CIESLAK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMIE C.,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 25-46 (MAS)

. MEMORANDUM OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Jamie C.’s (“Plaintiff”)! appeal of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner”) final decision

denying Plaintiff's request for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social

Security Act (the “Act”). (ECF No. 1.) The Court has jurisdiction to review this matter under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) and reaches its decision without oral argument under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below, the Court affirms the

Commissioner’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

In this appeal, the Court must consider whether the Administrative Law Judge’s (the

“ALJ”’) finding that Plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. The Court

begins with the procedural posture and decision by the ALJ.

' The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order

2021-10.

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB in July 2017, alleging a disability onset date of June

16, 2011, and last insured date of March 31, 2019. (AR 19, 421-22, 548, ECF No. 4.7) The Social

Security Administration (the “Administration”) denied the application both initially and upon

reconsideration. (/d. at 250-58.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing (id. at 265-66), and the

ALJ held a telephone hearing on November 5, 2020 (id. at 125-65). On March 24, 2021, the ALJ

denied Plaintiff’s claim. Ud. at 220-34.) Plaintiff appealed that decision, and the Appeals Council

subsequently granted review and remanded the case. Ud. at 245-47.) Following remand, hearings

were held on June 7, 2022 (see id. at 84-124), and October 27, 2022 (see id. at 46-83). On August

30, 2023, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim again. Ud. at 17-45.) Plaintiff submitted a request for

review, which the Appeals Council denied (id. at 1-6), making the ALJ’s August 30, 2023, decision

the Commissioner’s final decision. This appeal followed. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) On

April 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed her moving brief in this action. (Pl.’s Moving Br., ECF No. 7.) The

Commissioner opposed (Def.’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 10), and Plaintiff replied (P1.’s Reply Br., ECF

No. 11).

B. The ALJ’s Decision

In her August 30, 2023, decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled at any

time between June 16, 2011, and March 31, 2019. (AR 31.) The ALJ set forth the Administration’s

five-step sequential analysis for determining whether an individual is disabled. U/d. at 18-19 (citing

20 C.E.R. § 404.1520(a)).) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not “engage in substantial

2 The Administrative Record (“AR”) is located at ECF Nos. 4 through 4-29. The Court will

reference the relevant pages of the AR and will not reference the corresponding ECF page numbers

within those files.

gainful activity” during the period from her alleged onset date through the date last insured. (/d. at

19-20 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571).)

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments:

(1) acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (“ADEM”); (2) migrane headache disorder;

(3) disorders of autonomic nervous system; (4) immune deficiency disorders, excluding HIV

infection; (5) obesity; (6) trauma and stressor related disorders; (7) spine disorder; (8) anxiety and

obsessive compulsive disorders; and (9) depressive, bipolar and related disorders. (/d. at 20 (citing

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s “diagnoses of visual disturbances,

tinnitus, and GERD” were non-severe because “there is no medical evidence, either opinion or

otherwise, contained within the record that indicates any significant limitation in the [Plaintiff’s]

mental and physical abilities to do one or more basis work activities based on these impairments.”

(d.)

Despite the ALJ finding Plaintiff had severe impairments, she determined at step three that

Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments” that qualified under the

Administration’s listed impairments. Ud. at 19-20 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525,

404.1526).) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff possessed the residual functional capacity (the

to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C[.JF[.JR[.]

[§] 404.1567(a) except she can lift and carry up to 10 [pounds]

occasionally and less than 10 [pounds] frequently. She can stand and

walk 2 hours in an 8-hour workday and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance on

wet moving or uneven surfaces, kneel, stoop, and crouch; but she

cannot crawl, climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or work around

hazards, including moving mechanical parts or at unprotected

heights. She can understand and execute simple and routine tasks;

have incidental contact with the public but not with tasks that

involve direct customer service; and make simple decisions and

adapt to occasional changes in essential work tasks. [She] cannot

have concentrated exposure to temperature extremes of heat and

cold, wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor

ventilation. [She] can work in environments with moderate noise

levels. [She] will be off task 10% of the workday and absent once

per month due to the impairments.

