Cronican

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL SEAN CRONICAN, ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-638

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

v. )

) MAGISTATE JUDGE

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL ) JENNIFER DOWDELL ARMSTRONG

SECURITY, )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant. )

I. INTRODUCTION

The Commissioner of Social Security1 denied Plaintiff Michael Sean Cronican’s

application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). Mr. Cronican seeks

judicial review of that decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

This matter is before me pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b). (See ECF non-document entry dated April

1, 2025.)

For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court REVERSE the

Commissioner’s decision and REMAND this matter for further proceedings consistent with this

Report and Recommendation.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 2022, Mr. Cronican applied to the Social Security Administration (SSA)

seeking a period of disability and DIB benefits; he claimed that he became disabled on March 1,

2021. (Tr. 287, 289.)2 He identified six allegedly disabling conditions: (1) lumbar degenerative

1 Leland Dudek was serving as Acting Commissioner of Social Security when the complaint was filed. He

served in that role until May 2025, when Frank Bisignano, the current Commissioner, was confirmed.

2 The amended administrative transcript appears at ECF No. 11. The agency filed an amended transcript

because its initial transcript had included a small set of records irrelevant to Mr. Cronican’s claim. I will

refer to pages within the amended transcript by identifying the Bates number printed on the bottom right-

disc disease; (2) obstructive sleep apnea; (3) morbid obesity (BMI 50+); (4) insomnia; (5) post-

traumatic stress disorder; and (6) anxiety disorder with panic attacks. (Tr. 319.)

The SSA denied Mr. Cronican’s application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 207–

08, 217–18.) Mr. Cronican requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). (Tr. 235.)

The ALJ held a hearing on January 24, 2024, at which Mr. Cronican was represented by counsel.

(Tr. 169–99.) Mr. Cronican testified, as did an independent vocational expert (VE). (Id.)

On February 14, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Mr. Cronican is not

disabled. (Tr. 151–64.)

Mr. Cronican requested review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 281–82.) His counsel submitted

a brief setting forth arguments on appeal, primarily focused on his mental conditions. (Tr. 387–

90.) His counsel argued that the ALJ erred in finding his mental health conditions to be non-severe

and, further, argued that “[i]f his case had proceeded to step 5, he would have been found disabled

per the VE testimony, which stated that an individual weighing more than 300 pounds would

require an accommodation in the form of a bariatric chair.” (Tr. 282.)

On February 20, 2025, the Appeals Council denied review, rendering the ALJ’s decision

final. (Tr. 1.)

On April 1, 2025, Mr. Cronican filed his Complaint, challenging the Commissioner’s final

decision that he is not disabled. (ECF No. 1.) Mr. Cronican asserts the following assignments of

error for review:

First Assignment of Error: The ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by

substantial evidence because it did not accurately reflect Plaintiff’s need for

a bariatric chair.

hand corner of the page (e.g., “Tr. 164”). I will refer to other documents in the record by their CM/ECF

document numbers (e.g., “ECF No. 7”) and page-identification numbers (e.g., “PageID# 771”).

Second Assignment of Error: The ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by

substantial evidence because the ALJ’s rationale for discounting Plaintiff’s

symptom allegations did not comport with apposite regulations and case

law.

(Pl.’s Merit Br. at 8, 10, ECF No. 7, PageID# 771, 773.)

III. BACKGROUND3

A. Personal, Educational, and Vocational Experience

Mr. Cronican was born in February 1979 and was 43 years old on the date of his

application. (Tr. 284.) He graduated high school and completed occupational training to be a

security officer. (Tr. 320.) He previously worked for various security companies as a guard and, in

one instance, as an office manager. (Tr. 175–81.) He has driven for rideshare companies, and he

has worked as a customer service representative for an insurance company. (Tr. 183; see also Tr.

308.)

