Hardrick

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHEILA HARDRICK, ) Case No. 1:25-CV-00472

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER

)

v. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE JENNIFER

) DOWDELL ARMSTRONG

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

) ORDER & OPINION

Defendant. )

On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff Sheila Hardrick filed a complaint against the Commissioner

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental

security income (“SSI”). ECF 1. The Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell

Armstrong for preparation of a report and recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) and Local Rule 72.2(b). Magistrate Judge Armstrong recommends the Court affirm the

decision of the Commissioner. ECF 14.

Hardrick filed an objection on December 1, 2025, raising one assignment of error—that

the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) was not required

to sua sponte investigate an alleged conflict between the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony and

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). ECF 15. The Commissioner filed a response on

December 12, 2025. ECF 16. The Court has reviewed the record, the briefings, the R&R,

Hardrick’s objection, and the Commissioner’s response. Because no conflict between the VE’s

testimony and the DOT regarding the classification of Hardrick’s job at (then) Quicken Loans

Arena was made apparent to the ALJ, the ALJ was not required to sua sponte or otherwise resolve

the alleged conflict. The Commissioner’s decision to deny DIB and SSI was supported by

substantial evidence, so the Court overrules Hardrick’s objection and adopts Magistrate Judge

Armstrong’s R&R. Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision and DISMISSES the

case, with prejudice.

I. Background

Hardrick filed her DIB and SSI applications on December 21, 2022, alleging a disability

onset date of April 5, 2019. Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. She the

requested a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. at 99.1 The ALJ held a hearing on September 26, 2023,

where Hardrick appeared with counsel. Tr. at 30. Both Hardrick and an independent VE testified

at the hearing. Id. On February 12, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision, finding that Hardrick

was not disabled. Tr. at 11. The Appeals Council declined further review on January 30, 2025,

allowing the ALJ’s decision to become final. Tr. at 1.

At the ALJ hearing, Hardrick testified that she had worked several different cleaning jobs

in the past, including a position at (what was then known as) Quicken Loans Arena. Tr. at 35-38.

She testified that her work at Quicken Loans Arena was not in the public concourse or seating

areas, but rather in the executive offices and the common areas on the executive floors. Tr. at 38.

As part of her responsibilities in that role, she testified that she lifted between 30 and 50 pounds.

Id.

1 The transcript of proceedings before the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) is at ECF 8. All page references to

the transcript refer to the SSA’s numbering in the lower-right corner, and not the ECF PageID number added to the

header upon filing with this Court.

The VE testified that most of Hardrick’s cleaning positions were classified as medium or

heavy work positions. Tr. at 49. However, Hardrick’s job at Quicken Loans Arena, the VE

testified, was properly classified as “cleaner, housekeeping,” DOT code 323.687-014. Id. The VE

further testified that the DOT classified that position as light work as generally performed, and as

medium work as Hardrick actually performed it. Id. When the ALJ asked the VE if her testimony

was consistent with the DOT, the VE testified that it was. Tr. at 51.

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s review of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),

which requires a de novo decision as to those portions of the R&R to which objection is made.

“An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested

resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term

is used in this context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate

judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to[]”); Local Rule 72.3(b) (any objecting party

shall file “written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,

recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections[]”).

Judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards and whether there is “substantial evidence” in the record as a whole to support the

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2010).

“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla; it refers to relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gentry v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486

F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)).

A reviewing court is not permitted to resolve conflicts in evidence or to decide questions

of credibility. DeLong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014); Bass v.

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). Nor need the reviewing court necessarily agree with

the Commissioner’s determination in order to affirm it. “Even if [the] Court might have reached a

contrary conclusion of fact, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed so long as it is

supported by substantial evidence.” Kyle, 609 F.3d at 854-55. This is true even if substantial

evidence also supports the claimant’s position. See McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d

830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The findings of

the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial

evidence to support a different conclusion.”).

Even when there is substantial evidence, however, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will

not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’”

Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). Likewise, a court “cannot uphold an

ALJ’s decision, even if there ‘is enough evidence in the record to support the decision, [where] the

reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence

and the result.’” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet

v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996); and citing Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d

541, 544-46 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding it was not harmless error for the ALJ to fail to make

sufficiently clear why he rejected the treating physician’s opinion, even if substantial evidence not

mentioned by the ALJ may have existed to support the ultimate decision to reject the treating

physician's opinion)).

III. Law and Analysis

Hardrick asserted just one issue to be decided by this Court—whether the ALJ was required

to sua sponte investigate an alleged conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT.2 Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p provides that “[w]hen there is an apparent unresolved conflict

between VE . . . evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for

the conflict before relying on the VE . . . evidence to support a determination or decision about

whether the claimant is disabled.” 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000). SSR 00-4p further

provides that the ALJ must “inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such consistency.”

