Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------X

JOHN DOE, ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR

CHILD, JANE ROE1,

ORDER

Plaintiff, 25-CV-06214(JS)(SIL)

-against-

OCEANSIDE UNION FREE SCHOOL

DISTRICT, DR. PHYLLIS S.

HARRINGTON, JULIE MCGAHAN, DR. J.

DEROSA, and ANTWAN HASKOOR, M.D.,

Defendants.

--------------------------------X

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Chad A. Davenport, Esq.

Davenport Law PLLC

6384 Deanna Drive

Hamburg, New York 14075

For Defendants: Brian S. Sokoloff, Esq.

Chelsea Ella Weisbord, Esq.

Sokoloff Stern LLP

179 Westbury Avenue

Carle Place, New York 11514

Lisa M. Griffith, Esq.

Steven E. Smith, Esq.

LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.

290 Broadhollow Road

Suite 305

Melville, New York 11747

SEYBERT, District Judge:

1 Hearing no opposition to Plaintiff’s Letter Motion to Amend the

Caption to identify the minor child as “Jane Roe” (see ECF No.

12), said Letter Motion is GRANTED.

Presently before the Court is the Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction brought by Plaintiff

John Doe (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of his minor child Jane Roe

(“Jane”), against Defendants Oceanside Union Free School District

(“Oceanside” or the “District”), Dr. Phyllis S. Harrington, Julie

McGahan, Dr. J. DeRosa (collectively with the District the

“Oceanside Defendants”), and Antwan Haskoor, M.D. (“Dr. Haskoor”)

(collectively with the Oceanside Defendants, the “Defendants”).

(See ECF No. 5, hereinafter, the “TRO Motion,” see also “Compl.”,

ECF No. 1; “Reply,” ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed the TRO Motion

after the District denied Jane’s request for a medical exemption

from New York State’s school immunization requirements. (TRO

Motion at 1); see also N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164 (“§ 2164”).

Consequently, Jane has been barred from school since September 29,

2025. (TRO Motion at 7.) Plaintiff seeks an injunction (1)

enjoining and restraining Defendants from barring Jane from

school, and (2) compelling Defendants to approve Jane’s medical

exemption. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff argues the District’s denial

violates § 2164(8), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the

First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (TRO

Motion at 12-23.) Defendants oppose the TRO Motion. (See “Dr.

Haskoor Opp’n”, ECF No. 10; “Oceanside Opp’n”, ECF No. 11.) For

the reasons stated below, the TRO Motion is DENIED in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

I. Relevant Factual Background

Jane is a five-year-old enrolled at Oceanside’s School

#6 Early Learning Center (the “School”). (Compl. ¶ 10; TRO Motion

at 22.) Since September 29, 2025, she has been barred from School

because the District denied her request for a medical exemption

from New York State’s DTAP, Varicella, MMR, and Polio immunization

requirements; she is consequently not receiving instruction or the

specialized educational services the District would have provided

in connection with her autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) diagnosis.

(Compl. ¶¶ 3, 20, 23; TRO Motion at 2-4; the Denial Letter, Ex. G,

ECF No. 5-9, attached to the “Davenport Declaration”, ECF No. 5-

1); see also § 2164 (8).

Plaintiff registered Jane for kindergarten in early

2025, without documentation of any immunization or doctor-approved

exemption. (Oceanside Opp’n at 4; DeRosa Declaration at ¶ 12, ECF

No. 11-14, attached to the “Sokoloff Declaration”, ECF No. 11-1.)

On February 18, 2025, the District emailed Plaintiff, stating it

did not have Jane’s required immunization paperwork. (Oceanside

Opp’n at 4; DeRosa Declaration ¶ 13; February 18, 2025 Registration

Email, Ex. H, ECF No. 11-9, attached to the Sokoloff Declaration.)

2 Because neither the TRO Motion nor the Reply include page numbers,

the Court will consider the pages beginning with “Preliminary

Statement” on each respective filing as Page No. 1. For ease of

citation, best practice is to include page numbers in submissions.

