 7 at the Baritz defendants’ counsel’s law office and (2) answer questions

regarding, among other things, the underlying landlord-tenant litigation and her

medical treatment and history. (Order, Oct. 29, 2025 at 1, Dkt. No. 73); (Tr. of

Telephone Conference at 5–7.)

Two days before the scheduled deposition, Anderson filed a motion for a remote

deposition, given her purported heart condition. (Mot. to Conduct Deposition by

Remote Means at 1–5, Dkt. No. 75.) The Court denied the motion, reasoning that

Anderson failed to offer any evidence to substantiate her claim. (Order, Nov. 6, 2025 at

1, Dkt. No. 77.) Then, at about three o’clock in the morning on November 7, Anderson

filed another motion seeking to be deposed remotely, this time attaching a doctor’s note

stating that she has atrial fibrillation. (Emergency Mot. for Remote Deposition at 1–4,

Dkt. No. 79); (Penn Medicine at 3, Dkt. No. 79-1.) The motion was docketed after ten in

the morning, the start time for her deposition, but the Court quickly denied it, stating

Anderson’s note failed to explain how her atrial fibrillation, a heart condition common

to many Americans, prevented her from sitting for an in-person deposition. (Order,

Nov. 7, 2025 at 1–2, Dkt. No. 80.)

Anderson violated the Court’s October 29 Order by not showing up for her

November 7 deposition. After rejecting Anderson’s further efforts to avoid being

deposed in person, see (Order, Nov. 10, 2025 at 1, Dkt. No. 83); (Order, Dec. 2, 2025 at

1, Dkt. No. 95), the Court ordered Anderson’s in-person deposition to take place in

Courtroom 11-A on December 19, see (Order, Dec. 5, 2025 at 1, Dkt. No. 99). She was

deposed, finally, that day.

The defendants in the meantime moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(b)(2)(C). They seek reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused

by Anderson’s failure to appear for her November 7 deposition, or in the alternative, a

dismissal of her case. At oral argument, the Court told the parties that dismissal was

not an “appropriate sanction” under the circumstances, (Tr. of Oral Arg., Dec. 4, 2025 at

29), leaving only the defendants’ request for monetary sanctions.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) authorizes a court to sanction a party

who “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Because Anderson refused

to comply with an order requiring her to sit for a deposition, she “fail[ed] to obey an

order to provide or permit discovery.” In such a circumstance, the Court must order the

“disobedient party . . . to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused

by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances

make an award of expenses unjust,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), with the disobedient

party bearing the burden of proof, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to

1970 amendments.

A

A party is substantially justified in failing to comply with a court order if there

was a genuine dispute concerning compliance such that reasonable people could differ

as to whether compliance was required. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988);

Painadath v. Good Shepherd Penn Partners, 348 F.R.D. 16, 34 (E.D. Pa. 2024). To

satisfy this standard, the disobedient party typically must show her disobedience was

(1) based on a good faith and reasonable misunderstanding of her obligations under the

order, (2) only technical or at the periphery of the order causing the other party to

suffer no prejudice or (3) attributable entirely to forces or circumstances beyond the

party’s control. See 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 37.51[9],

LEXIS (database updated 2025).

Anderson’s disobedience does not fit into any of those boxes. Reasonable people

could not have misunderstood Anderson’s obligations under the Court’s October 29

Order. It required her to attend an in-person deposition at ten o’clock in the morning

on November 7 at the Baritz defendants’ counsel’s law office, and her disobedience was

not technical. And no external force or circumstance prevented Anderson from

attending her deposition.

Anderson seeks to justify her violation of the Court’s Order in two ways, neither

of which is persuasive.

First, she argues her “emergency” motion for a remote deposition was pending

before the Court on the day of her deposition. Thus, she says, she “acted reasonably

and in good faith by awaiting a ruling on a motion that directly affected her ability to

safely participate in the deposition.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Sanctions at 6, Dkt.