Id. As the Sixth Circuit has held, SSR 00-4p provides that an ALJ must “resolve the conflict by

determining if the explanation given by the expert is reasonable and provides a basis for agreeing

with the expert rather than the DOT information.” Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 170 F. App’x

369, 374 (6th Cir. 2006)

During the hearing, the VE testified that the Quicken Loans Arena job was classified as

“cleaner, housekeeping,” DOT code 323.687-014. Tr. at 49. Hardrick contends, however, that,

based on her “self-reported job description,” her work at Quicken Loans Arena should instead be

classified as “cleaner, commercial or industrial,” DOT code 381.687-014. ECF 15 at 2. A

commercial or industrial cleaner, according to Hardrick, performs work at the heavy exertional

level, meaning that she could not perform the position given her residual functional capacity

(“RFC”). Yet when the VE testified at the hearing that the Quicken Loans Arena job was “cleaner,

housekeeping,” neither Hardrick nor her counsel challenged that testimony. In fact, Hardrick’s

2 Hardrick only challenges the ALJ’s Step Four finding that she could perform her past work as a cleaner at Quicken

Loans Arena. She does not challenge the ALJ’s determinations regarding medical evidence or medical opinion

evidence. Accordingly, this Court will only discuss the responsibilities of the ALJ at Step Four.

counsel not only failed to ask any questions regarding the VE’s classification of the Quicken Loans

Arena job, but Hardrick’s counsel did not ask any questions of the VE at all. Tr. at 51.

Ordinarily, “[w]hen a plaintiff neither objects to a VE’s testimony during the administrative

hearing nor obtains permission from the ALJ to allow a post-hearing brief making such an

objection, that plaintiff waives the right to subsequently object to that testimony . . . .” Brown v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-cv-1258, 2023 WL 5765875, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2023)

(citation and quotations omitted). This would mean that the failure of Hardrick’s counsel to

question the VE during the administrative hearing would preclude Hardrick from raising the issue

before this Court. Hardrick argues that this is not the case for two reasons.

First, Hardrick attempts to shift the burden of raising the apparent conflict to the

Commissioner. She states that because the Commissioner “does not contend that the VE classified

[the Quicken Loans Arena job] correctly . . . there appears to be implicit acknowledgement . . .

that the ALJ improperly classified” the Quicken Loans Arena job. ECF 15 at 2. She argues that

her case is “factually indistinguishable” from the case in Piersante, where the court remanded the

matter for further determination of the petitioner’s past relevant work after determining that the

Commissioner “implicitly acknowledge[d] that Plaintiff's past relevant work was improperly

classified by not arguing otherwise.” ECF 15 at 2 (quoting R&R, Piersante v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 13-11079, 2014 WL 1048157, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2014)). And, as in Hardrick’s case,

the petitioner in Piersante did not challenge the VE’s testimony at the hearing. Id. (quoting R&R,

Piersante, 2014 WL 1048157, at *16).

However, contrary to Hardrick’s argument, Piersante is inapplicable and unpersuasive. As

the Commissioner points out, Piersante is an unpublished district court opinion that finds “no

support in either Sixth Circuit case law or in SSR 00-4p.” ECF 16 at 4. Indeed, the court in

Piersante even acknowledges that it is going against the weight of Sixth Circuit case law

concluding that “an administrative law judge need not conduct his or her own investigation into

the testimony of a vocational expert to determine its accuracy, especially when the claimant fails

to bring any conflict to the attention of the administrative law judge.” Order Adopting R&R,

Piersante, 2014 WL 1048157, at *4 (quotation omitted). And to the extent the Piersante court was

correct to do so, it was only because the conflict between the petitioner’s job as he performed it

and the VE’s classification under the DOT was so apparent that the ALJ’s failure to investigate

the conflict “casts doubt on the evidence the ALJ relied on to make his determination.” Id.

(quotation omitted). By contrast, as described, infra, any alleged conflict between Hardrick’s self-

description of the Quicken Loans Arena job and the VE’s classification of it under the DOT was

not apparent.

This brings the Court to Hardrick’s second argument—that the ALJ failed to properly fulfill

her responsibility to “[i]dentify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflicts” between the

VE’s testimony and the DOT before relying on the VE’s testimony. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL

1898704, at *1; ECF 15 at 3-5. In Hardrick’s view, “an ALJ’s obligation to identify conflicts is

not satisfied simply by asking the VE about conflicts and the VE identifying none in reply.” ECF

15 at 4. Rather, Hardrick argues, the ALJ has an affirmative duty “to assess the VE’s evidence for

conflicts the VE did not identify, but appear to be present regardless” because the ALJ “must

explain the resolution of the conflict ‘irrespective of how the conflict was identified.’” Id. at 4-5

(quoting SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4).

Yet the Sixth Circuit has made clear that “[t]he ALJ is not required to affirmatively

‘conduct an independent investigation into the testimony of witnesses to determine if they are

correct.’” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 535 F. App’x 498, 508 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)

(quoting Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 170 F. App’x 369, 374 (6th Cir. 2006)). Rather, the ALJ

is only required to “inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such consistency” between

the VE’s testimony and the DOT. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2; see also Johnson, 535 F.