When the February 18 email did not prompt any action from

Plaintiff, the District sent Plaintiff additional emails on March

6, March 19, August 1, and August 6, 2025, which similarly prompted

no action. (Oceanside Opp’n at 4; DeRosa Declaration ¶ 13.) On

August 26, 2025, a School nurse called Jane’s mother, informing

her Jane would be barred from the School starting on September 16,

2025 if Plaintiff could not show Jane: (1) had received all

required vaccinations; (2) was in the process of receiving them;

or (3) was approved for a valid medical exemption. (Oceanside

Opp’n at 4-5; Cohen Declaration ¶¶ 5-7, ECF No. 11-16, attached to

the Sokoloff Declaration.) Jane’s mother indicated over the phone

that she would send a medical exemption request, because of Jane’s

ASD diagnosis. (Cohen Declaration ¶ 7.) Despite her unresolved

immunization status, Jane was temporarily admitted to the School

in September. (Compl. ¶ 46; TRO Motion at 9.)

On September 5, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a medical

exemption request signed by Dr. Eric Goldstein (the “Exemption

Request”), which identified the following contraindications:

(a) Re: DTAP: A genetic MTHFR mutation impairing detoxification,

increased risk of contraindication due to ASD, and a prior

severe reaction of “muscular ticks/seizing” (Compl. ¶ 23; TRO

Motion at 4; Exemption Request Packet, Ex. B at 5, ECF No. 5-

3, attached to the Davenport Declaration);

(b) Re: Varicella: Reduced immune function and recurring

infections attributed to ASD and a prior vaccine-induced

pneumonia;

(c) Re: MMR: Immune deficiency and suppression associated with

ASD, prior vaccine-induced “muscular twitches and seizure”,

and a family history of seizures; and

(d) Re: Polio: Chronic eczema linked to an ingredient

contraindication, a family history of asthma, ASD-related

ingredient hypersensitivity, and a “severe reaction to the

last dose” (Compl. ¶ 23; TRO Motion at 4; Exemption Request

Packet at 6.)3

Although § 2164 (8) does not recognize non-medical

exemptions, Plaintiff has indicated he has religious objections to

vaccinations as well. § 2164 (8); (see also Compl. ¶¶ 115-24; TRO

Motion at 16-17; Religious Exemption Request, Ex. N, ECF No. 5-

15, attached to the Davenport Declaration.) Plaintiff’s religious-

based objection to vaccinations is informed by his personal

religious experiences and interpretation of the Bible, which are

rooted in his Catholic faith. (Id.) An undated exhibit shows a

letter purportedly authored by Plaintiff, in which he appears to

request a religious exemption from the District, although it is

unclear whether this letter was ever actually sent. (Religious

Exemption Request.)

On September 11, 2025, Dr. Haskoor, the District’s

medical director, recommended the District deny the Exemption

Request. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-37; TRO Motion at 5-6; DeRosa Decl. ¶ 15.)

Dr. Haskoor believed the asserted contraindications were not

3 The Complaint and TRO Motion indicate the Exemption Request was

submitted on September 11, 2025, but the Exemption Request

Packet is dated September 5, 2025, and the DeRosa Declaration

indicates Defendants received the Exemption Request on September

5, 2025. (See DeRosa Declaration ¶ 14.)

recognized under the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices

(“ACIP”) standards. (Id.) After discussing Jane’s Exemption

Request with Dr. Goldstein, his conclusion remained unaltered.

(TRO Motion at 5-6; DeRosa Decl. ¶ 16.) On September 15, 2025,

School Principal Julie McGahan denied the Exemption Request,

because it did not “contai[n] sufficient information to identify

a medical contraindication to a specific immunization and

specifying the length of time the immunization is medically

contraindicated”. (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27; TRO Motion at 11; Initial

Rejection Letter, Ex. C, ECF No. 5-4, attached to the Davenport

Declaration.) Later that evening, Dr. Goldstein submitted a

clarifying addendum, representing the contraindications may be

permanent but would be re-evaluated annually. (Compl. ¶¶ 30-31;

TRO Motion at 4-5; Exemption Request Addendum, Ex. D, ECF No. 5-

5, attached to the Davenport Declaration.) On September 22, 2025,

Principal McGahan requested additional details on Jane’s purported

adverse reactions. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33; TRO Motion at 5; Supplemental

Request, Ex. E, ECF No. 5-6, attached to the Davenport

Declaration.) On September 24, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sent the

District a letter demanding the Exemption Request be granted,

adding: “we are prepared to immediately file for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in the U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of New York.” (Compl. ¶¶ 41-43;

TRO Motion at 6; Demand Letter, Ex. H, ECF No. 5-7, attached to

the Davenport Declaration.) On September 26, 2025, Principal

McGahan issued a final denial of the Exemption Request, effective

September 29, 2025, citing insufficient evidence of a valid

contraindication and Plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with the

District’s September 22 request. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-46; TRO Motion at

7; Final Denial Letter, Ex. G, ECF No. 5-8, attached to the

Davenport Declaration.)