No. 88.) As an initial matter, Anderson’s filing of a motion for a remote deposition

under Rule 30(a)(4) did not stay her obligation to comply with the Court’s October 29

Order requiring her attendance at an in-person deposition.1 More to the point, the

Court had already denied Anderson’s prior motion seeking a remote deposition.

Anderson’s November 7 nocturnal motion was a calculated maneuver designed to avoid

being deposed in person, in direct contravention of the Court’s Order. She filed the

motion at roughly three o’clock in the morning, seven hours before her deposition was

to begin. The Court first learned of it when it hit the docket shortly after ten o’clock,

the start time of her deposition. And after the Court denied Anderson’s motion, she

1 Anderson argues that her failure to attend her November 7 deposition is excused under Rule

37(d)(2) because she had a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c). Even if her

“emergency” motion for a remote deposition under Rule 30(a)(4) can be characterized as a motion for

a protective order under Rule 26, Rule 37(d) applies to situations where a party fails to appear for a

deposition after being served with proper notice. The defendants here do not seek sanctions under

Rule 37(d), however, so that rule is not applicable. They instead seek sanctions under Rule 37(b),

which deals with a party’s failure to comply with a court order.

never contacted the defendants, nor did she make any effort to attend her deposition.

To accept Anderson’s argument would “invite continued argument on an issue already

decided, and seriously undermine the authority of the Court.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of

Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 110 F.R.D. 363, 373 (D. Del. 1986). In short, she was

not “‘substantially justified’ in willfully defying a court order, notwithstanding [her]

continued belief in the correctness of [her] position” that she could unilaterally dictate

the manner in which she could be questioned by defense counsel. Id.

Second, Anderson argues her “treating cardiologist expressly warned” her that

sitting for an in-person deposition “posed a significant health risk.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. for Sanctions at 7.) Specifically, she claims her doctor told her that “stress,

exertion, and prolonged in-person proceedings present[] a significant, medically

substantiated” risk of “cardiac” attack or “stroke.” (Id. at 15.) But Anderson fails to

support these claims with any “meaningful evidence.” 7 James Wm. Moore et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 37.50[1][c], LEXIS (database updated 2025). The only

medical evidence or documentation Anderson submitted to the Court regarding her

heart condition is a doctor’s note attached to one of her motions for a remote deposition

stating she has atrial fibrillation. But again, the note failed to explain why atrial

fibrillation, a common medical condition, prevented Anderson from sitting for an in-

person deposition.

B

The Court must next consider whether an award of expenses would be unjust.

In doing so, the Court considers the equities of the situation, including the “degree of

the sanction in light of the severity of the transgression.” Tracinda Corp. v.

DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 241 (3d Cir. 2007). A plaintiff’s pro se status does

not prevent a court from imposing monetary sanctions. Painadath, 348 F.R.D. at 34.

To begin, Anderson fails to offer any argument as to why an award of expenses

would be unjust. As the disobedient party, she bears the burden of persuasion. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendments. She obviously fails to carry

that burden.

In any event, an award of expenses is proportionate to Anderson’s transgression.

The Court ordered Anderson to be deposed in person, warning her that a failure to

comply could result in sanctions. (Order, Oct. 29, 2025 at 1.) She then filed a baseless

motion seeking relief the Court had already denied during the October 29 telephone

conference. She then tried again in the pre-dawn hours of her deposition date. And

though the Court denied this motion shortly after it was docketed, Anderson failed to

show. In short, Anderson willfully disobeyed a court order for no good reason and with

full knowledge of the consequences. She thumbed her nose at the Court and wasted the

defendants’ time and money, causing them to pay for a court reporter and file this

motion for sanctions. Finding an award of expenses to be unjust in this situation would

contravene two of the principal purposes of a Rule 37 monetary sanction: Redressing

“economic harms caused by violations of discovery orders” and preserving the Court’s

authority to oversee the orderly “administration of justice.” 7 James Wm. Moore et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 37.50[1][a], LEXIS (database updated 2025).