App’x at 508 (holding that the ALJ satisfies her duty “to identify and obtain a reasonable

explanation for any conflicts between occupational evidence provided by VEs and information in

the DOT if he or she asks the VE whether his or her testimony is consistent with the DOT” (cleaned

up) (quotation omitted)). If the VE does not self-identify any conflict, as was the case here, then

“[t]his obligation falls to the plaintiff’s counsel, who had the opportunity to cross-examine the VE

and bring out any conflicts with the DOT.” Beinlich v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 345 F. App’x 163,

168 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, regardless of whether or not there really was such a conflict, “[t]he

failure of Ms. Hardrick’s counsel to question the VE during the administrative hearing is fatal to

her argument in this proceeding.” R&R, ECF 14 at 8; cf. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146-47 (5th

Cir. 2000) (noting that “claimants should not be permitted to scan the record for implied or

unexplained conflicts between the specific testimony of an expert witness and the voluminous

provisions of the DOT, and then present that conflict as reversible error, when the conflict was not

deemed sufficient to merit adversarial development in the administrative hearing”).

Hardrick’s attempts to identify conflicts now on appeal are irrelevant, as any alleged error

by the ALJ is harmless because no conflicts exist between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. See

Johnson, 535 F. App’x at 508 (citing Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009)). In

her work history report, Hardrick described the Quicken Loans Arena job as requiring her to “clean

executive offices, remove trash from bins[,] sanitize and[] disinfect desk, vacuum floors[,] [and]

clean rest room,” including “moping [and] sweeping floors[, and] cleaning sinks and toilets.” Tr.

at 217. In the DOT, “cleaner, housekeeping,” code 323.687-014 is defined as:

Cleans rooms and halls in commercial establishments, such as

hotels, restaurants, clubs, beauty parlors, and dormitories,

performing any combination of following duties: Sorts, counts,

folds, marks, or carries linens. Makes beds. Replenishes supplies,

such as drinking glasses and writing supplies. Checks wraps and

renders personal assistance to patrons. Moves furniture, hangs

drapes, and rolls carpets. Performs other duties as described under

CLEANER (any industry) I Master Title. May be designated

according to type of establishment cleaned as Beauty Parlor Cleaner

(personal ser.); Motel Cleaner (hotel & rest.); or according to area

cleaned as Sleeping Room Cleaner (hotel & rest.).

This description incorporates, by reference, any of the duties under “CLEANER (any industry) I

Master Title.” That section includes:

Maintains premises of commercial, institutional, or industrial

establishments, office buildings, hotels and motels, apartment

houses, retirement homes, nursing homes, hospitals, schools, or

similar establishments in clean and orderly condition, performing

the following duties: Cleans rooms, hallways, lobbies, lounges, rest

rooms, corridors, elevators, stairways, and locker rooms and other

work areas. Sweeps, scrubs, waxes, and polishes floors, using

brooms and mops and powered scrubbing and waxing machines.

Cleans rugs, carpets, upholstered furniture, and draperies, using

vacuum cleaner. Dusts furniture and equipment. Polishes

metalwork, such as fixtures and fittings. Washes walls, ceiling, and

woodwork. Washes windows, door panels, and sills. Empties

wastebaskets, and empties and cleans ashtrays. Transports trash and

waste to disposal area. Replenishes bathroom supplies. Replaces

light bulbs. Classifications are made according to type of

establishment in which work is performed. Typical classifications

are CLEANER, COMMERCIAL OR INSTITUTIONAL (any

industry); CLEANER, HOSPITAL (medical ser.); CLEANER,

HOUSEKEEPING (any industry); CLEANER, INDUSTRIAL (any

industry); HOUSECLEANER (hotel & rest.).

Between [cleaner, housekeeping], code 323.687-014, and “CLEANER I Master Title,” all

the duties that Hardrick described for the Quicken Loans Arena job are included. Hardrick’s

argument that the “maximum weights” for the “cleaner, housekeeping” and “cleaner, commercial

or institutional” are different is unavailing. It is irrelevant that the specific terminology in the DOT

may not line up exactly with how the VE and/or Hardrick testified. See Beinlich, 345 F. App’x at

**3-4 (where the VE’s description of jobs was allegedly inconsistent with their respective DOT

description, “[t]he fact that some occupations with the terms ‘office clerk,’ ‘inspector,’ and ‘tester’

were listed in the DOT with different levels of skill and exertion does not change the result” that

petitioner’s argument was without merit (citing Lindsley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601,

605 (6th Cir. 2009))). “[T]he mere fact that the DOT does not list occupations with those precise

terms” or exact performance specifications “does not establish that they do not exist.” Id. at *4.

“The function of the VE is to advise the ALJ of jobs found among various categories of

employment which the plaintiff can perform with her limitations,” and that is precisely what the

VE did in Hardrick’s case. Id.

Hardrick does not challenge the ALJ’s characterization of her RFC. Nor does she challenge

the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony that someone with Hardrick’s RFC could perform the

duties of “cleaner, housekeeping,” code 323.687-014. Rather, Hardrick only argues that this

occupation does not appropriately classify her past work. Since the Court finds there is no conflict

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, this argument fails. Accordingly, after reviewing the

record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

IV. Conclusion

After considering the arguments raised and the underlying record, the Court hereby

OVERRULES Hardrick’s objection. Magistrate Armstrong’s R&R is ADOPTED and this case is

DISMISSED, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2025

s/Dan Aaron Polster

United States District Judge