II. Administrative Appeal & Relevant Procedural Background

On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an administrative

appeal of the District’s decision with the New York State

Commissioner of Education (the “Commissioner”), as provided for by

N.Y. Education Law § 310 (hereinafter, the “Administrative

Appeal”). (Compl. ¶¶ 48-49; TRO Motion at 7; Administrative Appeal

Motion, Ex. H, ECF No. 5-9, attached to the Davenport Declaration.)

As part of the Administrative Appeal, Plaintiff also requested a

stay of the District’s denial pending resolution of the appeal.

(Id.) On October 10, 2025, the District filed an opposition to the

stay request; the stay request was denied on October 15, 2025.

(Compl. ¶¶ 49-50; Administrative Appeal Opp’n, Ex. I, ECF No. 5-

10, attached to the Davenport Declaration; Stay Denial, Ex. K, ECF

No. 5-12, attached to the Davenport Declaration.) The Commissioner

subsequently extended the District’s time to respond to the appeal,

moving its deadline from November 10 to December 10, 2025. (Compl.

¶ 52; TRO Motion at 7-8; Extension Letter, Ex. P, ECF No. 5-17,

attached to the Davenport Declaration.)

Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 7, 2025, and

the TRO Motion on November 11, 2025. (See Compl.; TRO Motion.)

The Complaint and TRO Motion allege the District’s denial violates:

(1) § 2164(8), on grounds the District improperly rejected the

Exemption Request; (2) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act, on grounds the Exemption Request is a protected disability-

based “reasonable accommodation”; (3) Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, on similar “reasonable accommodation” grounds;

(4) the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, on grounds

Defendants’ conduct violates Plaintiff’s substantive due process

rights; (5) the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, based on

Plaintiff’s religious objection to vaccination; and (6) Monell

liability against the District, on grounds its exemption denial

policies are illegal.4 (Compl. at 20-33; TRO Motion at 9-19.)

Throughout the TRO Motion, Plaintiff also alleges the District’s

denial defies the injunction issued in Doe v. Oceanside Union Free

School District, No. 25-CV-2304 (GRB)(ST) (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Doe

I”), a separate vaccine exemption case involving an Oceanside High

School student. (See TRO Motion at 6.) Plaintiff also argues the

public interest and balance of equities favor an injunction, as

4 Plaintiff asserts the latter three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

Jane’s need for education and services should take precedence over

any burden the District bears in admitting Jane. (TRO Motion at

21-25.) On November 12, 2025, this Court declined to immediately

issue a TRO and set a briefing schedule. (See Nov. 12, 2025

Order.) The Oceanside Defendants and Dr. Haskoor filed separate

oppositions on November 21, 2025, and Plaintiff filed his Reply on

December 1, 2025.

In their Opposition, the Oceanside Defendants stress the

high burden a movant must clear to obtain a preliminary injunction,

which is even higher for “mandatory” injunctions altering the

parties’ status quo positions and for injunctions affecting

“government action taken in the public interest under a statutory

or regulatory scheme.” (Oceanside Opp’n at 7-8 (citing, e.g.,

Monserrate v. N.Y. State Senate, 599 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2010)

(“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never

awarded as of right”); Mastrovincenzo v. City of N.Y., 435 F.3d

78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (“mandatory” injunctions “alter the status

quo by commanding some positive act” and accordingly require movant

to “demonstrate a greater likelihood of success”)).) In the

Oceanside Defendants’ view, any showing of irreparable harm is

diminished, because of Plaintiff’s delay in filing the TRO Motion.

(Oceanside Opp’n at 9-12.) The Oceanside Defendants also argue

Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of

any claim, and that the District’s interest in public health tips

the balance of hardships and public interest in their favor. (Id.

at 13, 24-25.) Dr. Haskoor’s Opposition raises several

individualized defenses purportedly applying to him, as an outside

consultant not formally employed by the District. (Dr. Haskoor

Opp’n at 1-2.)