B. Function Report

Mr. Cronican completed a function report in October 2022. (Tr. 331–38.) He wrote that he

cannot stand or walk for longer than 15 minutes without experiencing back pain. (Tr. 331.) He

cannot bend over to pick things up off the floor. (Id.) He cannot sit upright for longer than a half

hour. (Id.) And he said he has anxiety “dealing with people,” “particularly people with extreme

emotions.” (Id.)

3 During the administrative proceedings, Mr. Cronican alleged that he was disabled as a result of both

physical and mental conditions. In this proceeding, he challenges the ALJ’s analysis only with respect to

his physical conditions. I therefore focus my summary on the evidence relevant to his physical conditions

and limitations. I note that there are a number of therapy records from 2020 and 2021 in the administrative

transcript; I have reviewed them, but they are not summarized here as neither party relies on them in this

proceeding. (Tr. 394, 396, 399, 402, 405, 408, 411, 414, 417, 420, 423, 426, 429, 432, 435, 438, 441, 444,

447, 450, 453, 456, 459, 462, 466, 469, 472, 475, 478, 481, 484, 487, 490, 493, 496, 498, 500, 503, 505,

507, 509, 511, 513, 515, 517, 519, 521, 523, 525, 527, 529, 531, 533, 536, 539, 541, 543, 547.)

Mr. Cronican described a typical day, in which he takes his medicine after waking up, then

stretches his back, then watches television until falling asleep. (Tr. 332.) He wrote that he attends

physical therapy twice a week for back pain. (Id.) Although his wife primarily takes care of their

pets, he is able to feed them and take them for brief walks twice a week. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican said that he experiences insomnia, discomfort, regular “spikes” of pain, and

difficulty with mobility after he wakes up. (Id.) He needs assistance dressing himself (pants and

footwear) and bathing, and he has difficulty with aspects of toileting. (Id.)

He is able to cook food every day that is “easy to microwave” or prepare in an air fryer,

but using the oven causes him pain. (Tr. 333.) He is not able to complete household chores, bend

over, reach, or lift. (Id.) He is able to drive. (Tr. 334.) He is able to shop once a month for

“essentials.” (Id.) He interacts with others over online gaming daily. (Tr. 335.) He does not

socialize in person outside the home anymore. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican estimated that he can walk for 100 yards before needing to stop and rest for

between five and twenty minutes. (Tr. 336.) He uses a cane rarely, after a “bad night of back pain.”

(Tr. 337.)

C. Relevant Hearing Testimony

1. Mr. Cronican’s Testimony

Mr. Cronican testified that he had been working as a customer service representative for an

insurance company until 2021, when he had a “mental break” due to anxiety. (Tr. 184.) He

described having difficulty dealing with angry callers who would scream and use abusive language

with him. (Tr. 186.) He left the company at that time and has not worked substantially since.

(Tr. 184–85.)

When asked to identify why he feels that he is unable to work, Mr. Cronican responded

that “[m]ostly the issue is mental.” (Tr. 185.) He described that he experiences significant anxiety

interacting with people in public, “particularly people who are emotionally explosive.” (Id.) He

also experiences anxiety while driving, ever since being in a car accident. (Id.) And he has back

pain. (Id.) Mr. Cronican testified that he is “wildly unreliable” as a result of this anxiety,

depression, and “sometimes” back trouble. (Tr. 185–86.)

Mr. Cronican takes three medications for anxiety. (Tr. 187–88.) He had been attending

therapy but stopped because he could not afford to continue that treatment. (Tr. 188.)

With respect to his physical conditions, Mr. Cronican testified that he will sometimes plan

to clean but will “wake up and today’s the day my back doesn’t want to work.” (Tr. 186.) He said

he had a consistent pain, which he described as “like an extreme fatigue reaction,” in his lower

spine. (Tr. 188.) The pain radiates up his back. (Id.) He does regular stretching throughout the day

to manage his symptoms. (Tr. 189.) His pain is triggered by bending and reaching, and he has

noticed that dishwashing and laundry are hard for him. (Id.) Sometimes even sitting can be

difficult. (Id.) He can sit in a power recliner for about an hour, but he cannot sit for longer than 10

minutes in normal office, kitchen, or living room chairs. (Tr. 190.)