(Ud. at 22.)

In determing Plaintiff had the RFC to “perform sedentary work” subject to certain

limitations, the ALJ thoroughly examined Plaintiff’s medical history, including medical records

such as those from Dr. Steven Greco, Ph.D (““Dr. Greco”) and Dr. Deepinder Arora (““Dr. Arora”),

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and the state agency consultants’ shared opinions. (See id. at

23-29.) Although the state agency medical consultants opined that Plaintiff should be limited to

“{I]ight exertion with occasional climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds and environmental

restrictions, such as concentrative noise, due to migraines” and “simple, routine and low contact

work{,]” the ALJ determined that the opinion was only “partially persuasive” because “any

deference that might ordinarily be afforded these assessment[s] under Social Security Ruling

(SSR) 17-2p is diminished by the fact that the consultants did not have the opportunity to examine

[Plaintiff] or review the evidence received after their file review was complete.” (/d. at 28.) Further,

the ALJ considered “a cardiac residual functional capacity questionnaire dated October 16,

2020[,| ... [that] indicates that [Plaintiff] ha[d] been treated since March 2020 for palpitations

and hypertension which would frequently interfere with concentration.” Ud.) The ALJ found,

however, that the opinion was “unpersuasive because it [was] based on less than [twelve] months

of a treating relationship” and noted that “there [was] insufficient explanation for such restrictive

limitations based solely on symptoms of palpitations.” (/d.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was “unable to perform any past relevant

work.” Ud. at 29 (citing 20 CER. § 404.1565).) The ALJ considered that Plaintiff was 39 years

old on the date last insured, which is defined as a “younger individual” and that she has at least a

high school education. (/d. at 29.) The ALJ determined that “[t}ransferability of job skills is not

material... because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that

[Plaintiff] is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not [she] has transferable job skills.” Ud. at 30.) Based on

the aforementioned factors and Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded at step five that “there were

jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy” that Plaintiff could have

performed. (/d. at 30-31 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569(a)).) In doing so, the ALJ relied

upon the testimony of the vocational expert, who testified that an individual of Plaintiff’s age,

education, work experience, and RFC would have been “able to perform the requirements of

representative occupations” such as document preparer, sorter, and addresser. (/d.) Based on the

above findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability “at any time from

June 16, 2011, the alleged onset date, through March 31, 2019, the date last insured[.]” Ud. at 31

(citing 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520(g)).)

This appeal concerns the ALJ’s step-two and step-three analysis pertaining to Plaintiff’s

conversion disorder and various arguments related to whether the ALJ’s determinations are

supported by substantial evidence. (See generally Pl.’s Moving Br.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues

that the ALJ’s failure to acknowledge her conversion disorder as “severe” was “plain error and not

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (Ud. at 21-23.) Plaintiff also argues that the

ALJ: (1) determined “that Dr. Greco’s pre-DLI findings were all normal [which] was a patent

mistake of fact” (id. at 19-20); (2) did not properly evaluate ADEM or its impact on Plaintiff (id.

at 23-25); (3) failed to consider “combined effects of impairments, side effects of medications, and

ageravating factors” (id. at 25-26); (4) failed to properly evaluate the evidence from Dr. Greco (id.

at 26-27); (5) discussed “many things which have tangential relevance to what’s wrong with this

Plaintiff’ (id at 27); (6) failed to consider Plaintiff’s impairments in combination (id. at

27-28); and (7) failed to consider “the impact of ADEM (including it sequelae) and of conversion

disorder on Plaintiff’s ability to function,” which all would have led the ALJ to conclude that

Plaintiff was disabled (id. at 28-29). The Court must therefore resolve whether the ALJ’s decision

is supported by substantial evidence and adequately explained.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

On appeal from the final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power

to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Matthews y. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001).