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law

“A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1)

irreparable harm; (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits

or both serious questions on the merits and a balance of hardships

decidedly favoring the moving party; and (3) that a preliminary

injunction is in the public interest”. N. Am. Soccer League, LLC

v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing

N.Y. ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d

Cir. 2015)). “The typical preliminary injunction is prohibitory

and generally seeks only to maintain the status quo pending a trial

on the merits. A mandatory injunction, in contrast, is said to

alter the status quo by commanding some positive act . . . [and]

thus alters the traditional formula by requiring that the movant

demonstrate a greater likelihood of success”. Mastrovincenzo, 435

F.3d at 89 (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60

F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original)); see also N.

Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37 (citing N.Y.C.L. Union v. N.Y.C.

Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012) (instructing party

seeking mandatory injunction to show “a clear or substantial

likelihood of success on the merits”). The “‘[s]tatus quo’ to be

preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable

uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy”.

Mastrio v. Sebelius, 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing

LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 n.7 (2d Cir. 1994); see also

Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 701 F. Supp. 2d 414, 426

(E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 500 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Caviezel

I”) (injunction requiring school to register unvaccinated student

would “affect government action taken in the public interest

pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme” and “alter the status

quo”)). “It is well established that the standard for entry of a

temporary restraining order is the same as for a preliminary

injunction”. Cooper v. Fire & Ice Trucking, Corp., 783 F. Supp.

3d 744, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Spencer Trask Software & Info.

Servs., LLC v. RPost Int’l, Ltd., 190 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580

(S.D.N.Y. 2002).) “[H]earsay evidence may be considered by a

district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary

injunction.” Mullins v. City of N.Y., 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.

2010).

II. Application

1. The Sought Injunction is Mandatory

Plaintiff contends the “last actual, peaceable

uncontested status” was “[Jane’s] position as an enrolled

kindergarten student permitted to attend” the School. (TRO Motion

at 8-9.) But Jane’s temporary admission was anything but peaceable;

the parties engaged in adverse communications throughout this

period. (See infra at 4-6 (“Relevant Factual Background” section.)

In contrast with Jane’s fraught and temporary admission, Plaintiff

seeks an indefinite injunction “[d]irecting Defendants to

immediately accept [Jane Roe’s] valid medical exemption[.]” (TRO

Motion at 25 (emphasis added).) Such an injunction can only be

categorized as mandatory, as it commands positive conduct. See

Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 89.

The positive conduct Plaintiff seeks to compel mirrors

the relief sought in Caviezel I. 701 F. Supp. 2d at 426. In

Caviezel I, the plaintiff sought an injunction requiring a school

district to register a student “without being required to be

vaccinated.” Id. at 425-26. The Court determined such an

injunction “w[ould] alter the status quo” and accordingly applied

the “clear or substantial” likelihood of success standard to

Plaintiff’s claims. Id. As an injunction in this matter would

similarly alter the status quo, in addition to disrupting New

York’s action taken in the public interest under a statutory or

regulatory scheme, Plaintiff must show “a clear or substantial

likelihood of success on the merits” of his claims to obtain the

sought relief. N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37.

2. Plaintiff’s Delays Diminish Showing of Harm

Irreparable harm is “the single most important

prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction . . .

the moving party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely

before the other requirements for the issuance of an injunction

will be considered”. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175

F.3d 227, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

“[I]rreparable harm exists ‘where, but for the grant of equitable

relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution

of the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they

previously occupied.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Tri-Borough

NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 80 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting

Brenntag Int’l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249

(2d Cir. 1999)). Loss of education has been held to be a form of

irreparable harm. See, e.g., NM v. Hebrew Acad. Long Beach, 155

F. Supp. 3d 247, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“school-aged children have

been deemed irreparably injured as a result of being excluded from

attending classes”); Caviezel I, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (court is

“satisfied” precluding child from school amounts to irreparable

harm). However, delay in seeking relief can mitigate against a

finding of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Fisher–Price, Inc. v.

Well–Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting

Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985))

(“‘[p]reliminary injunctions are generally granted under the

theory that there is an urgent need for speedy action to protect

the plaintiffs’ rights,’ and a delay in enforcement ‘tends to

indicate at least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy

action.’”); Garland v. N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, 574 F. Supp. 3d 120, 132

(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ claimed need for injunctive relief

is belied by their own delay in seeking that relief”).