Mr. Cronican testified that he can only stand for 15 or 20 minutes at a time before needing

to rest for 20 to 30 minutes. (Tr. 189.) He uses wedge pillows to help him sleep in a “semi-sitting

position” and he on occasion (but “rarely”) he “overdo[es]” his back and has to use canes because

his balance and stamina are especially poor. (Tr. 190–91.)

Mr. Cronican testified that he weighs 490 pounds, a weight that has been pretty stable for

him. (Tr. 191.) He has weighed more than 440 pounds for at least ten years. (Id.) He participated

in a bariatric program for a year and a half, but he stopped attending because of his anxiety.

(Tr. 192.) He lost 150 pounds through the program, but his treating professionals still declined to

move him forward to bariatric surgery. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican’s wife will prepare meals and wash dishes, and standing over the stove or the

sink is “agony” for his back. (Id.) He has difficulty bathing and using the restroom; he tends to

take short showers focusing on only one part of his body at a time. (Tr. 193.) He is able to shop for

groceries, including walking around the store, but he makes short trips to pick up only one or two

items at a time. (Id.)

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Sarah Holmes testified as a vocation expert (“VE”) at the hearing. (Tr. 193.) The VE

categorized Mr. Cronican’s past work as that of a security guard (DOT 372.667-034), a keep guard

(DOT 372.167-014), and—his position with the insurance company—a policyholder information

clerk (DOT 249.262-010). (Tr. 194.)

The ALJ asked the VE to assume that a hypothetical individual would be able to lift and

carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. (Id.) The person could stand or walk for

six hours out of an eight-hour workday. (Id.) The person could never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds, but could occasionally climb ramps and stairs. (Id.) The person could frequently balance

but only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. (Id.) The person has no mental limitations but

should avoid work in unprotected heights or around or operating dangerous moving equipment.

(Tr. 194–95.) The VE testified that such a person could perform Mr. Cronican’s past relevant work

as a policyholder information clerk. (Tr. 195.)

The ALJ next asked the VE to assume that the hypothetical person was limited to standing

and walking up to four hours per workday. (Id.) The VE confirmed that such a person could

perform the work of a policyholder information clerk and could also perform the work of an

information clerk (DOT 237.367-018), mail clerk (DOT 209.687-026), or office helper (DOT

239.567-010). (Tr. 195–96.)

Finally, the ALJ asked the VE to further limit the hypothetical individual to work at the

sedentary exertion level, standing and walking up to two hours per workday. (Tr. 196.) The VE

testified that such a person could perform the work of a policyholder information clerk, an order

clerk (DOT 209.567-014), a circuit board assembler (DOT 726.684-110), or a sorter (DOT

521.687-086). (Id.)

In response to questions from Mr. Cronican’s counsel, the VE testified that if the

hypothetical person from the last of the ALJ’s hypothetical questions was further limited to only

occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public, the person could not

perform the work of a policyholder information clerk but could still perform the work of an order

clerk, circuit board assembler, or sorter. (Tr. 197.)

In response to further questions from counsel, the VE testified that a standard office chair

can support up to 300 pounds. (Id.) If a hypothetical person required a heavy-duty chair capable

of supporting up to 500 pounds, “[t]hat would be an accommodation.” (Tr. 197–98.)

The VE testified that employers tolerate an employee being off task up to 15 percent of the

workday and absent once or twice per month (but no more than six to eight times per year). (Tr.

198.)

D. State Agency Consultants

A disability examiner (Victoria Scott), a physician (Bruce Hallmann, M.D.), and a

psychologist (Michelle Hoy-Watkins, Psy.D.) reviewed Mr. Cronican’s claim at the initial review

level. (Tr. 200–08.) Dr. Hoy-Watkins opined that Mr. Cronican’s mental health conditions were

not severe, reasoning that he had only mild impairments with respect to his ability to interact with

others; to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and to adapt and manage himself. (Tr. 203.)