To survive judicial review, the Commissioner’s decision must be supported by substantial

evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); see

Morales y. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the reviewing court is “bound

to the Commissioner’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence”). Substantial

evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol.

Edison Co. v. NERB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence “‘may be somewhat less

than a preponderance’ of the evidence.” Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (d Cir.

1971) (quoting Laws vy. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)).

In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the court “may not weigh the evidence or

substitute [its own] conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546,

552 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if the court would have

decided differently, it is bound by the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360

(3d Cir. 1999)). The court must “review the record as a whole to determine whether substantial

evidence supports a factual finding.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing

Schaudeck v. Comm’r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 Gd Cir. 1999)). “Since it is apparent that the ALJ cannot

reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the reason

why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can determine

whether the reasons for rejection were improper.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (3d Cir.

1981) (citation omitted).

B. Establishing Disability

To be eligible for insurance benefits, claimants must be unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than [twelve] months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1 (A). For purposes of the statute, a claimant

is disabled only if her physical or mental impairments are “of such severity that [s]he is not only

unable to do hfer] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy[.]” Jd. § 423(d)(2)(A). A physical or mental impairment is one “that results from

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Jd. § 423(d)(3).

Administration regulations provide a five-step evaluation procedure to determine whether

an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). For the first step, the claimant must establish

that she has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the onset of her alleged disability.

20 C.ER. § 404.1520(a)(4)@). For the second step, the claimant must establish that she suffers

from a “severe .. . impairment” or “combination of impairments.” Jd. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i1).

Claimants bear the burden of establishing the first two requirements, and failure to satisfy either

one results in a denial of benefits. Bown v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The third step

requires that the claimant provide evidence that her impairments are equal to at least one of the

impairments listed in Appendix | of the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)Gii). If the claimant

demonstrates that she suffers from a listed impairment or that her severe impairment is equal to a

listed impairment, she is presumed to be disabled and entitled to DIB. /d; 20 C.FR.

§ 404.1520(d). If she cannot so demonstrate, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four. See 20

C.E.R. § 404.1520(e).

Under the fourth step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s RFC permits her to

resume her previous employment. /d. If claimant’s RFC permits previous employment, she is not

“disabled” and thus is not entitled to DIB. /d@ § 404.1520(f). The burden of persuasion rests with

the claimant in the first four steps. Malloy ».. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 F. App’x 761, 763 (3d Cir.

2009). At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant can

perform other work consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past work

experience, and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden,

the claimant will receive DIB. /d.

Il. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. (See

generally P\.’s Moving Br.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider

her conversion disorder at steps two and three, and raises other miscellaneous arguments pertaining

to the evidence cited in the ALJ’s decision. The Court addresses each argument below.

A. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Conversion Disorder

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by not identifying conversion

disorder at step two and then failing to evaluate the evidence of somatic disorders, including

conversion disorder, at step three. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

L Conversion Disorder at Step Two

Plaintiff argues that that the ALJ erred at step two of the analysis in failing to acknowledge

conversion disorder as a “severe” impairment and subsequently failing to consider the impact of

the conversion disorder, a somatic disorder, throughout the disability evaluation process. (PI.’s

Moving Br. 21-23.) The medical records do reflect that Plaintiff was diagnosed with conversion

disorder (AR 1755), but the ALJ did not list conversion disorder as either a “severe” or

“non-severe” impairment at step two (id. at 20).

“At step two, an ALJ is required to determine[:] (1) whether an impairment is medically

determinable[;] and if so (2) whether that medically determinable impairment is severe or

non-severe.” Robert E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-6882, 2021 WL 5277193, at *6 (D.N.J.

Nov. 12, 2021); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device

to dispose of groundless claims.” Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). “It is well established that any omission of an impairment at [s]tep [t]wo is

harmless error, provided that the ALJ determines that the claimant has at least one severe

impairment and continues onto the subsequent steps of the sequential analysis.” Vanessa T-H. v.