The Complaint and TRO Motion detail Jane’s need for

education and specialized services, which she is not receiving

while she is excluded from school. (See Compl. ¶ 20; TRO Motion

at 20-21.) Without these services, it is possible Jane could

developmentally regress. These conditions, coupled with the

precedents finding education-based irreparable harm, tend to

support Plaintiff’s position. See NM, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 257;

Caviezel I, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 426.

However, Plaintiff’s position is undercut by his delay

in seeking relief, leading the Court to conclude this factor weighs

only slightly in Plaintiff’s favor. The delay analysis in Garland

v. N.Y.C. Fire Department is instructive. On October 21, 2021,

several New York City firefighters were informed they would be

barred from facilities if they did not receive a COVID-19

vaccination dose by October 29, 2021. 574 F. Supp. 3d at 123. On

November 24, 2021, several firefighters sought to enjoin the

action. Id. The Court denied this request because “Plaintiffs’

claimed need for injunctive relief is belied by their own delay in

seeking that relief”. Id. at 132.

A similar approach is warranted here. From February to

August 2025, the District repeatedly contacted Plaintiff about

Jane’s vaccination records, including by warning that Jane would

eventually be barred from school if she remained noncompliant.

(See infra at 3-4.) After several months of inaction, Plaintiff

did not submit the Exemption Request until September 5, 2025. (See

infra at 4-5.) Even after the District issued its final denial on

September 26, 2025, Plaintiff did not initiate the Administrative

Appeal until October 7, 2025, and did not file the instant

Complaint until several weeks after the Commissioner’s October 15

denial of the stay. (See infra p. 7.) This is so despite counsel’s

representation in his September 24, 2025 demand letter that

Plaintiff was “prepared to immediately file for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in the U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of New York.” (Demand Letter at 1

(emphasis added).) These delays undermine Plaintiff’s claim of

irreparable harm, although this factor is not dispositive because

Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate a “clear or substantial

likelihood of success” on the merits of any claim. N. Am. Soccer

League, 883 F.3d at 37.

3. Plaintiff Has Not Shown A Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Although Plaintiff is free to raise his claims in the

ordinary course of litigation, he has not demonstrated a

preliminary injunction is warranted for any of them, for the

reasons discussed below.

A. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on New York

Public Health Law § 2164(8) Claim

The parties disagree on whether § 2164(8) gives

discretion to school districts in handling exemption requests.

Under Plaintiff’s interpretation, § 2164(8) requires schools to

automatically accept any physician-certified exemption request.

(TRO Motion at 9-10 (citing N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(8); Miller

v. McDonald, 130 F.4th 258, 269 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. granted,

judgment vacated on other grounds, Miller v. McDonald, No. 25-133,

2025 WL 3506969 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2025) (“the authority conferred to

physicians [under § 2164(8)] is not discretionary [and] is limited

by the statute and regulations”); Doe I Tr. 55:24-56:04).) Under

the Oceanside Defendants’ interpretation, § 2164(8) gives school

districts discretion to ascertain whether a request is consistent

with ACIP standards before accepting it. (Oceanside Opp’n at 13-

15 (citing 10 NYCRR §66-1.1(1) (regulation requiring exemption to

be “consistent with ACIP guidance or other nationally recognized

evidence-based standard of care”)).)

The parties also disagree as to whether Plaintiff has

administratively exhausted his § 2164(8) claim and, as a result,

whether the Court can reach the statutory interpretation question

at all. Because the Administrative Appeal is pending, the

Oceanside Defendants argue Plaintiff must exhaust this process, as

required under New York law. (Oceanside Opp’n at 13-14 (citing

Walker v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, 788 F. Supp. 3d 427, 508

(E.D.N.Y. 2025); Watkins-El v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-CV-2256,

2016 WL 5867048, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016); 10 NYCRR §66-1.1,

1.3(c)); see also “Doe v. Kellenberg Tr.,” Ex, L, ECF No. 11-13,

attached to the “Sokoloff Declaration” (transcript of bench ruling

in Doe v. Kellenberg Mem’l High Sch., No. 25-CV-06013 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 10, 2025).) Plaintiff alternatively contends: (1) the state

administrative process is futile because the Commissioner extended

the District’s time to respond (see TRO Motion at 7-8); (2)

Plaintiff “diligently exhausted the futile state administrative

process” by seeking an emergency stay; (Reply at 1-2), and (3)

exhaustion is not required by New York state law (see Id. at 7-8

(citing N.Y. Educ. L. § 310)).