Dr. Hallmann opined that Mr. Cronican could frequently lift and carry items up to 10

pounds, and occasionally do so for objects up to 20 pounds; his ability to push and pull was

otherwise unlimited. (Tr. 204.) He could stand and walk for six hours and sit for six hours out of

an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 204–05.) He should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but could

frequently balance and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Tr.

205.) He should avoid all exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous machinery, but otherwise

had no environmental limitations. (Id.)

The agency consultants determined that Mr. Cronican retained the ability to perform light

work, such as that required of an “automatic car wash attendant” (DOT 915.667-010), “folder,

laundry” (DOT 369.687-018), or “photocopying machine operator” (DOT 207.685-018). (Tr. 206.)

They therefore found that he was not disabled. (Tr. 207.)

In a letter to Mr. Cronican explaining its decision, the Agency wrote that the evidence

shows that he experiences some pain and discomfort but is “still able to move [his] hands, arms,

legs, and back in order to perform a variety of less strenuous, work-related activities.” (Tr. 229.)

A disability examiner (Julie Greenwood), physician (W. Scott Bolz, M.D.), and

psychologist (Robert Baker, Ph.D.) reviewed Mr. Cronican’s claim at the reconsideration level.

(Tr. 209–18.) Dr. Baker affirmed the initial determination that Mr. Cronican’s mental conditions

were not severe, finding it consistent with and supported by the medical evidence. (Tr. 212.) He

further explained that the evidence indicates that his symptoms result in “no more than mild

limitations.” (Id.)

Dr. Bolz also affirmed the prior administrative medical findings and residual functional

capacity, concluding that they were consistent with and supported by the medical evidence.

(Tr. 215.)

Based on these conclusions, the agency consultants agreed that Mr. Cronican could perform

the work of an automatic car wash attendant, laundry folder, or photocopying machine operator,

and found him not disabled. (Tr. 216–17.)

In a letter to Mr. Cronican explaining this decision, the Agency wrote that his conditions

are severe and result in significant limitations, but that he remains capable of light activity.

(Tr. 234.)

E. Relevant Medical Evidence

Hospital records show that Mr. Cronican weighed 538 pounds in October 2019; his BMI

was 69.7. (Tr. 14, 44.)

Mr. Cronican consulted with Timothy Golemgeski, M.D., in a telephone appointment on

March 24, 2020. (Tr. 634.) He complained of intermittent back pain and said that he cannot sit or

stand for too long; he also reported that his work could not accommodate a chair or desk for him.

(Tr. 635.) He said that he had lost more than 80 pounds with a goal of obtaining bariatric surgery.

(Id.) Dr. Golemgeski noted that Mr. Cronican would “benefit from a formal weight loss program.”

(Tr. 636.)

Mr. Cronican followed up with Dr. Golemgeski by telephone on April 13, 2020. (Tr. 631.)

He reported that he had historically had no problems working, but “over the past week has been

having [a] hard time getting through work” because of anxiety. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican’s next telephone appointment with Dr. Golemgeski occurred on May 11,

2020. (Tr. 627.) He said that he felt that he should be doing better since losing weight, but he was

still struggling with attention and “g[e]tting through the day.” (Tr. 628.) He reported that he

weighed 480 pounds. (Id.) That weight was not materially different at his next telephone

appointment on May 22, 2020. (Tr. 625.)

Mr. Cronican reported his weight as 470 pounds on a telephone appointment with Dr.

Golemgeski on July 7, 2020. (Tr. 620.)

Mr. Cronican participated in a weight and diet consultation with dietician Alexis Supan and

Aviv Ben-Meir, M.D., on September 17, 2020. (Tr. 618.) He reported participating in martial arts

“almost daily.” (Id.) Dr. Ben-Meir noted that Mr. Cronican weighed 454 pounds, a decrease of 16

pounds from his starting weight. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican consulted with Kelly Manger, M.D., on November 22, 2021. (Tr. 600.) He

complained of increased anxiety and depression, which he attributed to starting a new job. (Tr.