’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-2293, 2024 WL 1635685, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2024) (citing Salles

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 229 F. App’x 140, 145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007).

Here, the ALJ found in Plaintiff’s favor at step two in finding that Plaintiff had multiple

severe impairments. Therefore, any omission of conversion disorder at step two is harmless error

and is not a basis for reversal or remand. See, e.g., Rivera v. Comm'’r of Soc. Sec., 164 F. App’x

260, 262 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[The plaintiff] also argues that the ALJ committed errors in the

second step, but the ALJ found in her favor at that step (holding that she did have a severe

impairment), so any such errors were harmless.”); Salles, 229 F. App’x at 145 n.2 (“Because the

ALJ found in [plaintiff’s] favor at [s]tep [t]wo, even if he had erroneously concluded that some of

her other impairments were non-severe, any error was harmless.” (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart,

399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005))); see also Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 825

(11th Cir. 2010) (“Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments

that should be considered severe. Instead, at step three, the ALJ is required to demonstrate that it

has considered all of the [plaintiff’s] impairments, whether severe or not, in combination.”).

2. Conversion Disorder at Step Three

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ was “nevertheless required to consider [the conversion

disorder’s| impact, in combination with the impact of Plaintiff’s other impairments . . . throughout

the disability determination process” and “the ALJ’s failure to evaluate the case for somatic

disorders [which includes the conversion disorder] at [s]tep [three]... was reversible error because

it affected the outcome.” (P1.’s Moving Br. 22-23.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred

by not directly citing Listing 12.07 in her evaluation of whether Plaintiff met or medically equalled

any listings at step three “despite discussing multiple other categories of mental impairment which

are less significant in this case[.]” (/d.)

The ALJ’s opinion must be “read as a whole” to understand the factors considered in the

decision, including those at step three. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). At step

three, ALJs typically must provide “some discussion” of their determination, although they “need

not ‘use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [their] analysis,’ as long

10

as ‘there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful

review[.|’” Holloman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 813-14 Gd Cir. 2016) (citing

Jones, 364 F.3d at 505). And should the Court find the ALJ’s step-three analysis deficient as to

certain impairments, the plaintiff must provide reasons as to why she “might have prevailed at step

three if the ALJ’s analysis had been more thorough.” /d. at 814.

As a preliminary matter, beyond a conclusory assertion that the ALJ’s purported failure to

analyze somatic disorders at step three was reversible error because it “affected the outcome” (see

Pl.’s Moving Br. 22-23), Plaintiff provides no reasoning as to why she would have prevailed if the

ALJ had considered such disorders at this step. See Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814 (“Whether or

not the ALJ’s analysis of these impairments was sufficiently thorough, [plaintiff] offers no

explanation of how further analysis could have affected the outcome of his disability claim. Even

if [the court] found a portion of the ALJ’s step-three analysis to be deficient, [the court] would

have no reason to conclude that the deficiency in analysis was harmful to [plaintiff’s] claim.”).

Furthermore, the ALJ relied on substantial evidence in determining that “[t]he severity of

the claimant’s mental [and related physical] impairments, considered singly and in combination,

did not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15.” (AR 21.)

Specifically, the ALJ noted that “[i]n making [her] finding, [she] considered whether the

‘paragraph B’ criteria were satisfied” and ultimately determined that Plaintiff “has moderate

limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with others,

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself.” (/d.) To come

to her conclusion, the ALJ specified that she reviewed certain medical records, including a

February 2015 mental status examination (noted as exhibit 49F) and a 2017 psychiatric

consultative examination (noted as exhibit 66F), both of which explicitly mention conversion

11

disorder. (See, e.g., id at 1993, 1995, 2430, 2432, 2454.) Where, as here, the “ALJ explicitly

considered Plaintiff’s impairments ‘singly and in combination,’. . . there is ‘no reason not to

believe’ that the ALJ did so.” Ward v. O'Malley, No. 18-13675, 2024 WL 1048078, at *6 (D.N.J.