Because “[c]ourts in this Circuit have held that, as a

prerequisite to bringing a state claim in federal court,

individuals suing school districts and their employees for denying

a[n] exemption from Section 2164’s school immunization mandate

must first exhaust administrative remedies by appealing that

decision to the Commissioner of Education”, the Court agrees

Plaintiff has failed to administratively exhaust his claim.

Walker, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 517 (citing Caviezel I, 701 F.Supp 2d

at 425.) For example, in Walker, plaintiffs were denied an

injunction to reinstate unvaccinated students because they failed

to file an administrative appeal. 788 F. Supp. 3d at 517. In

Watkins-El, the Court also deemed a failure to administratively

appeal a school’s exemption decision as a failure to exhaust. 2016

WL 5867048, at *3. In Doe v. Kellenberg Memorial High School, the

Court also denied a preliminary injunction brought on behalf of an

unvaccinated student with a pending administrative appeal. (See

Doe v. Kellenberg Tr.) In ruling from the bench, Judge Choudhury

explained “failure to exhaust is a serious issue, and I haven’t

seen an argument or a demonstration that the failure to exhaust

would permit me to even rule on the [§ 2164(8)] claim”. (Doe v.

Kellenberg Tr. 96:13-22.) Throughout her ruling, the Judge also

emphasized the heightened showing on the merits a plaintiff must

make to obtain extraordinary injunctive relief, especially where

the injunction is mandatory and disrupts state enforcement of a

regulatory regime, such as here, as opposed to the comparatively

lower standard needed to survive a motion to dismiss. (Id. at

88:07-16; 92:05-93:08.) Plaintiff counters by citing to Caviezel

v. Great Neck Public Schools, 739 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282 (E.D.N.Y.

2010) (“Caviezel II”), which Plaintiff says supports the

proposition that “exhaustion is excused where the remedy is

futile,” although Caviezel II did not address the futility of

administrative processes. (Reply at 8.)

In light of the caution this Court must exercise in

granting a mandatory injunction—especially where the injunction

affects a state regulatory regime—the Court finds the exhaustion

issue warrants against granting the injunction. Walker, 788 F.

Supp. 3d at 517; Watkins-El, 2016 WL 5867048, at *3; (Doe v.

Kellenberg Tr. 88:07-16; 92:05-93:08; 96:13-22). To the extent

Plaintiff wishes to show this claim does not need to be exhausted,

he may do so at a later stage, but he cannot currently demonstrate

the “clear or substantial likelihood of success” needed to obtain

the sought injunction. N. Am. Soccer League, LLC, 883 F.3d at 37.

Plaintiff also repeatedly asserts Defendants “willfully”

defied the Doe I injunction by denying Jane’s Exemption Request.

(See, e.g., TRO Motion at 11.) This is incorrect. While Judge

Brown did issue a preliminary injunction on behalf of a separate

Oceanside High School student with an immunization exemption

claim, his decision was “based on a very limited set of facts, and

it’s very specific to this case”. (Doe I Tr. at 53:1-54:21.)

Defendants have no obligations to Plaintiff or Jane under Doe I.

Doe I is also factually distinguishable. The Doe I

plaintiff sought an exemption from the final of three required

Hepatitis B vaccinations due to a history of vaccine-related

injuries, hospitalizations, near-death experiences, and other

related contraindications. (Doe I Tr. at 3:15-5:03.) Seven

doctors represented the plaintiff could not receive the vaccine;

some indicated she could even die upon receiving it. (Id. at

15:19-16:04.) In weighing the injunction’s public interest

factor, Judge Brown also observed the plaintiff was partially

inoculated against Hepatitis B which, in any event, carried a low

risk of transmission in schools. (Doe I Tr. at 59:15-23.)

By contrast, Jane is missing four vaccines and does not

have similar corroboration to extreme contraindications. (Compl.

¶ 23; TRO Motion at 4; Final Denial Letter.) To the contrary,

Plaintiff failed to provide additional corroborative information

when the District requested it. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-46; TRO Motion at

7; Final Denial Letter.) The record also does not contain

information showing, as the Doe I Court found, the missing

vaccinations do not pose a substantial risk to other students and

faculty. Thus Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on

the § 2164(8) claim at this stage.5

B. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the ADA

or Rehabilitation Act Claims

Plaintiff has additionally failed to establish a

likelihood of success on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.