601.) The clinic measured his weight at 505 pounds. (Tr. 602.)

His weight was relatively unchanged in March 2022. (Tr. 593 (498 pounds)).

Mr. Cronican complained of groin pain, back pain, and leg pain while sitting and standing

at an appointment in June 2022. (Tr. 588.) His weight was measured at 490 pounds. (Tr. 589.)

X-ray imaging of the spine in July 2020 revealed degenerative disc disease at the L5 to S1

level. (Tr. 638.)

Mr. Cronican was evaluated for physical therapy on August 10, 2022. (Tr. 678.) The

therapist noted some limited range of motion and tenderness on examination. (Tr. 679.) The

therapist further noted significant weakness and opined that Mr. Cronican would benefit from

physical therapy. (Tr. 680.)

Mr. Cronican consulted by telephone with Angela Brinkman, D.O., on August 12, 2022.

(Tr. 585.) He complained of back pain, insomnia, and anxiety. (Tr. 585–86.)

Mr. Cronican continued with physical therapy through the beginning of 2023. Treatment

notes throughout 2022 reflect that Mr. Cronican continued to report back pain, anxiety, and trouble

sleeping, with severity fluctuating significantly from appointment to appointment; his back pain

trended toward improvement over time. (Tr. 668–70, 671–77.)

Mr. Cronican consulted with Dr. Brinkman on September 1, 2022. (Tr. 581.) He

complained of experiencing pain “with everything he does.” (Tr. 582.) He said his back fatigues

easily and he has pain radiating to the left groin, left leg, and back. (Id.) He continued to complain

of anxiety and trouble sleeping. (Id.) His weight was reported as 498 pounds. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican was referred to Andrew Greunzel, M.D., with whom he met on October 7,

2022. (Tr. 557.) Mr. Cronican said that he hoped to decrease his pain in order to do housework and

sleep better. (Id.) Dr. Greunzel noted that Mr. Cronican was not treating with anyone regarding

weight loss and “appear[ed] somewhat against” weight loss surgery. (Id.) He weighed 490 pounds

at the appointment. (Tr. 559.)

Mr. Cronican consulted with Kelly McPhillips, M.D., on January 25, 2023. (Tr. 691.) He

reported “good control” of his depression symptoms but said he continued to experience insomnia.

(Tr. 692.)

Mr. Cronican underwent a psychological evaluation with Hugh Turner, Psy.D., on February

16, 2023. (Tr. 652.) Dr. Turner noted that Mr. Cronican, despite his weight, had no difficulty

ambulating in the office and maintaining appropriate posture while sitting for the interview.

(Tr. 655.)

At a physical therapy appointment on February 22, 2023, Mr. Cronican reported significant

improvement. (Tr. 667.) He said his weight was down to 470 pounds. (Id.) The therapist noted

good progress with improved function, strength, and mobility. (Id.) He reported low back pain at

his next appointment on February 27, 2023. (Tr. 666.)

Mr. Cronican consulted with Dr. McPhillips on May 16, 2023. (Tr. 688.) He complained of

worsening insomnia. (Tr. 689.) His weight was recorded at 478 pounds. (Id.)

Mr. Cronican consulted with Dr. McPhillips again on December 5, 2023. (Tr. 739.) His

weight was recorded at 491 pounds. (Tr. 741.)

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ determined that Mr. Cronican met the insured-status requirements of the Social

Security Act through December 31, 2024, and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

March 1, 2021 (the alleged disability onset date). (Tr. 156.)

The ALJ next determined that Mr. Cronican had the following severe impairments:

(1) morbid obesity; (2) degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; and (3) osteoarthritis.

(Tr. 157.)

The ALJ also noted that Mr. Cronican had non-severe impairments of depression and

anxiety. (Tr. 158.)