Mar. 11, 2024) (quoting Morrison ex rel. Morrison v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 268 F. App’x 186, 189

(3d Cir. 2008)).

The Court finds, therefore, that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s combination of

impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of the listed impairments was supported

by substantial evidence. The Court, accordingly, finds this argument an insufficient basis for

reversal or remand.

B. Plaintiff’s Remaining Arguments

Plaintiff's remaining arguments relate to various aspects of Plaintiff’s overarching

contention that the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. (See Pl.’s Moving

Br. 19-20, 23-29.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ made a “patent mistake of fact” in finding that “Dr.

Greco’s pre-DLI findings were all normal” and finding “there was ‘no evidence of . . . decreased

sensation or deep tendon reflexes[.]’” (PI.’s Moving Br. 20.) After appropriate consideration of the

extensive medical record before her, the ALJ noted in her analysis that Plaintiff’s

“neuropsychological and psychological findings fell within normal limits” and that Plaintiff’s

“psychological functioning was overall unremarkable.” (AR 24-25.) This conclusion is supported

by substantial evidence, including the ALJ’s review and citation to Dr. Greco’s June 2012

examination notes which indicated that “[i]ntegrating [Plaintiff's] neuropsychological and

psychological findings revealed at this point in time a cognitive profile that fell within normal

limits. In fact, her scores fell within the average to above average range.” U/d. at 1127, 2722.) The

12

ALJ also considered the single reference included in Plaintiff’s April 30, 2012 neurological

examination that Plaintiff’s “[d]eep tending reflexes was 1+, 2+ and there was dimunition of

sensation on the right side.” (/d. at 24.) Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s failure to consider the

evidence of “decreased sensation or deep tendon reflexes” is not supported by any citations to the

record, is directly contradicted by the ALJ’s analysis, and must, therefore, be rejected. (See Pl.’s

Moving Br. 20.)

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate Plaintiff's ADEM condition or

its impact in its analysis, and merely “checked the box” for ADEM. (/d. at 23-25.) The ALJ’s

conclusion that Plaintiff's RFC is “categorized as less than the full range of sedentary work,”

explicit mention of Plaintiff’s ADEM, and accounting for Plaintiff’s need for one emergency visit

per month for her ADEM all undermines this argument. (See AR 29.) In fact, the ALJ considered

Plaintiff’s medical records and explicitly noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with ADEM after a

June 2011 hospital stay and that Plaintiff “carries a diagnosis of [ADEM] with multiple emergency

department visits and inpatient stays.” Ud. at 24, 29.) In reviewing Plaintiff’s subsequent medical

documentation, including an August 2018 medical report that Plaintiff was having panic attacks

and examination notes from a July 2019 emergency department visit, the ALJ ultimately concluded

that “[Plaintiff’s] condition appears to have stabilized as the subsequent office visits reflect limited

13

follow up in 2018 and 2019.” Ud. at 27-29.) Such a conclusion is directly supported by Plaintiff’s

medical records, and thus, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.? (See id.)

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to consider the “combined effects of impairments,

side effects of medications, and aggravating factors” such as “Plaintiff’s headaches or sequelae of

ADEM, [and] the [fact that] Plaintiff cannot tolerate noise, which triggers and aggravates them.”

(Pl.’s Moving Br. 25-26.) Plaintiff argues that if the ALJ had “acknowledged that Plaintiff needs a

‘quiet’ environment and would not be able to tolerate a [forty] hour week in an environment of

‘moderate’ noise, this additional factor would preclude competitive work[.]” (/d.) Plaintiff’s own

testimony that her “difficulties . . . with respect to sound or . . . volume” were “[I]oud noises[,|

[jJust loud noises,” undercuts this argument. (See AR 112.) The Court must take the ALJ at her

word that she considered the entire record in coming to her conclusion. (See AR 29 (Thus, after

considering the entire record . . .”)); see also Jones v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 297 F. App’x 117, 120