To establish a failure to make a “reasonable accommodation” under

the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1)

that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she

was excluded from participation in a public entity’s services,

programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by

a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was

due to her disability”. Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 259 (2d Cir.

2016) (quoting Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir.2009)).

One of the two cases Plaintiff relies upon to establish the

“reasonable accommodation” element, Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire

Department, 352 F.3d 565, 565 (2d Cir. 2003), is factually

inapposite. (TRO Motion at 15.) Tsombanidis held a city failed to

reasonably accommodate the owners and residents of an addiction

recovery home by denying a zoning variance. Id. Plaintiff cites

this case in support of his assertion that the District

5 Because the exhaustion issue precludes a finding of a clear

likelihood of success on the merits, the Court declines to address

the parties’ supplemental jurisdiction arguments under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367.

discriminated against Jane “by reason of her disability”, but he

offers no explanation as to how the decision establishes a

likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. (TRO Motion at

15 (citing Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 580).)

Plaintiff’s citation to Doe I seems more availing as to

the ADA claim, but nonetheless fails to demonstrate a “clear or

substantial” likelihood of success. (TRO Motion at 15); N. Am.

Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37. In Doe I, ruling from the bench,

Judge Brown stated, “I do think that under the ADA, there is a

cognizable claim here” but he did not elaborate further upon the

ADA claim. (Doe I Tr. at 54:08-10.) As discussed above, the

remainder of Judge Brown’s ruling primarily rested on New York

State law and a distinguishable set of facts. (See infra at 19-

20).

These authorities contrast with the Second Circuit’s

explanation that a medical exemption denial does “not bar students

with disabilities from schools because of their disabilities.

Children who cannot be safely vaccinated because of their

disability will receive a medical exemption and may attend school,

so long as they can demonstrate a medical need, based on a national

evidence-based standard, for an exemption”. Goe v. Zucker, 43

F.4th 19, 36 (2d Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original). “[T]o the

extent there is a disagreement on whether the requirements are met

in any particular case”, the Second Circuit explains “parents can

appeal to the Commissioner of Education and seek judicial review

in the state court system through an Article 78 proceeding”. Id.;

see also D.A.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 45 F. Supp. 3d 400, 400-

403 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (denial of medical exemption for autistic

student does not violate Rehabilitation Act). Plaintiff

accordingly cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on these

claims.6

C. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the

Substantive Due Process Claim

Plaintiff also posits the District’s initial denial,

request for additional information, and final denial are “the

antithesis of a rational, good-faith application of the law [and

amount to] a bad-faith, arbitrary campaign against a

five‑year‑old child”, such that the conduct violates the

Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protections.

(TRO Motion at 16.) Plaintiff contends this conduct satisfies

the “shocks the contemporary conscience” standard because it was

“undertaken in willful defiance of” the injunction in Doe I.

6 As to the individual Defendants, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims are unlikely to succeed because “[n]either Title II of the

ADA nor § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides for individual

capacity suits against state officials”. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health

Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).

(Id. (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847

(1998); (Doe I) (emphasis in original)).)

“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said

to be ‘arbitrary’ in the constitutional sense,” and “the scope of

substantive due process is very limited”. County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); Soundview Assocs. v. Town of

Riverhead, 725 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting

cases). Given substantive due process’s narrow scope, it is

difficult to conclude Defendants’ denial and request for

additional information—done in consultation with a medical doctor—

amount to “the most egregious official conduct”. County of

Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847. Plaintiff cites to no case making

such a finding and, as discussed above, Defendants did not engage

in “willful defiance of” the Doe I injunction. (See infra at 19-

20.) Thus, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on this

claim.

D. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the

Free Exercise Claim

In addition to the medical claims, Plaintiff argues the

District’s denial unconstitutionally burdens his First Amendment

Free Exercise rights. (TRO Motion at 16-17.) While addressing

this claim, both parties cited to Miller v. McDonald, 130 F.4th

258 (2d Cir. 2025), which upheld New York’s repeal of § 2164’s

religious exemption provision. Plaintiff argued Miller only

allowed for a strictly “mandatory” and nondiscretionary medical

exemption regime, which the District failed to provide when it

reviewed the Exemption Request with an “unwritten” “ACIP-only”

standard. (TRO Motion at 17 (citing Miller, 130 F.4th 258).) By

contrast, the Oceanside Defendants argued the Free Exercise claim

cannot be maintained because Miller upheld the immunization law.