The ALJ determined that none of Mr. Cronican’s impairments, whether considered singly

or in combination, met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.)

The ALJ determined that Mr. Cronican had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform light work with a number of additional limitations. (Tr. 159.) Specifically, Mr. Cronican

was limited to standing or walking for only four hours out of an eight-hour workday. (Id.) He can

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and he can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs. (Id.)

He can frequently balance and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. (Id.) He must avoid

work in unprotected heights and work around or operating dangerous moving equipment. (Id.)

The ALJ determined that Mr. Cronican remained capable of performing his past relevant

work as a policy holder information clerk (DOT 249.262-010). (Tr. 162–63.)

The ALJ further determined that—considering Mr. Cronican’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC—there were additional jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national

economy that he could perform, including work as an “information clerk” (DOT 237.367-018),

“mail clerk” (DOT 209.687-026), or “office helper” (DOT 239.567-010). (Tr. 164.) Accordingly,

the ALJ determined that Mr. Cronican is not disabled. (Id.)

V. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council

becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott

v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)

(en banc)). The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 Fed. Appx. 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d

931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“Under the substantial evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record

and asks whether it contains ‘sufficient evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The standard for “substantial evidence” is “not high.” Id. While

it requires “more than a mere scintilla,” “[i]t means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consolidated

Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).

In addition to considering whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied proper legal standards.

Failure of the Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations

is grounds for reversal. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir.

2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by

substantial evidence, . . . a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails

to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives

the claimant of a substantial right.”).

Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence

in the record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp.

2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996))

(alteration in original).

B. Standard for Disability

Consideration of disability claims follows a five-step review process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.

First, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful

activity” at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant

must show that she suffers from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits . . . physical or

mental ability to do basic work activities.” Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment

that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment, or combination of

impairments, meets or medically equals a required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work

experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).

Before considering Step Four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional

capacity, i.e., the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis

despite limitations from her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). An RFC “is the most [a claimant]

can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). Agency regulations

direct the ALJ to consider the functional limitations and restrictions resulting from a claimant’s

medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, including the impact of any

related symptoms on the claimant’s ability to do sustained work-related activities. See Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *5 (July 2, 1996).

“A claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved

to the Commissioner.” Golden v. Berryhill, No. 1:18CV00636, 2018 WL 7079506, at *17 (N.D.

Ohio Dec. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, 2019 WL 415250 (N.D. Ohio

Feb. 1, 2019). The ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of determining the RFC based on [the

ALJ’s] evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence.” Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F.

App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013). “[T]he ALJ must give some indication of the evidence upon which

he is relying, and he may not ignore evidence that does not support [the ALJ’s] decision, especially

when that evidence, if accepted, would change [the ALJ’s] analysis.” Golden, 2018 WL 7079506

at *17.

At the fourth step, if the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not

prevent her from doing her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

416.920(e)–(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant’s impairment does prevent her

from doing her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled if other work exists in the national

economy that the claimant can perform. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). See Abbott, 905 F.2d at 923.

C. Analysis

Mr. Cronican raises two assignments of error in this administrative appeal. Because I agree

with him with respect to the first assignment of error, I need not reach a consideration of the second.

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Cronican argues that the ALJ erred when crafting the

RFC because the ALJ failed to include a limitation that Mr. Cronican would need a bariatric chair

supporting his weight and because the ALJ failed to explain why she did not include such a

limitation. Mr. Cronican points out that the ALJ identified morbid obesity as a severe impairment

at Step Two and found that the evidence established that he weighed upwards of 470 pounds. He

further points out that the VE testified that standard office chairs support only up to 300 pounds

and that a bariatric chair would be an accommodation.

The Commissioner defends the ALJ’s decision, arguing that a claimant does not meet their

burden to establish a limitation merely by presenting evidence of their significant weight. The

Commissioner would require that a claimant present a medical opinion or vocational evidence

establishing that the claimant needs a bariatric chair.