(3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e take the ALJ at [her] word[.]”). The ALJ’s decision, is therefore, supported

by substantial evidence in the record.*

> Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in not seeking additional medical expert testimony, (see

Pl.’s Moving Br. 24), also fails. The ALJ’s decision not to seek additional medical expert testimony

is entirely within the ALJ’s discretion. See Carin F. vy. O’Malley, No. 22-4193, 2024 WL 3949322,

at *14 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2024) (“[A]n ALJ is vested with broad discretion in determining whether

to consult with a medical expert.” (citing Hardee v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 188 F. App’x 127, 129

(3d Cir. 2006))). The ALJ, accordingly, did not err in her determinations regarding ADEM or her

decision not to seek additional testimony outside of the record for ADEM. See, e.g., Miguel v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 129 F. App’x 678, 680 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The regulations do not require that a

medical expert testify at the claimant’s hearing.” (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b))).

Plaintiff also argues that it is “not either-or, it’s both and all” in arguing again that the ALJ did

not consider Plaintiff’s combined impairments. (See Pl.’s Moving Br. 27-28.) For the reasons

discussed above, this argument once again fails as the Court finds the ALJ’s decision supported by

substantial evidence.

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Plaintiff subsequently argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the evidence from Dr.

Greco because she “discounted Dr. Greco’s post-DLI report because it was written post-DLI” and

ALJ did not discuss Dr. Greco’s voluminous records[.]” (P1.’s Moving Br. 26-27.) In addition

to broadly considering Dr. Greco’s reports, the ALJ explicitly discussed Dr. Greco’s post-DLI

report, noting that she found it “not persuasive as [Dr. Greco] did not identify when the opined

limitations applied as the opinion [was] rendered years after the DLI.” (AR 28); see also Porter v.

’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-3744, 2019 WL 2590994, at *4 (D.N.J. June 25, 2019) (noting ALJ

did not err in giving medical expert’s “opinion little weight because it ‘was rendered more than a

year after [Plaintiff’s] date last insured and [it] does not indicate that it relates back’ to the disability

evaluation period” (alterations in original)). The ALJ also need not refer explicitly to every detail

of medical evidence. See Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42 (noting that the ALJ need not “make reference

to every relevant treatment note in a case where the claimant . . . has voluminous records”). The

ALJ here properly “consider[ed]| and evaluate[d] the medical evidence [of Dr. Greco] in the record

consistent with [her] responsibilities under the regulations and case law.” /d. The Court, therefore,

rejects Plaintiff’s argument.

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that “had the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence, [Plaintiff] would

have been found disabled.” (Pl.’s Moving Br. 28-29.) Plaintiff fails to identify what evidence the

ALJ failed to properly evaluate and instead seemingly takes general issue with the ALJ’s RFC

determination. “A claimant’s RFC reflects ‘what [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her]

limitations.’” Morris v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 19-13744, 2020 WL 2764803, at *4 (D.N.J. May

28, 2020) (alterations in original) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)). “RFC does not represent the

least an individual can do despite his or her limitations or restrictions, but the most.” Titles IT &

Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at

15

*2 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Where “evidence in the record is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, [the Court] must accept the Commissioner’s conclusions.” /zzo v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 186 F. App’x 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971)). The Court finds that the ALJ’s findings, including but not limited to her RFC

determination, are supported by substantial evidence for the reasons discussed above and accepts

the ALJ’s conclusions.° The Court, accordingly, affirms the ALJ’s decision.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s final decision. The Court

will issue an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MICHAEL A. SHIPP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

nd

Dated: December A”, 2025

> The Court also notes that Plaintiff argues that “straw men and red herrings do not constitute

substantial evidence,” providing little-to-no support for this argument. (See Pl.’s Moving Br. 27.)

Because Plaintiff does not identify any evidence or even identify what she is referring to, the Court

deems this argument waived. See Conroy v. Leone, 316 F. App’x 140, 144 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009)

(finding “undeveloped argument has been waived” (citing Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256

(3d Cir. 2005))).

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