(Oceanside Opp’n at 19 (citing Miller, 130 F.4th 258).)

After the parties briefed the TRO Motion, the Supreme

Court vacated Miller in a December 8, 2025 grant, vacate, and

remand order (the “GVR Order”). Miller v. McDonald, No. 25-133,

2025 WL 3506969 (Dec. 8, 2025) (Mem.). The GVR Order granted

certiorari on Miller and remanded the case to the Second Circuit

“for further consideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.

S. 522 (2025)”. Id. The Second Circuit’s Miller opinion is thus

no longer binding precedent. See Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of

Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 114, 121-22 n.2 (2d Cir. 2001)

(“[w]hen imposed by the Supreme Court, vacatur eliminates an

appellate precedent that would otherwise control decision on a

contested question throughout the circuit.”)

Despite the GVR Order, the factual record and the

parties’ legal positions as to the Free Exercise claim are too

underdeveloped to demonstrate Plaintiff has a “clear or

substantial likelihood” of success. N. Am. Soccer League, 883

F.3d at 37; see also Upjohn Co. v. Medtron Lab’ys, Inc., 751 F.

Supp. 416, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining to issue injunction due

to “undeveloped state of the record”). To date, Plaintiff has not

filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority or made any arguments

about the GVR Order, and it is Plaintiff’s burden to show

entitlement to the “extraordinary” relief of a mandatory

injunction with a “greater likelihood” of success on the merits.

Monserrate, 599 F.3d at 154; Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 89.

Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges his vaccine-related religious

beliefs in the Complaint (Compl. ¶¶ 115-24), most of the briefing

and pre-litigation correspondence address a medical exemption. It

is unclear whether Plaintiff ever raised his religious beliefs

with the District. Given Plaintiff’s burden and the extraordinary

nature of a mandatory injunction, the Court cannot grant relief at

this juncture. N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37; Monserrate,

599 F.3d at 154; Sebelius, 768 F.3d at 120.

E. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likelihood of Success on the

Monell Claim

Because Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success

on the underlying claims, he is unable to show a likelihood of

success on his Monell claim. See Morales v. City of N.Y., 752

F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978))(no Monell liability where

Plaintiff’s “underlying constitutional claims” were dismissed).

4. The Balance of Hardships & Public Interest is a Neutral

Factor

Plaintiff argues the hardships Jane faces in being

excluded from school—as she is not receiving instruction,

specialized services, or daily socialization—pale in comparison to

the District’s burdens in admitting her. (TRO Motion at 21-23

(citing A.A.C. on behalf of G.C. v. Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist.,

No. 24-CV-1047, 2025 WL 1201971, at *21 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2025).))

Plaintiff similarly asserts the public interest “is served by

ensuring children have access to education” and that the “public

interest includes protecting child health by respecting the entire

statutory mechanism for medical exemptions”. (TRO Motion at 24

(emphasis in original).) The Oceanside Defendants maintain Jane’s

admission risks exposing “medically vulnerable individuals in or

near [Jane’s] classroom” to disease, including a student with brain

cancer. (Oceanside Opp’n at 24-25 (citing Doe v. Zucker, 520 F.

Supp. 3d 217, 250 (N.D.N.Y. 2021); Goe, 43 F.4th at 36 (further

citation omitted)) see also McGahan Declaration, ¶19, ECF No. 11-

15 (identifying the School’s medically vulnerable students and

employees).)

The Court finds the parties’ asserted interests are

respectively important. If Jane is admitted to school, third

parties could be placed at additional risk of infection. If Jane

is barred from school, she will not receive the education or

socialization she has an interest in receiving.7 Given the

significant societal interests implicated on both sides—public

health and access to education—the Court concludes that these

considerations offset one another and, further, do not favor either

party.

5. Claims Against Dr. Haskoor

Because Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success

on the merits on the aforementioned claims, the Court need not

reach the individualized defenses asserted by Dr. Haskoor.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s TRO Motion (ECF No. 5) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: December 22, 2025

Central Islip, New York

7 While the Court will not compel any action at this stage, it

encourages the District to ascertain whether any alternative

services can be offered to Jane while she is excluded from

attending the School, given “[p]ublic education has a pivotal role

in maintaining the fabric of our society and in sustaining our

political and cultural heritage”. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,

203 (1982). For example, perhaps the parties could agree to a

pendency placement agreement for Jane, under which some of Jane’s

educational needs could be met.