While the Commissioner’s argument is understandable in light of several court opinions

from this Court that are discussed in detail further below, it is unreasonably severe and—

ultimately—unsupported. In plain terms, this appeal presents the question: Does it take an expert’s

opinion to know that a 500-pound man cannot use a chair that is only able to hold a 300-pound

man? No, it does not. And in light of the evidence presented and the testimony of the VE in this

case, remand is appropriate for the ALJ to further consider and explain whether Mr. Cronican

requires a bariatric chair and, if so, the effect of such a limitation on the jobs that may be available

to him.

My analysis starts with the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ found morbid obesity to be a severe

impairment, but—beyond noting Mr. Cronican’s weight—the ALJ did not significantly discuss

any limitations stemming from that obesity when crafting the RFC:

The record also shows obesity. Claimant weight ranged from 505.2 pounds

in November 2021 to 490 pounds with BMI 68.33 in June 2022. Claimant

weighed 478 pounds in May 2023 and 491 pounds in December 2023. . . .

Claimant is limited to light exertion with standing/walking for 4 hours in an

8-hour day due to pain and obesity.

(Tr. 161) (internal citations omitted).

This limited discussion was so despite the VE’s hearing testimony that a standard office

chair can only support up to 300 pounds and that providing a heavy-duty chair capable of holding

up to 500 pounds would be considered an accommodation. (Tr. 197–98.) I further note that medical

records reflect that, on one occasion, Mr. Cronican complained to his treating physician that his

work could not accommodate a chair or desk for him. (See Tr. 635.)

It is true, of course, that “[a]n administrative law judge is only required to include in the

residual functional capacity those limitations he finds credible and supported by the record.”

Lipanye v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F. App’x 165, 170 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Casey v. Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993)). And, as discussed above, the

standard for substantial evidence is not high. E.g., Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019)

But, after careful consideration, I am convinced that the ALJ here did “not build an accurate

and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875,

877 (N.D. Ohio 2011). While no doctor specifically opined that Mr. Cronican was limited to using

a bariatric chair on account of his weight, the VE’s testimony and the evidence establishing Mr.

Cronican’s consistent weight clearly raises the question of whether Mr. Cronican is so limited.

Agency regulations state that ALJs will assess a claimant’s RFC “based on all of the relevant

medical and other evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (emphasis added).

Because the ALJ did not mention this evidence or address the issue of whether Mr.

Cronican needs a bariatric chair, this is a situation where the Court cannot determine if the evidence

was discounted or merely overlooked. See Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:25-cv-964-JRA,

2025 WL 3237489, *10–12 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2025) (report and recommendation pending

review).

The cases the Commissioner cites for the proposition that a medical opinion was required

are distinguishable. In Innocent v. Saul, the claimant established only that he weighed 600 pounds;

he did not offer any evidence establishing the weight that a standard work chair could hold.

Innocent, No. 1:18-CV-2391, 2020 WL 1031531, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2020). The Court held

that the claimant had not met his burden to show a limitation under those circumstances. Id.

Here, of course, Mr. Cronican’s counsel cross-examined the VE and elicited testimony that

a standard office chair can support only up to 300 pounds. (Tr. 197–98.)

The Court in Innocent did go on to state, broadly, that “[e]ven if Plaintiff had established

that his body weight exceeds what a standard workplace chair could hold, Plaintiff would still need

more to meet his burden . . . .” Id. I view that statement as dicta, and the case the Court relied upon

to support that statement is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.

In the cited case—Holcomb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.—the VE did not testify that a bariatric

chair would be an accommodation and in fact testified that he had placed morbidly obese

individuals in the jobs he specified in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical questions. Holcomb, No.

1:18-CV-191, 2019 WL 1102250, *10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2019), report and recommendation

adopted, 2019 WL 1099548 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2019). The Court in Holcomb found relevant an

Eighth Circuit case, wherein the VE testified that bariatric chairs are, in fact, commonly provided

to individuals in the workplace. Id. (quoting Higgins v. Commissioner, 898 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir.