C

Because Anderson was not justified in failing to comply with the Court’s Order,

and because an award of expenses would not be unjust, the Court now calculates “the

reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by [her] failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(C). In total, the defendants seek $10,141.00, a figure that comes from three

general categories of expenses: (1) the court reporter fee for Anderson’s November 7

deposition ($390), (2) attorney’s fees associated with the filing of this motion for

sanctions ($4,926) and (3) the attorney’s fees associated with preparation for Anderson’s

November 7 deposition and other related matters ($4,825). The Court will not consider

the third category of expenses because Anderson was eventually deposed, and the Court

does not know how much, if any, additional time defense counsel spent preparing for

the second deposition.

1

The defendants first seek to recover the non-refundable fee for the court reporter

scheduled to be present at Anderson’s November 7 deposition—$390. (Exhibit 1 at 2,

Dkt. No. 92-1.) This expense is clearly reasonable and caused by Anderson’s failure to

appear for her deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

2

The defendants next request attorney’s fees in connection with filing this motion.

Attorney’s fees associated with a motion for sanctions qualify as expenses caused by a

disobedient party’s failure to comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see

Cerco Bridge Loans 6 LLC v. Schenker, 768 F. Supp. 3d 559, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)

(explaining that reasonable fees may include attorney’s fees and costs in connection

with filing a motion for sanctions); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 729 F.2d

469, 475 (7th Cir. 1984) (endorsing the view that Rule 37(b) monetary sanctions include

all expenses that would not have been sustained had the disobedient party conducted

herself properly). To test whether attorney’s fees are reasonable under Rule

37(b)(2)(C), courts use the “lodestar” method—that is, the product of the reasonable

hours spent on the matter and a reasonable hourly rate. Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of

Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Doe v. Mast, No. 22-cv-

00049, 2025 WL 1787436, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 27, 2025). The party moving for

attorney’s fees bears the burden to show that her rates and hours are reasonable by

submitting “evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).

Two attorneys for the defendants—Dominic Borelli and Monica Littman—

worked on the briefs in support of their motion. Their billing rates were $235 and $275

per hour, respectively. Borelli and Littman submitted certifications outlining their

qualifications, years of experience and time spent on the matter. (Dominic Borelli Decl.

at 1–5, Dkt. No. 106); (Monica Littman Decl. at 1–6, Dkt. No. 107.) They also

submitted average prevailing rates in the market. Borelli is a 2023 graduate of

Widener University, Delaware School of Law and an associate in Kaufman Dolowich’s

Financial Services & Institutions Practice Group. (Dominic Borelli Decl. ¶¶ 5–6.)

Littman is a 2004 graduate of Villanova University School of Law and the Co-Vice

Chair of Kaufman Dolowich’s Financial Services & Institutions Practices Group.

(Monica Littman Decl. ¶¶ 7–8.)

Borelli’s and Littman’s hourly rates ($235 and $275, respectively) are lower than

the average rates charged by other attorneys with comparable experience ($265–315

and $630–$715, respectively) according to the schedule set by the Community Legal

Services, Inc. Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing

that the fee schedule established by the Community Legal Services, Inc. is a fair

reflection of the prevailing market rates in Philadelphia). Borelli’s $235 and Littman’s

$275-per-hour rates are reasonable.

Borelli billed 11.6 hours in connection with this motion; Littman billed 8. They

both provided a line-by-line itemization describing the tasks performed and hours

billed. See (Exhibit 8 at 2–3, Dkt. No. 85-8); (Exhibit 2 at 2, Dkt. No. 92-2). After

scrutinizing every line item, the Court concludes that the 19.6 hours billed are

reasonable. Multiplying the $235 hourly rate by the 11.6 hours expended yields $2,726;

multiplying the $275 hourly rate by the 8 hours expended equals $2,200. These fees,

combined with the court reporter’s bill, result in a total sanction of $5,316.00.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

Gerald J. Pappert, J.