2018)). The Court ultimately concluded that the VE’s testimony established that the claimant was

able to perform the work specified. Id. at *11.

Here, though, the VE did testify that providing a bariatric chair would be an

accommodation. Further, there is no testimony here that providing that accommodation is common

or that the VE had considered Mr. Cronican’s morbid obesity in opining that he could perform the

work of a policyholder information clerk, information clerk, mail clerk, or office helper. (See

Tr. 195–96.) In fact, Mr. Cronican reported to a physician that his work would not provide him

with a chair or desk. (See Tr. 635.)

I would expect a reasoned consideration of this issue on remand to include an inquiry into

these matters if Mr. Cronican requires a bariatric chair. I would further expect inquiry into whether

the number of jobs available to Mr. Cronican, if any, would be reduced if one assumes that the

employer would have to provide a bariatric chair.

The remaining case cited by the Commissioner, Strader v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (an out-of-

district opinion), is also distinguishable. There, the claimant did not elicit any testimony from the

VE that the claimant needed a bariatric chair. Strader, No. 5:22-CV-367-M-BM, 2024 WL 796523,

*10 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 779225. Here, of

course, Mr. Cronican’s counsel elicited testimony establishing that a standard office chair could

not hold Mr. Cronican’s weight and that providing a heavy-duty chair would be an accommodation.

The Commissioner argues that no evidence “specific to him” establishes that Mr. Cronican

needs a bariatric chair. But the ALJ’s decision must be read with common sense. E.g., Buckhannon

ex rel. J.H. v. Astrue, 368 F. App’x 674, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2010).

The ALJ concluded that Mr. Cronican must sit for four hours of every workday. The

undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Cronican weighs close to 500 pounds. The VE established

that standard work chairs cannot support people who weigh more than 300 pounds. Applying

common sense, Mr. Cronican cannot use a standard work chair. See also Joshua B. v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-cv-00436-LEW, 2020 WL 6376639, *4 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2020) (“Although the

commissioner attempts to frame the issue in medical terms of whether the decedent was

functionally limited to a bariatric chair as a result of his impairment of obesity, . . . the issue is

actually whether a typical workplace chair could have accommodated the decedent’s size and

weight, which is not a question of his functional ability so much as it is a question of the limitations

of the chair.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7395136.

Because that fact was established, it was error for the ALJ to fail to explain her

consideration of whether a bariatric chair is required and, if it is, to explain her consideration of

the effect (if any) on the jobs available to Mr. Cronican. I am convinced that remand is required

for the Commissioner to further consider and explain these issues. See Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 5:25-cv-964-JRA, 2025 WL 3237489, *10–12 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2025)

(recommending reversal under similar circumstances) (report and recommendation pending

review).

VI. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner’s

decision and REMAND this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this

Report and Recommendation.

Dated: December 22, 2025 /s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

U.S. Magistrate Judge

VII. NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Local Rule 72.3(b) of this Court provides:

Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,

recommendations or report made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof, and failure to file

timely objections within the fourteen (14) day period shall constitute a waiver

of subsequent review, absent a showing of good cause for such failure. Such

party shall file with the Clerk of Court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all

parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the

basis for such objections. Any party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. The District

Judge to whom the case was assigned shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge need

conduct a new hearing only in such District Judge’s discretion or where required

by law, and may consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge,

making a determination on the basis of the record. The District Judge may also

receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate

Judge with instructions.

Id. (emphasis added).

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or waiver of

the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds to the report and

recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be

specific and not merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the report and

recommendation; a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to object. Howard v.

Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

Stated differently, objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the

arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate judge. “A reexamination of the exact same

argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific objections ‘wastes judicial

resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the Magistrates

Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018)

(quoting Howard). The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the

interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878–79 (6th Cir. 2019).